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This thesis works on the basis of a ‘mutually critical correlation’ of the work 
of René Girard and Walter Brueggemann’s thought, particularly in relation to 
the biblical concepts of prophecy and sacrifice.  
The introduction sets out the character and scope of the two authors’ work, 
and considers two other figures that have had a major influence: Raymund 
Schwager on Girard, and Norman Gottwald on Brueggemann; the influence 
of Paul Ricoeur on both authors is also explored. Socio-literary and socio-
historical methods are also laid out in relation to the work of the authors. 
In Part 1, there is an exploration of what biblical concepts are, and how they 
are founded in patterns of thought which are no longer the dominant ones in 
Western society. The nature of symbol and myth are investigated, and the 
thinking of the authors related to these. Then the decay of biblical concepts 
in the contemporary era is examined and related to the projects of the two 
authors; Brueggemann’s idea of a ‘dominant version of reality’, which is 
applicable to the schemes of both is interrogated. 
In Part 2, the idea of sacrifice, and the meaning of that term in prehistoric 
societies, in the Old Testament context, and in the New Testament and the 
modern era are unpacked and considered in relation to the thinking of 
Brueggemann and Girard. The idea of atonement and what is understood by 
that term and by ‘sacrifice’ in contemporary society are developed in the 
terms of the two authors. 
Part 3 is an investigation of prophecy in some detail. Beginning with the 
ideas of the sacred, the holy and the signified, and moving through the 
application of these to the ‘here and now’, there is consideration of the 
alternatives to the divine view: those of Satan, Dionysus and the ‘royal 
consciousness’. Brueggemann’s suggestion that preaching (and therefore 
prophecy) constitutes an alternative version of these realities which 
subverts the status quo, is considered. 
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Part 4 brings together these elements and uses the thinking of the two 
authors to build up a composite picture, in which intent and action, original 
sin and original blessing are assembled and counterposed.
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Negative mimesis.  The mimetic process which, according to Girard, 
became a pervasive feature of humankind at the point 
of hominization. It is based on imitative desire and 
results in rivalry and spirals of violence. 
Positive mimesis.  Imitation which follows the example of God, 
particularly of God’s requirements for human conduct 
as described by Jesus and exemplified in his life on 
earth. 
 
DVR   Dominant Version of Reality 
NG   Norman K. Gottwald 
PR   Paul Ricoeur 
RG   René Girard 
RS   Raymund Schwager 
WB   Walter Brueggemann 
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This project has a pastoral purpose: to identify forces for a positive 
energizing of community, freed from the destructive forces which mire the 
world in its old ways.  
Such forces are not contemporary in origin; they are present in voices from 
biblical times which have often been misheard, unheard, or ignored within 
Christian ministry. The possibility and the understanding of a process of re-
energization is the project of both Brueggemann and Girard, and what is 
attempted in this thesis is a mutually critical correlation of their thinking1; 
that is to say, using the thinking of one to examine, and even more, to 
illuminate that of the other. 
These two writers are important, original contributors to contemporary 
theology – and both are controversial. Each is associated with a particular 
area: Brueggemann with prophecy, and Girard with sacrifice. Both of these 
terms have fallen into neglect and even disrepute within contemporary 
British culture, for reasons to do with post-modernism or the post-Christian 
condition we are supposed to have entered. However, the work of 
Brueggemann and of Girard does a considerable amount to show, 
respectively, how prophecy can be an authentic, corrective call to the way of 
truth; and how sacrifice is a troubled area in which the strategic deflection of 
conflict and violence onto an innocent third party is used to disguise the 
underlying truth of relational difficulties and avoid the unacceptable cost of 
reconciliation, and, at an extreme, a spiral of reciprocal violence leading to 
catastrophic destruction.  
However, the individual focus of these two authors does not amount to 
compartmentalisation; there are substantial overlaps, though these are not 
always obvious at first sight. This study examines both authors’ perspectives, 
                                                 
1 Tracy, 1975, Chapter 2 deals with the methodological implications of ‘mutually critical 
correlation’, though his position was first delineated in an article entitled ‘What is 
fundamental religion?’ in Journal of Religion 54 (1974). This was revised as chapter 2 of 
Blessed Rage for Order (1975). 
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and identifies the life which each of the writers brings to them and to 
theology generally. It also examines the implications of the arguments of 
each for the other, and makes use of the thinking of a few other writers to 
bridge gaps and enable a combined perspective to be assembled. 
The ultimate thrust of both Brueggemann and Girard is towards the truth of 
understandings of God, and by the same token they seek to root out the dead 
wood: erroneous and (let it be said) idolatrous concepts of God within the 
Christian and Old Testament Jewish traditions. 
Brueggemann and Girard are both Christians, though from differing 
backgrounds. Brueggemann is from North American Protestant stock, and 
Girard, who became an active believer in his adult years, from a French 
Catholic background.  Brueggemann is an Old Testament scholar, Girard a 
historian, literary critic and (latterly) a cultural anthropologist. Each, though 
individually important, is associated with another scholar who has exercised 
considerable influence over him. In the case of Brueggemann, it is Norman K. 
Gottwald2, author of seminal socio-religious and socio-literary studies of 
Israel and its formative stages; whilst Girard owes much to the late Raymund 
Schwager3, the Jesuit theologian at  Innsbruck University, who has provided 
‘dramatic theology’ as a framework for Girard’s ideas, and who helped Girard 
revise his understanding of sacrifice4. These two thinkers have been useful to 
Brueggemann and Girard respectively through having a more established 
place in the mainstream of theological thought than they do themselves, and 
thus enabling an adjustment of their work to theology; in Girard’s case, this 
is significant because he himself lacks a background in theology, and in 
Brueggemann’s, because he sometimes seems to choose to pass over 
elements of Old Testament theology when they do not seem important to 
him. This writer has had the benefit of access to unpublished 
                                                 
2 B. 1923. Former Professor of Old Testament and Biblical at Berkeley Graduate Theological 
Union, California, now Professor of Old Testament Emeritus at New York Theological 
Seminary. 
3 1935 – 2004. 
4 This unfolds in an exchange of letters (unpublished to date), between the years 1975 and 
1991, which the author has reviewed. Girard-Schwager, 1975-91. 
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correspondence between Schwager and Girard between 1975 and 1991, and 
this has enabled a greater understanding of the developing interaction 
between the two thinkers. These points of interaction are highlighted in the 
text. 
We are therefore, to some extent, considering two pairs of scholars, and the 
pairs to a degree tread the common path of socio-literary understanding of 
religion. Within each pair, there is a strong theological strain, but also a 
socio-religious and socio-literary interest. The strong and subtle interplay of 
commentary within the pairings is already notable; considered between the 
pairings it is symphonic. This is what gives power to the ‘mutually critical 
correlation’5 of the theories within the two distinct approaches. 
There are several other significant figures in this account, who may be 
considered as catalysts in the chemistry of the comparison of Brueggemann 
& Girard, in situations where a straightforward comparison between the two 
writers bears too little fruit.  Their work has not necessarily been explored 
extensively in all cases, as they are as it were helpers in the project rather 
than objects of research themselves.  
Paul Ricoeur is not grouped specifically with Brueggemann or Girard, though 
he has had an effect on both, and indeed has exercised a far-reaching 
influence more generally on contemporary thought.  In this account, his 
insightful views are drawn on at critical points to give an additional 
dimension or perspective to radical thought. 
Margaret Barker is something of a maverick in biblical studies circles. Her 
research, though definitely an object of keen interest within theology, leads 
her to conclusions which many of her peers reject as being too extreme and 
                                                 
5 Tracy, 1975, chapter 2. In this chapter Tracy discusses a mutually critical correlation of 
postmodern human experience and the texts of the Christian tradition. He answers his own 
question, “what is fundamental religion?” by stating that it is a revised correlation method 
that is “nothing other than a hermeneutically self-conscious clarification and correction of 
traditional theology. It is hermeneutically self-conscious because it does not so much appeal 
to the Christian fact as it appeals to mutually critical correlation between two sets of 
correlations.” Tracy, 1974, pp 13-34. See also Grant, R. and Tracy D., 1984, p170. See also 
Fiorenza FS & Galvin JP, 2011, pp.42ff.  
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insufficiently supported by the available evidence. Nevertheless, her 
scholarship is impressive for its broad sweep and the links she is able to 
make, and her observations overlap with Girard’s and particularly with 
Brueggemann’s in a way that adds perspective to their own schemes. The 
questions she raises have proved fruitful in the development of the ideas in 
this thesis.  
Tim Gorringe, in his short paper Numbers: Chapter 116 , has provided an 
insight of profound importance for this study, which paves the way for a link 
not only between Brueggemann and Girard, but also on the development of 
the concept of sacrifice, in the application of a short phrase, “God [who] is 
only known in the journey from bondage to freedom”. 
Others, too have been important in rounding out the concepts under 
consideration: Juergen Moltmann, Peter Berger, to mention but two. 
                                                 
6 Gorringe, 2005. 
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The structure of the Thesis is as follows: 
 
Introductory Section 
This commences with a description of the Thesis, and a literature review of 
Brueggemann and Girard. After that, the research method is explained, 
noting the bearing on theology generally. Then the two pairs of writers, 
Brueggemann-Gottwald and Girard-Schwager are explored in more detail.  
 
Part 1: Concepts and Versions of Reality  
It then moves on to clarify the terms of the thesis title, asking, what is a 
biblical concept? Then it surveys the nature of expression, the use of symbol, 
myth and intuition, and the decay of biblical concepts in modern and 
postmodern thought, and considers the implications for the biblical texts to 
successfully communicate their intended content under such circumstances. 
The stage upon which these writers walk, that is, the general nature of the 
discussion on God, prophecy and sacrifice, within the contemporary context, 
is thus set out. 
At this point, the methodological options take shape: the socio-religious 
account, in which God is delineated according to the predicament of society 
of the moment and the needs which flow from that; and, secondly, dramatic 
theology, in which God and humans meet, or fail to meet, in the savagely 
testing conditions of mimetic rivalry and the violence which flows from it. 
From these arenas the ‘mutually critical correlation’ is drawn. It involves 
exploration of the paradigms involved, their clashes and shifts, and views 
both ‘above the fray’ and ‘within the fray’. The two approaches, different as 
they are, offer a kind of binocular vision, and enable an initial exploration 
and a judgement on the possibilities which each approach offers individually 
and in combination. This discussion extends over two main sections: The 
Fading Concept of Sacrifice, and Prophecy; Outdated and Never Outdated. 
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Part 2: The Fading Concept of Sacrifice  
This begins with an extended analysis of Brueggemann/Gottwald, the 
paradigm involved, in The Holy and the Here and Now.   
It then moves on to an equivalent analysis of Girard/Schwager, in Satan and 
Dionysus: All Against One. This takes account of the continuing work at 
Innsbruck of the Dramatic Theology research project,  the critical voices 
raised against Girard’s theories7, as well as the work of his leading 
proponents8. It considers Girard’s prognosis of the future of mankind, which 
has sometimes had a dark character. 
 
Part 3:  Prophecy: Outdated and Never Outdated 
Here the ‘mutually critical correlation’ referred to above (an examination of 
the thinking of one writer under the perspective of the other) is essayed on a 
number of fronts.  The mechanisms through which prophecy and sacrifice 
operate are opened up for inspection, and the possibilities examined for 
effectively communicating the concepts with which Girard and Brueggemann 
are working. These concepts are of course both (on the positive side) the 
revelation of truth which they nurture in their work, and (on the negative 
side) the idolatrous, misguided, hypnotising forces ranged against them in 
the world-view generated by society, which flies in the face of God.  
The analysis reveals paradigmatic systems, which although they involve 
irreconcilable values, use terms which are near-identical, and can smoothly 
deflect the unwary from one path to another without them being aware of 
what is happening.  The ability to recognize one path from other misleading 
ones is therefore an attribute of inestimable value, and the contribution of 
                                                 
7 Such as Charles Davis and Sarah Coakley. 
8 Such as Robert Hamerton-Kelly. 
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Brueggemann and Girard to assembling and defending the skill-set involved 
is evaluated closely. 
The thesis goes on, in When the Sub-Version Surfaces,  to consider the idea of 
prophecy as “sub-version”. This double-entendre suggests a re-imagination 
of the world according to alternative criteria, the effect of which is to subvert 
the status quo. It notes the view of Brueggemann that it is only ‘limit 
situations’ when everything seems to have reached a nadir, that permit a 
new relationship with God to emerge (Brueggemann is following Paul 
Ricoeur to some extent, and has the support of David Tracy). That 
relationship is expressed in new terms drawn from the disastrous situation 
(‘limit expressions’, to use Ricoeur’s term). The rescue is inherent in the 
disaster; the new covenant is born of the collapse of the age. 
 
Part 4: Synthesis  
This section is one of evaluation and conclusion, in which the initial findings 
of Part 1 are re-examined and the analysis of Parts 2 & 3 critically appraised, 
to establish if the joint perspective has a synergy and enhanced value.  The 
findings are of course not yet fully known, but it will be the case that they are 
defined according to the predicament or type of situation in which society 
finds itself at any time. This aspect has already been examined by Ricoeur 
and by Tracy, and the ‘limit situations’ of which they speak, in which times of 
trauma and collapse in society become opportunities for new paradigms to 
emerge. There is therefore the possibility of authentic relationship with God 
to displace what Brueggemann calls ‘the royal consciousness’, in which the 
controlling hand of human power fixes attitudes and turns them inward 
upon itself.  
Whether such opportunities are likely to lead to a brighter future remains to 
be assessed, given Girard’s concerns about the likely future of mankind in 
some of his major books (Violence and the Sacred, Things Hidden for the 
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Foundation of the World and The Scapegoat, for instance), which tend to be 
bound to catastrophe and final collapse. However, the double perspective of 
both Brueggemann and Girard, taken together, may deliver another view.  
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This thesis is to be understood as an investigation by a practical theologian.  
‘Practical theology’ is a term here connected not just to the implementation 
in situations of pastoral care of theology arrived elsewhere9;  but as theology 
developed in the experience of pastoral situations. The developmental 
process involved is often a kind of dialogue;  
 a conversation, as Pattison & Woodward put it, between the interlocutor’s 
own ideas, beliefs and assumptions, those arising from the Christian 
community and tradition, and the experience of the contemporary situation. 
10 Such a synthesis is likely to glide over the normal frontiers of academic 
disciplines, because it is centred on the human situation and guided by 
needs. This is a point confronted by Chauvet in a review of the boundaries of 
theology and anthropology11; he finds something positive in the blurring of 
boundaries, and asks if theology might not render anthropology a service, as 
it has the formative experience of dealing not only with interpretation, but 
also with “the question of the confessing subject in an object that s/he is 
nevertheless trying to treat with all the resources of critical reasoning.” 
 
The situation described does indeed affect this thesis. To be a practical 
theologian, under the interpretation of that subject set out by Pattison & 
Woodward above, involves forging one’s theology in the context of 
experience. One’s sense of what it is to be church follows suit. To be 
authentically theological of course also involves measuring both that 
experience and biblical texts against one another. Such a process is 
foundational to the method of this piece of work, hence our reliance on David 
Tracy’s phrase, “mutually critical correlation”. Tracy notes that many 
theologians (he singles out Hans Kung) hold to a strictly theological 
understanding of the church, and resist any “strict reduction... to solely 
sociological terms”.12 But Tracy urges both those who fear reductionism and 
                                                 
9 Dyson, A., in Towards a New Discipline, in Willows & Swinton, 2000, p.19. 
10 Woodward J. & Pattison, S., in A Vision of Pastoral Theology, in Willows & Swinton, 2000, 
p.36. 
11 Chauvet, L-M, in Sweeney et al., 2010, p.160. 
12 Tracy, 1981, p.24. 
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those who practice it to note Peter Berger’s point: “the sociologist must 
examine the church on functional grounds just as one studies any other 
social reality.”13 Tracy concludes that as the church is both a sociological and 
a theological reality, then a correlation model is the appropriate one for 
relating the two understandings. He refers to the similar process in use 
between theology and philosophy. 
 
This is very appropriate to the two writers under consideration here. 
Brueggemann is himself a preacher, and so brings a particular experience to 
bear on the development of theory, particularly where prophecy is 
concerned  His interpretation of the Old Testament rests on the socio-
literary method, developed significantly by his associate Gottwald.  
 
Girard, though not a practitioner in this sense, as an anthropologist is 
concerned with the history of experience. He writes on theological matters, 
but is somewhat reliant on Schwager to act as an interface between his work 
and the theological mainstream. The extent of this interplay is newly 
apparent in the unpublished letters we have reviewed.14 
 
Therefore, we might view the secondary pairing of writers, Brueggemann-
Gottwald and Girard-Schwager, as already embodying the kind of correlation 
of which Tracy speaks. Bringing together Girard and Brueggemann naturally 
brings this dynamic with it, and results in a rich assembly of perspectives 
around the subjects of prophecy and sacrifice. The view is composite not just 
in terms of involving multiple scholars, but also because of their stance in 
relation to several disciplines.  
 
Having recognized and framed this context, the aim has been to let these two 
writers ‘talk’ to each other, for the thinking of one to interrogate the other. 
However, the two do not face one another along an even front; there is not a 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Girard, R. & Schwager, R unpublished correspondence, 1975-1991. 
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precise correspondence between the two which enables straight exchanges 
on all occasions. Where the dialogue has needed to be kick-started, the 
thinking of a number of other writers has proved valuable. This is explored 
in the next chapter.  
 
Prophecy and sacrifice represent mental categories which many people will 
consider passé and mainly of historical interest within today’s secularized 
society. Berger, reviewing the process of secularization, states that it “affects 
the totality of cultural life and of ideation”15, and the ideation of prophecy 
and sacrifice are amongst the casualties of this.  
 
In previous ages, a world view applied which looked to the creator as the 
source of order, and noted that fallen humanity tends to descend into chaos 
or anomy. Under those circumstances, and within Judaism, sacrifice became 
a protection against that effect and the catastrophe that tends to flow from it; 
prophecy the advice on how to avoid it. That scheme was progressively 
interpreted in different ways within Christianity, and sacrifice became 
identified with the Mass, in which the supreme sacrifice of Christ is forever 
perpetuated. As such, the basic scheme held up to the end of the middle ages.  
   
It is not controversial to suggest that an effect of the Enlightenment has been 
to view biblical texts as purported historical accounts, and test them as such 
for veracity. Under this perspective, the identification of order with God as 
‘designer’ first increased and then, with the advance of science, declined. 
Science has, for many, replaced the idea of God as the supreme rationalist 
with its own structure, which often has no place for God, and thus no place 
for sacrifice as a guarantor of order. Under these circumstances  prophecy, as 
a call to God’s correct service, loses a major part of its justification, too.  
 
The present predicament of prophecy and sacrifice is therefore that they are 
often not thought of as having much actual usefulness any more. Their 
                                                 
15 Berger, 1967, p.107. 
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present reality in terms of the lived experience is doubted, as their link to the 
causation of the world seems to have withered.   
 
This situation is part of the contemporary dominant version of reality, and 
forms a natural starting point for this study. Therefore, an objectivist 
approach, relying on historical method does not seem helpful. Instead, our 
chosen stance in reviewing these subjects is primarily subjectivist; 
ontologically, we have been concerned with the nature of these two concepts 
as found in the lived experience as writers have reported it. This enables us 
to countenance pre-scientific understandings much more ‘on the level’ than 
would otherwise be the case: in Brueggemann, analysis of specific situations 
described in biblical texts (like the Babylonian exile); in Girard, narrative 
accounts which may not seem to be factually historical at all, but drawn from 
literature –myths, novels and of course, accounts in the Bible such as the 
Book of Job.  
 
 
Method of interpretation and analysis 
The idea of a mutually critical correlation of the two writers’ work16, of 
course is intended to give a binocular view of the thinking of Girard and 
Brueggemann -a sort of inter-subjectivity. But the composite approach to the 
two writers’ work must involve a relativist perspective, where realities are 
developed in the form of a variety of mental constructions. This is the case 
even when the author’s project is expressed as a kind of realist 
constructivism (as Girard’s is). 
 
The realities are socially and experientially based, and in some cases local 
(for instance, local to contemporary North America, or Israel in the 
Babylonian exile). They are dependent on the individuals or groups holding 
                                                 
16 Tracy, 1981, pp 24 & 27. 
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them. In other cases, large scale speculative reconstruction is involved, for 
instance in relation to what the process or event of ‘hominization’ might 
comprise. Considerable challenges exist in bringing together two approaches 
of such diverse origin, and in using one to comment on, and to extend, the 
other. 
The knowledge claimed in relation to the biblical concepts of prophecy and 
sacrifice, is of course expressed in the shadow of an absolute, which is felt if 
not defined by both authors: the central imperatives of the Christian faith. 
The conjunction of an absolute with questioning enquiry is of course both 
the predicament and the driving force of theology. Here, that enquiry deals 
with fallibilistic thinking at various levels and in several eras in human 
society. The key factor for Girard, Brueggemann and for the present writer is 
what is transformational; a transformational effect is seen as a sign of 
prophecy and sacrifice having a reality, at that cultural point, as religious 
concepts.  
What is not possible is any form of positivist validation. Instead, the 
confluence of inductive approaches is being experimented with, and 
trustworthiness of conclusions is involved. Where interpretation is involved, 
the findings are examined as to their probable credibility to each of the two 
major authors concerned. Where transferability is concerned, only working 
hypotheses are abstracted, since little if anything can truly be said to be 
confirmable; much depends on the understanding of cultures and systems, 
the formative effect of the cultural-linguistic framework, experience and 
patterns of experience, and that most elusive of skills, the distillation of 
meaning from text. 
The methodology of this thesis therefore involves a basis of qualitative 
methods and interpretive tools and techniques. The process of interpretation 
is essentially one that stretches flexible concepts. The aim is to have as an 
outcome a body of material which will be useful in understanding how 
processes (sacrifice and prophecy) can be usefully employed in the future to 
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produce something which is of benefit in its actual context of time and 
culture.  
 
Biblical Concepts & Epistemic Territory 
In undertaking this project, it has been important to define what a biblical 
concept is17, and to use the answer, complex as it is, to identify the epistemic 
territory in which Brueggemann and Girard respectively choose to mount 
their campaign. The fact that these territories are significantly different 
hinders direct comparison to a degree, but in a broader sense enhances the 
comparison. Views can be defined over against one another, and, as it were, 
throw each other into a perspective. However, the complexity involved puts 
paid to any idea that the correlation takes place within any circumscribed 
existing discipline; rather, it overflows the barriers and occupies a territory 
defined by itself. It is telling that the strap-line to To Double Business Bound 
(1978) is ‘Essays on Literature, Mimesis and Anthropology’, as though 
mimesis were an academic discipline on a par with others, or that Girard has 
already made it so. 
The personal definition of subject area is not an entirely new one, but is an 
emerging feature of the present time. As Charles Davis has commented,  
“Take for example, the work of Michel Foucault. Is it philosophy, history, 
sociology or political science? Again, where would one place the 
deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida? Under the guise of literary theory it 
has profoundly changed the enterprise of literary criticism, and some think 
it is finally bringing to an end the hegemony of historical criticism in the 
theory and practice of biblical interpretation. With a nod towards Thomas 
Kuhn we could say that across the social sciences and humanities there is a 
search for new paradigms.”18 
                                                 
17 See Chapter 4. 
18 Davis, 1989, p.311. 
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So, we might accept that theology has a developing scope, and that its 
conventional limits, as defined in the nineteenth century, have been left 
behind. The new categories of method such as the historical and socio-
literary, which emerged in the twentieth century, are now being surpassed in 
a general collapse of normal categories in post-modern thought.  
Brueggemann shows a mild case of this syndrome, as he defines his own 
variety of literary analysis.  However, he remains a theologian and does not 
stray much outside that discipline. 
Girard, in contrast, shows a much more extreme example of thinking which 
not only crosses boundaries between disciplines, but seems to mix them and 
even explode them. Of course, he does not have a formal background in 
theology, and in a sense conventional theology is not his starting point, 
though he voyages about in it. His perspective is developed through his 
background in literature and in history, and this is the underlying influence.  
He has done some work in anthropology, and his status in that discipline is 
much the same as it is in theology: he is to some extent a self-educated man, 
who has carved out his own subject area. The assembly of all these subjects 
into a complex, Girardian view is conspicuously unique.  
The binocular view which we shall assemble from the work of these two 
writers therefore includes a complex layering of theology and Girardian 
thinking which crosses and stretches the traditional boundaries of 
disciplines, theology being only one such.  
 
Socio-Literary and Socio-Religious Approaches in Brueggemann 
and Girard 
Before embarking on an examination of various genres of biblical criticism, it 
will be worth asking informally, what do Brueggemann and Girard seem to 
be doing, in relation to religious understandings?  
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With Brueggemann, it becomes apparent almost immediately that he is 
concerned with the formation of literature in historical situations, and the 
literature produced is found to carry a truth not limited to the historical 
context.  He is writing about ideas of social criticism in a biblical context; 
hence the uncontroversial application of the socio-literary tag to his work.  
Girard, on the other hand, is hardly interested in any supposed historical 
facts, but only in accounts of human relations, no matter what vehicle is in 
use to illustrate them in action. Therefore, to him, myth, fiction and religious 
accounts are all valuable and he does not seem to prioritize one above 
another or ever apply any sort of evidential test other than to ask, what are 
the actual effects of various kinds of behaviour, societal structure, law, or 
emotion?  
That old-established standard of biblical criticism, the historical-critical 
method, seems to be at once taken for granted and dismissed by both 
writers.  They do not spend time criticizing it, but nor do they seem to 
consider it even worth commenting on its previously pre-eminent position in 
biblical studies. In the case of Girard, this may at first seem surprising, given 
his background in history.  Apparently, it is assumed by both writers just to 
represent a previous mode of thinking, not useful for either of their projects. 
In fact, it is Norman Gottwald, (notable for his influence upon Brueggemann), 
who notably sets out the pattern of recent approaches to biblical criticism. 
He deals firstly with doctrinal approaches, and then with post-renaissance 
methods which he describes as ‘scientific’; that is, they study and cross-
reference source, form, authorship, history and archaeology in a forensic 
way, sometimes with conclusions synthesised between methods. 
He then moves on to new literary and social science approaches, and 
considers two paradigms: 
“Two related sets of methods have emerged…One is the paradigm of the 
Hebrew Bible as a literary production that creates its own fictive world of 
meaning and is to be understood first and foremost, if not exclusively, as a 
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literary medium, that is, as words that conjure up their own imaginative 
reality. The other is the paradigm of the Hebrew Bible as a social document 
that reflects the history of changing social structures, functions, and roles in 
ancient Israel over a thousand years or so, and which provides an integral 
context in which the literary, historical, and religious features of the 
Israelite/Jewish people can be reviewed and interconnected.”19 
The first of these two methods – literary production - in a way summarises 
the starting point of both Brueggemann and Girard, different as they are. But 
Gottwald is of course doing little more than summarising trends which many 
others have commented on. For instance, Chauvet expresses the service 
which anthropology can render to theology, requiring theologians “to 
rethink from scratch a certain number of classical questions within 
theology”.20 Peter Berger, in The Sacred Canopy, and Berger and Luckmann in 
The Social Construction of Reality demonstrate how these trends help 
understandings of religion and the delineation of reality itself. 
It will be apparent that this type of approach fits well with Girard’s project, 
which looks for truths about society first, and reconciles those to the biblical 
texts and to theology second. But Brueggemann is not all that interested in 
the history of social structures, but only in their ability to demonstrate how 
circumstance impinges on the human ability to interface with God and to 
articulate understandings of God’s will for the world in ways that fly in the 
face of the status quo of the moment. It is in the sheer radicalism of the 
moment of prophecy that the reconciliation to social method lies; 
Brueggemann’s focus on prophecy produces an interest in the social 
structures that are inimical to it, and in contrast, the fertile ground: exile, 
subversion, the conditions that generate protests and protestors. 
There is a subtlety in this, in which an explanation given by Erich Auerbach is 
helpful. In an essay which draws a contrast between Homer and the Bible, he 
comments: 
                                                 
19 Gottwald, 2009, p.11. The emphases are original. 
20 Chauvet, 2010, p.159. 
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“I have said...the Homeric style was ‘of the foreground’ because , despite 
much going back and forth, it yet causes what is narrated to give the 
impression that it is the only present, pure and without perspective. A 
consideration of the Elohistic21 text teaches us that our term is capable of a 
broader and deeper application. It shows us that even the separate 
personages can be represented as possessing ‘background’. God is always so 
represented in the Bible, as he is not comprehensible in his presence, as is 
Zeus. It is always ‘something’ of him that appears, he always extends into 
depths. 
...Abraham’s actions are explained not only by what is happening to him at 
the moment, nor yet only by his character...but by his previous history; he 
remembers, he is constantly conscious of, what God has promised him- his 
soul is torn between desperate rebellion and hopeful expectation; his silent 
obedience is multilayered, has background.”22 
This gives a powerful clue as to how Brueggemann uses socio-literary 
method to interpret the content of the Old Testament. Making use of the in-
built, internal historical perspective which Auerbach notes, he is able to 
reference prophecy in terms of cycles of liberty and slavery, prosperity and 
deprivation, settled existence and journey or exile, and note how these 
conditions relate to apprehensions of God and his Word: the background 
protrudes into the present, and provides as it were an index for recalibrating 
human understandings. This is an index of prophecy’s effectiveness in 
driving for changed understandings, including understandings of what 
sacrifice it is that God requires of us.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 A reference to some of the sections of the earlier books of the Old Testament characterised 
by the naming of God as ‘Elohim’, a plural understanding of God realised in the world as 
presences in situations in immaterial or in human form. The spirits or angels concerned in 
these positions had God as ‘background’. God himself (El) is a being who is 
incomprehensible and so cannot be identified as a totality, but only recognized in ‘aspects’. 
22 Auerbach, 1953, p.12. 
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Research Questions 
The overarching question addressed by this thesis is “Are the biblical 
concepts of prophecy and sacrifice effectively reclaimed by Girard  and 
Brueggemann, considered together, and if so, to what extent and in what 
form?” This is a statement about the outcomes of these writers’ work, , not 
their intentions. 
The question can be related in part to each section of the thesis, as follows: 
 
Part 1: Concepts and versions of reality 
Investigate ‘biblical concepts’, the ‘dominant version of reality’, and 
relate to prophecy and sacrifice.  
Part 2: The fading concept of sacrifice 
Investigate the Christian concept of sacrifice and place it in its 
context; examine its effectiveness. 
Part3: Prophecy: outdated and never outdated 
Examine the meaning of prophecy, ancient and modern, its 
relationship to the dominant version of reality, and the meaning that 
might be found in it.   
Part 4: Synthesis 
 A general conclusion is made in chapter 20: The Reclamation Assessed 
 
Outcomes: the end product; to whom the research will become 
available.  
This thesis will not attempt to become a handbook or manual for 
practitioners for whom sacrifice and prophecy either are, or might become, 
part of the religious foreground. It will stop short of that, but provide the 
basic investigation on which such a handbook might in the future be 
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founded. It is the author’s intention to embark on this second project at a 
later stage. Therefore, the success criteria for this piece of work are to use 
academic method to explore the valency of one writer’s thinking for the 
work of the other, and to attempt a synthesis. The process of carrying out 
this work, it is anticipated, will throw up insights and perspectives on 
prophecy and sacrifice which will, in due course, become useful for 
practitioners in understanding and pursuing the usefulness of these concepts 
in the present day, within Western culture.  
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René Girard 
René Girard (born 1923), is a French polymath, long resident in the USA. His 
initial academic work was in medieval history, but by the time he took his 
PhD in 1950, his interest had broadened into the history of the modern era, 
and into literature. He taught both subjects at Indiana University, then at 
Duke University and Bryn Mawr College, then at Johns Hopkins University, 
where he became professor in 1961. Positions at the State University of New 
York and Stanford followed;  he was professor of French Language, 
Literature and Civilisation at Stanford until 1995.  
Girard’s first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, came out in 1961 in its initial, 
French language version. Since then, his thought has led him into other 
fields. His main achievement, put simply, has been to articulate a radical 
theory of human behaviour, which many have found to be meaningful, and to 
give insight into basic problems of society and the function of religion. His 
ideas involve an understanding of how human behaviour is formed from the 
earliest stage by a process of imitation, which he calls ‘mimesis’; and of how 
desire itself is driven very powerfully by imitation, so that what is desired is 
what another person is seen to already possess. Thus desire tends to develop 
into a spiral of rivalry, leading to violence. There is, therefore, a pattern of 
linkages: human behaviour generally and imitation, desire and imitation, 
desire and violence, and imitation and violence; all are tied together in a 
continuum, which, according to Girard, is both concealed from its 
participants and self-generating among them; it is the general condition of 
humanity. It also tends to generate a distance from God. As Girard puts it, “a 
natural desire for God exists, and mimesis does not attach itself to this...but 
(is) immediately deviated towards human models by original sin.”23  
The mechanism for controlling the tendency to a mounting spiral of imitative 
violence is scapegoating: this redirects violence away from the rivals and 
onto a third party, thus exhausting the aggression and enabling 
                                                 
23 Girard-Schwager 1975-91, p.181 The author is aware that these letters are informal, private 
documents not intended for publication, the value of which is to give an insight to the 
development of thought rather than to define final positions.  
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reconciliation of the rivals. This is the function of religion. This process by its 
nature redefines truth and paints an alternative world-view, one in which 
the basis of blame or hostility is shifted to permit positive relations between 
either human parties or human parties and God, where previously there had 
been some perceived problem.  
The mimetic process therefore works through violence and depends on it, 
but also has the parallel effect of limiting violence and securing peace. 
Religion is the vehicle for this: it brings harmony by enacting this process as 
the ritual of sacrifice. Religion, in Girard’s view, is fundamentally linked to 
violence, and cannot be understood without this link. Girard claims that ‘the 
victimage process is the basis of religion’.24 Religion plays a double game 
throughout: the law by prohibiting desire, awakens desire.25 
Girard also claims that the hidden nature of the mimetic process, which leads 
to victimage and sacrifice, is essential to its power and effectiveness. When it 
is exposed, it loses its power, because the participants, made aware of what 
is happening, can opt out of it; it is the particular achievement of Jesus that 
he articulates this exposure, and thus paves the way for a new order not 
basically formed by violence and its mechanisms. However, the final 
consequences of this move may be apocalyptic, as the restraining power of 
the victimage process is neutralised along with the hidden tendency. In the 
absence of the deflection of blame onto a third party, it becomes more 
possible for violence to develop and become completely uncontrolled and 
therefore catastrophic. 
Girard’s theory of behaviour, with its link to religion, can be seen as a very 
complete one, though some significant critics26 dissent from claims made for 
his thought (mainly by his followers27) as a comprehensive analysis, the 
                                                 
24 Girard, 1978, Chapter 1, p.3ff. 
25 Girard-Schwager 1975-1991, p.8. Girard quotes Romans 7:7, “I would not have known 
what is was to covet if the law had not said; you are not to covet.” However, that is not to 
say that the mimetic tendency and the law have the same origin. They do not, according to 
Schwager, and thus the Law does not disappear when sacrifice does. Girard-Schwager 1975-
91, p.14. 
26 Such as Rowan Williams and Sarah Coakley. 
27 Such as Robert Hamerton-Kelly. 
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totalizing effect of which seems to make some other approaches 
redundant28. 
In recent years, Girard has been notably modest in his own claims for his 
work29, and has backed away from some of his earlier opinions in favour of a 
less extreme approach which is more accommodating to other scholarship, 
particularly on the subject of sacrifice. 
Outline of Girard’s work 
Girard’s thinking emerged from a study of literature, particularly the work of 
Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. It was in these studies that his ideas on 
mimesis began to emerge. In a second phase of writing, these ideas were 
further developed into a coherent theoretical scheme; the third phase sees a 
number of refinements to his major theories, some relatively minor 
excursions, and, in Evolution and Conversion, a late, and possibly final, 
ingathering. Overall, the picture might be sketched out briefly like this: 
 
Phase 1 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel 1961 (1965)30 
Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky 1963 (1997) 
 
Phase 2 
Violence and the Sacred 1972 (1977) 
Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World 1978 (1987) 
The Scapegoat 1982 (1986) 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For instance, Andrew Lascaris OP, who has expounded Girard’s hypothesis on several 
occasions in New Blackfriars, states “even I…consider (Girard’s) hypothesis to be less 
embracing than Girard sometimes seems to think”. New Blackfriars 70 (1989), p.416. 
29 As in his interview with Rebecca Adams (Adams & Girard, 1993). 
30 Dates in parentheses here indicate publication dates for English language versions. 
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Phase 3 
Conversation with René Girard: Interview with Rebecca Adams 
(1993)  
I See Satan Fall Like Lightning   1999 (2001) 
Evolution and Conversion (2007) 
Battling to the End   (2010) 
 
Of course, the whole picture is more complex and less tidy than this, but 
nevertheless, this is a fair representation of the general shape of Girard’s 
output. In addition, Things Hidden stands out in this analysis as a watershed; 
the point at which Girard’s emphasis shifted to the central importance of the 
Christian Gospels in defining the mimetic problem and its solution.  
 
Definitively human behaviour 
Girard is much concerned with a theory of ‘hominization’, establishing a 
point of development at which humanity takes on a recognizable form. At 
this stage, according to Girard, the species also begins to display imitative 
traits, involving desire and violence in a unified pattern. This pattern, 
‘mimesis’, is claimed to be universally human and definitive of the species, 
though it exists in animals to a lesser extent. It feeds into other human 
phenomena: sacrifice and the scapegoating process are linked and are the 
salient effects.  Girard gives these effects foundational status in the human 
and social sciences, and he remarks that he is not the first to do so31.  
However, as we shall see, there is now evidence that some of his broader 
assertions about hominization cannot be sustained, and it seems that some 
revision, and, to be blunt, dilution of his theory is now very likely.  
                                                 
31 “With its comparative method and vast accumulation of material on dying or dead 
religions, ethnological research has hastened the transformation of religion into a scientific 
problem, without ever resolving that problem.  Ethnologists have devoted much of their 
theorizing to the questions of religious origins and the nature of religions. Roughly from 1860 
to 1920, the solution seemed excitingly close. One can detect a common desire to be the first 
to write an ethnological equivalent to On the Origin of Species; an ‘Origin of Religions’ would 
play the same decisive role in the human and social sciences that Darwin’s great book has 
played in the life sciences.” Girard, 1987, p.3. 
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Religion, considered in this way, is the control mechanism for mimetic 
rivalry, under Girard’s theory. The need for such control arises from the 
nature of the human brain, which is “an enormous imitating machine”32. That 
is, there is the physical basis for much greater imitative action than within 
other species, and for processing the effects of such action. He notes that the 
higher apes display acquisitive mimesis, and observes that these are 
important traits of behaviour which foreshadow human characteristics33, 
particularly when the imitator is seen to resist temptation and withdraw. He 
claims that the purpose of the withdrawal is to prevent conflict (though this 
point has been contentious within psychology and ethnology34), and takes 
that as a jumping-off point for his observations on human behaviour. In 
other words, he identifies hominization with developed mimetic behaviour, 
but acknowledges antecedent behaviour in the primates.  Hominization 
involves a step-change in which mimesis becomes much more important. 
Recently, investigations into animal behaviour have established that animals 
have more extended imitative patterns of behaviour than Girard seems to 
assume, and use redirected aggression which, in human terms, we call 
scapegoating.   This has been reported on by David Barash, a psychologist at 
the University of Washington, Seattle, specialising in the underlying 
evolutionary factors influencing human behaviour35.  
The discovery would seem to undermine a key feature of Girard’s theory of 
hominization, and therefore a serious diminution of Girard’s scheme, as the 
criteria he gives for hominization become less distinct. However, the 
revelation, though serious in itself, would not detract from a less particular 
but broader claim that mimesis is part of animal socialization. This includes 
human socialization, in which it is more developed and much more apparent.  
                                                 
32 Ibid, p.7. 
33 Ibid., p.8. 
34 Ibid, p.11. 
35 David Barash gave a paper entitled “Payback: retaliation, redirected aggression and 
revenge in animals and humans’ at the Girard-Darwin conference ‘Surviving our Origins’ 
Cambridge, May 2011. The paper “suggests that it provides a hitherto unappreciated way of 
understanding the phenomenon of scapegoating, at the level of societies as well as 
individuals.” It notes “the catharsis of redirected violence” as a factor operating in animals as 
well as in humans. Barash, 2011. 
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Indeed, abandoning the idea of hominization as an entry point, but retaining 
it as a developmental point for mimesis may strengthen the theory, and help 
to avoid some of the criticisms of unsupportable absolute assertions that 
tend towards Gnosticism36.  
In any case, Girard’s thinking projects back into human prehistory a theory 
of culture which, as Paul Dumouchel comments, is astonishing in the 
comprehensiveness of its derivation, and of its application: 
“ Beginning from literary criticism, and ending up with a general theory of 
culture, through an explanation of the role of religion in primitive societies 
and a radical reinterpretation of Christianity, René Girard has completely 
modified the landscape of the social sciences. Ethnology, history of religion, 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology and literary criticism are explicitly 
mobilized in this enterprise. Theology, economics and political sciences 
history and sociology – in short, all the social sciences, and those that used 
to be called moral sciences – are influenced by it.”37 
 
The Involuntary Nature of Mimesis 
Jean-Michel Oughourlian,  a psychiatrist and collaborator of Girard’s,  is also 
his interlocutor in Things Hidden. He puts the point: 
“We are at the point of asking just how far back in human or pre-human 
history the victimage mechanism should be situated. If this mechanism is 
the foundation for everything that is human in man, for humanity’s most 
ancient institutions, such as hunting or the incest prohibition, the question 
then becomes the process of hominization, or in other words the transition 
from animal to man.”38 
Oughourlian has pursued this matter in his own, more recent, book The 
Genesis of Desire39. Drawing upon the work of the neuroscientist V.S. 
                                                 
36 Coakley, 2009, amongst others, makes this accusation. 
37 Dumouchel, 1988, p.23. 
38 Girard, 1978, p.84. 
39 Oughourlian, 2010., p.12.  Oughourlian describes the meaning for him of mimetic theory 
as follows: 
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Ramanchandran40, he refers to scientific evidence that mimetic behaviour 
comes from the existence of ‘mirror neurons’ in the brain. These mirror 
neurons developed only about 40,000 years ago, although the brain achieved 
its full modern size41 about a million years before that. But it is the 
emergence of mirror neurons which truly marks the point of hominization, 
when imitative behaviour greatly expanded the possibilities for learning, and 
the pace at which it could proceed. Reviewing the work of Ramachandran, he 
describes how humans might be termed the "Machiavellian Primate". This 
refers to their ability to "read minds", or predict the behaviour of other 
people, and steal a march on them. He then enquires as to how this ability 
came about, and whether a special ‘circuit’ in the brain is involved.42 
The solution, Ramachandran finds, comes from a study of single neurons in 
monkeys by Giacomo Rizzollati, in which experimental evidence was found 
to support the idea of mimetic mechanisms being at work43. He claimed that 
‘mirror neurons’ and the behaviour they support represent a large, 
significant area of biology which previously has proved mysterious and 
inaccessible, but which can now be seen to account for certain mental 
abilities”44. Ramachandran interprets Rizzolati’s findings as follows: certain 
neurons fire when specific actions are undertaken, but also fire when the 
same action is observed. 
                                                                                                                                     
“Over the years, my clinical practice as a psychiatrist has enabled me to assess the great 
therapeutic value of the mimetic theory. Every day I find myself amazed by its power to 
elucidate complex situations that might at first seem simply irrational. And I still feel 
surprised to see how many troubled couples are really prisoners of that mimetic mechanism 
working on them without their awareness. Jealousy, lust, rivalry, indifference can work their 
way into the heart of a relationship by way of the very force of desire that brought them there 
in the first place. How can we understand such a strange paradox? 
The true nature of desire, its mimetic character, along with our denial of the truth, leads us 
ceaselessly to copy within ourselves the desires of everyone we encounter, subjecting 
ourselves to their influence, and by that very act of imitation, making them into rivals and 
obstacles to what we think are our own desires.”   
40 Ramachandran, 2000. Ramachandran refers to Giacomo Rizzollati’s discovery of mirror 
neurons in the ventral premotor area of monkeys. Rizzollati noted the importance of these 
neurons to language evolution, and Ramachandran extends this thinking.  
41 1.5 litres. 
42 Ramachandran, 2000. 
43 Ramachandran, quoted in Oughourlian, 2010, p.2. 
44 Ramachandran, 2000. 
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“With knowledge of these neurons, you have the basis for understanding a 
host of very enigmatic aspects of the human mind: "mind reading" empathy, 
imitation learning, and even the evolution of language. Anytime you watch 
someone else doing something (or even starting to do something), the 
corresponding mirror neuron might fire in your brain, thereby allowing you 
to "read" and understand another's intentions...Mirror neurons can also 
enable you to imitate the movements of others ...(and)...these neurons may 
also enable you to mime — and possibly understand — the lip and tongue 
movements of others which, in turn, could provide the opportunity for 
language to evolve. (This is why, when you stick your tongue out at a new 
born baby it will reciprocate!) Once you have these two abilities in place the 
ability to read someone's intentions and the ability to mime their 
vocalizations then you have set in motion the evolution of language.” 45 
Overall, this brief summary of Ramachandran’s thinking seems to support 
the foundations of Girard’s theory, even if it rather complicates the idea of 
hominization.  
However, that discovery was still in the future in 1978 when Oughourlian 
put the question to Girard, who answered in anthropological terms, and 
claimed that  
 “The advantage of our hypothesis over psychoanalysis or Marxism lies in 
the elimination of false specificities of the human being. If you begin with 
the incest prohibition, the economic motive, or socio-political oppression, 
you can never really pose the problem of hominization and the origin of 
symbolic systems on the basis of human nature, whereas precisely this 
needs to be done if we are to renounce once and for all providing ourselves 
with answers in advance of every problem we confront. The notion of the 
father does not exist among apes. Subdominant animals will let themselves 
die of hunger rather than challenge dominant animals for their food. If we 
can manage to think through the process of hominization, beginning with 
acquisitive mimesis, and the conflicts it provokes, we will escape the 
legitimate objection of using a vicious circle to determine an origin…”46 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Girard, 1978, p.89. 
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This stance takes on a new importance and profundity in the light of the 
recent discoveries which Ramachandran describes. Mimesis is a defining 
attribute of human nature (which is therefore determined by it47), and, 
under the scientific perspective, mimetic behaviour is free of any moral value 
or association, characterized only by evolutionary value. However, Girard, 
closely involved as he is with the idea of moral outcomes from human 
behaviour, is inclined in his earlier work to talk of mimesis as though its 
essence involves morally negative tendencies (though he later corrects and 
moderates his previously expressed opinions48). From this point on, we shall 
therefore speak of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ mimesis. 
That leaves us with something of a philosophical gap between the observed 
existence of mirror neurons, which give humans the propensity to copy, and 
learn by copying, and Girard’s anthropological hypothesis: the idea of 
mimetic copying.  Girard’s idea is well-developed and logically argued at 
length from an anthropological and historical standpoint49, but requires 
acceptance of a starting point: that the propensity to copy leads to desire and 
rivalry, and that human evil largely springs from that linkage. That point is 
the essence of Girardian thought. However, Girard, while recognizing mirror 
neurons as a fact about humanity, shows little interest in getting involved in 
the detail.  In an interview published in Mimesis and Science (2011), Girard 
comments: 
“...we know that what mirror neurons demonstrate is true, even if we don’t 
have a precise explanation for it.”50 
                                                 
47 Oughourlian, as a practicing psychiatrist, certainly believes it is a determining factor: “It is 
through research, practice and clinical observation that I have come to understand that all 
human relations are governed by one and the same principle: a ‘universal mimesis’ from 
which no-one can extricate himself and which operates within us inexorably. It is the nature 
itself of our desire that makes us imitate one another ceaselessly and remain always under the 
influence of those around us.”  Oughourlian, 2010, p.13. 
48 Girard, ed. Williams, 1996.  Ch. 5, (an extract from an interview of René Girard by 
Rebecca Adams) deals with the idea of the goodness of mimetic desire. Girard says (p.63), 
“Jesus seems to say that the only way to avoid violence is to imitate me, and imitate the 
Father. So the idea that mimetic desire itself is bad makes no sense. It is true, however, that 
occasionally I say ‘mimetic desire’, when I really mean only the type of mimetic desire that 
generates mimetic rivalry and, in turn, is generated by it.” 
49 Girard, 1977 Violence and the Sacred carries this argument throughout.  
50 Garrels (ed), 2011, p.242. 
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Girard is here finding affirmation in this recent discovery of assumptions 
made at an earlier stage. It is a sort of “I told you so”.  Girard’s intuition is 
distinguished from scientific thought by its engagement with moral and 
ethical value and the underpinning ideas of good and evil. The strong claims 
of his earlier work, later moderated, as we have seen, propose that to live 
under Satan is a natural consequence simply of being human, because 
hominization, to Girard, is marked by the new, governing importance in 
human behaviour of mimesis and the victimage process51. To be called away 
from that state is to reject human nature in one of its defining aspects, and to 
refer to a pre-human state, before the advent of mirror neurons and the 
vastly more dominant mimetic behaviour they engender (if we are to follow 
Ramachandran and Oughourlian). It is, therefore, to reject what is built into 
humans both genetically and through social experience, bearing in mind that 
the human inheritance in this regard is almost universal, despite cultural 
variations52. 
Coakley has used this point to criticise Girard’s thinking in its fit with 
Christianity: 
“Gone, in effect, is the story of the Fall from a state of primary innocence; the 
Fall here is the foundational state of the human – a sort of debased 
Calvinism strangely married to the Freudian id.”53 
It is, in a very real sense, original sin. That makes the consequences of 
mimetic desire and rivalry as a journey away from God, with no past before 
that journey to remember, and the voice of prophecy as a call back along that 
road, or a call to a change of direction towards a destination which can only 
be imagined. That tends to suggest that if the word ‘exile’ can be used 
meaningfully to describe the human state when it stands in need of 
correction.  It is an exile in which the memory of the pre-exilic state is 
                                                 
51 In his later thinking, Girard acknowledges that as all human behaviour is mimetic, and not 
all behaviour is evil, then good mimesis must exist. 
52 Girard deals with the universality of mimetic effects in several of his books, notably 
Violence and the Sacred, and The Scapegoat, noting its demonstration in every kind of literature 
and in the myths and customs of primitive peoples.  
53 Coakley, 2009, p.10. 
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mystical. This will have considerable implications for this study at a later 
stage. 
 
Mimetics and Memetics 
Richard Dawkins has proclaimed a new science of ‘memetics’54, a term he 
coined in 1976 to define a view of how habits, skills and behaviours are 
passed from person to person by imitation55. The term ‘meme’ which he uses 
to describe the causality is analogous to ‘gene’.  Examples of this in action, 
according to Blackmore, are “words and stories, TV and radio programmes, 
famous symphonies or mindless jingles, game and sports, religions, cults and 
scientific theories”. Dawkins singles out religions (to which he is hostile) as 
‘viruses of the mind’, a term which suggests that they use memetics in a 
particularly effective (and, he would say, pernicious) way.  
Although Dawkins’s theory is effective as an analogue of how ideas gain 
currency, once looked at closely it contains some unsubstantiated claims as 
to entities such as ‘units of imitation’, which may or may not have much 
substance of meaning. René Girard’s parallel theory of ‘mimesis’56, which is 
based upon human relations rather than the replication of ideas arguably 
offers a more helpful insight into human culture57, but Dawkins’s analogue is 
thought by some to provide a useful basis for looking at phases of growth 
and decline in ideas and their expression.  
Above all, and perhaps ironically, Dawkins’s memetics offer a graphic way of 
understanding ‘groupthink’, which is nowhere seen in more voracious form 
than it is in the sacrificial and scapegoating process which Girard considers 
so central to social formation. Similarly, groupthink is a feature of the times 
against which prophecy ranges itself. 
                                                 
54 in The Selfish Gene, 1976. 
55 Blackmore, Susan, in The new science of memetics: the case for, in Think, issue 5 Autumn 2003 
56 Mimetics and memetics both refer to a mechanism which can be ‘viral’, and over which 
humans have little control. The two terms have a common derivation from the Greek µίµησις 
(mimesis). 
57 Taylor, M., 2002, p.1. 
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Mimetic Desire & the Sense of Being Individual 
‘Desire as the first seed of the mind’58 is an ancient piece of wisdom, and one 
with which Girard would concur; it has been a foundation of his thinking 
since his first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel.  Children imitate their 
parents and each other unthinkingly, but with adults, there is the additional 
factor that they may wish to appear as original thinkers, not imitators, and to 
set fashions rather than follow them: 
“The adult likes to assert his independence and offer himself as a model to 
others; he invariably falls back on the formula ‘Imitate me!’ in order to 
conceal his own lack of originality.”59 
However, despite this, desire is essentially mimetic and we are all imitators. 
Whilst similarity in a general way might make for harmony, the danger 
inherent in the convergence of desires is rivalry. Imitation is a primary 
impulse, but it is also resisted when the imitation is perceived as a kind of 
theft or impersonation. Girard says the primary injunction is “imitate me”, 
and the secondary, “do not appropriate my object!” 60 
That means that the mediation of desires61 is a societal process of some 
delicacy. It is developed to a high level by the market economy and 
particularly by the fashion industry in the contemporary West, which, as 
Kirwan points out, is adept at suggesting that acquiring the object of mimetic 
desire involves a sort of expiation or release. Desire is a source of torment, 
and a number of novelists, particularly Dostoevsky62, have developed their 
plots around this idea. 
                                                 
58 Antonello & de Castro Rocha in Girard, 2007, p.5; they credit this quotation to the 
Sanskrit: Rig-Veda 10.129.4. 
59 Girard, 1977, p.146. 
60 Ibid, p.147. 
61 Kirwan, 2004, p.19. 
62 For instance, in The Eternal Husband. 
3  Brueggemann & Gottwald, Girard & Schwager 
 
40 
 
In I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, Girard develops the idea of mimetic 
contagion, and the biblical injunction against it. He takes the example of the 
stoning of a supposedly guilty (but actually innocent) victim, and notes that 
the imitative action of an initially reluctant crowd to join in the grisly process 
is due to the fact that they are given a model to follow: someone casts the 
first stone, and a threshold has been passed and after that, it becomes easier 
to join in with the brutal execution and to find ways of justifying it. 63 For 
identical reasons, Jesus is successful in protecting the woman taken in 
adultery, by insisting, “let he who is without sin cast the first stone”. That is, 
Jesus challenges the confidence of any first-mover present, and by deterring 
the ones who might become the prime movers and models, removes the 
power of the remainder of the crowd to act.  
The contagion of violence is automatic and can only be forestalled when 
seeded with understanding of the automatic process.  It is this understanding 
which enables voluntary action, ‘good’ or ‘positive’ mimesis. 
 
Girard and Positive Mimesis 
In recent years, both Girard and Oughourlian have argued against the idea 
that mimetic impulses are irresistible. Oughourlian claims that although 
mimesis is a universal mechanism, desire can be rejected.64 Girard said, in an 
interview with Rebecca Adams65, that mimetic control of behaviour, though 
natural and compelling, is something that can be modified: 
“RA:  So are you saying that mimesis, imitation and the violence it engenders is 
extremely powerful like a current in a river, but it is not as if a person 
cannot resist it? 
RG:  Even if persons cannot resist it, they can convert away from it. 
RA:  But again, that’s the idea of the renunciation of the will, isn’t it? 
                                                 
63 Girard, 2001, p.49ff. 
64 Oughourlian, 2010, p.27. 
65 Girard (ed. Williams), 1996, p.62-65. 
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RG:  ...as to whether I am advocating ‘renunciation’ of mimetic desire, yes and no. 
Not the renunciation of mimetic desire itself, because what Jesus advocates 
is mimetic desire. Imitate me, and imitate the Father through me, he says, so 
it’s twice mimetic. Jesus seems to say that the only way to avoid violence is 
to imitate me, and imitate the Father. So the idea that mimetic desire itself is 
bad makes no sense.” 
‘Good mimesis’ appears as early as 1978 in ‘Things Hidden’; later66, Girard 
further formalized and rebalanced the extension of his thinking on mimesis 
to include positive aspects. But Robert Hamerton-Kelly, in a summary of 
mimetic theory arrived at jointly with Girard, but perhaps mainly indicative 
of what might be termed the conservative Girardian view, has commented on 
the revisions: 
 “There have been recent discussions in Girardian circles about the 
possibility of "good mimesis" and the focus of discussion has at times 
wavered from imitation as violence to imitation as compassion. On this 
definition mimesis is necessarily violent, and benign mimesis is the result of 
meliorative factors in culture, but the first of even these meliorative factors 
remains violence, the good violence that controls the bad via the ritual of 
religion.”67 
 
“...when mimetic desire is operating it is necessarily competitive and 
necessarily violent, to be controlled only by the violent mechanism of the 
surrogate victim.”68 
 
The possibility of these linkages is an important one. Primary mimesis, then, 
according to a leading member of the Girard camp, is imitation as violence, 
and any positive variant, in which imitation leads away from violence, is 
secondary and relies on the primary process that automatically leads to 
violence for its mechanism. This is perhaps distilled selectively from some of 
Girard’s earlier books. However, it is not the perspective of all Girardians, 
                                                 
66 For instance in Evolution and Conversion: Girard, 2007. See page 430, for instance. 
67Hamerton-Kelly, R:  
http://www.imitatio.org/uploads/tx_rtgfiles/A_Commentary_on_Mimetic_Theory.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2012). 
68 Ibid. 
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and is clearly not the whole story so far as Girard himself is concerned. For 
instance, Rebecca Adams, following the interview with Girard referred to 
above, went on to produce a developed theory of loving mimesis or creative 
mimesis69. Therefore, Girard’s followers pull in two opposite directions. 
 
However, an avenue of theological thought opens up if two propositions are 
accepted and synthesized: the first comes from Girard, and is that primary, 
violent mimesis is identified with the process of hominization; the second 
follows Barker’s suggestions, based on her particular understanding of a 
number of biblical texts70: 
 
1. There is something hidden about the reality of God and the 
world which only a particular theological insight can penetrate. 
 
2. Jesus had this insight, and before him the early temple priests 
had it, according to Barker71. Putting the two together, the insights of 
Jesus based on those of the early priests (including Moses) expose 
violent mimesis for what it is, and allow an alternative world view 
which includes a mimetic cycle of another sort.  
 
3. This scenario is capable of some generalisation: might not all 
education and training depend upon the setting of positive examples 
by teachers, mentors and those in positions of leadership?  Hauerwas 
comments: 
 
“each of the major offices in Israel – king, priest and prophet – also 
drew its substance from the need for Israel to have a visible 
exemplar to show how to follow the Lord. What was needed was 
people who embodied in their lives and work the vocation of Israel 
                                                 
69 In Swartley, Willard M. (ed) 2000, Ch.13. Having adapted Girard’s thinking to remove his 
tendency to scapegoat positive mimetic desire,  Adams suggests that Girard’s “mimetic 
theory becomes much more convincing as a general theory, one on which we might build a 
common ethic, understanding of human beings, and practice of peacemaking.” (p. 298). 
70 Barker, 2004, Introduction p1ff. 
71Ibid,Ch.4 p.75ff. 
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to ‘walk’ in the ‘way’ of the Lord. The king, the prophet and the priest 
were judged by how well they dedicated their lives to being suitable 
models for the people to imitate. As a result there was a clear 
tendency for the three functions to coalesce in one figure – for 
example, Moses or the servant in the ‘Servant’ songs of Isaiah.”72  
Let us now examine a number of key points in this synthesis. At a later stage, 
it will become clear how they fit together. 
 
Israel’s Understanding of God and Satan, in Opposition to the 
Natural State of Mankind 
If the thinking of Girard is married up with that of Barker and Hauerwas,  
Israel, particularly in the pre-monarchical period demonstrates itself as a 
special case which illuminates the abstract issue, because the history of 
Israel embodies a unique relationship with God and some sort of awareness 
of the role of active evil, personified in other gods and idols73. The special 
relationship is defined in the Ten Commandments; Girard argues that the 
tenth commandment is an injunction against desire and acquisitive 
mimesis74: 
“Since the objects we should not desire and nevertheless do desire always 
belong to the neighbour, it is clearly the neighbour who renders them 
                                                 
72 Hauerwas,2001, p.123 and Hauerwas, 1983, Chapter: Jesus and the Social Embodiment of 
the Peaceable Kingdom. 
73 In discussions about the pre-monarchic period, the only safely authentic texts of the period 
are  the Elohistic ones which survived the redactions of the Deuteronomists. These do not 
refer to Satan, but are much concerned with other gods who personify opposition to Elohim 
(as in the first of the Ten Commandments, at Ex. 20;1-17. Barker stresses this aspect, but 
draws on the book of Revelation for a supporting reference to Satan: 
 
“There is only One God, and to worship anything else is idolatry. An idol is anything man-made - 
not just a statue. It can be an economic or political system. Idolatry gives a false centre to the 
Creation, which warps and distorts the whole system. The second of the ten commandments warns 
that idolatry results in iniquity [a word meaning ‘distortion’], which affects several generations. 
In his great vision of the day of Judgement in the Book of Revelation, St John heard heavenly 
voices proclaiming the Kingdom of God on earth, ‘the time for destroying the destroyers of the 
earth’. Then he saw St Michael and his angels fighting Satan, ‘the deceiver of the whole world’ 
. The battle against those who destroyed the earth was a battle against those 
who deceived with false knowledge.” Barker, 2005. Accessed 3 April 2013. 
74 Girard, 2001, p.7ff. 
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desirable…What the tenth commandment sketches, without defining it 
specifically, is a fundamental revolution in the understanding of desire. ..our 
neighbour is the model for our desires. This is what I call mimetic desire”  
The commandment ‘love thy neighbour’ is anti-mimetic in nature; it forbids 
individuals from engagement in mimetic rivalry. Jesus makes it his particular 
focus, and re-interprets it in terms of positive action, rather than prohibition.  
That being the case, there is an indication at the time of Moses of an 
exception or counter-process to the mimesis which is normal to humans: as 
the mimetic process causes a blindness in those who are involved to what is 
actually happening75, then the Mosaic prohibition indicates an insight, or 
lack of blindness. This in itself shows that either mimesis is limited: not 
operating, or is not operating with its usual totalising power.  
 
Mimesis and the Neighbour Principle 
Oughourlian has expanded Girard’s arguments in this area, to the extent that 
he claims that  
1. the self is defined by desire76, desire being a process which is 
relational. 
 
2. the self is defined over against God as a consequence of mimetically 
inferring God’s desires from his actions.  
Humanity is an incomplete project until choice is implanted77.  Desire then 
has the two-stage consequence of firstly creating a sense of self, and 
secondly of tailoring God’s manifest character to a comparison of some sort 
with the self. Such a process naturally puts the self at the centre of any 
picture; man becomes the frame of reference for defining God. However, God 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p.15. 
76 Oughourlian, 2010, p.32-35. 
77 Ibid., 64-80. Oughourlian suggests that humanity was completed by the onset of the 
mimetic process (which is described biblically by the Fall), and by an entry into time, which 
is an entry into a finite episode within the infinite.  
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may be put at the centre of an alternative understanding of reality. This will 
become important in this study when we come to Brueggemann’s idea of 
prophetic ‘counter-imaginations of reality’. 
For this reason, the précis given by Jesus and by Paul of the commandments 
working on the basis of the principle of ‘you shall love God with all your 
heart, soul, mind and strength’, is ‘love your neighbour as yourself’78. In 
other words, put God and your neighbour at the centre of the picture, and do 
not allow the self to displace them. This could be translated into the 
terminology of Girard as, “recognize and reject mimetic desire.” Here we 
might again experiment with the idea of exile: “exile yourself from desire”, or 
“allow yourself to be removed from the psychological home territory which 
puts self at the centre”. So the exile from God which tends to be the result of 
inherent mimetic characteristics active in human behaviour is countered by 
another exile: the recognition of mimetic desire and rivalry for what it is, and 
its rejection. This is an exile from the present state of behaviour controlled 
by mimesis of the negative kind, which defines normal human behaviour and 
thus inevitably defines society and the standards by which it operates.  This 
idea, too finds a resonance in Brueggemann’s thought. 
Renunciation of mimetic desire in the normal sense (in which the self is the 
beneficiary), by means of its re-direction towards God, is the anti-Satanic 
principle, and re-direction can only be achieved if desire is renounced. 
Therefore, the pre-monarchical history of Israel is the key exception to the 
rule of Satan, which is seen as the principle by which kingdoms generally 
                                                 
78 "Love one another even as I have loved you." [1] 
 
"The first is, 'Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord 
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all 
your strength.' The second is this, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself.' There is no 
other commandment greater than these." [2] 
 
"He who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law. The commandments, 'You shall not 
commit adultery, You shall not kill, You shall not steal, You shall not covet,' and any other 
commandment, are summed up in this sentence, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself.' 
Love does no wrong to a neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." [3] 
 
[1]. Jn 13:34; [2]. Mk 12:29-31; cf. Deut 6:4-5; Lev 19:18; Mt 22:34-40; Lk 10:25-28; [3]. 
Rom 13:8-10. 
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operate.79 That is not to say that mimesis was absent from it, or that it was 
anything like perfect, but that it was not constituted on the basis of mimetic 
principles, which Girard maintains are also Satanic principles, but 
constituted against those principles. It therefore represents an intermediate 
position which, despite many problems, is not ruled by and blinded by the 
mimetic process, and has a chance of having an authentic aspiration to the 
kingdom of God, and a willingness, at least from time to time “to take on the 
yoke of God’s kingship.”80 
So, making use of Girard’s thinking, we may conclude that the Law handed 
down to Israel embodies a form of opposition to the mimetic principle. This 
is something which Jesus interprets and builds upon. His understanding of 
what the Kingdom of God means is fundamentally bound to that structure81. 
Importantly for this study, where the idea of kingdom is current, the idea of 
exile hovers close.  
 
Mimesis Disempowered: Satan overcome by the Cross, 
anonymously 
In their introduction to Evolution and Conversion, Pierpaolo Antonello and 
Joao Cezar de Castro Rocha comment on the centrality to Western culture 
and ethics of the protection of victims: 
 
“ The entire ideological perspective of contemporary culture is, in fact, built 
on the victimage principle, i.e. on the centrality of victims in all our ethical 
concerns: the victims of the Shoah, the victims of capitalism, the victims of 
social injustice, of war, of political persecution, or ecological disasters, of 
racial, sexual, religious discrimination…the ultimately unattainable goal of 
Nietzsche’s intellectual project, namely, the desire to free the West from its 
obsession with victims is, according to Girard, one of the proofs of the 
ineluctability of Christian ethics in Western culture. For this, we all know, is 
                                                 
79 Partly because it was not a kingdom but a theocracy. 
80 According to Schwager, a formula of the rabbinic tradition. Schwager, 1999, p.29. 
81 Schwager, 1999, pp. 30-31. 
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based on inclusion rather than on exclusion, on universalism rather than on 
local and partisan allegiances, on forgiveness rather than on retribution.”82 
 
Inclusion (the counter-move to the scapegoat process) has triumphed, even 
at the moment when religion seems to be exhausted: 
 “The Cross destroys the power of Satan as the ‘king of this world’, meaning 
the power to unleash violence through the scapegoat 
mechanism...Indirectly, therefore, because of our inability to live without 
scapegoats, Christianity is a source of disruption in our world. Christianity 
constantly suggests that our scapegoats are nothing but innocent victims.”83   
“Nietzsche aimed at a deconstruction of Christianity, which he understood 
correctly as the defence of victims. Our modern nihilists want to deconstruct 
everything except the defence of victims, which they espouse. Thus, they are 
a very special form of nihilist: they deny everything except the defence of 
the victim. In other words, they could not be more Christian than they are, 
against Christianity of course, but their self-contradiction is becoming 
obvious.”84 
 
The points laid out above are drawn from Girard, and used to arrive at a 
conclusion which flows naturally from those points but it is not altogether 
Girard’s own conclusion. He does not say that Israel is the exception to his 
rule that the mimetic principle is unavoidable within human society and is 
part of hominization. Rather, he suggests that the rule is universal, but the 
tendency to follow it is powerfully countermanded by Jesus. There is not 
necessarily a contradiction here, provided that one allows that the handing 
down of the Law on Mount Sinai and its acceptance marked appoint of 
conversion, in which Israel was called away from its naturally hominized 
state, and prepared as fertile ground for the seed which would be sown by 
the ministry of Jesus. 
 
                                                 
82 Antonello & de Castro Rocha in Girard, 2007, pp.14-15. 
83 Girard, 2007, p.262. 
84 Girard, 2007, p.258. 
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Girard on the New Puritanism of Meaning 
In the concluding chapter of Things Hidden85, Girard reflects on how 
dependent people now are on the foundational work of the gospel texts in 
detecting the scapegoat mechanism.  Without it, there would be no starting 
point. But now, history acts as an intermediary, so that the detection process 
does not any longer need to refer to the gospels; the disintegration of 
sacrificial Christianity leaves the “authentic reading of the gospel text” with 
an increasing prominence.  That is to say, the culture of Christendom and its 
successor, the secular state, through a process of internal reference, connect 
with the essence of the message of the gospels in relation to the scapegoat 
mechanism: 
“All the data of fundamental anthropology as it relates to the Judaeo-
Christian scriptures are from now on at humanity’s disposal...Just one last 
push has to be given, and everything will tip over onto the non-sacrificial 
side.”86  
The historical process is “accelerating and leading toward an increasing 
revelation of the truth”. The sacrificial forms have been “analysed, 
dismembered and devoured...judgements come full circle and inevitably turn 
against their authors in the end...the spectacle makes us think that critical 
thinking is never anything more than an attempt at personal justification.”87  
Meaning is the casualty here. Where meaning is absent, the basis of 
distinctions and so an increasing homogenization of culture and society 
arises: “the death of all cultures”.  Girard observes that this death of meaning 
is a new form of Puritanism, not based as the old one was, on “depriving 
mankind of sexuality”, but –much worse - on depriving it of meaning: 
“Man cannot live on bread and sexuality. Present-day thought is the worst 
form of castration, since it is the castration of the signified. People are 
always on the lookout to catch their neighbours red-handed in believing 
something or other. We struggled against the Puritanism of our parents only 
                                                 
85 Girard, 1978, p.436ff. 
86 Ibid, p.436. 
87 Ibid., p.436-7. 
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to fall into a Puritanism far worse than theirs – a Puritanism of meaning that 
kills all it touches.”88 
This train of thought links the authenticity of the gospel message mediated 
through society and its systems, which are very often non-religious and 
particularly non-sacrificial, with a loss of meaning. Why should these two 
things occur together? The conjunction invites the question, is the loss of 
meaning a consequence of the failure of the scapegoating process, or might it 
in some way be brought on by the abandonment of religion? Girard suggests 
that the outlook is bleak because there is “no pharmakon any more, not even 
a Marxist or psychoanalytic one”89, but distances himself from this situation, 
by claiming that “truth is not an empty word”. However, it is apparent from 
the way he expresses himself that he is conscious he is fighting a rearguard 
action, as a lonely voice in the wilderness, crying in the hope that others will 
join him, and that God will turn the tide.  
 
 
 
 
 
Walter Brueggemann 
Walter Brueggemann (b. 1933) is American, a reformed Christian, a minister 
of the United Churches of Christ, and, indeed, the son of a minister. He is an 
Old Testament scholar, and a theologian noted particularly for his work on 
prophecy and for his use of rhetorical criticism.  
Brueggemann has been extraordinarily prolific throughout his long career. 
He has published more than fifty-eight books, several commentaries and 
many articles. His energy seems inexhaustible.  
                                                 
88 Ibid., p.442. 
89 Ibid., p.446. 
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Brueggemann’s higher education has been in theology throughout. He took 
his ThD90 from Union Theological Seminary, New York, in 1961, and PhD91 
from St Louis University in 1974, and went on to serve as William Marcellus 
McPheeters Professor of Old Testament at Columbia Theological Seminary 
from 1986 up to his retirement a few years ago. 
It has been said, “He is first and foremost an exegete”92, and it is true that his 
primary focus is on texts. However, he is more than just an exegete. His 
considerable scholarship and use of socio-literary method has enabled him 
to assemble a sociological perspective and an insight into the situations and 
states of mind that either lead to interactions with God, or not. This makes 
him an interesting theological commentator on contemporary matters, and a 
writer of prayers which strike a chord with many of his contemporaries. 
To give an example of this, his comments on the controversies over 
homosexuality in the Church take account of the forces for and against 
change: 
“…I propose that the discussion of homosexuality, for the most part, is not 
about sexuality but is about the reordering of social power, the fearful effort 
to maintain conventional forms of power that carry less and less conviction, 
and the awareness that the old centre ‘will not hold’.”93 
He goes on, “The great centres of socioeconomic, political and military power 
depend upon the great temple liturgies that enacted deeply rooted myths to 
create and manage social reality.”94 There is an implicit reference here to the 
inertia of what Brueggemann refers to as ‘the dominant version of reality’; he 
takes the status quo, and the forces defending it, as generally inimical to 
hearing the word of God. This important concept is examined in more detail 
in a later chapter: The Dominant Version of Reality. 
                                                 
90 ‘A form-critical study of the cultic material in Deuteronomy: an analysis of the cultic 
encounter in the Mosaic tradition’. 
91 ‘The history of Eden Theological Seminary 1925 – 1975’. 
92 Miller, Patrick D., in foreword to Brueggemann, 1999. 
93 Brueggemann, 1993, p.19. 
94 Brueggemann, 2009, p.2. In a footnote, Brueggemann refers to Hooke, S.H., 1933 & 1948, 
which he describes as ‘defining essays’. 
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Brueggemann has a preoccupation with prophecy in the Hebrew Bible as a 
re-description or ‘re-imagination’ of reality. He takes as a starting point the 
idea that a ‘world’ (understanding of the world or world-view) is built up as 
a ‘network of symbols’, which is “always a carefully constructed social fabric 
that intends to shape and exhibit social reality in one way rather than in 
many other ways that are available. Thus a dominant ‘world’ is an intentional 
advocacy that establishes assumptions, procedures, and goals for the 
management of social power.”95 
Brueggemann is sensitive to articulations of a desire for transformation, 
coming from a motivation either to move away from a present state, or 
towards a future vision, or both. He has been influential in promoting this 
view, and though he does not have disciples in the way Girard does, there is a 
seeping influence apparent in theological dialogue. For instance, Don Cupitt, 
using a near-synonym of ‘the dominant version of reality’, in relation to the 
supposedly value-free status of the physical world, has suggested that  
“For centuries the dominant traditions of thought have been implicitly 
nihilistic because they have been unable to affirm the primacy of value in 
constitution of the natural world”. 96 
 
Cupitt goes on to say, “We assert that valuation comes first, is omnipresent 
and creates everything.”  In other words, he takes a religious view of the 
primacy of value and detects the hand of the dominant version of reality in 
dumbing down new expressions of value when not identical with its own 
parameters. 
In a number of areas of his work, but particularly in Deep Memory, 
Brueggemann focuses on right public ethics and the scriptural call to behave 
in a way that is independent of orthodoxies. This way may buck normal 
expectations and challenge presumptions about what it means to be 
righteous or religious. It is often outrageous, and therefore its aims need to 
                                                 
95 Brueggemann, 2009, pp.1-2. 
96 Cupitt, 1987, p.50. 
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be clearly expressed. Brueggemann refers to the alternative paths indicated 
by the prophets as “the causes of God”97; he quotes Isaiah 58:6: 
“Is not this the fast that I choose; 
To undo the bonds of injustice 
To undo the thongs of the yoke, 
To let the oppressed go free…” 
 
The ethical measure is reinforced and takes a new turn at Isaiah 61:1-2, 
where the keynote is the reversal of the fortunes of ‘captives’ and the 
oppressed. Of course, the captives Isaiah had in mind were specific, as to 
identity and to the place of their captivity. But the message is of course easily 
applied to others, captive in a literal or metaphorical sense in other times 
and other places. The reading which is put forward by Brueggemann is that 
this is primarily about social transformation. God’s people are called to live 
in God’s way, and adopt God’s standard of righteousness in all situations. 
This involves freeing the oppressed, binding up the broken-hearted, & 
proclaiming liberty to captives; in this scenario, God’s vengeance is on the 
oppressors and the culture of oppression, on those who persecute or ignore 
the broken-hearted, withhold liberty, etc. He undoes the system they work 
to.  
The Lord’s favour lies in such policies and actions, which cut across the 
natural grain of human institutions. God wants society to change, and it is 
with this in mind that Luke uses Isaiah’s words to “launch his evangel”.98 
We see here a good example of the general pattern of Brueggemann’s 
thinking, which is teleological as much as enquiringly analytical: his 
scholarship has a mission which is founded on faith. Unlike Girard, he does 
not seem to have come to faith through looking at the world and coming to 
understand its systems. Instead, he appears to bring an agenda to bear on 
the world, focussed through biblical study. He is very clear in his approach; 
he makes claims which are often straightforward in themselves, and 
                                                 
97 Brueggemann, 2000, p.38. 
98 Luke 4:18-19. 
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develops these through the Bible texts. It is a feature of his scholarship that 
he clarifies deeply troublesome aspects of the Bible and the human 
predicament, and does this for a broad readership, neither predominantly 
theologically expert nor naive; the span of his appeal is truly remarkable.  
However, he has been criticised for an inclination to ignore traditional 
aspects of biblical criticism that either do not interest him, or seem 
unnecessary.99 He tends to be dismissive of such criticism, and not much 
interested in exploring how his work relates to that of others in the field or 
engaging in dialogue100. He is a master elucidator, but one who likes 
autonomously to define his own territory within the bounds of the discipline 
of theology. This has provoked some criticism from other scholars; for 
instance, John Goldingay, whose concern is to start with the Old Testament 
and use it as a lens to examine the New Testament and the present age. He 
criticises Brueggemann’s approach as being the reverse of his own, applying 
a liberal, post-modern mentality and working through relentless 
deconstruction and application of the perspective of liberal Protestantism. 
As Noonan has put it, 
“Brueggemann is a strong reader. From his tower of power (the liberal 
Protestant metanarrative), he surveys the theological landscape of the texts 
found in the Tanakh / Old Testament, picks and chooses from its landmarks, 
and builds a reading of selected landmarks into a theory accommodated to, 
and critical of, trends within liberal Protestantism, the American way of life, 
and geopolitics.”101  
The conjunction in Brueggemann’s method of post-modern deconstruction 
and ‘liberal Protestant metanarrative’ is an intriguing one, as contradiction, 
or more exactly, selective deconstruction, seems to be involved. This is how 
Brueggemann indirectly responds: 
                                                 
99 Interview of Professor Walter Moberly, October 2009. 
100 Despite this, Brueggemann has been known to make claims to the contrary, as at Linafelt 
& Beal, 1998, pp307ff. 
101 http://ancienthebrewpoetry.typepad.com/ancient_hebrew_poetry/2010/01/john-
goldingay-versus-walter-brueggemann-in-old-testament-theology.html accessed 23 December 
2011. 
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“No-one can doubt that theological interpretation of the Bible – most 
especially in the context of a Christian reading – is in a quite new, quite 
different and quite demanding interpretive situation. It does not matter to 
me if that new circumstance is termed ‘postmodern’, though I have used that 
term to describe it. What counts is a pluralistic interpretive community that 
permits us to see the polyphonic character of the text, and the deprivileged 
circumstance whereby theological interpretation in a Christian context is no 
longer allied with or supported by dominant epistemological or political-
ideological forces... Learning to do biblical ideology outside Western 
hegemony is demanding work...hermeneutical problematic and possibilities 
have now displaced positivistic claims – historical or theological – as the 
matrix of theological reflection.”102 
The post-modern approach in Brueggemann, then, has a strong focus on the 
deconstruction of social power forms in Western Christianity, through 
pluralism and ‘deprivileged circumstance’ and is therefore a concerted 
revision of the Western theological standpoint - but still contained within its 
bounds. Brueggemann goes on to sketch out his continuing project in six 
categories: 
1. The theology of the Old Testament cannot appeal to history, because 
the Old Testament frequently asserts a memory which runs counter 
to recorded history. 
2. The consequence of adopting this approach is to appeal to ‘the 
practice of rhetoric’. 
3. The focus is not on substantive themes but on verbal processes, 
interactive process (God found in relationship) being central both to 
the idea of God in the Old Testament, and to the “pluralized, 
deprivileged context of our own work”. 
4. The focus on “juridical language of testimony” is intended not as a 
theme but as a process. 
5. The “juridical language” is important for another reason:  “the process 
of litigation that gives great manoeuvrability allows for a pragmatic 
juxtaposition of core testimony and countertestimony”; the 
                                                 
102 Brueggemann, ‘A Prompt Retrospect’, in Linafelt & Beal (eds)1998, p.307. 
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countertestimony being evidence of Israel’s determination to tell the 
truth about itself. 
6. “Everything said about Yahweh is said about Yahweh in relation.”103 
 
God ‘in relation’ and Girard 
The essential common ground with Girard, it is suggested here, lies in the 
idea of religion as a relational subject. This is a point of which Girard makes 
much, speaking of ‘interdividuality’ and ‘intersubjectivity’.104It starts with 
God conceived in relational terms. Brueggemann looks back in the Reformed 
tradition through the work of Eichrodt105 to John Calvin, and declares “the 
God of Israel was primarily a God in relation”106. To be in relation with God, 
according to Brueggemann, means divesting oneself of the dominant version 
of reality.  For Girard, to be in relationship with God lies in renouncing the 
default mode of humanity, which is in a way aligned with Satan rather than 
God. It is to be shown, and then adopt, a perspective on behaviour in 
relationship to ones fellows which is not the automatic one for humans; in 
other words, it is to reject the dominant version of reality.  
 
Brueggemann and Girard on Myths and the ‘Otherness of Reality’ 
Both of these authors are concerned with the importance and role of myth. 
In Brueggemann’s case, that they define reality, and in Girard’s, that they 
hide it by creating something to stand in its place. In both cases, the ‘social 
construction of reality’107 is in operation. In Brueggemann’s case, the issue of 
truth is suspended for the time being as he observes the construction 
process in action; in Girard’s, it is always in the foreground as he constantly 
maps the patterns by which myth conceals the essence of human behaviour 
                                                 
103 Ibid, pp.312-313. 
104 For instance, in an interaction with J-M Oughourlian at Girard, 1987, p.199. 
105 Walther Eichrodt, 1980-1978, a German OT scholar and protestant theologian 
106 Brueggemann, in Linafelt and Beal (eds), 1998, p.308. 
107 Berger and Luckmann’s 1967 work The Social Construction of Reality is quoted by 
Brueggemann. Brueggemann, 2009, p.2. 
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and legitimates the processes of violence. Girard is therefore tending to 
assume that truth exists as a standard independent of human behaviour, 
whilst Brueggemann tends not to use the term since his concern is the 
disparity between world-views. Amongst these world-views, all propounded 
by religious people, some are prophetic (when they are revolutionary) and 
others are non-prophetic, when they represent an established view. If 
prophecy is the voice of truth or the voice of God (the two being more or less 
interchangeable terms in this discussion), it follows that truth is often not 
found in the statements of established human institutions. On this basis, 
there is something implied in this discussion which is common to Girard and 
Brueggemann: established institutions have a dynamism away from God and 
true understandings of the world. Brueggemann would go on to say that it 
sometimes takes radical changes of fortune (like exile) to show up the 
inadequacy of the established world-view and open the door to new 
understandings of the truth.   
Whilst Girard looks to find truths that apply fundamentally to all societies, at 
one of three stages, the earliest stage of ‘hominization’, the developed pre-
Christ stage, and the post-Christ stage, Brueggemann applies a different 
perspective, sticking to the religion of Israel and its extension into 
contemporary times. He is concerned with ‘the otherness of reality’108, and in 
his consideration of the ‘God-talk of Israel’ (which he differentiates from talk 
about the religion of Israel), he states that “God-speech…offers that this 
Other is provisionally identifiable…the otherness of reality given to us on the 
lips of Israel makes our deciding always penultimate and provisional, always 
yet again unsettled by new disclosings”.109  Brueggemann understands 
perceptions of God, and therefore the relationship with God, as being 
provisional at every juncture. However, his own observations are not so 
cautious as to be described as ‘provisional’. 
Girard puts forward experimental, provisional arguments, and suggests to 
others that they are internally coherent and also consistent with the texts 
                                                 
108 Brueggemann, 2000, p.115-117. 
109 Ibid, p.117. 
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themselves and with other scholarship. He considers himself to be a realist 
rather than a relativist or antirealist, and thus tends to avoid post-modern 
styles of thought110. At each of these points, there is a clear contrast in this 
with Brueggemann’s method and approach.   
However, these differences of stance and method create opportunities for a 
binocular view on certain issues.  There is a possibly useful complementarity 
between the two approaches, if they can be seen in action in relation to a 
similar problem or topic, in cases where there is sufficient common ground 
or overlap. 
However, the differences should not be minimised, as they sometimes 
preclude a direct comparison. As a scholar working within the conventional 
academic frontier of theology, Brueggemann seems much less totalising than 
Girard, whose comprehensive scheme comes from working across academic 
boundaries; Girard, unlike Brueggemann, is quick to show how his theories 
are consistent with other scholarship. Although in recent interchanges111 
Girard has shown himself to be minded to refrain from universal, exclusivist 
claims for his thinking, one or two of his followers are much more robust in 
their claims112, and the reputation of Girardianism tends to be of a scheme 
which makes other approaches unnecessary. 
So, although Girard is often thought of as a figure of great controversy, 
Brueggemann is not; however, he is certainly important in Old Testament 
criticism and in the definition of faith within the Reformed tradition, and to 
some extent beyond it. He proposes, on the basis of his scholarship, radical 
views of life, but not anything so provocative as a re-explanation of human 
behaviour generally; for this reason, there is no band of ‘Brueggemannists’, 
in the way that there is an academic body of Girardians. Although many 
                                                 
110 Kirwan (2009) cites Loughlin (1997, pp. 96-103) in support of an argument that Girard’s 
whole work is a plea for a voice excluded by modernity. To this extent he is a postmodernist. 
(p.136). 
111 Such as the video interview presented at the Girard-Darwin Conference, Cambridge, UK, 
2009, the notable interview with Rebecca Adams, and a number of his own books, which 
have a dialogue format.  
112 An example of someone who takes such a position habitually would be Robert Hamerton-
Kelly.  
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books cite him, and some (like Goldingay’s) criticise his approach, it would 
be surprising to hear anything damning or vitriolic – a scholar renouncing 
Brueggemann for falsifying the basis of reality, or unjustifiably displacing 
other theological explanations113 - in the way that Girard is criticised by his 
detractors. 
 
                                                 
113 This criticism was made of Girard by Rowan Williams and Sarah Coakley at the Girard-
Darwin Conference, Cambridge, 2009. However, Williams is more well-disposed towards 
Girard than Coakley. 
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“...sacrifice appears to be much more an activity than a concept, and as such 
it may not easily be identified within, much less be removed from, a 
religious system.”114 
 
The meaning of this is not altogether clear, though the suggestion that 
sacrifice is just an activity within a culture and not much else has some 
currency. But all activities which are at all considered must involve concepts, 
and  concepts and activities may not be distinct from one another. To that 
extent, there is the basis for comparison of sacrifice across cultures. What 
Chilton seems to be saying here is the activity of sacrifice may not be 
attended by much thought, but be little more than a visceral or instinctive 
action. However, even to give a simple account of an instinctive action 
involves ideas, because without ideas or concepts no speech is possible. 
Therefore, from the earliest stages of the development of society, sacrifice is 
undeniably a matter involving concepts, though those concepts may be 
teleological. That is to say, if sacrifice is a means to an end, and is seen to be 
efficacious in itself, then its conceptual structure may be built into the 
present circumstances which sacrifice is deemed to be effective to change, 
and into the future state which is desired. Similarly, the concept may be 
submerged in the idea of the deity, whose power makes the sacrifice 
effective.  What Chilton seems to be saying is that sacrifice is not an idea that 
stands alone, but lies at the level of implementation of relationships with 
higher powers. For that reason, (and despite what Chilton says), it is hard to 
remove from a religious system, as a part of the machinery would no longer 
be present and effective, and therefore the system would cease to function 
completely. 
Michael Fishbane, in a study of the transformation of sacrifice in Judaism115, 
argues that sacrifice and ritual gifts are “omnipresent” and important in 
                                                 
114 Chilton, 1997, p.226. 
115 Fishbane, M., in Astell and Goodhart (eds) 2011, pp 114-139. 
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*ancient Israel, and occur at “every turn and every cultural stage”116. Though 
the nature and form of the sacrifice changed as time progressed, the idea of 
something foregone in order to heal the rupture between God and mankind 
remained, though this might be subtly understood. So, to take the later 
perspective, reading the Torah might be considered as a sacrifice, because to 
do so involves a suppression of the personal will. He quotes from the 
Babylonian Talmud: 
“Study of the Torah atones for all the sins of the sinful soul, as (the 
sages) of blessed memory (have said in) their teaching...’Why (does 
Scripture) say, this is the Torah for the burnt-offering, for the meal-
offering, for the sin-offering, etc? – and concludes that whoever 
studies Torah has no need of the burnt-, meal-, sin-, or guilt-
offerings.”117 
He goes on to quote Hosea, who in response to poor peoples’ pleas that they 
cannot afford (animal) sacrifices, replies, “It is words that I want, and I shall 
forgive all your sins”118 the meaning of ‘words’, according to Fishbane, and 
evidenced by him in some quotations of uncertain origin, “is Torah”.119 And 
in Tanhuma Va-yaquel, he states, Torah “bears (or carries off) all Israel’s 
sins”120. 
It may be concluded that Fishbane is more making a point about the 
supremacy of the Torah than about sacrifice here. The ritual activity involved 
in reading the Torah may indeed involve an act of submission, but the 
activity itself may hardly be observable. The strength of the concept in action 
therefore must be all the greater, and indeed this must be the pattern 
whenever public ceremony is replaced by private acts of commitment. And 
this is where the other half of Fishbane’s argument comes into play: it is the 
Torah which has the power to counter and cancel sin, and as the Torah is 
                                                 
116 Ibid., p.114. 
117 Ibid, p.135. 
118 Hosea 14 is referred to by Fishbane, but this does not seem to be a direct quotation from 
Hosea. Fishbane, p.135. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
4  What is a Biblical Concept? 
 
62 
 
part of the Bible, we may say, it is the concept embodied in the Bible which 
does the work.  
Countering sin may mean more than just cancelling it. Take an explanation of 
Girard’s thinking on violence and religion like the following, by Vanessa 
Avery-Wall:  
“Religious rituals are phenomena manifesting the stories of religious 
tradition. One purpose of religious ritual, according to Girard, is to contain 
violence and provide a nexus for communal reconciliation.”121 
What Fishbane is saying is that within the religion of Israel, the “nexus for 
communal reconciliation” has shifted (at least in Israel’s more advanced 
thinking) to the divinely-ordained ethical rules of the religious state, and that 
this reconciliation is affirmed by a positive benefit, a blessing: 
“A blessing is effective language-blessings create reality and carve out a 
future for the one being blessed.”122  
Avery-Wall goes on to add in a footnote to this statement, “After the 
destruction of the second temple, and the death of the priesthood in Judaism, 
the religious traditions changed to accommodate the Jews’ new 
circumstances. One change is that parents became kohanim (priests), and, as 
such, direct transmitters of divine blessings.” 
Avery-Wall speculates that the sacrifice of our evil inclination, taken together 
with the efficacy of the parental blessing, might lead to “a gradual 
overcoming of mimetic desire”.123 
She agrees with Girard that the tendency to rivalry is fundamental to human 
nature and also suggests that the Jewish writings call us away from our 
natural desires and therefore in time will upset the forces which ‘make the 
world go round’: 
                                                 
121 Avery-Wall, 2011, p.1. 
122 Avery-Wall, 2011, p.2. 
123 Avery-Wall, 2011, p.6. 
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“The evil inclination is considered a part of creation, and thus ‘good’; it is 
said in Genesis Rabbah that the evil inclination is what compels us to marry, 
build a house and trade (with one another). But the evil inclination is part of 
humanity’s base nature, and the inclination that drives us towards rivalry, 
lust and envy. According to the early rabbis, the evil inclination is part of the 
self and must die in each and every one of us…the slaughtering of the evil 
inclination is ‘as if one had sacrificed all the sacrifices together’.”124   
 
Sacrifice as Approach 
Let us now turn to the early, more ‘primitive’ condition of human societies, 
and think of how they might use sacrifice as a form of approach to God. We 
are aware that the approach manifested in biblical times had a variety of 
purposes: for thanksgiving, praise and worship; for dealing with sin; for 
communion or fellowship with the deity; for preserving the world in a safe 
and stable state.125 
As we noted at the start of this chapter, some Girardians126 suggest that this 
kind of analysis, which describes belief and ritual in relation to concepts, is 
both inappropriate and inadequate. This is because it suggests that there is a 
voluntary, discretionary quality to religion, that it religion is built 
intellectually and culturally as an assembly of ideas. Indeed, the words 
‘concept’ and ‘idea’ are themselves in dispute because they are seen as not 
foundational, but belonging to a later phase of religion when discourse 
emerges, not to the initial, visceral stage.  Girard’s doubts come out of an 
anthropological method127, though he also uses literary and philosophical 
methods in important ways.  
He portrays religion in its earliest stages as amounting mainly to sacrifice, 
which, no matter what its form, is “a reaction to the unseen power hidden in 
                                                 
124 Avery-Wall, 2011, p.4. 
125 Brueggemann, 2002,  pp182-184. 
126 Notably Robert Hamerton-Kelly, who is a powerful figure in studies of Girard and a key 
figure in Imitatio, which promotes Girardian studies. He is presumed to have a following. 
127 "Mine is a search for the anthropology of the Cross, which turns out to rehabilitate 
orthodox theology" Williams (ed), 1996, p. 288). 
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the world about us.”128  It is an unthinking, visceral move to confront or 
deflect the forces of violence which otherwise threaten existence itself. What 
is happening is not explained (since the process predates explanation), but 
the victim is hinted at in myth as a fragment of text might become visible in a 
palimpsest.  
That is the claim made by some129 who see in Girard’s theories a penetration 
into the core of human society’s systems, and a step beyond the reach of 
most writers on religion. That particular claim has truth in it.  However, it 
may be that their stance, with its anthropological emphasis and dismissal of 
conventional categories fails to distinguish post-fact description from 
thinking process. This can be illustrated in two ways. First, ‘concept’ and 
‘idea’ are terms most often used analytically in retrospect. Prophets may say 
“God has spoken”, and priests “I must sacrifice to God”, but do not articulate 
what is happening as an idea, but as a fact about the world or as an 
imperative. They describe something felt, that may be viscerally provoked, 
not a product of abstract thinking. Nevertheless, ideas are involved, and 
conceptual categories may be applied, so these words cannot be discounted. 
Further, when symbols are used, as they are in mythological accounts, then 
by definition the name of one thing is being used to refer to another, and it is 
inescapable that ideas are part of the system of communication. Ideas and 
concepts are thus an inherent part of the mythological and religious 
communication system at a formative level. This will be discussed further in 
the next chapter.  
On the other hand, one might say with Girard, and others such as Ricoeur 
and Barker, that applying the thinking and the categories of a rational mind 
to pre-rational behaviour as recorded in myth simply deprives the myth of 
its meaning, and leaves only the shell or husk behind, that is, a non-rational 
story, to which it would be hard to allocate any truth-value. Girard writes 
                                                 
128 Young, 1975, p.111. Young was not writing about Girard, but here her understanding 
coincides with that of Girard. 
129 For instance, James Alison, Robert Hamerton-Kelly and Michael Kirwan, in their various 
summaries of Girard’s thought; for instance, Kirwan, 2009, pp20ff.  
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about this at length130; but some other writers also take the same view. For 
instance, Margaret Barker comments on how the priests of the Second 
Temple (c.516 BCE -70CE) wrote Genesis 1, “and were silent about the 
angels of Day One. They turned the myths of the Temple into history, and 
thus the myths lost their power”.131 Barker is here referring to the myths of 
the First Temple (c.950-586 BCE), which had a different theological scheme 
to that of the Second, being polytheistic and holding that sacred ritual was 
causal in the world;  for instance, in believing that the priestly ministry of 
atonement was necessary “to maintain the stability and harmony of 
creation.”132  The centrality of this issue in the view of scholars who give 
emphasis to the symbolic aspects stands in stark contrast to Brueggemann, 
as we shall see. Barker holds that the Deuteronomists substituted historical 
occasions for ongoing situations, for instance portraying the everlasting 
covenant made by God with Noah as the guarantee of stability, rather than 
the ongoing process of atonement. 
This brings us to the second point. Might one argue that the tie between the 
stability of the world and the iterative process of atonement depends on 
something which might, with the perspective of the 21st century, be 
described as a ‘concept’?  Now, Girard insists that the sacrificial process has a 
pre-rational nature and that the myths that incorporate it into culture derive 
from a pre-rational state.  But within human society, which by definition has 
speech, words are involved and where there are words there are ideas. 
Therefore, as Girard himself states, sacrifice if pre-rational is a product of 
‘hominization’, of the process which leads to the emergence of human kind as 
a species, and in the view of such Girardians as Alison, Hamerton-Kelly & 
Kirwan, this would tend to exclude categories of thought133.  
This is open to question, not just as a matter of scientific anthropology134, but 
also as a matter of the exclusive possession by developed, social humans of 
                                                 
130 For instance, throughout Violence and the Sacred (Girard, 1977). 
131 Barker, 2004, p.37.  
132 Ibid. 
133 See also the discussion in relation to Gans (footnote 123 below) and Ricoeur (p.187). 
134 For instance, “German scholar Markwart Herzog has criticized Girard for drawing the 
Totalität der Geschichte from a single event-type. While he concedes that Girard has assembled 
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categories of thought, or speech. Simple points will serve to illustrate this. 
Whales communicate by sonic signals, though we do not know what 
messages they transmit; cows have awareness of the normal pattern of 
events in time, and know what time they are normally milked, for instance, 
so might be said to have a concept of ‘milking time’. They know the meaning 
of the time, the process associated with it, and the desired outcome. So, even 
if the possibility of concepts is limited to this very basic, pre-human level, it 
would be fair enough to talk about ‘biblical concepts’ as something involving 
process or ritual, a situation to be resolved, a desired outcome (a state of 
being blessed), and place-specific and time-specific elements. This can be 
done without invalidating the descriptive attempt through hopeless 
anachronism, even if an established, narrow, epistemological definition of 
‘concept’ is not met at this stage.   
For that reason, it seems to be acceptable to take prophecy and sacrifice in 
particular as events in society which might be represented in language (and 
thus consist of ideas) at a very early stage in the development of human 
                                                                                                                                     
much empirical material from mythology to support his “Kultopfer”-theory, Herzog remains 
skeptical whether the same material is capable of validating the assumption of an “Uropfer” 
the historicity of which cannot be validated. He also argues that Girard’s system is 
scientifically unsound in that is not open to critical evaluation and cannot be falsified by 
empirically grounded objections. This immunity comes at the price of being unscientific.” 
Stork, P at http://payingattentiontothesky.com/2011/01/13/an-introduction-to-the-work-of-
René-girard-by-peter-stork/  accessed 10 Feb. 2011. 
But sympathisers of Girard have modified his theory in this regard. For instance, "According 
to Gans, language is thus the condition of the emergence of man and of religion – not the other 
way around, as Girard thinks.  This theory addresses critical issues in the theory of human origins 
as an 'event,' a sudden (not gradual) emergence. When Gans' theory of the origin of signs as the 
definingly human trait is fleshed out, it leads to a novel defense of modernity against its post-
modernist critics.”  Gardner, Stephen L., in 
www.thedaviesgrouppublishers.com/katz_originary_hypothesis.htm.  This is a review of Gans’s 
work in Katz (2011). Accessed 10 Feb. 2011. 
Sarah Coakley speaks of “a new accord between the particular energies of religious practice 
(sacrifice, as positively considered) and the ratiocination of an appropriately justified belief 
(in a sense to be duly clarified). In short, I seek to cleanse the notion of sacrifice from that of 
a mandated (Girardian) violence, and identify in the new notion of evolutionary sacrifice a 
principle of divine reason.”  Norris Hulse Inaugural Lecture, 
http://scripturalreasoning.org/faculty/coakley_inaugural.pdf, accessed 10 February 2011. 
This thinking is more fully discussed in Chapter 2, The Fading Concept of Sacrifice. 
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society.  Thus it is fair to describe them as ‘biblical concepts’ in this 
discussion without implying that an advanced rational process or discourse 
is involved. However, the method of analysis of traits in society, such as the 
predisposition to rely on sacrifice and associated activities such as 
scapegoating, will need to engage with the mode of thought that generated 
them. This is symbolic, rather than rational. If Girard is to be followed, then 
the conceptual-symbolic thought processes may be naturally insulated from 
the mechanism actually operational (the mimetic process), so that there can 
be talk of sacrifice, constructed according to a conceptual and symbolic 
framework, which is incapable of actually voicing the causation which is in 
operation. 
We are therefore dealing with mental realities at two levels, explicit and 
concealed. Furthermore, the realities which are explicit may not be ordered 
according to philosophical categories, but instead follow other patterns, and 
of these, symbolism is perhaps the identifiable mode so far as modern minds 
are concerned.  This emphasis may be seen as a conscious choice in the case 
of nascent Israel, as it left the comparatively systematised society of Egypt 
behind, and made an exodus from a certain sort of physical and mental 
organisation. This is foundational to the culture which gave birth to the 
Hebrew Scriptures. 
But the situation of the contemporary commentator will seem odd to some: 
rationalist thinking and method is to be used to describe something which 
operates by other rules. So, one has to expect differently ordered outcomes, 
for instance; under the old mind-set, which saw sacrifice as effective practice, 
the desired outcome is a blessing; under the more developed mind-set, it is 
justice and righteousness. The tendency has been towards the ethical for 
millennia now. 
 
However, the dislocations cannot be avoided. We can only start from where 
we are. We live with reason as the accepted definer of the public realm135 
and the lingua franca of discourse in the general forum of debate.  In 
                                                 
135 Tracy, 1994 p.9. 
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addition, we have a fundamental problem in approaching symbolic thinking 
on its own terms: as we encounter it in mythology, it does not have its own 
key provided with it; either one is privy to it through participation in its 
governing culture, or one is not136. If one has no key, then it is only by 
literary analysis, archaeology, psychology and possibly through identifying 
parallels that progress can be made in working towards an understanding of 
the meaning of mythological material. That, at least, is the position argued by 
Girard and others137. However, there is the methodology defined in Paul 
Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor138, in which he argues that there is a 
linguistic imagination that "generates and regenerates meaning through the 
living power of metaphoricity.” Symbolic systems “make and remake 
reality”.139 He compares aesthetical grasping of the world in the literary 
narrative to the epistemological grasping of the world by scientific models. 
Ricoeur argues that both can be perceived as “sustained metaphors aiming at 
redescription of reality.” The relationship between mythos and mimesis is 
equal to the relationship between heuristic fiction and redescription.140 This 
exploration of relationships and methods is pursued in Chapter 8. 
 
Turning aside now from Girard to Brueggemann,  one immediately finds that 
the example of sacrifice is less fruitful. In his case, prophecy is the particular 
focus. Once again approach to God, or the convergence of God and mankind 
is involved, and it would be possible to claim that the need for God and the 
need to hear God speak is primordial for humanity and counts among basic 
instincts. Indeed, Brueggemann shows a great deal of interest in the 
relational nature of God, and in theology as ‘speech about God’141, but much 
less in the origins of the relationship. In particular, he seems to avoid the 
subject of atonement through sacrifice in a postmodern approach that tends 
                                                 
 
137 Such as Fawcett (1970) and Langer (1960). 
138 Ricoeur, 1977. 
139 The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality in Ricoeur, 1991, p. 117. 
140 Ricoeur draws both terms from Aristotle’s Poetics. Ivic, 2009. 
141 Brueggemann, 2000, p.115. 
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to reduce religion to ethics142, and the background to the ethics is left 
untraced. Such an approach has little engagement with symbolic or 
mythological modes of expression and tends to draw a fairly simple, 
generalised conclusion from them.  
Therefore, in Brueggemann’s work, we see not only a tacit acceptance of 
rational, post-Enlightenment analysis as adequate for the purpose, but also a 
lack of interest in what one might term anthropological aspects. That is not 
to say, though, that Brueggemann discounts the Hebrew mind-set, as he is a 
noted Hebrew scholar and has written about the process of reversing ‘the 
process of modernity’ in order to achieve a postmodern view which is more 
contextual, local and pluralistic.143  So, it is not that Brueggemann lacks the 
basis for examining the origins of relationships with God, but that he seems 
to leave that set of issues to one side and focus on an area of more interest to 
him.  It is also the case that in following a socio-literary approach, he is much 
influenced by Gottwald, one of whose particular achievements is to work 
back to the Elohist and Yahwist sources, but not to try and get back beyond 
1250 BCE, to sources of Israel which he describes as ‘baffling’144.  Gottwald 
does refer to ‘humanistic’ studies, but the sources of religion beyond 
recorded sources are not something which he pursues.  
Within the self-limitation of the socio-literary frame which he to a large 
degree shares with Gottwald, Brueggemann uses the language of concepts 
freely, and it is apparent even from the titles of some of his books and 
papers145 that he is comfortable with working in the world of ideas and does 
not feel them inapplicable to the biblical context. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that Brueggemann and Girard are each 
preoccupied with different levels of human development, and make quite 
different starting assumptions about what conceptualisation lies behind 
                                                 
142 See Tim Chester’s review of An Unsettling God, at 
http://timchester.wordpress.com.2010/11/30/review-brieggemann-on-an-unsettling-god/ 
accessed 10 February 2011. 
143 Brueggemann, 1993, pp 8-9. 
144 Gottwald, 1979, p.3. 
145 For instance, Covenant as a Subversive Paradigm, and Rethinking Church Models through 
Scripture. 
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biblical concepts as we inherit them. Both express their understandings 
relative to contemporary society and contemporary religion, but their 
differing perspectives on the source conditions mean that their views are 
more complementary than directly comparable.  
5 Symbol, Myth & Intuition 
 
71 
 
Heaven and earth did sing my Creator’s praises, and 
could not make more melody to Adam, than to me 
Thomas Traherne 
 
Brueggemann and Girard, though their work apparently has limited overlap, 
each acknowledge that they owe something to Paul Ricoeur.146 Ricoeur’s 
work The Symbolism of Evil seems to have been particularly influential. A 
little unpacking of the issues which emerge in it, and in some of Ricoeur’s 
other books147,  which surface again in Brueggemann’s and Girard’s work 
will be a useful starting point for a study of how they both relate to the world 
of expression that lies outside rational language and historically-based 
accounts.  
 
Ricoeur claims that “myth is a dimension of modern thought”148, once it has 
been demythologised through contact with scientific history and “elevated to 
the dignity of a symbol.”  This is an arresting statement in a time when the 
often-heard view is that symbolic or mythological constructs are based upon 
assumptions about the world which have expired, and are simply no longer 
acceptable or relevant in a rational age. As Iris Murdoch has one of her 
fictional characters say, “It’s better not to tinker with a dying mythology. All 
those stories are simply false, and the oftener that is said in plain terms, the 
better.”149  But Ricoeur defines his usage of the word ‘myth’ as  
 
                                                 
146 For instance, Brueggemann tells in the preface of Redescribing Reality how Ricoeur 
permitted him to “think again about reality”, and how he “supplied phrasing for what has 
been operative in [his] nurture”. [Brueggemann, 2009, p. xx-xxi.  Girard in Things Hidden 
refers to Ricoeur’s championing of the view that Christianity both demonstrates continuity 
with previous traditions and a divergence from them, and that both positions are necessary. 
This is a point which Girard himself relies on. Ricoeur, too, has expressed his indebtedness 
to Girard’s insights {Kirwan, 2004, p.95, referring to a speech at the 1998 Colloquium on 
Violence and Religion, which is an annual academic conference concerned with the thinking 
of Girard] Contagion, Vol. 6 Spring 1999, p.1ff. 
147 Particularly Interpretation Theory (Ricoeur, 1976). 
148 Ricoeur, 1967, p.5. 
149 Murdoch, 1966, p.21. 
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“not a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a traditional 
narration which relates to events that happened at the beginning of time 
and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions of 
men of today, and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of action 
and thought by which man understands himself in his world.”150 
 
This is a substantial claim, with which Girard concurs, as we shall see. 
Following Ricoeur, we shall not in this section use the term in its pejorative 
sense, to dismiss texts and beliefs now thought to be unjustifiable, as mere 
stories incapable of substantiation151. Instead, we shall look for the meaning 
which myths carry, even when they will not stand up to the truth-tests of 
empirical science and analytical history. This exercise has to face the fact that 
any meaning they do carry may not immediately be accessible to the modern 
mind, but may be found to be expressed according to a pre-Enlightenment, 
non-scientific system. That system has an operating vocabulary of symbols. 
Therefore, let us begin by reviewing what is involved in the use of such a 
vocabulary, and at how metaphor, as a system for employing symbols, 
abridges comparisons152, and in its rhetorical use, makes the probable more 
attractive153. Metaphor, unlike myth, is capable of translation154 and 
therefore where an account is both mythological and metaphorical, a degree 
of dual analysis may be possible. 
 
Symbols and their Assembly into Myths 
Some symbols are universal or almost so; they tend to be the ones which life 
experience itself most powerfully suggests. For instance, the sun is taken as a 
                                                 
150 Ricoeur, 1967, p.5.. 
151 Of course, Girard does sometimes use the word ‘myth’ in a sense which has a negative 
association: myth in his view conceals violence, whereas the gospel reveals it. Myths are 
tacitly based upon a system which goes back to the ‘founding murder’, but the gospels expose 
that system. 
152 An observation of Cicero and Qunintillian to which Ricoeur makes reference. Ricoeur, 
1976, p.48. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid, p.49: “We can translate a metaphor, i.e. replace the literal meaning for which the 
figurative word is a substitute. In effect, substitution plus restitution equals zero.” 
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symbol of creative power in areas as disparate as Greece, Egypt and pre-
Columbian America. Symbols therefore may come out of man’s common 
experience, and exhibit similar thinking patterns across cultures, as J. 
Danielou has noted; C.G. Jung commented on the universal nature of 
symbolic motifs in ancient and modern times.155 However, other symbols are 
far from universal, and it is therefore possible to be completely misled by a 
symbol taken out of context. For instance, water may be a symbol of fertility 
and creation in one set of circumstances, and a threat in another (in a storm 
or flood for instance). In such instances, metaphorical usage (such as, ‘a well-
spring of truth’, or ‘drowning in debt’) may provide an essential clue. 
 
Symbols are also very frequently bound up with animistic concepts. Fawcett 
has commented that there is now a presupposition that primitive people 
made distinctions as we do between animate and inanimate matter, but not 
so: the gods were 
“invariably the result of animistic attitudes which saw everything in the 
world as imbued with personal life.”156 
The idea of spirit and personal life outside biology is a defining characteristic 
of religion. To talk of God without a concept of the presence of God is to put 
the proposition in the spheres of philosophy or science or even history, but 
not religion. Conversely, there is no space within science for the idea of a God 
who intervenes in the world or who suffers. 
 
In the early forms of Greek mythology, gods in some cases were the great 
entities of nature, such as mountains, of which a number were called 
‘Olympus’157. These were held to be divine entities having a personal life. 
Later, the god in question was represented as a being in space and time 
(Olympian Zeus), and stories were told as elements of the life-story of him or 
                                                 
155 Fawcett, 1970, p.27. 
148 Fawcett, 1970, p.104. 
157 Langer, 1960, p.186. 
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her to explain the personal nature of the god in human terms. Such traits in 
mythological tales tend usually to distance the tale from the contemporary 
reader, and to disconnect her from any sense of meaning within the tale. At 
least, that will be the case if the reader is firmly in the grip of a modernist, 
factual way of thinking, and much less so if they are sympathetic to religious 
panentheism in  nature, or to the idea of Gaia, and derive a sense of animism 
from that. 
 
But anthropologically speaking, symbols often precede theology (the study 
of God, or perhaps of gods) in the expression of a worldview, and the 
symbolic rendering may later become incorporated into a theological 
account. Therefore, theology may make a mistake if it does not allow for this, 
and speaks of its texts only in a factual way.  Where there is any divergence 
between symbols and theology, it is possible that the symbols may tell the 
more closely delineated story about the worldview158 which gave rise to the 
account.  
 
However,  even when symbols have a universal quality, and therefore are 
comprehensible from outside a particular culture  as having meaning in their 
own right, their assembly into greater units of meaning (myths) frequently 
gives rise to problems. These problems are rooted in concepts, and in the 
nature of metaphor which is fundamentally not so much linguistic as 
conceptual.  Ricoeur states that metaphor, founded in the imagination, in a 
sustained form aims to redescribe reality159.  This expanded version of 
reality naturally has effects on the conceptual structure of the individual and 
community concerned. As we shall see, this term ‘redescribe’ is much used 
by Brueggemann in connection with prophecy. As an avowed post-
modernist, he is at ease with the idea of multiple meanings and therefore 
with the possible reality of a redescription of the world, as we shall see.  
                                                 
158 Wright, 1992, p.127. 
159 Ricoeur, 1991, p.117. 
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However, the facility of redescription available within a metaphorical 
account, and its capability of adjusting one conceptual system to another in 
small units of usage, may not be available in longer accounts. A metaphor 
may be “a poem in miniature”160, but a myth attempts description on a 
broader front, by a more extensive method.  In such circumstances, when the 
resulting conceptual base is disconnected from that of the reader, the 
process by which meaning is demonstrated is short-circuited and earthed-
out before it can become effective161. Then, a myth tends to become an island 
of meaning, apart from the mainstream of thought, and may not relate to or 
lie parallel to other myths. Outside their temporal and cultural context, 
myths are not readily understood in any depth because the code on which 
their meaning depends lacks any sort of key, and therefore tends to be 
elusive. As Ricoeur puts it, we cannot connect either to the time of the myth’s 
creation, nor can we connect mythical locations with our geographical 
space.162  It is the disconnection which tends to trigger the use of ‘myth’ as a 
category, and which makes it difficult to treat a myth as an explanation of the 
issues which the reader experiences in her own life.  
 
The difficulty of connection can be put in other ways. Like all languages, 
myths have their own grammar and syntax,163 according to which the 
symbols are assembled, but these are never recorded. To make matters 
worse, myths have sometimes come down to us in transcriptions made when 
the myths were already in decline164, and had hardened into mere works of 
fiction, their previous connection with conceptual ways of thinking having 
been lost. So, from the outside, when myths look like fantastic stories which 
                                                 
160 Monroe Beardsley, quoted in Ricoeur, 1976, p.46. 
161 To put it metaphorically, that is. The power and transparency of metaphor in such an 
instance is considerable. 
162 Ricoeur, 1967, p.5. 
163 Langer, 1960, p.94. 
164 Fawcett, 1970, p.95. 
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are expressions of magic, their value in expressing concepts central to life 
may be going by unrecognized165 .  
 
Even when serious analyses of texts are made within faith contexts, the 
conservative reaction against any evaluation of them as having mythological 
aspects has often been visceral.166 To religious conservatives in particular 
the very idea of truth being compromised by being reduced to ‘mythology’ is 
abhorrent.   They characteristically seem to operate on the basis of a single, 
absolute standard of truth and reporting in religious texts. This standard is 
analogous to, though differently based from, the claims made by science. 
Complete rejection of any mention of mythology results, and it then becomes 
difficult to discuss any meaning concealed within the text.  
 
But the dislocation would tend to happen not just within cultures where the 
normal test of veracity is verifiable truth (as it usually is in the post-
Enlightenment West). There, it happens because the two systems 
(mythological demonstration and rational description) are overtly 
incompatible. But it also happens in settings where it is customary to 
mediate value through a mythology which is not identical to the mythology 
under examination.   The fact that a similar problem emerges under such 
widely divergent conditions is because there is usually little or no possibility 
of understanding the ‘code’ of one mythology on the basis of another 
mythology or another conceptual system, and an invalid mythology may be 
worse than incomprehensible: it may seem to depend on alien, evil 
understandings and appeal to dark forces. Mythology which is alien is 
therefore either meaningless, or a threat. 
                                                 
165 “Because the symbolic forms stand forth so clearly as pure articulations of fantasy, we see 
them only as fictions, not as the supreme concepts of life which they really represent, and by 
which men orient themselves religiously in the cosmos.” Langer, 1960, p.200. 
166 An early example would be the work of D.F. Strauss (1808-1874), whose Life of Jesus 
Critically Examined (1835) claimed that the gospel stories were mythological & drawn from 
those of the Old Testament. He was pilloried by both the Catholic and the Lutheran 
establishments. 
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 So, on several fronts, there seems to be a severe obstacle to the continued 
acceptance of mythology (or mythological elements) in any religious text, 
once the mythology is no longer current. This is an understood problem in 
some areas, and may be the reason why Islam prohibits the reading of the 
Koran in translation. Translation might unavoidably involve interpretation, 
and thus might undermine the continuance of its base as active 
communication within the original, intended, mode. That is the usual line 
within Islam. But the continuing base may still be described by an outsider in 
terms of a symbolic system, without disputing its truth-value.167 
 
Ricoeur says that the position is then recouped by demythologization, which 
he contrasts with demythization168. In demythologization, what is lost is “the 
false logos” by which the myth explains causation. By losing the myth as 
immediate logos, it is regained as myth, that is to say, we regain the 
opportunity of capturing the message which the myth carries.169  This is the 
route to the rehabilitation of myths as texts carrying meaning, once the myth 
has become separated from the cultural environment that gave birth to it.  
 
And the capture of the message (but not the rehabilitation of the myth) is 
precisely Girard’s project: the exposure of truths which have been for ages 
concealed, even “things hidden since the foundation of the world”170. By this 
resonant phrase, he means universal patterns of behaviour which go by 
unrecognized because they are understood as something other than what 
                                                 
167 Langer (1960) comments on this phenomenon (without any reference to the Koran, which 
is my illustration of the general point).  [p.201]:  “The meanings given through language are 
successively understood, and gathered into the whole by the process called discourse; the 
meanings of all other symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate model are 
understood only through the meaning of the whole, through their relations within the total 
structure. Their very functioning as symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a 
simultaneous, integral presentation.” Langer, 1960, p.96. 
168 The separation of myth from history. 
169 Ricoeur, 1967, p.161-2. 
170 The title of Girard’s 1987 book. 
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they actually are. They are dislocated from their original function in terms of 
time and culture, and indeed, they may have developed a function of 
obscuring their own origins, as we shall see.  
 
The key example is imitative (mimetic) violence, which tends to escalate, and 
if left unchecked would eventually result in calamitous destruction. The 
parties to this do not understand themselves as being involved in imitation 
or even rivalry, but in a mission with right on their side, variously to defend 
their country, extend the rule of law, protect trade, obtain the necessary land 
for living-space, bring salvation to the heathen, etc. There is in fact a 
tradition of imitative violence which stretches right back to the original 
‘founding murder’171, which Girard describes as ‘invisible’; that is to say, 
these things are referred to in myths but in a way which conceals the real 
violence between humans in acts of persecution, by dressing the account up, 
typically as the struggles of the gods. Mythology therefore has a function not 
only of explaining a branch of human society to its members, but 
simultaneously of concealing how society and its interactions work. It is 
telling that there is a link etymologically between the words ‘myth’ and 
‘mute’.172 
 
One of the main functions of religion is to channel this tendency to respond 
to violence with violence, and to deflect it onto a third party. Whilst the 
control process has a useful function in addressing the problem, the claimed 
achievement of Jesus is to expose the problem and the process for what they 
are, and refuse to engage in either of them. By this means, the problem is 
removed, and human interaction is considerably changed providing that 
people stick to Jesus’s message. Of course, they very often don’t, even when 
they claim to be committed followers of Jesus, so it has to be acknowledged 
that the message is widely misunderstood. However, it might be said by a 
                                                 
171 Girard, 1978, p.105ff. 
172 Kirwan, 2004, p.68. 
5 Symbol, Myth & Intuition 
 
79 
 
Girardian that Jesus’s message seeks to destroy the old logos of mythology 
and to replace it with another insight which, although spiritual in character, 
is overt, and does not have a hidden process as the mythological system 
does.  
 
Put another way, mimesis is deeply rooted in human behaviour world-wide, 
and always has been. The project of Jesus is to expose it by unveiling the 
process of its vehicle within society. It is the way of the world. Girard sees 
mythology as a literature extending back to the beginnings of human 
interaction, which narrates mimetic desire and mimetic violence. He 
analyses this in considerable detail173 but his work is far from being 
universally accepted, particularly where it seems to make other scholarly 
approaches redundant.  
 
 
Symbolism and Myth at Work in Redefining Truth 
 
It is in this area of study that Brueggemann and Girard draw upon Ricoeur 
significantly. Brueggemann takes his insights as a starting point and uses 
them theologically in his own way, whilst Girard, as a historian- 
anthropologist, is much closer to the continuum of study which has 
developed since Fraser published The Golden Bough, was significantly 
advanced by Ricoeur in the 1960s, and has had a flourishing recently in the 
understanding of sacral kingship.174   
 
If Brueggemann’s scheme centres on creative (prophetic) talk of God as a 
counter-imagination of the world, communicated through the media of 
                                                 
173 See particularly Violence and the Sacred, and Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World. 
174 See Quigley (ed), 2005. 
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symbol and metaphor, then Girard’s scheme, which is constructed around  
concealment of the truth by myth and the killing of the prophets175 (speakers 
of truth), is a dissimilar exercise where similar methods might nevertheless 
be appropriate. We shall return to this point later. But Brueggemann in The 
Prophetic Imagination and Cadences of Home describes situations in which 
both the prophetic message and arguments ranged against it (such as the 
Solomonic ‘paganization of Israel’176) would both logically make use of 
symbol, metaphor and myth to carry their message. So in Brueggemann we 
see symbol and metaphor understood as a general, universally-available 
method, and little attention paid to myth specifically; whereas Girard tends 
to focus his attention on the function of myth in its application to the human 
tendency to conceal violence and its causes. Does this simply reflect Girard’s 
area of interest? He does not positively say that there is something about 
myth and symbol which means that it can only be used in this way; but he 
does say that myth has existed as a servant of the mimetic process. He makes 
the major claim that Jesus calls time on the mimetic process and exposes it. 
In other words, he reveals the process of which myth forms a part; Girard 
generalises from this, without exploring what else myth might be used for, if 
anything.    
 
This takes us back to Ricoeur’s statement that myth, once stripped of its 
aetiological intention and explanatory pretensions, becomes a symbol and 
can be a dimension of modern thought. For Girard, myth is certainly a 
symbol, and he ascribes to Jesus the groundbreaking stripping of misleading 
causal accounts of the mythological. By exposing the process, Jesus 
neutralised it as a viable process, because once understood, it loses its power 
to feed upon the human character. The nature of sin is exposed, and the 
account thus exposed becomes a symbol which is useful within modern 
thought (or indeed, thought of any period). There seems, therefore to be a 
                                                 
175 Girard, 1978, p.165. 
176 Brueggemann, 1978, p.31. 
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broad coherence between Girard and Ricoeur here, and Girard has taken 
Ricoeur’s insights to another level, in a Christian context at least.  
 
Brueggemann’s focus on myth comes a distant second to his theory of the re-
description of reality, a process involving symbols and metaphor. He is much 
less inclined to enquire into myth as a process formative of established 
description. He suggests that the Bible is read as a network of symbols, and 
that the system by which these symbols interrelate is invested in readers, or, 
as he puts it, in “the social, cultural context of Bible reading”.177  It might 
therefore be said that he simply does not attempt to penetrate as far back 
into human systems as does Girard, but is content to stay within the limits of 
theology, and not make links into other disciplines. Some of Girard’s critics, 
like Sarah Coakley, might well say that Brueggemann’s approach is the more 
reliable here, and carries much less risk of ‘category mistakes’178.  
 
Brueggemann’s interest is in the dynamics of symbolism, as an area in which 
meaning is added, lost or modified by change. This is an approach which 
tends to accommodate post-modern relativism fairly easily, as it does not 
deal in absolute referents, but only in God’s commentary, through prophecy, 
on a moving target. God’s view is therefore by no means static, and 
revelation is only ever the part of God’s word which is relevant to a 
particular situation in time.   
 
This invites another question, which is how God’s recorded word is 
understood as human situations change.  Prophetic words spoken to Israel in 
exile cannot have the same meaning when read in contemporary Britain.  
 
                                                 
177 Brueggemann, 2009, pp.1-2. 
178 A point made against Girard, as in footnote 28 above. 
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Girard is working with very different concepts from Brueggemann here. His 
mimetic theory depends on the insights of Jesus which blow apart the 
invisible but usually unavoidable mimetic process being everlastingly 
durable and everlastingly relevant. He is a realist about truth, and not 
inclined to the view that any fundamental dilemma in human behaviour is 
transitory. 
 
 
 
The Ousting of Old Mythology by Myth and Prophecy 
 
It may be wondered, are Brueggemann and Girard myth makers? Is their talk 
of myth actually the start of a new mythology? The question depends on 
whether there is any possibility of mythology in contemporary culture, or 
whether the succession of myth supplanting myth, time out of mind,  as 
cultures unfold and overtake one another,  has come to an end. That 
succession was possible because the outgoing and the incoming mythologies 
were incompatible; one had to replace another. However, they were both 
symbolic-mythological systems in a similar sense.  
With the Enlightenment this changed, to the extent that science claims to be 
completely free of myth. Science substitutes for mythological vehicles its 
own unique system of coherence, in which all its claims are to be shown to 
correspond to facts. Exclusivity in this regard was asserted, and claims made 
on other bases than science were progressively rejected as science advanced.   
Indeed, its tremendous advantages of provable veracity for its claims 
independent of culture give it a formidable internal synergy.  It is a universal 
system for measuring reality and accrediting facts. But recently, there has 
been doubt expressed as to whether any human system can avoid selection 
and arrangement, and neutral and objective approaches may just be a 
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figment of the post-Enlightenment imagination179. A sceptic might ask, what 
is the difference between this situation and one in which one mythology 
ousts another?  Is not science a sort of super-mythology, which, like Girard’s 
theory, tends to universalize its claims?  
In answering this point, it may be useful first to note some recent raggedness 
which has started to appear in the advance of science.  In advanced science it 
has it become apparent that the bases, for instance, of conventional physics 
and quantum mechanics are incompatible.  Increasingly, specialists in this 
field are happy to go on record with such statements as,  “There is no deep 
reality.  There is no quantum world.  There is only an abstract description” 
(Neils Bohr), and “The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose 
existence is independent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict 
with quantum mechanics and with facts established by experience.” 
(Bernard  d’Espagnat)180.  This is particularly remarkable, because it 
disputes the traditional basis of empirical science.  And yet the credentials of 
quantum mechanics are now well established, regardless of this clash. 
Quantum methods can now be verified by their output; they are used in 
some forms of manufacturing, for instance, that of liquid crystal displays.  
Since both quantum mechanics and conventional physics can be 
demonstrated to carry truth-value, the processes of neither can be sufficient 
in itself for understanding the universe. An incomplete or over-extended 
system is one that has no choice but to operate symbolically, and to use such 
symbolic combinations as it has to bridge the gaps in understanding. Is this 
not precisely what mythology does?  
So far as symbolism is concerned, there is of course nothing new about the 
claim that science is dependent upon it. If, as Langer says,  
 
                                                 
179 Wright, 1992, p.15. He was referring to the history of the emergence of Christianity, but 
the point is transferable. 
180 Bradley, R.D. How to Lose your Grip on Reality? An Attack on Anti-Realism in Quantum Theory  
Simon Fraser University, 2000  p.1. The point being made by d’Espagnat is that Quantum 
Mechanics theories involve the arrangement of particles being dependent on the number of 
observers. 
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“A sentence is a symbol for a state of affairs…A temporal order of words 
stands for a rational order of things.” 181 
Then what is an equation or a chemical formula? And what is mathematics in 
its entirety?  It may seem odd to refer to science and mythology in the same 
breath, but so long as knowledge is incomplete the expression of ideas that 
run ahead of knowledge must depend on the assembling of symbols using to 
metaphors similes and analogies. This is how myths are made.  
Therefore, let us note that 
(a) Symbolism is arguably the basis of expression in all times and 
cultures, and that generalisation includes the present scientific age. 
(b) Symbols are assembled into mythologies, because that is how their 
meaning is given eloquence. 
 
Therefore, it would not be illogical to claim that science is a mythology 
amongst other mythologies. We could logically add to this account that 
history depends, like science, on the mutual proofs of facts, or “justified true 
belief”, in which the ‘justification’ and the ‘truth’ are dependent on a form of 
cross-referencing. Therefore, history is ultimately subject to the same 
limitations as science.  
 
Some writers, notably Langer, have claimed that in the present time we are 
in a fallow period following the death of religious and mythological 
communication, and waiting for a new mythology to emerge182. Here, we 
shall consider counter-proposals: that mythology is still active, and that a 
mythology is not apparently such to those who operate within that 
mythology’s home culture. If that is the case, then there is perhaps little 
                                                 
181 Langer (1960), p.73. 
182  “Religion rests on a young and provisional form of thought to which science must 
succeed if thinking is to go on; when that is exhausted, there will be another vision, a new 
mythology.” Langer, 1960, p.201. 
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scope for a fallow period, and it may be possible analytically to discern the 
areas covered by present-day mythologies, by making use of previous 
examples as analytical tools.  
 This brings us to the point: is the writing of Brueggemann and Girard 
respectively one and another form of mythology? 
In Girard’s work, it is temptingly easy to say that he has written a myth about 
Satan, and Satan’s violent mode of behaviour.  The old myths are revealed in 
their workings by another myth of Girard’s invention.  
But in Brueggemann’s scheme, each new revelation modifies the old, and all 
revelation is time and culture-specific, and therefore incompletely relevant 
to the understanding of other reality. Therefore all religious accounts share 
with mythology a nature and a truth-value which are incompatible with, and 
unacceptable to, science-history. 
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“Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that actually takes place in human life. For 
‘consciousness of sin’ is a real event and so are despair and 
salvation through faith. Those who speak of such things (Bunyan for 
instance) are simply describing what has happened to them, 
whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it.”183  
 
How durable are biblical concepts? In fact, how durable are subtle abstract 
concepts of any sort? They may seem to persist through centuries, but do 
they actually persist in a way which is identical with their original definition? 
And, in some cases, even when a concept remains recognizable, does its 
content of meaning seem to change or waste away? Does, for instance, what 
happened to Bunyan relate to the Bible in way that we, four hundred years 
later, would recognize, and find truth in?  
 
In many cases a simple phenomenon is apparent: the decay of biblical 
concepts is related to their replacement by others which carry a scientific 
warrant. With others, no such simple explanation is possible. The second of 
these is the general situation of interest to us here: concepts which used to 
carry weight, but now seem to have lost their coherence or importance. 
 
To take an extreme example of a concept which has lost its importance, the 
dietary and hygiene regulations laid down in Leviticus have been eclipsed by 
public health and other rules, and although the same guiding principle might 
be discerned, ‘avoid contamination’, that is no longer a religious injunction 
(except in a metaphorical sense) but has become a practical and a legal one. 
Similarly, the idea of ‘uncleanness’ has vanished and been replaced by a 
                                                 
183 Wittgenstein, Culture & Value, quoted in Phillips (1997), p.253. 
6  The Decay of Biblical Concepts in Modern & 
Postmodern Thought 
 
87 
 
number of others, chiefly medical; for instance, infection and contagion in 
diseases, and correspondingly, in public health measures.  
 
In The Symbolic Language of Religion184 Thomas Fawcett reviews the 
symbolism in biblical texts and religious language, and concludes that the 
rise of rationalism, the development of machines and particularly computers 
have progressively altered patterns of thought away from the symbolic and 
towards rational modes relying on verification of empirical evidence. In his 
view, the symbolic mode of thought, which sees communicating signs in 
many aspects of life and the physical world, has been depopulated of those 
signs and left them blank.  
 
The old symbolic way of thinking declined; Greek thought turned the old 
awareness of symbols into philosophy, and Hebrew thought turned it into 
history within ancient times185. The Mediaeval cast of mind withdrew from 
this trend to some extent, even though that era’s greatest thinkers, like 
Aquinas, progressed with it.  But what has finally killed it is the iconoclasm 
which began with the Reformation. It could be argued that this iconoclasm 
was destructive of something on which knowledge of God depended, 
possibly mediated by symbolic means; the representations which were 
destroyed in that period, Fawcett says, may be called angels, because ‘angel’ 
is a word for a communicating sign of any sort. The inability to recognize 
symbols for God is to be without ‘angels’, and the lack of those symbols 
makes God incognito in nature and history.186  So, God slowly expires 
through simply not being recognized in his creation. 
 
                                                 
184 Fawcett, 1970. 
185 Ibid., p.272. 
186 ibid., p.273. 
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Fawcett ends his well-developed argument – almost – on this gloomy note, 
noting that expired symbolism is more or less inaccessible to the age that 
inherits it.  The pavilion of meaning once so active in providing a means of 
understanding ultimate realities, can degenerate into a sort of museum of 
terms which are desiccated and have lost their vital power: 
 
“When the church becomes a preserver of obscure symbols, it tends to 
appear as an institution doggedly maintaining irrelevancies.”187 
 
Amongst the ideas that have lost their coherence are sacrifice and prophecy. 
The concepts are still live, but the perception of meaning contained in them 
has shifted. Sacrifice has lost its primitive, propitiatory aspect, but retained 
the idea of personal sacrifice, the giving of oneself for others’ benefit; its 
third aspect, that of the deflection onto a third party of a responsibility or 
blame (scapegoating), which is the particular aspect of interest to Girard, is 
something we will look at in detail in Part 2. 
 
When we turn to the idea of prophecy, as a generalisation it seems that most 
people, these days, have little expectation that any prophet will emerge in 
the contemporary world. The possibility of an individual having access to the 
mind of God seems to be something that belongs to the past. People do now 
talk of visionaries or forward-thinkers, who correctly anticipate the future, 
but that is a lesser category of prophet, if a prophet at all. The possibility of 
being at one mind with God is something which contemporary thinking in 
general does not readily admit, even amongst religious people. This is in 
strong contrast to previous ages, even in Britain since the Reformation. 188. 
 
 
                                                 
187 ibid., p.281. 
188 Part of the fascination with William Blake in contemporary times may stem from the fact 
that he did show signs of having such an insight, or believing that he had it. 
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Modern Thought & the Post-Modern Revolution 
 
For more than five hundred years, ever since the Enlightenment, rationalism 
(or modernism) has been the dominant mode of thinking in the West. Its 
collapse in the last half century into postmodernism perhaps marks the end 
of a worn-out system, but nevertheless, rationalism is the mode in which 
nearly all of our language is constructed189.  That means that the conceptual 
structure that is in use at this point of time is for the most part rationally 
derived, as the ambiguous, chicken-and-egg relationship between concepts 
and language is slow to adapt to the new order. The problems of 
postmodernism are related partly to the fact that postmodern concepts are 
still expressed using a conceptual structure which is essentially modernist. 
 
This rational structure has space for God, because there is nothing about it 
which dictates that rational thought excludes thought of God. Biblical 
concepts therefore have at least an entrée into rational thought, even if 
reason often seems to reject them in the end. So it is not any sort of 
contradiction for the scientists Hawking and Einstein to refer to an entity, 
called ‘God’ or ‘spirit’, which antecedes the Universe. They are using a 
biblical concept to refer to an object of interest which science can identify 
vaguely as a necessary entity but has no means to quantify or assess.  
However, where the boundary line comes between the provinces of scientific 
explanation and those of religious explanation has shifted drastically since 
the Enlightenment. 
 
 
There has been a decay in the idea of absolutes under postmodernism; 
instead of making its main concern with principles (for example, unity, 
identity, and certainty), postmodernism fixes itself on other matters: 
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difference, plurality, textuality, and scepticism. The whole idea of concepts, 
as reliable categories which can be agreed upon, is therefore subject to 
question.  
 
However, Girard is chary of these categories, and refuses to sign up to 
modernism or postmodernism, insisting on defining them as it were from an 
external standpoint, according to his own terminology: 
 
“The only way modernity can be defined is the universalization of internal 
mediation190, for one doesn’t have areas of life that would keep people apart 
from one another and that would mean that the construction of our beliefs 
and identity cannot but have strong mimetic components.”191  
 
In other words, for Girard modernity is a situation in which internal 
mediation is dominant. That means that modernity can manifest itself at any 
juncture in time. However, he accepts that modernity, thus defined, emerges 
in the Renaissance192. 
 
 
When invited to comment on the progressive abandonment of reading the 
Bible in the last two centuries, which many would see as the culmination of 
modernism and the starting point of postmodern thought, Girard responds 
that the withdrawal of all Gods is the first transreligious phenomenon. 
Christianity can be identified as the cause, because it has dealt the old pagan 
order a death blow: 
 
                                                 
190 Girard explains imitation in terms of external mediation, in which the subject is in a 
different domain from his model, and internal mediation, in which in which they belong to the 
same domain, and the model’s objects are accessible. “Therefore, rivalry will eventually 
erupt.” Girard et al., 2007, p.57. 
191 Girard et al, 2007, p.240. 
192 Ibid, p.239. 
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“It is ironic: Christianity seems to be dying together with the religions it 
extinguishes, because, in sacrificial terms, it is perceived as one mythical 
religion among others. Christianity is not one of the destroyed religions but 
it is the destroyer of all religions. The death of God is a Christian 
phenomenon. In its modern sense, atheism is a Christian invention. There is 
no atheism in the ancient world… The disappearance of religion is a 
Christian phenomenon par excellence. Of course, and let me clarify that I  
am referring to the disappearance of religion in so far as we see religion as 
aligned with a sacrificial order.”193 
 
That is, of course, not entirely the common definition of religion. Girard’s 
interlocutor then asks him if he thinks that the world is becoming more and 
more Christian, despite appearances, and Girard’s reply commences: 
 
“Yes. This fact makes the phenomenon much more paradoxical, because it is 
much easier to recover biblical principles if one doesn’t know they are 
biblical.” 
 
So, Girard is denying the reality of the postmodern understanding, by saying 
that biblical principles (which are not identical with concepts, but closely 
related to them) are in abeyance in terms of their recognition within 
contemporary culture, but the reality of those principles and their attendant 
concepts is being instantiated by other means. That is how the world is 
becoming more and more Christian, but does not realise it; when things are 
expressed as ‘Christian’ or ‘biblical’, this process may be interrupted by an 
adverse reaction.  
 
The important example from Girard’s point of view is the loss of the concept 
of sacrifice (through a sort of new ignorance or cultural blindness). The 
                                                 
193 Girard et al, 2007, pp.256-257. 
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concept is replaced by the principle of the innocence of victims. There is a 
movement exhibited here,  
 
1. from the concept of sacrifice, only half-understood (if understood at 
all) by the cultures which allowed it to control their world,   
2. through understanding (as laid out in the message of Jesus), to  
3. a new mode of behaviour derived from the new understanding. The 
new stance is arrived at without any explicit acknowledgement of 
what has occurred. 
 
Therefore, Girard, as a realist about mimesis194, is claiming that the cultural 
shift which has cast aside the possibility of an absolute truth about sacrifice 
is nevertheless bound to a sort of recognition of that truth, through having 
espoused the principle which defends victims against persecution. 
Considered at its highest level, the biblical principle is intact, but has lost its 
derivation. It therefore has an altered appearance. 
 
It might be said here that Girard is revealing a process, and those who accept 
his revelation will have had the biblical principle restored within them. 
However, one could go further, and say that Girard is revealing the 
underlying reality of the biblical concept of sacrifice, through what one might 
call the overarching concepts of mimesis and the scapegoat mechanism. In 
other words, it is Girard’s achievement to have identified the over-arching, 
high-level concept from which the superficially apparent biblical concepts 
derive.  
 
In doing, this, Girard is following the pattern set by Jesus, whose ministry 
revolved around identifying over-arching concepts195 within the texts of the 
                                                 
194 Ibid, p.26. 
195 He said to him, "'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your mind.'     This is the greatest and first commandment.   And a second 
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Hebrew Bible. The suggestion here is not that Jesus talked about ‘concepts’ 
or any synonym of that word, but that he identified the ideas behind the 
words used in religion and in the Law. We are referring to thinking at the 
highest level, which is communicated via an assembly of lower-level 
expressions which can be interpreted in terms of actions. An example of this 
would be sacrifice as ritual slaughter of animals. Therefore, it might be said 
that one of the chief projects of the New Testament is the communication of 
these high-level concepts196, and that therefore Girard’s work is directly 
related to that project.  
 
However, that is the macro-view, and a closer focus will enable us to examine 
how these high-level concepts become apparent, remain concealed, or slip 
from being apparent into a sort of invisibility. Girard’s thinking, of course has 
as one of its central points the invisible nature of the scapegoat mechanism 
and of the mimetic principle generally. This could be interpreted as an 
epistemological claim about the possibilities for knowledge, and the 
codification of knowledge into a system of concepts, that system being 
impermanent and potentially evanescent; but the high-level concepts from 
which the concepts are derived being flexible, durable and capable of being 
instantiated by alternatives to the lower-level concepts first used.  
 
Girard’s view of where the limits of biblical concepts are set is therefore not 
anything like a typical one. High on his list will be items to be expected, 
particularly sacrifice, but also others like the deflection of violence, the role 
of desire and rivalry. This is because, in his view, these are aspects of high-
level concepts, and central to the understanding of the world put forward in 
the Bible. Indeed, it is the unique importance of the Bible that it grasps the 
elusive, hidden meaning of these concepts and exposes them for what they 
are.  Therefore, it is part of Girard’s argument that biblical concepts are not 
                                                                                                                                     
is like it: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself.'   On these two commandments hang all 
the law and the prophets."  Mt 22:37-40. 
196 Including blessing. redemption and the fulfilment of prophecy. 
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what they probably at first appear to be, and it is only through an enlarged 
understanding of the nature and extent of biblical concepts that the Bible 
itself can be appreciated and used for the understanding of the world which 
it embodies.  
 
Girard’s thinking is notable for the way it links many concepts together into 
an integrated scheme. For instance, he thinks that apocalypse is a biblical 
concept which has fallen out of use: 
“The apocalyptic feelings of early Christians were not pure fantasy. These 
texts should be discussed: they are just as relevant today as they were at the 
time of their writing, and I find it disconcerting that many churches have 
stopped preaching on them”197.  
But he goes on,  
“Any great Christian experience is apocalyptic because what one realises is 
that after the decomposition of the sacrificial order there is nothing 
standing between us and possible destruction.”198 
 
So a link is made between two concepts, one of which has failed to regain 
much currency (apocalypse) and one that has regained some currency 
(sacrifice), partly thanks to Girard. But it is interesting that according to 
Girard, one is bound up with the other, and that the neglected concept, 
apocalypse, is essential in order to make sense of the end of the sacrificial 
order.  
 
However, although Girard stresses his apocalyptical stance on a number of 
occasions, and although it is important to his scheme of thought, he does not 
seem to be anything like as influential in this as he is in the other aspects of 
his work, such as mimetic desire and scapegoating. So, one might say that 
                                                 
197 But others have not. 
198 Girard, 2007, p.235. 
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either Girard has failed so far to reclaim the biblical concept of the coming 
apocalypse, or that contemporary thought has failed to embrace a concept 
which is essential. 
 
One might generalise from this point, and say that although Girard’s overall 
scheme has made an impact and his thinking has many admirers, it remains 
in a niche of thought and has not yet brought about any general adjustment 
of biblical concepts, even though in specific cases (the concepts of sacrifice 
and violence, in particular) Girard’s thinking is well-enough established to 
merit a mention in any summary of the subjects. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Brueggemann is actively concerned with the categorization of concepts, 
particularly the concept of theology itself199. Beneath this umbrella, he is 
constantly probing into what is truly meant by familiar concepts which are 
                                                 
199 For instance, 
Brueggemann, W., "A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain", CBQ 47 
(1985) 395-415; reprinted in W. Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology. Essays on Structure, 
Theme, and Text (ed. P. D. Miller; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) 22-44. 
Brueggemann, W., "Biblical Theology Appropriately Postmodern", BTB 27 (1997) 4-9; 
reprinted under the same title in A. O. Bellis – J. S. Kaminsky (eds.), Jews, Christians, and the 
Theology of the Hebrew Scriptures (Society of Biblical Literature. Symposium series, 8; Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2000) 97-108. 
Brueggemann, W., "Theology of the Old Testament: A Prompt Retrospect", in T. Linafelt – 
T. K. Beal (eds.), God in the Fray: A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1998) 307-320. 
Brueggemann, W., "Contemporary Old Testament Theology: A Contextual Prospectus", 
Dialog 38 (1999) 108-116. 
Brueggemann, W., "The Role of Old Testament Theology in Old Testament Interpretation", 
in E. Ball (ed.), In Search of True Wisdom: Essays in Old Testament Interpretation in Honour of 
Ronald E. Clements (JSOTSup 300; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 70-88. 
Brueggemann, W., "James Barr on Old Testament Theology: A Review of The Concept of 
Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective", HBT 22 (2000) 58-74. See also Barr's reply: 
Barr, J., "Predictions and Surprises: A Response to Walter Brueggemann's Review", HBT 22 
(2000) 93-119. 
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often simply taken at face value. For instance, in his commentary on Genesis, 
he queries what is meant in that book by the idea of God’s call.200 A 
substantial part of his work201 is directed at the idea of prophecy, and 
establishing what exactly that might be, and under what circumstances it 
tends to be produced and find fertile ground in its hearers. In other words, 
he looks at prophecy’s essential timeliness. 
 
He distinguishes between ‘core testimony’ (Israel’s characteristic and 
habituated speech) and ‘Israel’s countertestimony’, consisting of “themes 
and texts (e.g. divine hiddenness, the lament) that that challenge or protest 
the more ‘normative’ speech.”202  Fretheim, reflecting on Brueggemann’s 
God, comments that “the line between these two testimonies becomes 
blurred. For example, violence ‘belongs to the very fabric of this faith’, and 
‘savageness …belongs to the core claims of Yahweh.”203 
  
The dividing line between conventional religion (testimony) and prophecy 
(countertestimony) may be difficult to discern on occasions, but what is 
coming across clearly here is that violence belongs to both. A ‘core claim’ of 
religion in either department, let alone both, takes us firmly into the area of 
biblical concepts. It also brings us up against another term which 
Brueggemann is inclined to use, ‘the common theology’. This refers to a 
theory, derived from Gottwald, which is explored in Chapter 9, and for now it 
will suffice to say that this is a reference to the general theology found in the 
several related regions of the Near East, in which the theology of Israel 
originated, and from which it later became differentiated. A developmental 
process can be traced from the common theology to what Brueggemann calls 
                                                 
200 Brueggemann, 2010. Interpretation commentary on Genesis. p.1. The term ‘call’ 
dominates the structure of the whole book. 
201 For instance, The Prophetic Imagination (1978). 
202 Terence Fretheim in Linafelt and Beal (eds), 1998, p.26. The quotations are from 
Theology of the Old Testament pp. 381 & 276. 
203 Ibid. 
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the ‘core testimony’, to prophecy or ‘countertestimony’. The role of violence 
changes in this developmental process, as we shall see.  
 
 
 
 
Brueggemann & Girard on the Biblical Concept of Violence 
 
Although there is clearly common ground between Brueggemann and Girard 
in recognizing the changing role of violence within the conceptual structure 
of the Bible, their treatment of the subject is by no means identical.   
 
Girard is famously quoted in his axiom, “Violence is the heart and secret soul 
of the sacred”204.  This claim is of course about religion, not specifically about 
Christianity, though Christianity’s part in changing the role of violence is 
unique. His study begins with a strong anthropological interest, drawing 
upon the work of Frazer, Durkheim205 and others. He embraces a vast sweep 
of cultural history, from the earliest moments of society to the present day 
and beyond. 
 
Brueggemann has no such wide constituency. His interest is biblical and 
regional, and looks no further back than the ‘common theology’. He makes no 
claims about the origin of religion or of concepts, but focuses on their 
development within his subject area. Although his approach, following 
Gottwald to some extent,  is firmly socio-literary and is opposed to the older 
historical-critical method, his remit is effectively defined by historical and 
                                                 
204 Girard, 1977, p.31. 
205 Though he claimed not to have been influenced by Durkheim. See footnote 292. 
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geographical  boundaries, though he does consider the issues of biblical 
episodes in their relevance to the present day. 
 
Brueggemann contends that the shape of Old Testament Theology is defined 
by the “embrace of pain”206.  He explains,  
 
“By embrace of pain is meant the full acknowledgement and experience of 
pain and the capacity and willingness to make that pain a substantive part of 
Israel’s faith-conversation with its God. Such an act of embrace means to 
articulate the pain fully, to insist on God’s reception of the speech and the 
pain, and to wait hopefully for God’s resolution. The term ‘pain’ here refers 
to any dysfunction in the relationship with God and to any derivative 
dysfunction in the order of creation or society.”207 
 
This is a wide and rather vague definition, but one anchored to a term 
indicating a hurt received. So, the dragging off into exile of Israel or the long 
detention of the Israelites in Egypt would be ‘pain’, if it arose as part of God’s 
plan; God’s plan therefore works partly through a mechanism involving 
violence, which is the counterpart to pain: the infliction of a hurt. 
 
Brueggemann has written extensively on the ‘Psalms of Lament’ and on the 
biblical idea of lament, which he sees as a protest against the common 
theology208, and as a key part of a process by which power is transferred 
from God.  This happens when God’s legitimacy is protested against, because 
it is seen as not taking into account the “suffering reality of the partner”209. 
                                                 
206 Brueggemann, 1992,  pp. 22-44. 
207 Brueggemann, 1992, p.25. 
208 Brueggemann, 1992, p.27. 
209 Brueggemann, 1992, p.28. At pp. 35-36, Brueggemann considers Genesis 18:16-33, which 
he describes as a counter-narrative, introduced to shift the balance of the older narrative of 
Genesis 19:1:29, in which God holds all the initiative. He refers to a correction of the text in 
18:22, which places Abraham standing before God; the uncorrected version has the positions 
reversed: God stands before Abraham, who is holding him to account.  
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He sees the laments as “Israel’s primary and distinctive departure from the 
common theology”210, which make Yahweh “no longer a trouble-free God”, as 
Israel refuses to accept God being “positioned above the fray”: 
 
“The lament is a dramatic, rhetorical, liturgical act of speech that is 
irreversible. It makes clear that Israel will no longer be a submissive, 
subservient recipient of decrees from the throne… the conventional 
distribution of power is called into question…Pain speaks against legitimacy, 
which is now for the first time questioned as being illegitimate.”211 
 
Brueggemann gives the example of Rosa Parks, who declared her pain in 
public in 1955 by refusing to give up her seat for a white passenger, and 
move to the back of the bus where the rules said black persons must sit; this 
expression of pain was also a release of energy, that enabled a great change 
to begin, and a wrong to be righted.   
 
Tolstoy, in The Law of Love and the Law of Violence 212 proclaimed a sort of 
Christian pacifist anarchism (in the sense of a Christian duty to refrain from 
domination of others) and illustrated his point with an imaginative episode 
in which a young man is imprisoned for refusing on Christian grounds to 
take part in military service. His pain is not expressed in any retaliatory 
aggression, but in a non-violent and forgiving approach and peaceful manner 
which infuriates his oppressors, who pile more and more punishment on 
him; but his message is infectious and others in the prison join him (a release 
of energy is demonstrated in this).  H.G Wells, quoted by Tolstoy’s translator, 
is in agreement with Tolstoy, but unlike him believes the development of the 
world to date to have followed an inevitable course: 
 
                                                 
210 Brueggemann, 1992. P.29. 
211 Ibid, p.27. 
212 Tolstoy, 1948. 
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“Our state could have grown up in no other way. We had to have these 
general dealers in human relationship, politicians and lawyers, as a 
necessary stage in political and social advancement. Just as we had to have 
soldiers and policemen to save people from mutual violence”213 
 
In other words, domination of others through methods which involve 
violence is the only mechanism through which society could reach its 
present state of development.  
 
These reflections on pain and the essential human state bring us very close 
to Girard, but not to any real overlap, as they remain unconnected to any 
over-arching theory of behaviour over and above, on the one hand,  the 
existence of mutual violence, possibly as a necessary tool of human 
development, and, on the other, the moral desirability (or religious 
imperative) of avoiding it. The main difference is that Girard sees the divine 
position as one deeply opposed to violence, but violence as a fundamental 
part of religion; Jesus reveals this situation for what it is. Brueggemann, on 
the other hand, sees violence as a feature of both human and divine 
behaviour, and draws upon the ample evidence in the Old Testament in his 
discussion. Because his focus is mainly on the pre-Christian, the revolution 
brought about by Jesus specifically in attitudes to violence and retaliation 
does not surface in the mainstream of his work.  
 
However, there is another fundamental difference between the two writers, 
which lies in the degree to which they accept or reject existing conceptual 
structures as a starting point. On that basis, it appears that Brueggemann, 
though far from straightforward, is the more straightforward of the two 
writers, in that his understanding of concepts is directed more at exploring 
recognized categories than Girard’s, and less at re-engineering the whole 
edifice of concepts. His work is therefore more capable of being integrated 
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into an existing conceptual scheme; he rarely can be said to stand alone, or 
be claimed to have an integrated system for which claims of exclusiveness 
are made, or to have a theory which demands a revolution in the reader’s 
conceptual structure.  
 
However, despite this, he is concerned both to explore how the mind of the 
Hebrew writer worked in its structuring of texts, and to expose concepts to 
perspectives of analysis which were unknown in previous ages. In this 
enterprise he continues the work of Norman K. Gottwald, who continues to 
be a towering figure in the field of Old Testament interpretation.  
 
Therefore, a survey of biblical concepts, where these two writers are 
concerned,  has to cope with a number of aspects of the term ‘biblical 
concepts’, and knocks at the foundation of what a biblical concept might be, 
and to what it owes its origins.  
 
 
 
Prophecy in Brueggemann & Girard 
 
The position of Girard 
Girard refers to the biblical prophets who preceded Jesus only occasionally, 
and the general subject of prophecy is not a topic that he addresses directly, 
though he does acknowledge the contribution of the prophets as witnesses 
to the gradual decline of the sacrificial system: 
“the pre-exilian prophets Amos, Isaiah and Micah denounce in vehement 
terms the impotence of the sacrificial process and ritual in general. In the 
most explicit manner they link the decay of religious practices to the 
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deterioration of contemporary behaviour. Inevitably, the decay of the 
sacrificial system seems to result in reciprocal violence. Neighbours who 
had previously discharged their mutual aggressions on a third party, joining 
together in the sacrifice of an ‘outside’ victim, now turn to sacrificing one 
another.”214 
However, it is noteworthy that the prophets are seen here as standing in 
opposition to the decline of the system, and calling people back to the old 
standards. Jonah, an unwilling prophet, is made the subject of a symbolic 
episode in which the calling out of the sailors each to his own god symbolises 
the breakdown of the religious order, and the foundering of the ship the 
impending destruction of the city of Nineveh, unless it repents. When the 
ship’s passengers look around for a sacrificial victim to take responsibility 
for the crisis, Jonah puts himself forward, saying, “for I know for my sake this 
great tempest is upon you.”215  Having continued without success to try and 
save the ship by their own efforts, since they wish to save Jonah’s life, the 
sailors finally address themselves to the Lord (that is, Jonah’s Lord, not their 
own), and ask for indemnity of Jonah’s innocent blood, on the basis that the 
Lord demanded it of them. They cast Jonah overboard, the sea ceased its 
raging, and the sacrificial crisis is resolved.216 
 
Thus, in Girard’s view, the prophets who preceded Christ (with the notable 
exception of Isaiah’s Suffering Servant) stand within the old tradition of 
religion which has violence at its core. However, in parallel with this is the 
trend which increasingly has concern for the victim. This begins in Egypt 
when God tells Moses that the Egyptians who will not at that time let the 
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people of Israel go, will in the end expel them as scapegoats in sacrificial 
crisis when Egypt is ravaged by plagues.217 
 
“Genesis and Exodus are only the beginning. In the other books of the Law 
and particularly in those of the Prophets, a reader who has been alerted to 
the role of the scapegoat cannot fail to notice an increasing tendency for the 
victim to be brought to light. This tendency goes hand in hand with an 
increasing subversion of the three great pillars of primitive religion: first, 
mythology, then the sacrificial cult (explicitly rejected by the prophets 
before the exile), finally the primitive conception of the law as a form of 
obsessive differentiation, a refusal of mixed states that looks upon 
indifferentiation with horror.”218 
On both counts, the prophets are creatures of their time and unlike Jesus, do 
not have insight into the divine wish, which Jesus recognized, to unmask the 
mimetic process and the violence involved in it. Again, the clear exception to 
this time-bound succession is the Suffering Servant. 
 
Let us therefore look at Girard’s observations on the Suffering Servant. He 
sees this episode as  
“the great transformation for which the prophet paradoxically paves the 
way, a decisive manifestation of Yahweh 219. 
This epiphany... is evidently realised twelve chapters further on, in the 
collective murder that ends the crisis, the murder of the Suffering Servant. 
In spite of his kindness and his love for others, the Servant is not loved by 
his own people, and in the fourth and last song, he dies at the hands of a 
                                                 
217 Exodus 11:1 “Then the Lord said to Moses, I will send only one more punishment on the 
king of Egypt and his people. After that, he will let you leave. In fact, he will drive all of you 
out of here.” 
218 Girard, 1978, p.154. 
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hysterical crowd that mobs against him. He is the victim of a true 
lynching.”220 
 
Girard goes on to claim that the collective lynching of the prophet, in this 
episode and in the Gospels, and the revelation of Yahweh “make up one and 
the same event”.  He also refers to this as “the occasion of a new and supreme 
revelation”221, or epiphany.  Within the thinking of Girard, therefore, but also 
within much established theology, the two episodes speak of the same 
account, one foretelling the other, but despite the way Girard puts it, the 
words of Isaiah do not relate to an event that has already taken place222. The 
epiphany of Isaiah’s Suffering Servant was of course many hundreds of years 
in the past by the time of Jesus’s persecution and the epiphany which that 
constituted, but the event Isaiah foretold had not previously taken place. 
 
‘The Messiah’ is of course the usual concept grouping Isaiah’s Servant and 
Jesus together, one the prophecy, and the other the fulfilment of that 
prophecy. We know from the gospels that Jesus was, by the time of his final 
few days in Jerusalem, a great disappointment to the populace who had had 
such high expectations of him. They had expected him to throw the Roman 
yoke off, and make Israel free and great. In that respect, their expectations of 
the Messiah (a leader anointed by God who would unite the tribes of Israel 
and usher in an age of peace223) were simply incompatible with those of 
Jesus, who used the same ideas in a contrary way.”224 
 
It might be said that Jesus connected the concept of the Messiah to the 
prophecy of Isaiah but the Jerusalem crowds did not, and looked only for a 
                                                 
220 Girard, 2001, pp29-30. 
221 Ibid, p.31. 
222  Ibid. “it is to announce that the life and death of Jesus will be similar to the life and death 
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great leader in the conventional terms of this world. Under a Girardian 
perspective, the dichotomy is a classic one, a microcosm of the conflict 
between God and Satan. One might therefore say of Girard’s position (though 
he does not say it himself explicitly), that the multiple understandings of the 
term ‘Messiah’ are a symptom of the interweaving of mimetic thinking and 
anti-mimetic thinking throughout the Bible. Another example lies in Genesis 
18, where the Lord and Abraham argue about retribution against the city of 
Sodom on account of the sinfulness of some of its inhabitants. 
 
But if Girard sees prophecy as relevant under the two headings of defending 
the sacrificial system and decisively closing off that system through a 
supreme revelation, Brueggemann tends to see it as a sporadic activity 
related to moments of need and opportunity. There is a dichotomy between 
the two writers on this point, and it is not one that can be reconciled readily. 
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The loss of the power to speak of God symbolically  
The loss of the capacity and the habit of speaking of God symbolically and 
metaphorically has an effect on biblical concepts. Take the story of the 
creation in Genesis, for instance, and the huge controversies that persist on 
whether it is a true account or not. The proponents and opponents of 
creationism rarely seem to pause and say, “what if it is true at a symbolic 
level?”, because within our culture, to say that something is a symbolic 
statement is judged as being a low grade of affirmation not actually involving 
a truth-test. The symbol as a viable parallel to truth, important because it 
brings the issue within the human conceptual range, is understood 
intellectually, but given little weight.  
 
The claim that symbolic thinking has declined is not, I think, a controversial 
one, and is seen by many as an effect of modernism and a legacy of the 
Enlightenment. In this, symbolism is defined objectively when put into a 
historical perspective, as background. It may not be noticed in the present or 
recent times, when it is, as it were, within the foreground. Postmodernism, 
despite its rejection of modernistic modes of thought, has not seen any 
notable return to patterns of symbolic thinking, though it may be playing 
host to an interest in symbolism (again, as something distanced from 
present-day culture). Since, in the absence of a consensual approach, 
symbolism is bound to remain an object of study, tackled with reference 
book in hand, rather than an active mode of exchange of ideas, symbolism 
still seems to be stuck largely in a sort of museum status. This is very 
different from the active life of analogical and symbolic forms when they are 
current: 
 
6  The Decay of Biblical Concepts in Modern & 
Postmodern Thought 
 
107 
 
““for analogy to speak not merely to the mind of man but also to his heart, it 
must be subordinated within symbolic models which have for him the 
quality of revelation.”225 
“The medium is the message”, to quote Marshall McLuhan226, and this is 
possibly an unchanging fact about humanity. However, the perception of 
symbols is often confined to a historical perspective. One might conjecture 
that this situation can be viewed under a number of headings: 
1. It applies to old patterns of symbolic thought, on the one 
hand, which are legitimately the subject of academic 
study. 
2. It applies also to categories of thought which are 
incapable of expression in any form of direct factual 
terminology, since language and the conceptual structure 
currently in place do not permit it. 
3. Following Girard, one might claim that certain concepts 
are hidden, and that they are described only tangentially 
by myths, rituals and interdictions. 
 
Point (3) is something which will be explored in detail in later chapters. 
Point (1) is an observation that is simply something to bear in mind – 
patterns of old symbolic thought go out of date; but point (2) is one that is 
useful in a consideration of Brueggemann’s approach. 
 
Brueggemann does not refer to symbolism much, but is greatly concerned 
with interpretation, and sees this as a principal task of the church227. He 
makes it clear that this process, for him, is not just the ordinary business of 
interpreting propositions, but something more involved. Quoting David 
Tracy, he suggests that “for a classic document that is timeless to be timely, it 
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must be interpreted.”228 Of course, this tacitly places him in the camp of 
those who believe that the Bible speaks metaphorically and symbolically, not 
just historically or factually; simple propositional truths, taken as such, 
require little or no interpretation, whilst symbols and metaphors by 
definition always require interpretation.  Indeed, it is the standpoint of 
fundamentalists such as creationists that attempts at interpretation are 
intrinsically a sign of being in error, because they knock at the foundation of 
the idea of the text as a factual statement which is always true and always to 
be received in the same sense.  
 
It would also be true to say that Brueggemann reveals a postmodern 
standpoint in his attitude to interpretation. Addressing those who work 
within the church on Bible study, he states, 
 
“This…is a bid that such a reader of these essays recognize himself/herself 
as an interpreter, as one with a responsibility to decide, yet again, what the 
church may be saying to the church as God’s live word, and as one with 
enormous freedom in that act of interpretation. That freedom means that the 
interpreter has wide latitude in ‘discovering’ a voice in the text and in 
‘assigning’ a voice in the text. As a consequence the interpreter is 
inescapably ‘making’ meaning and not just ‘finding’ meaning, so that 
interpretation is an imaginative act of construction. 229 Any thought that we 
may present ‘biblical truth’ without interpretation is an illusion and 
indicates an unfortunate deficit of self-knowledge on that part of the 
interpreter.”230 
 
                                                 
228 Brueggemann, 2009, p.13. 
229 “The term poesis from which we derive ‘poetry’ means to ‘make’ or ‘perform’. Thus 
interpretation is a ‘making’ as well as a receiving’” [Brueggemann’s footnote]. 
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Brueggemann identifies ‘meta-issues’ of which a church interpreter needs to 
be aware.231 These are enumerated as follows: 
 
1. Two tyrannies 
i. Confessionalism: under this heading, he traces the 
medieval tendency to make the Bible the servant of the 
church’s dogma, the tendency following the 
Reformation to free the Bible from interpretative 
monopoly, and regard it as its own testimony, the rise 
of historical criticism as an attempt to thaw the text 
from church authoritarianism.  
ii. Reductionism: he also refers to this as ‘the tyranny of 
the academy’, and it is directed against historical 
criticism which has “functioned to overcome the 
intellectual scandal of the text that attested the 
unfettered freedom of God,  the stunning energy of 
God’s miraculous presence in the world, and the 
revolutionary ethic that is an embarrassment to a 
managed world.   
 
He sums up. “Both ‘literalists’ and ‘liberals’ are beset by 
these tyrannies, in both cases seeking to reduce the 
power and elusiveness of the text to a controllable 
dimension.” 
 
2. Two temptations 
i. Privatisation: the reduction of the Bible to a personal 
guide, devoid of the “powerful communal dimensions of 
the text”, a “resource for one’s comfort and well-being”.  
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In the hands of the religious right, it becomes “ ‘family 
values’, personal virtues, and moral norms”. The result 
is that the discourse of the church “withers to safe 
personal, interpersonal subjects that align the Bible in a 
vote for the status quo.” 
ii. Politicization: this temptation “makes an easy and 
uncritical move from the text to contemporary issues, 
while hiding or denying the complex interpretive 
manoeuvre that makes the connection possible. The 
politicization of the text “runs the risk of denying the 
transcendent mystery of God and the eschatological 
claims of the text. Thus the core biblical metaphor 
‘Kingdom of God’ cannot be immediately equated with 
any social construct we may have devised. The 
temptation moves in the direction of idolatry that 
wants to regard one’s own political advocacy as an 
ultimate expression of biblical intentionality. 
 
3. Two tendencies 
i. Equilibrium: this is to do with the legitimation of 
structure, which “generates rationales for the 
maintenance of the way things are”.  
ii. Transformation; this propensity “emphasizes 
liberation, distributive justice, and the gift of freedom 
out beyond conventional social habits. I have termed 
thus inclination ‘the embrace of pain’, by which I 
suggest that these texts reflect a deep awareness of the 
suffering caused by present arrangements, and the 
conviction that God wills other for the world.” 
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The two Tendencies are in a way opposites, and Brueggemann apparently 
disapproves of the first and approves the second, but the same is not true in 
the other sections, which simply enumerate undesirable aspects. From the 
point of view of our present concern, symbolism, it can be seen that 
problems occur in biblical interpretation both when the symbolic nature of 
biblical writing is ignored or denied, and the texts are treated as 
straightforward propositions to be tested on a historical basis; or when the 
biblical symbolic method is ignored and the symbolism of the present 
authority (be it church or state) is followed instead. What Brueggemann is 
seemingly working towards is the message that interpretation is required 
because the texts are not amenable to an immediate understanding, and that 
application of the texts to the present moment and time, whatever that may 
be, require understanding of the texts’ underlying agenda. In both cases, a 
loss of the power to speak of God symbolically is involved. 
 
This brings us back to biblical concepts and the vehicle that carries them, the 
texts, stand in need of interpretation out of the literary, historic and cultural 
capsule of their writers and into that of present readers: “our appropriation 
of biblical texts is always and inescapably contextual and contested. Faithful 
reading requires a full recognition of the complexity of the text and an 
equally full recognition of the complexity of social reality in the midst of 
which we do our interpretation”.232 
 
Brueggemann does not explore what the effects on concepts might be of 
faithful (or unfaithful) reading, but it seems to be a matter of simple 
deduction that there must be an effect, and he himself alludes to that effect in 
action in the failure to comprehend eschatological issues of ‘the Kingdom of 
God’ noted in the temptation of politicization, above. 
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Therefore, to Brueggemann, the failure of concepts lies largely in a failure to 
adopt an adequate approach. He seems to view culture as a cyclical process, 
and for the present time to be at a low point when it comes to its capacity for 
interpretative understanding. The response indicated is better discipline. 
Girard, on the other hand, is inclined to see development as progressive in a 
more linear way, leading finally to apocalypse233. He therefore tends to note 
that certain important concepts can become extinguished or can become 
newly apparent through a non-cyclical shift in understanding. At an extreme, 
this can result in the appearance of atheism, which he claims comes out of 
the rise of Christianity234. 
 
Girard sees the mimetic system as essentially hidden, but capable of 
exposure, and seminally exposed by Jesus, though several times since lost 
again.  His work is one of explanation of the truths which Jesus identified. In 
other words, Girard puts in contemporary explanatory terms what Jesus and 
some others have explained in other ways. To that extent, Girard is not only 
explaining prophecy, he is doing a prophet’s work.  
 
However, there is more to the reclamation of biblical concepts than their 
explanation. The central importance of symbols is strikingly put by Ricoeur: 
“symbols give rise to thought”235, a maxim which he describes as the 
principle by which a solution will be found to the problem of how to re-
integrate imagination with reflection.  
 
Fawcett pauses to consider the mythology of modern man in the last few 
pages of his important study236.  However, his approach is largely a 
preservationist one; he seeks to point out ways in which old symbols can be 
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brought into creative life, and also allow new symbols to be formulated and 
brought into use.  
 
Ernst Cassirer observed 
“In every work of art, says Carlyle, we discern eternity looking through time, 
the godlike rendered visible.”237 
What the project of reclaiming biblical concepts needs is not just penetrating 
understanding and explanation, but also an element of this artistic ability to 
inject the concept into the soul, by rendering the godlike visible. Girard 
understands the role of literature in achieving this, and Brueggemann the 
specific role of prophetic texts. 
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Brueggemann sees the meaning of the biblical texts (and, indeed, of all texts) 
as being inextricably bound up with the world-view of their creators.  
Accessing the meaning therefore depends upon understanding the 
normative concepts which assembled themselves into a world-view. So, 
although Girard is concerned with areas of behaviour which may be judged 
to be pre-conceptual, in the sense of not being articulated as ideas in their 
own time, but only in ritual and myth, Brueggemann focuses on analysing 
texts and uses his analysis to build up a world-picture of the people by whom 
and for whom those texts were composed. 
 
Brueggemann refers to this as the ‘Dominant Version of Reality’238 of the 
culture, place and time. Girard does not have such a neat term, but perhaps 
would not disagree with Brueggemann’s. The construct, according to 
Brueggemann, is found within societies generally (though it varies in type) 
and is very powerful in its effect in shaping understanding. It obscures, 
denies or makes invisible other versions of reality, which then seem not to 
pass the test of truth or reason. Prophets, therefore, may be seen as cranks 
babbling or wailing nonsense in the wilderness until and unless their version 
gains sufficient currency to challenge the Dominant Version of Reality. At 
that point, they cease to be perceived as mere cranks and instead become 
either a threat or a salvation.  
 
The dominant version of reality amongst us (meaning in present-day 
western society) is a narrative of violence, according to Brueggemann in 
Deep Memory239.  This is a comment about violence not only as the default 
method of authority, but also as a motif or constituent feature imbuing a 
society configured in God’s absence: 
“The dominant version of reality among us is a narrative of violence. This can 
run all the way from sexual abuse and racial abuse to the strategy of the 
wholesale imprisonment of “deviants” to military macho that passes for 
policy. It eventuates in road rage and in endless TV violence piped in our 
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homes for our watching pleasure. I suspect that underlying all of these 
modes of violence is...economic violence.” 240   
And when God is absent, “everything is possible”, and people become 
increasingly selfish and brutalising241. Later, we shall be drawing upon the 
work of René Girard to look at the idea of the Christian message as a counter-
imagination of the world, that is, in terms contrary to those of violence. 
 
The idea of violence as the underlying force in human society is of course not 
new, and occurs in the myth-based schemes of antiquity, particularly where 
a golden age at the beginning of history gave way to a human scheme based 
upon ‘plots and violence and the wicked lust for possession’.242 This is also 
the analysis of Girard, and one of the foundations of his theory. The history of 
the Exodus may be seen as the configuration of a society to avoid that trap, 
and indeed to avoid the process exhibited in the myths, the ‘sacred 
universe’243 in which violence became enshrined.244   
Brueggemann speaks of prophecy as the sub-version of reality245, a 
deliberate double-entendre referring to the paradigm-shift246 involved in it, 
since it articulates an alternative to the DVR; and also to its subversive effect. 
In considering this, the first thing to be done is to examine the relationship of 
the sub-version of reality (the essential stuff of the incipient paradigm shift) 
to the everyday world and established attitudes, and see how and when it 
successfully changes perceptions of reality. 
  
 
                                                 
240 Ibid. 
241 Brueggemann, 1997, p.8. 
242 Cohn quotes Ovid: “Punishment and fear did not exist, nor were threatening phrases to be 
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The Dominant Version of Reality and the Contemporary World 
Brueggemann views the contemporary state of the church in America as 
‘enculturated’ into consumerism247, and he looks to the prophetic ministry of 
the Old Testament, and particularly to Moses, for a way out of this 
predicament. In other words, his Old Testament study is to some extent 
teleological and its object is the problems of our own time. However, this 
part of his project gets relatively little of his attention and is not complete.  
As we shall see, in considering his work alongside Girard’s, it is on Girard 
that we rely mainly for a direct commentary on how things are in the 
contemporary age248. Girard’s understanding has a single, linear track to it; 
Brueggemann’s commentary is much more based on historic parallels. That 
is not to say that Brueggemann does not have a vision on how things will 
turn out; he does, and it could be argued that his vision is a fuller one than 
Girard’s.  This situation has a bearing on where, in these texts themselves, 
commentary ends and prophecy may begin.  
In The Prophetic Imagination, he explores the hypothesis “the task of 
prophetic ministry is to nurture, nourish and evoke a consciousness and 
perception alternative to the consciousness and perception of the dominant 
culture around us.”249  ‘Prophecy’ is not simply defined, but is made the 
subject of an extended discussion on ‘what prophets do.’ The key word, he 
says, is ‘alternative’, and he drives at finding a realisation of this which is 
durably alternative, that is, will not become domesticated, but reliably hold 
together the twin qualities of criticism and energizing – qualities which he 
goes on to explore in the ministry of Jesus. The state of perpetual revolution 
which they suggest, with its dual basis, has to avoid the two traps of 
liberalism and conservatism250.  Moses is an appropriate example to use of 
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this in action, since he stands at the point of formation of the nation, and 
because that formation was internal in the sense that no external human 
agency or existing organisational model was involved. Its effect in essence 
was the evocation of an alternative consciousness to that of royal Egypt, and 
its means was prophecy: “prophecy is born precisely at that moment when 
the emergence of social reality is so radical and inexplicable that it has 
nothing less than a theological cause.”251 
Brueggemann characterizes the imperial aspect which ran through religion 
and society in Egypt as ‘the royal consciousness’, the consciousness which 
‘undergirded’ the regime of ancient Egypt and made that regime possible.252  
The counter-community called into existence by Moses is polarly opposed to 
it.  More generally, this relationship equates to the status quo versus 
prophecy. The royal consciousness makes God domestic, and therefore not a 
challenge to the status quo. God is dissociated from risk, and instead is 
associated with the stability achieved by the regime.  
Brueggemann asserts253 that “it seems probable that the radicalness of the 
Mosaic phenomenon cannot be separated from the social setting of the 
Hapiru”.254 That is to say, its radical politics tend to go with that irregular 
form of society, and by the same token, very different standards hold in 
settled circumstances. Brueggemann is apparently thinking thoughts like 
those of Hosea, when he says on God’s behalf, “I will make you live in tents 
again”.255 
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252 Brueggemann, 1978, p.28. 
253 Brueggemann, 1978, p.30. 
254‘ Hapiru’ refers to a nomadic people living in the Fertile Crescent (that is, from present day Iran 
to Egypt) roughly between 2000 and 1200 BCE. From various sources, it is apparent that they are 
regarded as not only nomads but also invaders, outlaws and migrant labourers. 
255 Hosea 12:9. 
7 The Dominant Version of Reality 
 
118 
 
The Common Religion of the Near East, prevailing dominant 
Versions of Reality and the Power of God 
Before we move on, it will be worth dwelling for a moment on how Israel and 
the Old Testament tradition generally both fit within and differ from their 
own larger cultural setting, which one might describe as the owner of the 
Dominant Version of Reality on a regional scale. This has considerable 
implications for ideas of the power of God, and will also help set the fugitive 
community of Israel in the wilderness in its two important contexts: first, its 
self-definition over against the royal consciousness of Egypt, and second, its 
self-definition over against general pattern of religion in the Near East at that 
time. 
Brueggemann quotes256 Gottwald’s revision of the views of Morton Smith257 
on the ‘common theology’ of the Near East in Old Testament times. Smith had 
argued that religious belief all over the Near East then had a similar 
structure, differing only in detail between individual cultures258.  Gottwald, 
in his seminal study of the socio-religious make up of Israel, observed that 
“We immediately detect points where the Israelite religion stands out as a 
highly idiosyncratic version of the common theological pattern.”259 
 
 
                                                 
256 Brueggemann, 1992, p.6. He acknowledges a debt to Patrick D. Miller (1973) pp 37-62, 
who has “most helpfully explored this issue”. 
257 Smith, 1952, 35-47. 
258 Brueggemann summarises points made by Morton Smith as characteristics of the common 
theology: 
a. The god believed in is addressed in exaggerated and flattering prayer and praise, and 
is claimed to be the only God, even if it is a minor god in a pantheon.  
b. This god is claimed to be effective in all realms of history, nature and morality. 
c. This god is regularly characterized as both just and merciful, as the object of both 
fear and love. 
d. This god, in any culture, is one who punishes those who offend him and rewards 
those who please him or her: that is, it is a theology of strict retribution. Smith calls 
this ‘essentially contractual’. 
e. Prophets are important in such a system and are everywhere honoured, because they 
know of the god’s will and so can speak about the prospects for rewards and 
punishments. Indeed, the prophets are human agents who know what actions can 
lead to life or death. (Brueggemann, 1992, pp 5-6). 
259 Gottwald, 1979, p.679. Brueggemann quotes this in Old Testament Theology p.8., and 
uses it as a starting point for his own thesis on the matter. 
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Gottwald’s Scheme 
Gottwald’s revision of Morton Smith in respect of the religion of Israel (not of 
the region generally) marks the entrance of sociological analysis into what 
had previously been the domain of a religio-historical approach260.  His 
scheme contains various points: 
a. The sole high God usurps the sacred domain; 
b. The sole high God is conceived by egalitarian socio-political analogies; 
c. The sole high God is coherently manifest in power, justice, and mercy; 
and 
d. The sole high God is interpreted by egalitarian functionaries.261 
Gottwald lays considerable stress on the ‘mutations’  of faith in Israel away 
from the common form:  “…one must say that the Old Testament itself is a 
mighty struggle between the common theology that has great strength in 
Israel and the mutations that seek to transform that theology.”262.  
Brueggemann seizes upon these and focuses on the aspect of power: 
“statements about God are also understood as statements about misuses of 
human power and the proper use of human power.”263 In other words, 
Gottwald and Brueggemann are making claims for the religion of Israel as 
having a combined theological and social dimension related to power which 
is not found in other Near-East religions of ancient times.  
Therefore, it is Brueggemann’s claim that the new social reality of Israel was 
radically discontinuous with that of the region and with the state religion 
Egypt. The differences are rooted in social reasons – the experience of 
oppression in Egypt, and because of the perceived effectiveness of its 
theological mandate. That began with the discrediting of the gods of Egypt, 
who were powerless to act in response to the third plague264 summoned up 
                                                 
260 Gottwald characterises this approach as ‘historical-critical’, and notes it as an heir of 
Renaissance studies of ancient writings, which reached maturity in the Enlightenment. 
Gottwald, 2009, pp5-6. 
261 Brueggemann, 1992, p.7, referring to Gottwald, 1978, chs. 53-54. 
262 Brueggemann, 1992, p.8. 
263 Brueggemann, 1992, p.7. 
264 Exodus 8:17. 
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by Aaron. At that moment, the imperial religion and the politics of 
oppression collapsed in the face of the ‘new free God’.265  The new formula 
then endured from the 13th century to the year 1000 BC as a ‘viable social 
reality’266, before the idiosyncratic reign of David, followed by the process of 
abandonment of the Mosaic scheme and its radicalism which set in under 
Solomon from 962 onwards.267 
Other scholars would uphold some of this, but not its particular emphasis, 
which comes of the socio-literary approach in which Brueggemann follows 
Gottwald. This has overturned many of the conclusions of previous 
approaches, particularly the historical-critical method268. Therefore, it would 
be fair to say that Brueggemann is proceeding on the basis of a particular 
understanding of the nature of the formation of the nation of Israel, and this 
understanding is not universally accepted. 
Despite this, what is of particular interest to us is how it fits with the 
thinking of Girard. In a Chapter entitled Job as a Failed Scapegoat in The Voice 
from the Whirlwind269, Girard lays out a critique from which one can distil a 
drama related to a DVR and God perceived as part of it. Job, who is loath to 
protest until driven to it, is a tacit prophet; he stands for an incorruptibility 
which the DVR cannot countenance. Supposedly prophetic advice is given by 
Satan and by Job’s ‘friends’, who claim to discern reality and the transfer to 
God is made on the basis of vox populi vox dei.270 God goes along with the 
DVR for a long time, during which Job submits to suffering he believes he 
does not deserve. But God has a greater game imperceptible to man, within 
which the scapegoat carries suffering and by doing so facilitates a process of 
change, in which not only the ideas of the DVR but those of God himself are 
                                                 
265 Brueggemann, 1987, p.16. 
266 Brueggemann is very concerned with social reality, and credits Berger and Luckmann with 
developing thinking in this area. He also refers to “Israel’s powerful discernment that 
Yahweh’s presence is always intensely related to social experience and social reality.”  
[Brueggemann, 1992, p.143]. 
267 In making these claims Brueggemann refers to George Mendenhall, who described  
the achievement of Solomon as ‘the paganization of Israel’ (Mendenhall, 1963, chs. 7-8) 
268 The historical-critical method is scientific in nature, “tries to establish the actual origins of 
the text and to evaluate the probability that things happened in the way described”. 
[Gottwald, 2009, p.5]. 
269 Girard, 1992. 
270 Ibid., p.186. 
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adjusted. The DVR is understood as an expression of the territory of God’s 
favour; the preconceptions upon which any DVR are founded (the essential 
corruptibility of human nature in this case) are also held to be God’s 
expectations, and with the change in these expectations a new era dawns. 
The new dawn occurs after a nadir in which ‘limit situations’, referred to by 
Ricoeur, are found.271 In the book of Job, the nadir is one embodied in the 
condition of Job himself.  
This is not Girard’s analysis, but the present writer’s. It is however consistent 
with Girard’s thinking.  
One might go further and find an analogy for Gottwald-Brueggemann’s ideas 
on the profile of Israel in the region and its common religion, as an ethical 
coalition, defined over against its neighbours by its ethical stance. The 
adjustment of the concept of the human capacity for justice and God’s 
emerging support for the just as newly defined is a process of change in 
which scapegoats play an important part at a personal cost. 
 
 
 
Review 
Our research question, Part 1: Concepts and versions of reality, was to 
investigate ‘biblical concepts’, the ‘dominant version of reality’, and relate to 
prophecy and sacrifice.  The outcome may be summarized as follows:  
 ‘Concepts’ turns out to be all too approximate a term for something 
both related in some way to ideas, but simultaneously non-cerebral, a 
category of instinctive behaviour, containing elements which Girard 
says are part of ‘hominization’. This is particularly the case with 
sacrifice.  
 
                                                 
271 See page 14 for a summary of this. 
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Prophecy, Brueggemann argues powerfully, is a voice raised against 
the DVR, but sacrifice may be either this or a mode of procedure 
within the DVR – or both. When concepts exist both within and 
outwith the DVR, a confusing unresolved hybrid may result – and this 
has been the case with Christian sacrifice since the time on earth of 
Jesus, and remains a besetting problem even now, adding a shroud of 
misunderstanding to a subject which, according to Girard, is already 
rendered deeply mystifying by traits in human behaviour which have 
a quality of invisibility about them. 
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PART 2:  
THE FADING CONCEPT OF SACRIFICE
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“In the Bible the victims, not the persecutors, have the last word, and for that 
reason the scapegoat mechanism is unmasked and rendered inoperative .That 
is why the death of Christ is not a sacrifice even though as an event it would 
seem to have re-enacted the primal violence. The gospel writers describe how 
the violence against Jesus became unanimous through mimesis. At the end, 
Jesus was rejected by the entire society: by the Jewish leaders, by the Romans 
and even by his own disciples...He was killed as the innocent victim who 
renounced violence and turned the other cheek. The sacrificial 
reinterpretation of Jesus’ death, from the epistle to the Hebrews onwards, 
marks the failure of human beings to follow Jesus in embracing total 
nonviolence”272 
 
Girard’s Evolving Views on Sacrifice 
Girard’s best-known works on sacrifice – Violence and the Sacred (1977) and 
Things Hidden (1987) are amongst his earlier publications. However, I See 
Satan Fall Like Lightning (2001) and other more recent work have seen some 
withdrawal from the extreme claims of his earlier position. Particularly 
notable are the views expressed in his 1993 discussion with Rebecca 
Adams.273 For the most part, it is this later, modified argument that is 
considered in this chapter. However, the earlier view cannot simply be 
ignored as superseded, as the later view is only articulated as a modification 
of the earlier view, and in any case is not completely documented in its own 
right. A synthesis of early and late writing is therefore inevitable. The 
position is further complicated by the fact that, despite Girard’s modification 
of his position on sacrifice, it is his earlier view which tends to be 
remembered and quoted by many other writers, particularly by those who 
are inclined to put a contrasting view. For instance, Chauvet comments as 
follows: 
“...the success twenty years or so ago within Christian circles of the non-
sacrificial reading of Jesus’ death by René Girard should also be noted. It was 
                                                 
272 Davis, 1989, p.324.  
273 Adams & Girard, 1993. 
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indeed tempting to make use of the author’s general theory in order to 
denounce a theological interpretation of Christ’s death and the Eucharist 
that laid excessive stress on sacrifice and expiation...But there are also good 
reasons to beware of Girardian theory: first of all, is he not in the process of 
burning the sacrifice that the Church so much ‘adored’ in the past? Then, 
‘how can one not be a Christian’ if one follows Girard to the letter; that is to 
say, in saying that the heart of Jesus’ message is to denounce the victimizing 
sacrificial process in the way that he understands it? Finally, if theologians 
turn anthropologist, it is a truism to say that they run the serious risk of 
levelling out the cultural and religious particularities of sacrifices...”274 
In summary, Girard’s critics acknowledge the breadth and significance of his 
claims but tend to resist two things:  
1. The exclusiveness of his theory in general275, which seems to be 
asserted in the early work276, and in the work of some of his 
followers277. 
2. The correctness of some of his forays into disciplines outside his own, 
such as anthropology278.  His view is therefore often that of an 
outsider279 to a particular academic area, and inconsistent with the 
general consensus within it. However, this aspect is not necessarily 
judged a weakness.  For instance, Andrew Lascaris applauds this 
aspect of Girard’s project: “I myself feel closer to those attempts, 
which, like Girard’s, try to dismantle the boundary fences between the 
                                                 
274 Chauvet, 2010, pp.158-9. 
275 Reference has previously been made to the Girard-Darwin conference in Cambridge, 
October 2009, when Rowan Williams and Sarah Coakley expressed reservations about 
Girardian thinking. The point here is that they emphasized their opposition to any idea that 
Girard’s thinking was an adequate and sufficient substitute for other competing theories of 
human behaviour at a general level. 
276 Particularly in Violence and the Sacred (Girard, 1977). 
277 The most powerful and outspoken of whom may be Robert Hamerton-Kelly, whose work 
for instance on the Gospel of Mark, subjects the whole account to a mimetic interpretation. 
(Hamerton-Kelly, 1994). 
278 For instance, the Belgian anthropologist Luc de Heusch contributed a strongly critical 
article to Le Monde (le Monde, 25 June 1982, p.19), entitled “L’Evangile selon Saint-
Girard”. 
279 Indeed, the impression that Girard is by nature an outsider not only as an academic but in 
his personal life is explored by his interlocutors Pierpaolo Antonello and Joao Cezar de 
Castro Rocha in Evolution and Conversion (Girard, 2007, pp26ff.).  
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various disciplines, constituting a parallel movement to 
postmodernism.”280 
 
 
Criticisms of Girard: Gnosticism 
Charles Davis made some strong criticisms of Girard on the basis that his 
faith in the Christian gospels is not scientifically grounded281, and he lists 
problems which he says add up to “multiple questionableness”282. These 
criticisms are directed at Girard’s earlier work, and were published in 1989.   
Davis admits to being tempted by the aspect of Girard’s theory that 
interprets the gospels as a call to the total renunciation of violence. However, 
he is unhappy about the claim being exclusive to Christianity, as he says that 
exclusive claims tend to end up in violence, as history demonstrates. 
Therefore, a narrow view of the gospels, focussing on their command to 
renounce violence in fact leads to the promotion of violence. He is also chary 
of what he sees as Girard’s straightforward acceptance of gospel texts at face 
value, in a way which renders them into “persecution texts” directed against 
the Jews283.  
Davis also makes a point about the involuntary nature of sin, according to 
Girard. According to his analysis, mankind has no option but to sin until eyes 
are opened to the possibilities of avoiding such sin by exposing the trap of 
mimesis; mimesis is “structurally necessary to human beings because 
otherwise desire has no object”284 
                                                 
280 Lascaris, 1989, p.417. 
281 Davis, 1989, p.327. Davis is saying that Girard takes insufficient account of the analytical 
work of biblical scholars. 
282 Davis, 1989, p.327. 
283 Davis, 1989, p.326. 
284 Davis, 1989,p.325. 
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“what he outlines is a gnostic anthropology. Human nature is structurally 
evil. It is not a question of sin, but of being trapped in a structurally 
necessary, but destructive mimesis.”285   
The talk of things structural does not end there. “Religion would not retain 
its structuring power in the formation of society if it did not hide the 
generative violence at its origin.”286 Religion works on the basis of taking the 
murder of an innocent victim, and camouflaging the murder as sacrifice. The 
camouflage is what is meant by religion: 
“Myths are composed from the point of view of the murderers. Behind the 
sacralization of the victim, it is easy enough to discern the accusations of 
which the victim is the object. The victim is made responsible for the 
disaster, the catastrophes, which are afflicting the community. While 
present and alive in the community, the victim is considered as a cause of 
death; when dead as a source of life.”287 
Davis’s commentary is pungent and acerbic; he is a harsh and unforgiving 
judge. However, he is taken to task by Andrew Lascaris, in a milder and more 
measured, but nevertheless telling way: 
“Contrary to Davis, it seems to me to be difficult to deny that mimesis 
(imitation) is a fundamental law of human existence...Satan is the mimetic 
principle in so far as he perverts human relationships and creates rivalry”288 
He goes on,  
“We do not have to escape from mimetic desire as such, but only from the 
possibility of its destructive consequences” 289 
Lascaris’s understanding of Girard is therefore much less harsh than Davis’s. 
He disputes the conclusion that Girard’s view of human nature is inescapably 
pessimistic, and disputes Davis’s suggestion that, under Girard’s view, 
human nature is “structurally evil”, which he says is Davis’s interpretation 
                                                 
285 Davis, 1989, p.321.. 
286 Davis, 1989, p.319. 
287 Davis, 1989, p.319-320. 
288 Lascaris, 1989, pp.417-418. 
289 Lascaris, 1989, p.419. 
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only and not what Girard actually said.290 He then floats the idea that original 
sin is preceded by “original blessing”291. He is referring to the sequence in 
which mimesis precedes the scapegoat mechanism and its consequent 
violence, and he makes a point which Girard stresses in his later work: 
mimesis is not necessarily bad. To be human is to be mimetic, and to have 
our existence standing at the centre of a network of relationships. To have 
that place is the ‘original blessing’. To violate the network is, in Lascaris’s 
view, to be violent.  
“However... as a matter of fact we order our relationships on the basis of 
violence, for we reject the place allotted to us and want to be like God. 
Stories such as that of Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel, the Flood and the tower 
of Babel, are all attempts, based on ordinary human experience, to show 
how this can happen. By appealing to the ‘original blessing’, by 
remembering the discovery of being free when Israel was expelled from 
Egypt, and by referring to Christ, our violence is slowly revealed and new 
ways are opened.”292 
Lascaris goes on to question Davis’s view (drawn from that of Burton L. 
Mack, and admittedly showing some signs of stepping back from Mack’s 
position), that the gospels were written to incriminate the Jews. Lascaris 
says, the gospels were written to show that “we Christians were persecutors 
before we became converted”293.   
Lascaris is therefore inclined to see mimeticism as both a fundamental 
human ability and as the cause of a dilemma between the ‘original blessing’ 
vested in humans, and the temptation vested in possibilities for self-
promotion over others and rivalry with God, which is how he interprets 
original sin.  This is an interesting and persuasive argument, but it is an 
interpretation and in some ways extension of Girard’s theory, just as much as 
Davis’s arguments are. He does not delve into Girard’s theory of the founding 
murder, nor make any critique of Davis’s characteristically raw statement 
                                                 
290 Lascaris, 1989, p.418, referring to Davis, 1989, p.321. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Lascaris, 1989, p.419. 
293 Lascaris, 1989, p.420. 
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that Girard considers scapegoating to be “the murderous deceit which lies 
behind official religion.”294, but he does address Davis’s question,  “is God for 
Girard limited to the New Testament and Christ?”295 For Lascaris, as for 
Girard, Christ is God’s response to a mechanism which is Satanic in its 
operation, and in almost all cases, draws people away from God. One might 
add to that viewpoint that Christ shows how to secure a blessing granted 
much earlier, which human nature unaided had proved itself rarely able to 
secure. 
 
 
The Pre-Biblical Stage: Sacral Kingship as Expressed in Myths and 
Rituals 
In Girard’s view, the Hebrew Bible as we have inherited it commences with 
the end of the period of sacral kingship296 and the start of a new order.  That 
is not to say that there is no overlap: Girard places much emphasis on how 
the earlier biblical texts refer to and base themselves on the need to address 
the following: 
1. Dissolution in conflict, removal of differences and hierarchies which 
constitute the community in its wholeness. 
2. The all against one of collective violence. 
3. The development of interdictions and rituals.297 
The first point involves episodes of destruction through which order in the 
world is imposed or restored (such as the Flood, or the destruction of Sodom 
and Gomorrah).  In the second case, Girard stresses the use of doubles (Esau 
                                                 
294 Davis, 1989, p.324. 
295 Davis, 1989, p.322. 
296 Kingship in early developing societies often cannot be separated from religion and 
response to external, cosmic forces. “Kingship is a unique principle of political organisation 
in that it straddles societies of every type part from the very simplest hunter-gatherer 
communities...even a superficial study of kingship reveals certain core themes that marked 
the emergence of the academic discipline of social anthropology and the comparative study 
of mankind – in particular, the understanding of sacrifice, ritual and scapegoating.” Quigley, 
2005, pp.1-11. 
297 Girard, 1987, p.142. 
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and Jacob, Jacob and the angel at Jabbok) to demonstrate that the crisis of 
‘warring brothers’ is only resolved by expulsion.  In the third, effective 
practice (circumcision, sacrifice and blessing), for instance) is a practical 
means of understanding and processing the will of God.  
In these foundational passages, the stage is set for God’s intervention, and 
alteration of the existing understandings. So, in the episode of Abraham and 
the sacrifice of Isaac, we see God rescinding his perceived command to 
sacrifice the child, and in the substitution of animal sacrifice; when God 
intervenes after Cain’s murder of Abel to protect Cain, and forbid more 
murder, we see the emergence of an explicit law interdicting an important 
type of mimetic violence. Girard observes (in relation to the story of Joseph 
and his brothers), 
“The authors of Genesis have recast a pre-existent mythology, adapting it in 
the spirit of their special concerns. This involves inverting the relationship 
between the victim and the persecuting community.”298 
Girard, referring to Max Weber’s conclusions, opines in relation to his 
comments on the Cain and Abel episode that the biblical writers “have an 
undeniable tendency to take the side of the victim on moral grounds and 
spring to the victim’s defence”299. Cain, is of course, only newly become the 
victim, having previously been the aggressor, but it is the present situation 
which is of interest here, the situation after the mythological account closes. 
In an account written much later, in Isaiah 52-53, we see God going further 
and identifying with the victim – the Suffering Servant.  
These points serve to illustrate how far Davis, who asks ““is God for Girard 
limited to the New Testament and Christ?”300 is labouring under a 
misunderstanding of the scope of Girard’s concern with the Hebrew Bible. 
Indeed. It tends to support Lascaris’s comment that the gospels were written 
                                                 
298 Girard, 1987, p.151. 
299 Girard, 1987, p.147.  
300 Davis, 1989, p.322. 
8  Prehistory & Girard 
 
131 
 
to show that Christians were persecutors before being converted to another 
role301.   
 
Girard’s Societal Theories 
Girard is knowingly operating in the wake of seminal anthropologists and 
authors on primitive kingship, particularly Emile Durkheim302 and James 
George Frazer303, to whom he frequently refers. His theory is therefore not a 
rejection of all existing thinking, though he claims in several places that the 
influence was not direct, or that his analysis has fundamental differences 
from the earlier models. For instance, he distances himself from Durkheim, 
stating that “contrary to what many people believe, I was never directly 
influenced by Durkheim”304, though he had found reading his work a 
“marvellous experience”, and after doing so he “added a few relevant quotes” 
to his book. True influence came from English writers, and Radcliffe-Brown’s 
Structure and Function in Primitive Society “was really important to me”305.  
However,  a greater degree of influence is apparent in Frazer: “some of 
Frazer’s descriptions were really inspirational” to him, though he has not 
directly continued Frazer’s thought: 
“Some critics have said that Frazer had already recognized the scapegoat 
mechanism in its mimetic sense. This is wrong, because there is no 
scapegoat mechanism in Frazer. For him, the scapegoat is mainly a 
materialized metaphor...he does not see, as I do, that the scapegoat is more 
than a metaphor...”306 
Girard claims that scapegoating precedes kingship. Writing specifically about 
sacred kingship and central power, he states: 
                                                 
301 Lascaris, 1989, p.420. 
302 Author of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). 
303 Author of The Golden Bough (1890). 
304 Girard, 2007, p.140. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Girard, 2007, p.138. 
8  Prehistory & Girard 
 
132 
 
“At first there is neither kingship nor any institution. There is only the 
spontaneous reconciliation over and against a victim who is a ‘true 
scapegoat’, precisely because no one can identify the victim as that and only 
that. Like any human institution, monarchy is at first nothing but the will to 
reproduce the reconciliatory mechanism.”307 
The statement here that monarchy is “the will to reproduce the 
reconciliatory mechanism”, amounts to a declaration that it is linked to 
sacrifice and scapegoating and shares part of the same purpose.  In Evolution 
and Conversion (2007), Girard claims that it is sacrifice that defines human 
development. Whist Eric Gans “proposed a theory of human origins in which 
language acts as a stand-in for actual sacrifice”308, Girard claims that Gans’s 
presupposition that a “higher form of rationality” was present at this stage, is 
incorrect as “that can only follow after a crucial event, like, in my view, the 
victimary mechanism and the scapegoat resolution. It can never precede the 
event itself.”309 
Therefore, Girard is claiming that there is a sequence which commences with 
the initial event that sets up a chain of reciprocal violence (‘the founding 
murder’), and from this effect and the danger which it represents to society 
flows a mechanism for controlling it: victimage, sacrifice and the scapegoat 
mechanism. These are intuitive rather than rational, and expressed in rituals 
and myths, and only later is any form of idea distilled from what is perceived 
as an effective process, sufficient in its own right. In the case of mythology, 
an account which speaks truth about the reality of the world, it both gives 
guidance as to the effects of the process but simultaneously disguises its 
origins.310 
Out of this develops kingship – sacral kingship – in which the good of the 
community is secured through the offices of the king. When bad times come, 
and crops fail, or there is a defeat at the hands of an enemy, the king takes on 
his own person the evil and as it were sucks it out of the community and into 
                                                 
307 Girard, 1987, p.51 
308 Girard, 2007, p.122 
309 Girard, 2007, p.123 
310 Girard, 1987, p.105ff 
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himself. His ritualised death or expulsion sets the community to rights. As 
Girard puts it, “the conditions of ‘royal enthronement’ are those of 
sacrifice”.311 
This is of course not the way most people would seek to explain the entire 
phenomenon of monarchy, be they ethnologists, anthropologists, or social 
scientists – and in the difference is an insight into the totalising effect of 
Girard’s thinking. He feels free to leave aspects out, and say little to explain 
or include general human needs including that for stability, for a single point 
of authority, policy or direction and an expression of group identity, though 
of course he focuses on and develops the important matter of peace-making 
and reconciliation to divine powers. The dynamic aspect of kingship, which 
has a bias for action which group decisions sometimes lack, is not referred 
to, though these are important matters referred to in Israel’s decision to be 
ruled by a king312.  One may therefore speculate whether Israel’s monarchy 
was a step towards reconciliation with the world-view of the region. Let us 
then look at monarchy, and then at the state which in Israel may have 
preceded it.   
 
God as a Monarch 
It seems ironic that the Jewish religion, having begun by at the point at which 
sacral kingship was abandoned, went on to adopt kingship as its mode of 
rule, and further developed its concept of God, to the extent that many 
passages of the Hebrew Bible now describe God in terms of monarchy. How, 
then does the idea of God as monarch fit into the wider context? – that is, the 
legacy of sacral kingship and the developed form in which (as in Isaiah and 
the New Testament) God takes on the suffering of the community.  
It is of course not insignificant here that the Hebrew Bible was first put into 
written form in the time of Israel’s monarchy, and it would seem only natural 
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for parallels to be drawn between divine and secular leaders and links 
between the two to be stressed. The possibility therefore has to be 
considered that the books of the Hebrew Bible written during the period of 
the monarchy reflect an image of God influenced by the experience of earthly 
kingship, and that some other model of God preceded this. 
 
 
 
 
Alternatives to Monarchy 
 
Buried within the Hebrew Bible’s earlier books are sections defined as 
‘Elohist’, which preserve a possibly earlier, orally-transmitted form of the 
religious concepts of at least some of the people who later made up Israel313. 
This is not a matter to which Girard gives attention, but it is very significant 
in the work of Norman Gottwald, who in turn has been influential on 
Brueggemann. Therefore, the phenomenon is interesting form the point of 
view of this study, as it represents a point where the thinking of Girard and 
Brueggemann may begin to overlap.  
Thomas Fawcett, following Philip Berger314 has suggested that when Israel 
“made a radical break with the cosmic order as seen in the myths 
represented by the fleshpots of Egypt”, and with symbolic emphasis walked 
out of Egypt to spend a prolonged period in the wilderness, a new model of 
God was in the process of being forged: “the appearance of an entirely new 
point of view”. As part of this, the Passover was the ritual event for 
                                                 
313 Gottwald refers to the biblical history of the exodus in this connection. However, there are 
a number of views current in academic thought, including ones which place the Elohist later 
in history, and deny that there was any extended period of wandering in the wilderness in 
which Israelites might have developed a nomadic tradition and corresponding social 
structures. Gottwald considers that the Elohist sections were composed in the Northern 
Kingdom 90-850 BCE, some 30-80 years after the first Yahwist accounts were composed at 
Jerusalem under Solomon. Gottwald, 2009, p.82. 
314 Fawcett, 1970, pp204ff, referring to Berger, P.L. 1969, pp.115ff. 
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remembering the birth of the nation at the hand of God315.  This meant the 
end of sacral kingship, defined through mythology, though echoes of it 
remained. Fawcett concludes that the sacral monarchy had been displaced 
but not eliminated, and symbolic language took a new turn as a result, with 
the language previously applied to the king and formulated for his role now 
being reserved for Yahweh exclusively. This perhaps describes a situation in 
which part of the identity of the sacral king has been transferred to God. 
 
El, Elohim & Yahweh 
These sections are immediately distinguished by the different term used for 
God: Elohim, rather than Yahweh. There is much dispute about the precise 
meaning of this title. It is undoubtedly derived from or is a form of the name 
of the Canaanite god El, and indeed, there is amongst other forms ‘El YHWH’ 
or ‘El Yahweh’, apparently meaning the ‘El who truly exists’, or ‘the El who is 
present’.316 There is evidence that there was fluctuation in the 
understandings and rivalries as to the precise identity of the supreme God, 
from the time of the earliest archaeological relics down to the Babylonian 
captivity of the sixth century. Yahweh is a name not known before the time of 
Moses, and seems to emerge with the development of the sense of 
nationhood of Israel. However, the redactions of the Deuteronomists have 
blurred the picture to a considerable extent, and references to Yahweh can 
be found in the text of Genesis as early as Chapter 4317.  The commentary that 
follows is therefore heavily dependent on the reconstructive work of 
scholars and must be regarded as provisional synthesis. 
However, within the Hebrew Bible, there is an apparent difference of usage. 
Amongst scholars, there seems to be some reticence about  reconciling ‘El’ 
and ‘Elohim’, but also some consensus that the plural noun ‘Elohim’ refers 
not to a single, named, defined individual (as Yahweh tends to), but to God in 
a more general sense, "He (or they) after whom one strives", "Who is the goal 
                                                 
315 ibid., p.211. 
316 Becking et al, 2001, p.92. 
317 See Genesis 4:26. 
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of all human aspiration and endeavour", "to whom one has recourse in 
distress or when one is in need of guidance", "to whom one attaches oneself 
closely"318. Some scholars have found a plurality of spiritual entities to be 
implied by the term319, but others describe the plural usage as a mere device 
of speech, like the royal ‘we’. Either way, Elohim is, or are, powerful as a 
protective and ethical force, and a presence in the world which can be 
sensed. (There is perhaps a parallel here with the later concept of the Holy 
Spirit). It is Elohim that called from out of the burning bush, that provided 
the Ten Commandments, and Elohim that wrestled with Jacob, and Elohim 
who instructed Abraham first to sacrifice his son320, and then told him not to. 
321 
                                                 
318 Dillman, cited in Catholic Encyclopedia on line version at 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05393a.htm accessed 29 Dec 2005. 
319 As in Gen 6:2 
320  
Major Episodes of the Elohist Source 
Story Complex Episode Reference 
Ancestral Story   
 Sarah as Sister Genesis 20:1-18 
 Sacrifice of Isaac Genesis 22:1-10, 16b-19 
 Jacob wrestles with God Genesis 32:22-32 
 Joseph Short Story Genesis 37-50 (with J and P) 
Exodus and Sinai   
 Midwives Exodus 1:15-21 
 Burning Bush Exodus 3:1-15 (with J) 
 Exodus from Egypt Exodus 13 
 Wilderness Incidents Exodus 17-18 
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These sections are thought by some to have their origins in the pre-
monarchical era322 , when peoples later integrated in to ‘Israel’ existed in a 
confederation of small units of population323.  According to Gottwald324, this 
confederation represented a coalition on ethical matters. It was this ethical 
stance that distinguished them from other, neighbouring tribes, not a 
dissimilarity of ethnicity or of culture in a more general way. 
Therefore, it may be that the Elohist concept of God resists the personal 
identity which stands at the heart of Yahwism, or else marks a definite move 
away from the personal aspect of sacral kingship in favour of a more diffuse 
but spiritual understanding. Referring back to Gottwald’s ‘ethical coalition’ 
and the idea that Israel was in some sense a movement of peasants (this 
                                                                                                                                     
 Theophany Exodus 19:1-9 
 Ten Commandments Exodus 20:1-17 (with P) 
 Book of the Covenant Exodus 20:18-23:33 
 Covenant Ceremony Exodus 24:1-18 (with P) 
 Golden Calf Exodus 32-33 
Wilderness Experiences   
 Complaints and Disputes Numbers 11-12 
 Balaam and the Moabites Numbers 22-24 
Source:  
http://www.hope.edu/academic/religion/bandstra/RTOT/PART1/PT1_TBB.HTM 
accessed March, 2008 
 
321 But Genesis 22:14 states that Abraham called the place of sacrifice ‘the Lord (Yahweh) 
will provide’. 
322 Though others date their inclusion in the biblical books as quite late, and regard their early 
origin as unproven. 
323 Gottwald states, “My hypothesized dividing line between fully formed Israel and the 
Mosaic and patriarchal prehistories is an admittedly arbitrary one. It is arbitrary, in the first 
place, because Israel emerged as a social system in Canaan by stages. It is impossible to point 
to a single date when Israel came fully into being, and it is necessary to conceive its course as 
a social system in terms of decades which continued up to the verge of the monarchy under 
Saul...this aspects of proto-Israelite life reflected in the patriarchal stories, for instance, may 
have been contemporary with the early stages of the social system of Israel”. Gottwald, 1972, 
p.33. 
324 Gottwald, Norman K. The Tribes of Yahweh  Maryknoll, NY, Orbis, 1979, Ch.5. 
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seems to mean, an egalitarian social structure lacking a ruling class) strongly 
defined by their ethics, then it can be seen that they would tend to reject a 
model of understanding of God which fed upon alien types of social 
structure, and indeed that a diffuse understanding of God might appeal when 
their own social pattern lacked any core structure or personification of 
power. 
 
This view is consistent with the scheme put forward by Gorringe325, in a 
piece about chapter 11 of the Book of Numbers.  This chapter comments on 
difficulties on the journey across the desert, after the exodus from Egypt.  
Gorringe points out that the way through the wilderness, of making sense 
out of chaos, is indicated by God “who is only known in the journey from 
bondage to freedom”. That freedom is found in the uncomfortable 
circumstances of the desert journey, whose uncertainties and lack of comfort 
and choice are quickly resented by some of the group of fugitives. They 
preferred the limitations on fundamental liberty, but plentiful supply and 
choice of material goods which life in Egypt had meant. This there was at this 
stage a split within the travelling community between those who had found 
God in the experience, and those with more material priorities. 
 
What Elohim is offering here is a form of fundamental liberty, but under a 
different appreciation of what is desirable in life to that which is normally 
understood by ‘living well’. To some of those fugitives, it did not seem to 
have the desirable attributes of liberty at all, but a new set of restrictions 
which make it less attractive than their former slavery. In particular, choice 
was taken away from them: for instance, instead of having a range of foods 
available to them, they had only manna to eat, and it quickly became 
                                                 
325 Gorringe, Tim Numbers: Chapter 11  Expository Times   Vol. 117, Number 1, p.13. 
London: Sage Publications, 2005. The passage referred to  is acknowledged to be Elohist, 
though, surprisingly, Gorringe does not mention this point, referring instead to Yahweh as 
the deity. 
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boring326. The dilemma they faced is not one that can conveniently be 
categorized according to the terms of Utilitarian theory, since it hinges on the 
relative value of the opportunities concerned; God was presenting them with 
a radically different view of what it is to be free and happy, of what ‘the good 
life’ truly contains.327 By extension, one might speculate on what constitutes 
the ‘kingdom of heaven’ and certainly one might redefine what is involved in 
appropriate sacrifice. The point is that the exodus itself is a metaphorical as 
well as a historical account328, relating what God asks one to leave behind 
and the difficulty of doing so. 
 
Similarly, Elohim steps outside normal perceptions of goodness by calling 
Abraham to a new kind of ethical imperative.  This involves submission to 
the divine source of all goodness, even when this is in conflict with ethics as 
normally understood,329and even human love itself. As Kierkegaard famously 
described it, God (Elohim) calls Abraham outside ethics330 to a higher duty, 
which Kierkegaard terms ‘the teleological suspension of the ethical’. Under 
this view, a duty to ethics is suspended by a higher duty to God. A revision of 
Kierkegaard’s view which might be proposed, consistent with the general 
thrust of the Elohist texts, is that a superior or more complete form of ethics 
is imposed, and the focus on good within it is only partly discernible to 
humans.  It is key that the form of the sacrifice is not to be a matter of 
convention, but emerges out of a seemingly illogical modification of it. 
In the eighth century BCE, the prophet Hosea provides an interesting insight 
and memory of how life was different when the temptations of a settled life 
and economic self-promotion did not exist: 
                                                 
326 This point is of course easily transferable to criticism of consumerism, and what J. K. 
Galbraith has called ‘the culture of contentment’. 
327 This kind of approach of course surfaces again in the New Testament, where following the 
Way defined by Jesus is defined as the route to blessedness, and to the knowledge of God. 
328 Of course, some suggest that it is not a historical account at all. 
329 But some say that child-sacrifice would not have been considered unethical, in the context 
of the period (Jane Mather: A Jewish Reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear & Trembling: MA 
dissertation, Heythrop College, London University, 2006). 
 330 Kierkegaard, Soren  Fear and Trembling  London: Penguin Classics, 1985. Pp 83-147. 
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“The people of Israel are as dishonest as the Canaanites; they love to cheat 
their customers with false scales. “We are rich”, they say, “We’ve made a 
fortune. And no-one can accuse us of getting rich dishonestly. But I, the Lord 
your God, who led you out of Egypt, I will make you live in tents again, as 
you did when I came to you in the desert.”331  
 
 
What Common Ground? 
It would be easy to conclude that the arguments of Girard and those of 
Gottwald-Brueggemann are at best parallel tracks and that there is no real 
overlap.  However, the work of Raymund Schwager, who has extended the 
application of Girard’s thought within theology, is helpful here. Schwager by 
no means seeks to avoid the problems of God as a violent, sometimes 
apparently irrational, judge of those who either keep his commandments or 
not. 
“The notion of retribution and vengeance permeates virtually all the Old 
Testament books. Note carefully that God never appears as a cool judge 
who, with utter detachment, would guide the people in the strict observance 
of the laws. Yahweh turns out to be a god who is directly affected by the 
deeds of men and women and correspondingly reacts to them...divine 
violence is always an immediate consequence of evil human deeds.”332 
However, Schwager observes that it is humans who incite God’s anger, and 
humans who carry out the violent deeds which are seen to be his 
judgement333. God applies punishment through withdrawal; when he retires 
from the scene, people begin to destroy one another, and when they are left 
to their own devices, nothing good results. This is the fall from grace: 
“Because Adam and Eve sinned, they lost the privilege of being in God’s 
presence...God did not himself punish the transgression of the law by 
                                                 
331 Hosea 12:7-9. 
332 Schwager, 1978. P.57. 
333 Ibid., p,.67. 
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death...but he did deprive them of his presence (the expulsion from 
paradise) and left them basically to their own devices.”334 
Within human behaviour, violence follows jealousy and rivalry, and sacred 
ideas originate in the scapegoat mechanism335, says Schwager with Girard.336  
Sacrificial regulations do not originate from Yahweh’s wishes, but are a 
human invention. The criticisms of sacrifice by the prophets are because 
right knowledge of God cannot come from a cult, but “of historical 
experience. For Yahweh is not a cult God, but ‘God because of Egypt,’ that is, 
because of a historical and historically effective situation.”337 
Here we do have a clear link to the general idea of the Elohist model of God, 
in so far as this is, as Gorringe puts it, the “God who is only known in the 
journey from bondage to freedom338”. 
At this point, we have on the one hand,  
1. God known through a certain type of experience, in which priorities 
are adjusted away from those of human society as it defines itself in 
God’s absence, and towards another standard in which God’s 
commandments are the only authority.  Within God’s scheme, 
sacrifice is not wanted. 
And on the other,  
2. Human nature asserts itself in God’s absence, and under these 
circumstances violence becomes salient. Sacrifice and scapegoating 
are part of this situation, and may be generated by it automatically 
and inescapably.  
 
                                                 
334 Ibid., p.69. 
335 Ibid., 76-91. 
336 And with the coming of Jesus, “the house of the sacred collapses”. Schwager in Girard-
Schwager 1975-91, p.54. 
337 Ibid, p.84. Schwager is quoting Schungel’s Gottesbild, p.94 here. 
338 Gorringe, 2005. 
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The work of Jesus is to attempt a new gathering339, in which (1) is operative 
and (2) is not. Therefore, we may anticipate the new order to resist the 
dominance of human nature, with all that that implies; and to a new scheme 
in which God’s will or law, is the only standard. Sacrifice will, under this 
regime, depend upon an appropriate state of mind, and the human ploys that 
go with achieving dominance will be foregone340. However, first we must 
consider the Old Testament base; recalling as we do so Fishbane’s arguments 
that sacrifice could, from an early stage, be commuted to study of the law.341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
339 Ibid, p.180ff. 
340 See interview with James Williams in Williams (ed) 1996, pp.272-274: sacrifice is only 
efficacious depending on state of mind. Chilton comments that in the episode at the Mount 
of Olives, in which Jesus undoes the slicing off of an ear of one of the temple staff, he does 
this as the mutilation would have prevented that person taking part in ritual; the message is 
that Jesus’s concept of sacrifice is essentially restorative of harm done. (Luke 22:51). Chilton, 
1997, in Religion (1997) 27, p.227. 
341 See pages 55-56. 
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The Lord says, “I hate your religious festivals, I cannot stand them! When you 
bring me burnt offerings and grain-offerings, I will not accept them; I will not 
accept the animals you have fattened to bring me as offerings. Stop your noisy 
songs; I do not want to listen to your harps. Instead, let justice flow like a river, 
and righteousness like a river that never goes dry”342 
 
If sacrifice is a biblical concept, then it should be reasonably possible to find 
a standard definition of what the term normally includes. Brueggemann 
provides such a summary, in  Reverberations of Faith343, ‘a theological 
handbook of Old Testament Themes’, including some comments on what the 
New Testament has done with the Old Testament practice and the concepts 
that lie behind it. 
Of course, as Brueggemann sets out to define the subject of sacrifice, and not 
simply to expound his own views on the matter, an inclusive mode of 
description is in order. There is the opportunity for him to state what others 
have suggested, but which he does not concur with. However, no such 
observations are made. With the exception of some cautionary remarks 
about the interpretative approaches of liberal Protestantism, Brueggemann 
sets out his survey with the implication that it is both uncontroversial and 
complete, including the following main points: 
1. Sacrifice is a sign of the defining importance of God for the life of the 
community. The particulars are largely borrowed from surrounding 
cultures, but adapted to reflect the particular character of Israel’s 
God. 
2. Sacrificial practices are vehicles and instruments designed to 
celebrate, affirm, enhance and repair the defining relationship. 
3. Israel’s linkage to God was probably given expression ‘from the 
outset’ by the dedication of one’s best produce to God. 
                                                 
342 Amos 5:23-24. 
343 Brueggemann, 2002, p.182ff. 
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4. Over time, random and spontaneous gestures of this sort were 
systematized and made into a coherent system. 
5. Sacrifice makes concretely visible what is otherwise a hidden344 
relationship. 
6. Some sacrifices are ‘sacrifices of well-being’, some are restorative, 
some acknowledge God’s ownership of the land and entitlement to its 
produce; some acknowledge God’s generosity. 
7. The most extreme sacrifice is that of one’s child.345 
8. Leviticus 16 prescribes special sacrificial measures for the Day of 
Atonement, including forgiveness and reconciliation.  
9. The ‘interpretative stance’ of liberal Protestantism in relation to 
sacrifice (which involves a denial of its effectiveness as a practice, and 
substitution of indirect aims and effects) will never permit one to 
appropriate either of two things: the wonder or the gravity of the 
claim that God has provided concrete mechanisms for sustaining the 
relationship of God and his people.  ‘Suspicion’ of the act only serves 
to position the commentator ‘outside the wonder of the act’.  
10. Psalm 51:16-17 and Micah 6:6-8 indicate that sometimes material 
sacrifice becomes metaphysical and relational. This is not a 
development from ‘material to metaphorical’, but a different order of 
                                                 
344 The hiddenness of key parts of Israel’s faith is something which Margaret Barker discusses 
at length in Temple Theology (Barker, 2004). Her contention is that the Deuteronomists in 
their revision of the texts and practices of the First Temple suppressed a number of key 
concepts and their revisions had the effect of abolishing much of this sense of hiddenness. 
For instance, they had no creation theology, and the lack of this removed any need for a 
reference to the ‘keys’ of creation. They “forbade the secrets of the holy of holies.(and) based 
their religion on the visible material creation”.(p.36). Barker makes reference to 
Deuteronomy 29:29: “There are things hidden, and they belong to the Lord our God, but 
what is revealed belongs to us and our children for ever; it is for us to observe all that is 
prescribed in this law.” In other words, Deuteronomy turns its back on the hidden things.  
345 Compare Levenson, 1993, p.3ff. Levenson draws on Exodus 22:29-30 to suggest that 
sacrifice of the first-born son was a standard requirement in ancient Israel, but that animal 
sacrifice could be (and usually was) substituted for the human sacrifice. But Levenson also 
suggests that this text be held in balance with others, such as Jeremiah 19:5-6, which abhor 
human sacrifice: “Jeremiah wanted child sacrifice to be considered idolatrous in every 
instance, and, as the majority opinion of scholars shows, history has abundantly granted him  
his wish.” (p.5). 
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reality, in which ‘the practice of sacrifice is a deeply symbolic gesture 
that invites interpretation in a rich variety of directions’346. In other 
words, material sacrifice can simultaneously be an act of 
communication by ‘bodied creatures’ with their unbodied creator, an 
act which is effective in bridging that gap in orders of being. 
11. Prophetic critique of sacrificial practice is recurrent in the Old 
Testament. 
12. Jesus replaced an obsolete form of Jewish sacrifice, a ‘failed system’. 
13. Christian sacrifice is essentially appropriated from the Old Testament, 
in that the gesture of sacrifice is deemed to be efficacious: Christ died 
for my sins, therefore my sins are taken away. 
We shall unpack these issues in detail later, but for the moment the key point 
is that Brueggemann does not see the matter of sacrifice in either Old 
Testament or New Testament as either foundational, complex in conceptual 
terms, or key to understanding biblical texts or society itself. Sacrifice is in 
essence a sign, an outward manifestation, of the defining importance of God. 
In this, he differs profoundly from Girard, as we shall see. However, 
Brueggemann does make the important point that sacrifice is: 
 firstly in its essence a practice, or a process enacted; 
 secondly, a practice which can be interpreted into metaphysical 
and relational terms: 
 thirdly efficacious practice, which can therefore be described as 
‘concrete mechanism’347 (Brueggemann’s term) or method for 
achieving an objective. 
This analysis is unlikely to be faulted by the other writers we consider here, 
though it might be added to. For instance, Chauvet notes the parties to 
sacrifice: 
                                                 
346 Brueggemann, 2002, p.183. 
347 Brueggemann, 2002, p.183. 
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“..Sacrifices, in their extreme diversity, seem to be structured by a link 
between four agents: a sacrificer, who is in charge of the operation; the 
person on behalf of whom the sacrifice is made, who is its beneficiary (and 
who is sometime, as an agent, the same person as the sacrificer); a sacrificed 
object, which is alive, or something that symbolically represents life; and 
finally a recipient, who belongs to a category of beings superior to 
humans...348.  
He goes on to analyse what might be happening at a symbolic level in 
sacrifice, and identifies some drivers not found in either Brueggemann’s or 
Girard’s thinking: 
“...sacrifices...can be interpreted as a symbolic exchange structured by a 
series of opposed couples of which the most all-embracing is without doubt 
that of conjunction/disjunction, a couplet that itself mixes with fundamental 
oppositions like death/life, debt/repayment, sacred/sacrilegious, without 
mentioning elsewhere their links with social structures (like the opposition 
man/woman), cultural paradigms (like the one that exists between nature 
and culture) or economic conditions (like that between prodigality and 
penury, or between the excessive and the derisory), which come 
symbolically into play in this global negotiation.”349 
 
As a further point, Brueggemann points out that sacrifice within the 
traditions of Israel makes apparent, or ‘concretely visible’350 a relationship 
which is otherwise hidden. In this, he perhaps comes close to a part of 
Girard’s mimetic theory, in which sacrifice is identified as the visible aspect 
of an otherwise hidden process. Although there are clear and substantial 
differences of opinion on what it is that is hidden, the fact that both writers 
identify sacrifice as a visible representation or marker of something hidden 
is interesting, though perhaps not unusual within theology these days. 
Brueggemann describes sacrifice as a malleable concept and process, and 
identifies the adaptation of both these aspects within Christianity. He would 
                                                 
348 Chauvet, 2010, p.157. 
349 Ibid., p.157. 
350 Brueggemann, 202, p.182. 
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certainly accept that development took place in earlier centuries, too, and 
this is illustrated by the ending of child sacrifice and the criticisms of the 
prophets.  However, defining the practice of earlier periods requires 
penetration behind the redactions of the Deuteronomists, and is a subject of 
theological controversy, as Gottwald points out. His use of ‘priestly 
redaction’ is synonymous with the ‘Deuteronomistic redaction’ referred to 
by other scholars: 
“The final redaction of the Torah, decisively influenced by the Priestly 
viewpoint, assumed that the worship practices of the postexilic community 
had been received from Moses and had continued unchanged over the 
centuries. Once it is recognized that the cult of ancient Israel underwent 
development over time, the question arises: Is it possible to determine the 
actual worship forms of Moses, or at least of the first Israelites who 
developed the Moses tradition?”351 
 
 
 
Earlier Patterns 
The assumption that the worship practices of the post-exilic community 
remained unchanged since Moses therefore needs adjustment into 
recognition of a plateau in those practices during the Deuteronomistic period 
(the period of ascendancy of the priesthood), with periods of change either 
side. We know what came after that period; what came before is not fully 
evidenced, but may be possible to determine.   
That possibility of course hinges on the method of research and 
interpretation employed.  In the case of Gottwald & Brueggemann, it is a 
socio-literary method, with an eye on the parallel socio-religious method.  
Girard, by contrast, has a method of his own which is often described as 
anthropological, but in fact is more complex than that. It is anthropological-
                                                 
351 Gottwald, 2009, p.120-121. 
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literary-psychological-theological352, and if its strength is in transcending 
normal categories, its weakness is in often failing to satisfy the peer groups 
of experts within normal categories353. However, in this case it is notable that 
Girard’s complex approach enables him to look further back in time than 
Brueggemann, to the foundations of human society, and to develop his 
theory of sacrifice in that direction354. Brueggemann looks no further than 
the regional milieu out of which Israel developed. 
 
Sacrifice as a Phenomenon with Regional Characteristics 
Sacrifice, in its normal sense in the Old Testament, is of course a physical 
matter, though it may have hidden, non-physical elements to it, and it may be 
transcended completely by a new concept, such as that which Fishbane 
articulates355. As a ritual usually involving killing animals and the burning of 
their meat356 (analogous to the preparation of a meal), it was of course 
common to the whole Mediterranean region and beyond in prehistoric and 
ancient times. There are signs that the practice of ancient Israel in this 
regard was very similar to that of other nations in the region357. The sheer 
scale of it is surprising: at Carthage, excavations have revealed a total of 
20,000 urn burials of the remains of child sacrifices. This equates to two a 
week for 200 years, in the period 400 – 200 BCE.358 
                                                 
352 This is how Girard describes his own situation: “Many people see literary criticism as my 
original field, but, in an academic sense, literary criticism is no more ‘my’ academic field 
than anthropology, or psychology, or religious studies. If our ‘real’ field is the one in which 
we are not self-taught, my ‘real’ field is history. In everything that truly matters to me, 
however, I am self-taught.”  Adams and Girard, 1993, p.11. 
353 Coakley is an example of this, referring to the discussion being taken to “the borderlands 
between the sciences, philosophy and theology”. Coakley, 2009, p.16. 
354 In an interview with James Williams, Girard stated that from the moment of his discovery 
of the scapegoat system “I was convinced that archaic cultures, far from being simply lost in 
superstition or having no constancy or stability, represented a great human achievement”. 
Williams (ed.) 1996, p.262. 
355 See page 60. 
356 Though it could involve other sorts of produce instead. However, “slain animals were 
usually regarded as richer and better offerings” Young, 1975, p.22. 
357 Gottwald, 1979, pp 670-671. 
358 Levenson, 1993, p.20. 
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Eusebius359 quotes Philo360 on Saturn’s sacrifice: 
“It was a custom of the ancients in great crises of danger for the rulers of a 
city or nation, in order to avert the common ruin, to give up the most 
beloved of their children for sacrifice as a ransom to the avenging daemons; 
and those who were thus given up were sacrificed with mystic rites. Kronos 
then, whom the Phoenicians call Elus, who was king in the country, and 
subsequently, after his decease, was deified as the star Saturn, had by a 
nymph of the country named Anobret an only begotten son, whom they on 
this account named Iedoud, the only begotten being still so called among the 
Phoenicians; and when very great dangers from war had beset the country, 
he arrayed his son in royal apparel, and prepared an altar, and sacrificed 
him.”361 
However, Israel progressively grew away from child sacrifice, and forgot the 
religious imperatives which seem to have been previously attached to it: 
“They have built shrines to Baal, where they burnt their sons as whole-
offerings to Baal. It was no command of mine; I never spoke of it362, it never 
entered my thought.”363 
Tertullian364, a Christian historian writing at Carthage, regarded child 
sacrifices as plain murder. Child sacrifices were still going on in his time, 
though ‘in secret’365. However, Christian texts on the sonship of Jesus and on 
his being given up as a sacrifice, would have been resonant for many in the 
Mediterranean world. For instance, John 3:16, “God loved the world so much 
that he gave his only Son, that everyone who has faith in him might not die 
but have eternal life”366 Levenson comments that, to a person familiar with 
the Phoenician tradition, there would be a resonance; they  “would recall not 
only the sacrificial death of Iedoud/Ieoud at the hands of Kronos/El, but 
                                                 
359 Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, 263-339 CE. 
360 Philo, Jewish writer at Alexandria, 20 BCE-50 CE. 
361 Ibid., p.26 Eusebius lived 263-339 CE, and Philo 20 BCE-50 CE. 
362 But Exodus 22:28 does speak of it. 
363 Jeremiah 19:5. 
364 160-220CE. 
365 Levenson, 1993, p. 25.  
366 New English Bible. 
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perhaps also Philo of Byblos’s account of the children ‘given up…with mystic 
rites’”367 
 
Norman Gottwald, taking a parallel socio-literary approach to Levenson’s, 
comments on sacrifice as defined within biblical sources368: 
 “The P source369 gives an elaborate description of sacrifices, presided over 
by an Aaronic priesthood with Levitical assistants, and conducted at a 
moveable shrine (tabernacle) housing a wooden chest (ark) that stood in 
the centre of the Israelite wilderness camp.” 
“The sacrificial system according to P included the following types of 
offerings: 
1. Animal offerings burnt on the altar (whole burnt offerings or 
holocausts). 
2. Animal offerings partly burnt370 and partly consumed by priests and 
worshippers (peace or communion offerings). 
3. Animal offerings to atone for sins, not consumed by the guilty 
parties (sin and guilt/reparation offerings). 
4. Grain or cereal offerings. 
5. Offerings of incense or spices. 
6. A display of loaves of bread on a tabernacle table (showbread or 
bread of the presence).”371 
There is, of course, in this procedural guide, no mention of other types of 
offering, the ‘offerings of the heart’, though the principle of substitution 
could apply. Gottwald goes on to comment: 
                                                 
367 Levenson, 1993, p.31. 
368 Gottwald, 2009, pp. 105-164. 
369 The Priestly source of the Pentateuch, dated in the 5th – 6th century BCE. 
370 i.e. immolated. 
371 Gottwald, 2009, pp.121-122. 
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“The socio-religious element in the traditions most often judged to be 
authentic for that period372 is the introduction of a new deity called Yahweh 
and of a new cult that may have included an ark and/or tent and sacrifice. 
To this horizon may also belong a covenant instrument and very likely also 
basic provisions such as the brief Decalogue for the internal ordering of the 
community ... on the other hand, it is evident that the fullest statement of the 
cult, laws, and regulations belong to the socio-historical horizon of priestly 
practice at Jerusalem many centuries later, during the late monarchy, exile 
and Judahite restoration.”373 
Gottwald perhaps controversially links the introduction of a new deity with 
possible new cultic arrangements including sacrifice. That implies that the 
idea of sacrifice, and its delineated limits, flows from the idea of God. To that 
might be added that the definition is bound to be mutual: the ritual and the 
concept feed upon one another. For identical reasons, they may be 
impossible to disentangle. 
Jon Levenson, a Jewish academic, in The Death and Resurrection of the 
Beloved Son, examines the development of human and animal sacrifice 
within Israel, and comments, 
“Animal sacrifice did not replace child sacrifice: the animal substituted for 
the child.374 
In other words, the sacrifice offered is truly the child who is one’s dearest 
possession, and this remained the actual object of commitment; God’s claim 
upon the child was ‘realized’ through the death of the animal stand-in375. 
Levenson argues that understanding of biblical (and indeed in other 
foundational stories in ancient literature) depend on this understanding. 
This is because of Israel’s status as God (Yahweh’s) first born son. He quotes 
Exodus 4:22-23, in which God instructs Moses: 
 
                                                 
372 Meaning the period of the Exodus and the leadership of Moses. 
373 Gottwald, 2009, p.126. 
374 Ibid., p.36. 
375 Levenson also argues that circumcision is a substitution ritual: “you are a bridegroom of 
blood to me because of the circumcision” Exod. 4:26  Ibid., p.49. 
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“Then you shall say to Pharaoh, ‘Thus says the Lord: Israel is my first-born 
son. I have said to you, “Let my son go, that he may worship Me”, yet you 
refuse to let him go. Now I will slay your first-born son.” 
 
Levenson produces other material in support of his view, from Hosea and 
Jeremiah376. He suggests that the description is not purely figurative, because 
it was the habit in ancient times to see close relationships (as in father-son) 
as not dictated merely by biological links. Therefore, to call the sonship of 
Israel a mere figure of speech is “to fail to reckon with the import of the 
biblical story”.377 In other words, a metaphorical interpretation cannot do 
justice to the concepts of the original text, in that the term ‘son’ as applied to 
Israel by God, is not merely metaphorical (drawing an illustrative parallel 
between human sonship and Israel’s relationship with God) , but is intended 
to carry with it statement which is substantial in itself and makes a truth-
claim – whilst remaining a metaphor.  
However, it might be argued that even if this was the principle, in time, the 
practice perhaps gradually usurped it: the price of reconciliation shifted to 
animal, rather than human, currency, and this seems to have involved a shift 
in value.  It is perhaps this that Jesus attempted to address by gathering and 
synthesising former prophetic voices who called for knowledge of God and  
‘a sacrifice of the heart’, that leaves the interests of the self behind378. 
Here, and not for the first time, we encounter a real difficulty in reconciling 
modern patterns of thought to those of the Old Testament. The idea of God 
(Yahweh) as directly involved in the fatherhood of the nation, and the 
flexibility in the application of the term ‘firstborn’ (neither Jacob nor Isaac 
was actually the firstborn of their father)379 represents counter-intuitive 
thought for the modern mind, though the ideas, once tackled, allow insight 
into biblical accounts, in which the first-born, or true heir, is recognized: for 
instance,  
                                                 
376 Hosea 11:1-6 & Jeremiah 31:7-9. 
377 Levenson, 1993,, p.41. 
378 As in Psalm 51:17 and Hosea 6:6. See Mark 8:34-38, Matthew 19:21. 
379 Ibid. 
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“You are my son; I have fathered you this day380 
Levenson goes to some lengths to explain attitudes of substitution. Quoting 
Nils Dahl, he explores the idea of the ram caught in the thicket in the story of 
Abraham and Isaac being equivalent to Jesus: “the ram, rather than Isaac is 
seen as a type of Christ”381. But Levenson goes on to suggest that Paul’s Jesus 
supersedes Isaac, and that this was the understanding within early Christian 
literature382. 
 
 
 
 
The Idea of the Temple & Sacrifice 
We have already commented on how the Temple ritual centred on animal 
sacrifice, as was normal within the cultures in the region.  The ritual put 
across the significance of sacrifice not only with spilt blood, but inspired with 
a more general appeal to the senses: the gorgeous materials of the building, 
the robes, the music, the all-pervading smell of burning flesh. The mystery 
and splendour of the ceremonies and their intoxicating effect spoke 
powerfully to people unaccustomed to anything on such a scale. As Malina & 
Rohrbaugh have commented383, the Temple was the locus of divine presence, 
a cosmic centre understood to be the navel of the world. It “articulated 
structured social relations”, that is to say, it affirmed an order of society in 
which the monarchy and the people were assembled in a sacred hierarchy 
under God, as his own people, ahead of all other peoples in his favour. 
Divinely ordained kingship had brought it into existence, and, tellingly, the 
Hebrew word for ‘temple’ is the same word as for ‘palace’.  God was deemed 
                                                 
380 Ps. 2:7. 
381 Levenson, 1993, p.213. 
382 Levenson quotes Galatians 3:13-14, and also Romans 11:11-29 to support his description 
of the early Christian claim that the relationship between Abraham and God was transferred 
to Jesus and away from the Jewish nation. 
383 Malina & Rohrbaugh, 2003, p.416. 
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to be resident in his temple, and next door in the palace, the king was in a 
parallel state, and authorized by a divine warrant. The Temple therefore 
spanned the concepts of divinity, authority and nationhood, and could even 
be viewed as a moral person, capable of being honoured or dishonoured384. 
Any such honour or dishonour would affect all involved in it, from the king 
down.385  
The Temple was, therefore, in itself symbolic: it revealed a divinely 
sanctioned order. And as the Temple, its people and its processes were all 
assembled to display aspects of God and his plan, his commitment to his 
chosen people and their reciprocal commitment to him, so it sought to 
mediate, systematize and regulate that relationship into an orderly scheme 
integrated with the national life.  
The Temple was a machine for sacrifice. It was designed for the purpose, on 
the basis that “the material gesture” was efficacious386. Robert Hamerton-
Kelly has described graphically and explicitly its blood-soaked character.387 
The importance of blood and its connotations, in biblical times, can hardly be 
overstressed.  The lack of ready transferability to modern thought is 
similarly very important and a substantial barrier to the understanding of 
biblical practices and to Jesus’s comments on the bread and wine as body 
and blood at the Last Supper.  
Brueggemann believes that “the entire argument made for Jesus, as priest 
and as sacrifice, is cast in and dependent upon the categories of Israel’s 
sacrificial practice”388. Therefore, to say, “Christ died for my sins…depends 
completely on the efficaciousness of the material gesture.” Brueggemann is 
very much aware of the problems this creates for the modern mind, and 
                                                 
384 “Destroy this temple, and I will raise it again in 3 days”, said Jesus in relation to his own 
body. [Jn. 2:19]. The statement dishonoured the Temple in the eyes of its officials, and 
consequently dishonoured them, too. Jesus seemed to knock at the foundations of that 
symbol of God and state by suggesting that there were now superior symbols of God’s 
presence and action, and a higher order of understanding at work. 
385 Ibid, p.417. 
386 Brueggemann, 2002, p.183. 
387 Hamerton-Kelly 1994, Chapter 1. 
388 Brueggemann, 2002, p.183. 
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refers to the unfortunate associations of bribery, bargaining and 
manipulation which sometimes occur. 
 
Conclusion 
We commented earlier that Brueggemann does not set out to advance the 
thinking on sacrifice. Though his analysis is helpful, it only provides a partial 
catalogue of contemporary thinking, and in particular does not either include 
or refute the points made by Girard and by others in his sphere of influence. 
In so far as these involve anthropological insights into primitive societies, 
and societies in any age, they may be regarded as supplementary to 
Brueggemann’s thinking. 
 However, it must be remembered that Brueggemann’s focus is for the most 
part on the Old Testament, and it would be unfair to suggest that his self-
imposed remit should invariably include developments that occurred after 
the Old Testament period came to an end, though he himself does attempt 
this in Finally Comes the Poet. Therefore, in the summary below, which draws 
upon points made in Reverberations of Faith, we note later developments 
without implying incompleteness on Brueggemann’s part. 
1. Sacrifice is a sign of the defining importance of God for the life of the 
community. Yes, but this is only one possible aspect. It may be rooted 
deep in human behaviour and have an evolutionary importance, as 
Coakley suggests. It may therefore be a sign of hominization itself, as 
Girard puts it. 
2. Sacrificial practices are vehicles and instruments designed to celebrate, 
affirm, enhance and repair the defining relationship. Yes, but they may 
be instinctive, rather than designed, and may be found effective for 
that purpose and for the purpose of repairing human relationships 
and avoid dangerous crises.  Where the nature of the practice 
depends on priestly interventions, a new description is needed for 
New Testament times, if the message of Jesus is to be accepted. 
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3. Israel’s linkage to God was probably given expression ‘from the outset’ 
by the dedication of one’s best produce to God. Yes, it probably was, 
and probably long before that. In other words, the linkage to gods was 
found through sacrifice not just in Israel, but in the region generally 
and beyond, before and after the emergence of Israel. 
4. Over time, random and spontaneous gestures of this sort were 
systematized and made into a coherent system. Perhaps. Increasing 
organisation and standardisation seem likely, and the requirements 
in Leviticus may be taken as a sign of this. But again, we have seen 
that standard practices existed in the region beyond Israel, and the 
system changed fundamentally during the Old Testament period and 
after it. It is possible to argue as Brueggemann and Keenan do 
variously that Old Testament sacrifice simply wore out as a practice, 
became a failed system and was itself sacrificed, but it is also possible 
to argue that the concept itself has evolved to a degree that the term 
itself becomes confused, since some of the major purposes of sacrifice 
change fundamentally. 
5. Sacrifice makes concretely visible what is otherwise a hidden 
relationship. Yes, it can, though aspects of sacrifice itself may 
themselves be ‘hidden’, so the revelation may not be simple, and in 
some cases revelation is not the point. 
6. Some sacrifices are ‘sacrifices of well-being’, some are restorative, some 
acknowledge God’s ownership of the land and entitlement to its 
produce; some acknowledge God’s generosity. Yes. This enlarges 
Girard’s point that sacrifice is violence. Chauvet adds a useful 
additional perspective here.  
7. The most extreme sacrifice is that of one’s child.  Yes 
8. Leviticus 16 prescribes special sacrificial measures for the Day of 
Atonement, including forgiveness and reconciliation. This point accords 
well with Avery-Wall’s idea of the Jewish system having a ‘vaccine’ 
built into it. 
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9. Interpretative approaches to sacrifice (as in liberal Protestantism) will 
never permit one to appropriate either the wonder or the gravity of the 
claim that God has provided concrete mechanisms for sustaining the 
relationship of God and his people. Yes. There is a good deal in the 
whole subject that is hard for modern understanding to penetrate. 
10. Prophetic critique of sacrificial practice is recurrent in the Old 
Testament. Yes, but lasting effect is hard to find, except in the 
understanding of Jesus provided by Girard and others. 
11. Psalm 51:16-17 and Micah 6:6-8 indicate that sometimes material 
sacrifice becomes metaphysical and relational. Yes, but this shift, once 
again, does not seem to have taken place at a general level until the 
intervention of Jesus and his followers. But all sacrifice may now have 
made this leap in Western society, and not exclusively within 
Christianity; there may have been a cultural shift against material 
sacrifice on an almost world-wide basis. 
12. Jesus replaced an obsolete form of Jewish sacrifice, a ‘failed system’. A 
worn-out system, perhaps, but the underlying causes which the old 
system addressed may still be present and may resurface. 
13. Christian sacrifice is essentially appropriated from the Old Testament, 
in that the gesture of sacrifice is deemed to be efficacious: Christ died 
for my sins, therefore my sins are taken away.  And Old Testament 
ideas of sacrifice, according to Girard, are themselves drawn from a 
lower base. The claim that efficacious practice is involved within 
developed Christian practice would not be accepted by all, though it is 
recognized within Avery-Wall’s thinking and is present in Coakley’s 
talk of “the particular energies of religious practice (sacrifice, as 
positively considered)”.389 
Finally, one might note with J.G. Williams,  
                                                 
389 Coakley, 2009, p.18. 
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“From the standpoint of mimetic anthropology, there is a profound 
continuity between the prophetic critique of violence and sacrifice and the 
Gospels’ story of Jesus’ death and resurrection as the exposure of the 
scapegoat mechanism. The very matrix of the Christian message is a 
combination of the importance of sacrifice and a prophetic witness that calls 
it into question.”390  
In other words, the prophets have as a major part of their role, their stand as 
witnesses against the scapegoat system. Priests, in Brueggemann’s view, 
both enable the curative system which worship and sacrifice constitute, and 
perform a necessary function of communication between God and people, 
resolving the distance between them. Priest and prophet, sacrifice and 
prophecy, together constitute a double system which has overlaps. Girard 
would say that the voice of prophecy ultimately means the end for the 
priestly system, and dooms sacrifice in the traditional sense and its capacity 
for peace-making to extinction. However, Girard, moving away from the 
more extreme position taken in Things Hidden on the end of sacrifice, in 
Apocalyptic Thinking After 9/11 dwells upon the self-sacrifice of Jesus as an 
act of atonement.391 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
390 Williams, J.G., 1997, p,221. 
391 Girard, 2008, p.30. 
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“The thought that sacrifice is not an ‘ancient’ or ‘primitive’ mistake, but an 
irreducible aspect of social living, invites us to reflect on how we might 
conceive of it.”392 
 
New Testament and the End of Sacrifice  
There is claim of long standing – found in Hebrews 9 and set out by 
theologians since Augustine393 if not before - that Jesus put an end to 
sacrifice in the sense in which it applied in the Second Temple. The claim has 
been the subject of dispute over centuries, but some would say the 
discussion has been greatly advanced by Girard’s thinking. Nevertheless, it 
contains, as Kirwan comments, an ‘irreducible ambiguity’ - the sacrifice of 
sacrifice394.   
However, more widespread is the view that sacrifice has not disappeared but 
has mutated; the older form depended on the immolation of material; that 
evolved into non-material forms of sacrifice, in which personal well-being 
and desire become the subject sacrificed.  
Within that orthodox Christian view, drawing upon Hebrews 4:14-16, Jesus 
is the ‘Great High Priest’ who offers sacrifice: 
“Every high priest is selected from among men and is appointed to 
represent them in matters related to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices for 
sins. He is able to deal gently with those who are ignorant and are going 
astray as he himself is subject to weakness. This is why he has to offer 
sacrifices for his own sins as well as for the sins of the people.  
No-one takes this honour upon himself; he must be called by God, just as 
Aaron was. So Christ did not take upon himself the glory of becoming high 
priest. But God said to him, 
“You are my Son; today I have become your Father.” 
                                                 
392 Chilton, 1997, p.226. 
393Augustine’s understanding of Christian sacrifice remains foundational. For instance,  
speaking of the eucharist, “the visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign of an 
invisible sacrifice.” Augustine of Hippo, City of God, Vol 34, p.440. 
394 Kirwan, 2009, p.78. 
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And he says in another place, 
“You are a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek.”395 
So, Jesus earned his place in the highest order of priesthood through his 
obedience to God as a son, and he makes a sacrifice for himself and for all to 
atone for sin. The language of sacrifice is carried over from the Old 
Testament, but, according to Schwager, the continuity “does not appear in 
the name of sacrifice...but of faith”. 396 Faith and the close reflection of God 
made possible by it lie at the heart of Jesus’s ‘sonship’. 
The idea of ‘sonship’ means that God is involved in the giving, and is not 
merely the recipient of the gift. The sacrifice made is of the self, and indeed of 
a life dedicated to God’s service: 
“First he said, ‘Sacrifices and offerings , burnt offerings and sin offerings you 
did not desire, nor were you pleased with them’ (although the law required 
them to be made). Then he said, here I am. I have come to do your will.”397 
Therefore, as a practical matter, true sacrifice is effective in helping to carry 
forward God’s project. It also turns the person who makes the personal 
sacrifice in the direction of salvation. It may also be effective as ritual or 
cultic practice, in a setting where ritual is deemed to have an effect in itself. 
This point will be explored further later. 
In this modification of sacrifice away from the traditional use of animals and 
indeed of a third party of any sort, interiorization has taken place398. This has 
generated a problem, in that the term ‘sacrifice’ tends to be used in an 
apparently similar way in both cases, and confusion results between two 
activities which are conceptually distinct.  
However, the move from material to non-material sacrifice, both within 
Christianity and Judaism, may be seen alternatively as an attempt to focus on 
the meaning which, from the start, sacrifice had been meant to contain This  
                                                 
395 Hebrews 5:1-11. The two quotations are from Psalm 27 & Psalm 110 [NIV]. 
396 Girard-Schwager 1975-91, p.49. 
397 Hebrews 10:8 [NIV]. 
398 Daly, 1978, p.7. 
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had been lost when focus shifted, myopically, to its mere outward forms.  By 
discarding the outward forms, only the concept was left and thus became 
inescapable. Keenan does not go so far, though he agrees the basic point: 
“The progressive interiorization of sacrifice did not, however, represent a 
repudiation of sacrifice, rather the necessity of the proper interior 
disposition accompanying the outward act.”399 
“ Sacrifice becomes an ethical, as well as a cultic category. The true sacrifice 
is an invisible sacrifice that is visible to God, and that reflects the proper 
interior disposition of the ethical agent. The true sacrifice is mercy.”400 
Note how close the second quotation is to the definition provided by 
Augustine in footnote 393. However, this transformation of sacrifice was a 
long time a-coming, and may have had a number of false starts. Psalm 51:16-
17, which according to the superscription is a psalm of David (1061-971 
BCE)401, states  
You do not want sacrifices 
You are not pleased with burnt offerings. 
My sacrifice is a humble spirit, O God 
You will not reject a humble and contrite heart” 
 
There are of course other examples, but it was the work of Jesus and his 
followers to make this view the mainstream, as it is found, for instance, in 
Hebrews 13:15-16:   
“let us, then, always offer praise to God as our sacrifice through Jesus, which 
is the offering presented by lips that confess him as Lord. Do not forget to do 
good and to help one another, because these are the sacrifices that please 
God.” 
 
                                                 
399 Keenan, 2003, p.189. 
400 Keenan, 2003, p.180. 
401 For the director of music. A psalm of David. When the prophet Nathan came to him after 
David had committed adultery with Bathsheba. (NIV). 
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Brueggemann’s Reconciliation of Temple Sacrifice with the 
Christian Concept 
The reference to ‘the Great High Priest’ neatly takes us to a surprising turn in 
Brueggemann’s work in this area; surprising, that is, for a Protestant 
theologian. He is convinced that the subject of sacrifice, as delineated within 
the Old Testament, is efficacious practice in which the intermediary of the 
priest resolves the distance between god and man.  The means for this are 
delineated in Leviticus 6:1-7 as acts of worship.402 Brueggemann comments: 
“The linkage of violation of God and violation of neighbour is found not only 
in Amos403 but also in Leviticus, not only in the rage of prophets but in the 
ache of priests.”404 
Therefore, he is at the minimum implying that an important aspect of the Old 
Testament can only be understood if the concept of priesthood is accepted as 
having an important instrumental role within that relationship. What is not 
said, but may be implied, is that this intermediary relationship is superseded 
by Jesus, who fundamentally shifts the concept of sacrifice.  
However, Brueggemann’s particular understanding of priesthood is very 
much bound up with the message of prophecy, and he sees an overlap in the 
agendas of sacrifice and prophecy, and also tends to discern Christian 
understandings of God’s part in sacrifice in earlier practices: 
“The animal is the means for sacrament. The animal given is the sign of the 
self-giving of God, whose self-giving is required for a new beginning....the 
priests in the Leviticus text know that finally guilt requires a sacrifice ‘from 
the other side’ from the very person of God who alone has enough self to 
give to answer the guilt. ”405 
                                                 
402 Brueggemann, 1989, p.23. 
403 Amos 5:21. 
404 Brueggemann, 1989, p.24. 
405 Ibid., p.27 & 30. 
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This statement is open to question; no substantial evidence is produced to 
support the idea that the animal ‘is the sign of the self-giving of God’ as 
anything but Brueggemann’s own idea, though Brueggemann insists that 
Leviticus 6, having dealt with human reparation, describes “God’s 
sacramental activity.” The text seems to refer to the awesome, even 
dangerous holiness of offerings made, and the response of forgiveness. 
The role of a priest is that of a doctor, authorized in the community to work 
healing; healing, that is, of a holy kind, which is the enactment of atonement.  
Here, there may seem at first sight to be an echo of Girard’s anthropological 
views on sacral kingship, in which the king guarantees the community’s 
health, and dies when that guarantee is found wanting; but in fact the 
similarity is fleeting and insubstantial. Brueggemann is not at all concerned 
with ritual and myth, but only with the developed relationship with God 
exhibited in the Bible. 
For Brueggemann, the role of the priest is set in a context, in which “the 
panoply of God’s rage, hurt, ache and love is an awesome dramatic reality in 
the life of faith.”406 Therefore, sacrifice is a dramatic gesture made as part of 
a drama: the life of faith. As part of that drama, the priest has iterative duties. 
This is not the same idea as Schwager’s ‘dramatic theology’, which sees 
events unfold progressively through the biblical accounts. Rather than 
looking for the pattern on that grand scale, according to Brueggemann, it 
instead looks for a cycle within a ‘life of faith’, in which ‘new life with God’ is 
found in a promise ‘to be free for life in the world’.407 
 
This interpretation of Old Testament theology in the post-exilic community 
comes in a book408 which moves fairly freely between Old and New 
Testaments, and is much more concerned to find a continuum than to 
observe any shifts in culture that may have come about in the first century. 
Brueggemann quotes the Epistle to the Hebrews, and finds in it a ‘preaching 
point’ about the hope involved in sacrifice, that God will provide a suitable 
                                                 
406 Ibid., p.33. 
407 Ibid., p.34. 
408 Brueggemann, 1989: Finally Comes the Poet. 
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object a of sacrifice, a ram without blemish in a world where everything we 
are and have is blemished. The ‘clean heart409’, the heart without blemish, is 
the gift of God, which God provides for sacrifice, and the process for 
cleansing of the heart is the process of sacrifice. This process of healing, as 
described in Hebrew 10, is accomplished by Jesus, the priest anticipated in 
Leviticus 6, who “does what we cannot do for ourselves”410. The priest’s self-
giving is a gesture of God’s self-giving.  
The considerable amount of induction means that Brueggemann is more a 
preacher than a scholar at this point. His model of God is intensely personal; 
the character is apparently drawn substantially from understandings of 
Christ, but is also based on a close familiarity with the unfolding character of 
Yahweh. And it is Yahweh that Brueggemann seems to focus on, though he is 
inclined to read into passages like Leviticus 6 an element of the character of 
that other model of God, Elohim, the presence in the world which can be 
sensed and (again referring to Leviticus 6 as an example) detected even in 
prescribed ritual and in the actions of priests, in which God’s own act of 
giving may be apparent. 
 
Anti-Ritual & Girard 
Kirwan, taking up this point in his summary of the discussion between 
various writers411, quotes Louis-Marie Chauvet: the priesthood and sacrifice 
of Jesus were exercised ‘”existentially and not ritually”412;  this amounts to 
“anti-sacrifice”, a concept which Kirwan believes aligns with Girard’s revised 
concept of sacrifice, but not his earlier view. Girard’s developed position 
aligns with that of a number of other writers (Keenan, Daly, Chauvet) and is 
                                                 
409 Psalm 51:10. 
410 Ibid., p.35. The reference to the text is obscure, as Leviticus 6 gives instructions for the 
actions in sacrificial ritual of ‘an Aaronite priest’, but does not seem to anticipate any 
particular priest. 
411 Kirwan, 2009, pp.76-80. 
412 Chauvet, 1995, p.299. 
10    The New Testament and Beyond 
 
165 
 
characterized as ‘the exodus from sacrifice’, “an ‘exodus’ from the hellish 
process of pious victimisation.”413 
This is some of the support given for the Girardian view, and exemplifies the 
body of thought which is being built around his thinking.  But not all the 
work resulting from this is a straightforward development or extension of 
Girard’s thought. Some writers including Coakley and Keenan are cautious 
and not inclined to accept that the ‘exodus’ described by Girard is really 
beneficial; they have expressed fears that by closing off the old tradition of 
animal sacrifice, a door is opened to new and worse forms of sacrifice, and 
also more dangerous situations in which violence spirals out of control414. 
However, Coakley develops her polemic without taking into account Girard’s 
explanation of why this should not be the case: the mimetic system can only 
operate in its natural, hidden state; once exposed, it loses its power, and 
therefore would not re-emerge unless in ways which are secret and not 
exposed by Jesus. Coakley’s argument and dismissal of Girard’s explanation 
is therefore incomplete in this particular aspect. 
However, within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, if not elsewhere, animal 
sacrifice came to an end at roughly the same time. Christians may give Jesus 
the credit for this, but Jews would not attribute to him the fact that the 
Second Temple and its practices came to an end in 70 CE and have not been 
reinstated. There is scope for a new temple, for which Ezekiel provides a 
specification. Jews pray daily, 
“may it be your will, Lord our God and God of our ancestors, that the Temple 
shall be speedily rebuilt in our days, and grant us our share in your Torah. 
And may we serve you there in reverence, as in the days of old and as in 
former years.”415 
This comes at the end of a section which lays out in detail the prescribed 
arrangements for daily animal sacrifice, and which begins, 
                                                 
413 Kirwan, 2009, p.80. 
414 Coakley, 2009, p.10. Keenan, according to Kirwan, states “sacrifice of sacrifice, which 
could…then return (relatively unchanged) in far more subtle and pernicious forms.” Kirwan, 
2009, p.78. 
415 Singer, S [tr] (2007) Page 33. 
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“The Lord said to Moses, ‘Command the Israelites and tell them: be careful 
to offer Me at the appointed time My food-offering consumed by fire, as an 
aroma pleasing to me. Tell them: This is the fire-offering you shall offer to 
the Lord: two lambs…”416 etc. 
It could therefore be assumed that the wish to rebuild the Temple implies an 
intention to recommence the programme of sacrifices.  But there are 
differences between various branches of Judaism on this point: Orthodox 
Jews explicitly affirm the intention to resume sacrifice, but other Jews 
instead replace the references to sacrifice with passages from the Talmud 
which teach that atonement for sin is now achieved by acts of loving-
kindness. They, therefore, look to the restoration of the Temple, but not the 
resumption of sacrifice. This move away from sacrifice is of very long 
standing: Maimonides referred to it in the 12th century.417 
However, remarkably, neither the reconstruction of the Temple, nor the 
resumption of animal sacrifice has ever been enacted either in the state of 
Israel or elsewhere within Judaism. Perhaps the question of sacrifice has 
proved too difficult to resolve, and the restoration of the Temple has been 
deferred for that reason and others418. This is easy to account for in secular 
terms: society has developed in the centuries that have elapsed since the 
year 70, and blood sacrifice has become simply obsolete and unacceptable, 
not just within Judaism and Christianity, but almost everywhere. The Jewish 
prayer formulas simply do not reflect present day Jewish attitudes, which 
have matured with other faiths in a process of development which Kirwan 
describes as ‘the religious history of mankind”419. 
                                                 
416 Ibid., pp 25-27. 
417 Maimonides (1135-1204) in his early work A Guide for the Perplexed states “God 
deliberately has moved Jews away from sacrifices towards prayer, as prayer is a higher form 
of worship.”  However, in Mishnah Torah, which is widely thought to be his later, defining 
view, he states that sacrifice will take place in the yet-to-be-built Third Temple. He gives a 
description of how sacrifice will proceed, in detail.  
418 Including the fact that the site is occupied by a mosque. 
419 Kirwan, 2009, p.76.  Kirwan is summarising from the interview between Girard and 
Rebecca Adams  (Adams and Girard, 1993, p.29). 
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This common-sense approach should not blind us to the possibility of a 
religious, not merely a cultural, development. Vanessa Avery-Wall, providing 
a Jewish perspective, quotes Sandor Goodhart: 
“In opposing the Old Testament to the New, in reading the old God as the 
sacrificial God of vengeance and anger and the new as the anti-sacrificial 
God of love, have we not unwittingly slipped into the very structure we have 
wished to displace, believing in a new law or ‘part two’ which it has already 
been by definition , as it were, the goal of the Old Testament to reveal to us, 
and Old Testament which is thus that much richer by virtue of having 
foreseen our sacrificial misunderstanding of it.”420 
That is, it is only a misunderstanding of the Old Testament that enables the 
New Testament to be seen as a departure. To other eyes, it is a logical 
continuation of an unbroken tradition. Although Avery-Wall’s comments are 
specific to Judaism, she hopes that they will ‘find resonance’ in other faiths. 
In other words, she hopes to have identified a general truth about religion: 
that changing ideas on the nature of God are built into religion, and these 
involve the control of mimetic desire and its outlet in sacrifice.  
 
She traces this from the identification of the first Messiah, the ‘Messiah ben 
Joseph’, Ephraim, who with his brother Manasseh, having received a blessing 
from their grandfather Jacob, were made paradigms: Jacob said, “in this way 
shall Israel bless: ‘may God bless you like Ephraim and Manasseh’”421. They 
therefore represent peaceful fraternal relations instituted for the first time in 
Israel, breaking the cycle of violence. This base of peace enables a focus on 
other things. That is to say, a step taken towards overcoming mimetic rivalry 
is a foundation for the development of the nation, but one could generalise 
this into a foundation for human development. The second Messiah, the 
‘Messiah ben David’, is to come later. The Messiah must die “for the advent of 
deliverance”,422 and for “the sacrifice of the evil inclination”423; “a total break 
                                                 
420 Goodhart, Sandor, in Dumouchel (ed) 1988, p.62-3. 
421 Genesis 48:20. 
422 Avery-Wall, 2010, p.3. 
423 The ‘evil inclination’, Avery-Wall explains, as a part of God’s creation, is a good thing, 
and enables human activities such as trade, marriage and building; but it is “part of 
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with the nature of man as it has unfolded through the dimension of 
history”.424 It is not clear whether the death of the Messiah ben Joseph is 
spoken of literally (a death in battle), or allegorically as the death of the evil 
inclination.  
 
She refers to this process as the ‘Jewish vaccine against mimetic desire’. This 
phrase seems to be drawn from Girard himself, who uses the analogy of 
inoculation to describe the protective effects of ritualised violence within 
religion: 
 
“The physician inoculates the patient with a minute amount of the disease, just 
as, in the course of the rites, the community is injected with a minute amount of 
violence, enabling it to ward off an attack of full-scale violence.” 425 
 
At both macro- and micro-levels (the nation and the person), this inoculation 
is underpinned by ritual blessing, which is effective language, changing 
people and the world.  
 
The metaphor of vaccine is a useful one, and hints at development in itself, 
because vaccines are not available to us from the first, but are a matter of 
discovery and invention. On the basis of the very long-term creeping effects, 
promoted by ‘booster-shots’ of blessing every week, Avery-Wall speculates 
that we witness “a continuous thread revealing the gradual overcoming of 
mimetic desire”.426 
 
Here, it might be noted that blessing has been identified as preceding original 
sin and the Fall. This is a point made by Lascaris: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
humanity’s base nature, and the inclination that drives humanity towards rivalry” Avery-
Wall, 2010, p.4. It seems that the evil inclination is generally consistent with Girard’s good 
and bad varieties of mimesis. 
424 Ibid., p.4. 
425 Girard, 1977, p.289. 
426 Ibid., p.6. 
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“From a Christian point of view, we cannot do very well without the term 
‘original sin’…however…’original sin’ is preceded by ‘original blessing’. This 
‘original blessing’ is not taken away as such by ‘original sin’, but remains 
present in our world and makes itself felt. It is not necessary to assume, as 
Girard does, an almost unmediated divine origin of the Gospel and to make such 
a quick assertion of Christ’s divinity. Jesus is first and foremost the embodiment 
of the ‘original blessing’.”427 
 
However, ‘original blessing’ does not seem to form any part of Girard’s 
scheme. Rather, humanity has the opposite of blessing – the curse of mimetic 
behaviour - built in from the start. Sarah Coakley has commented on the 
basic lack of hope in Girard’s scheme: 
 
“If violence is primary and without it we have no social stability, how can 
that function be sublated by a saviour who merely announces its end but 
then becomes another victim of it? This theory of sacrifice surely merely re-
establishes what is purportedly seeks to critique.”428 
 
Having said this, Coakley immediately concedes that Girard has taken steps 
to deal with the problem in his later work, so the criticism is to some extent 
counterbalanced. However, it is also an unfair criticism; under Girard’s 
theory, violence is an effect or a fact about the world rather than ‘primary’. 
The saviour does not announce the end of violence: he exposes the victimage 
mechanism, one of the key means by which violence has been given meaning, 
and thus deprives it of efficacy.  That does not mean the end of violence, 
though. And, though Coakley does not mention it, Girard is not completely 
without hope, as the closing pages429 of Things Hidden make clear: 
 
“ All issues of ‘psychological health’ seem to me to take second place to a 
much greater issue – that of meaning which is being lost or threatened on all 
sides, but simply awaits the breath of the Spirit to be reborn. Now all that is 
                                                 
427 Lascaris, 1989, pp.418-9. 
428 Coakley, 2009, p.10. 
429 Girard, 1987, p.447. 
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needed is this breath to recreate stage by stage Ezekiel’s experience in the 
valley of the dead.” 
 
Therefore, it may be questioned whether Coakley has truly addressed the 
key points Girard is making. 
 
However, alongside Avery-Wall’s thinking, we might place another strand of 
thought which also refers to a continuum of thought and tradition, relating to 
the theology and practice of the First Temple. These had been replaced by 
different theology by the Deuteronomic redactors, and different practice 
within the Second Temple. 
 
First Temple concepts, generally thought to be eclipsed and in abeyance in 
the first century,  were in fact not forgotten, and were taken up by Jesus and 
his followers and reinstated.  This, at least, is the contention of Margaret 
Barker, in her deeply controversial book Temple Theology.430  It is widely 
thought that Barker’s work is interesting but goes some way beyond the 
limits of reasonable deduction.  However, the point to be taken up here is 
shared with Avery-Wall: there is in reality only one continuing tradition, not 
a second tradition overthrowing the first, though correction was involved. 
 
Barker describes First Temple practices as frequently hidden within “a 
secret priestly tradition”431 The function of the royal High Priest was to  
 
“carry away the sin and uncleanness of the people so that they could be restored 
within the bonds of the covenant.”432  
 
The main thrust of temple ritual, then, was to restore the relationship with 
God. The Royal High Priest, according to Barker, was  
 
                                                 
430 Barker, 2004. 
431 Barker, 2004, p.10. 
432 Ibid. 
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“the great angel in human form, the Man, who passed between heaven and 
earth…born as son of God in the Holy of Holies…the two temple rituals 
originally exclusive to the high priests were carrying blood into the Holy of 
Holies on the Day of Atonement and eating the most holy Showbread on the 
Sabbath. These were combined to become the Christian Eucharist”433 
 
Of course, the main anchor of this argument is ‘the bonds of the covenant’, 
and it may not be entirely clear which covenant is referred to, as there are 
several possibilities. (This matter is further considered in the next chapter & 
in chapter 18). Barker suggests that the covenant in question is not to be 
found in any part of the present Old Testament canon, as no covenant there 
refers to ‘the remission of sins’, which is a key part of the Christian concept. 
Instead, she suggests that it refers to the high priestly function of making 
atonement for sin434, a function in which we may see some resemblances to 
sacral kingship. 
 
Since it is ‘sin and uncleanness’ that outrage the covenant, if there is a 
necessary relationship between sin and uncleanness and the mimetic 
process, then there may be a fit with Girardian thought.  But Girard is 
preoccupied with violence, and tends not to define the limits of that term, 
and consider where violence begins and ends, though he identifies its origins 
as frequently lying in imitative desire. In other words, one might provide a 
definition for Girard thus:  
 
“Violence is the harmful outcome which attends frustration from being shown 
something, which you come to want from being shown it in others’ possession, 
and not getting it for yourself. It is frustration vented on others. Desire is 
imitative and begets violence, theft and covetousness. Violence is also imitative, 
and likewise begets more violence, in an ascending spiral of destruction. 
Religion from the first has forbidden access to the objects of mimetic desire, and 
thereby seeks to contain this process which is endemic in mankind.” 
 
                                                 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid., p.34. 
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Violence attends desire and the forbidden emotions of envy and 
covetousness. The definition does not cover all aspects of the Ten 
Commandments (or any other of Israel’s covenants) but it does cover the 
commandments from six to ten. Violence, defined as relative to the mimetic 
process, therefore outrages the bonds of the covenant, or some of them. 
Therefore, a partial fit with Girardian thought can be found.  
 
At this stage, we therefore have a measure of consensus between Girard, 
Avery-Wall and Barker that the religious history of Israel  
 
1. Exists in the context of maintaining a relationship with God 
2. That maintaining that relationship involves conflict with the ‘evil 
inclination’ embodied in human nature. 
3. Atonement for sin necessarily involves sacrifice in a developing 
variety of forms. 
4. Sacrifice has not come to an end, and will only do so when human 
behaviour has changed and operates on a new basis which is 
inherently acceptable to God. 
 
Christian Adaptation of the Ideas of Sacrifice and Temple 
 
The contemporary Catholic writer Dennis King Keenan, in The Sacrifice of the 
Eucharist435 describes the Christian imperative as to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’, and 
move on to a new concept. However, in making this recommendation, he is 
cautious as to whether sacrifice might make a covert return. We take up this 
point again later. 
 
Kenneth Slack, writing in the SCM Press Lent Book for 1966 on the theme of 
Is Sacrifice Outmoded?, observed that the role of sacrifice in present day life, 
was to give up pleasures and gains in order to better society.436  This has the 
                                                 
435 Keenan, 2003. 
436 Young, 1975, p.12. To ‘better society’ is of course a similar expression to ‘bring closed the 
kingdom of God’. 
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authority of Hebrews 13:16, “Do not forget to do good and help one another, 
because these are the sacrifices that please God.” The passage quoted, 
however, follows immediately one which refer to the essential “sacrifice of 
praise”, confessing Jesus as Lord; in other words, stating the distinctive claim 
of Christianity as a religion rather than a way of living or ethical system, and 
(by implication) commitment to the Way which Jesus indicated, the New 
Covenant.  The religious statement is followed by and gives rise to the ethical 
one, and adopting a new attitude is involved in the process. The lesson of 
Psalm 51 is that the change of attitude precedes acceptable sacrifice of what 
was then the conventional kind: without the humble and contrite heart 
achieved in advance, the burnt offering is ineffective. The Christian position, 
articulated by Slack and others, focuses on the preparedness of the heart, 
and simply disposes of the sacrifice previously associated with it. The term 
has therefore taken on a new meaning, and Slack, (who unlike Keenan, was 
writing before Girard) does not refer in a cautionary way to the possibility 
that the mimetic process and sacrifice might re-disguise itself and become 
effective again. 
 
R J Daly, writing on the origins of the Christian doctrine of sacrifice, claimed 
that “living the Christian life has taken over the atoning function of the 
sacrificial cult”437. This argument short-circuits ideas that it is possible for 
the believer who sins to take advantage of a perpetual cycle of forgiveness. It 
hangs on Hebrews 10:26ff, which states that no longer is any sacrifice 
effective in taking away sin once the sinner realises the position she is in. In 
the face of the very explicit explanation delivered through Jesus, sin 
committed once the sinner is aware of the error of her position (that is, sin 
consciously committed) cannot be atoned for with sacrifice of the traditional 
sort, because the new covenant has been flouted, and the ‘Spirit of Grace’ 
insulted, and the ‘blood of God’s covenant’ (referring to Jesus’s atoning 
sacrifice) held cheap by the rejection of standards which are already 
understood. This is a controversial area, and many would find Daly’s view 
too simple an understanding of the nature of forgiveness and the position of 
                                                 
437 Daly, R.J, (1978), p.25, quoted in Forrester et al. (1983), p.19. 
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backsliders. However, it takes the unveiling of the mimetic process by Jesus 
plus his directions on acceptable living as an imperative against mimetic 
behaviour, which itself makes sacrifice in the traditional sense both obsolete 
and unacceptable. 
 
 
The Continuing Importance of Sacrifice 
In her inaugural lecture as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at      
Cambridge 438, Sarah Coakley argued contra Girard for sacrifice as being 
neither dead, nor irrational nor obsolete. She observed that 
“the latter part of the twentieth century in the West has been marked by a 
strongly negative approach to the topic, seeing it as essentially violent and 
irrational. Such assumptions have of course been shored up by the recent 
outbreak of suicide bombings, on the one hand, and by a fashionable secular 
atheism, on the other, which calls on evolutionary biology to show that all 
religion, in general, is irrational, and all sacrificial religion , in particular, 
debased and bloody.”439 
In her view, the late modern period is defined both by a negative view of 
sacrifice and also by a retreat from confidence in the rationality of 
Christianity. The situation (she says it is not a coincidence) is that 
Christianity “now has little if any apologetic force in relation to the 
dominating secular worldview”.440 
As Coakley speculates on how a re-evaluation of Christian faith as sacrificial 
might proceed, noting that the battleground in such a debate, involving 
making a ‘public case’ for the rationality of Christian belief, would not be the 
                                                 
438 Coakley, S., Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Christian Belief Inaugural 
Lecture as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge, Oct. 13, 2009, found 
at http://scripturalreasoning.org/faculty/coakley_inaugural.pdf 8 April 2011  p.4 (Accessed  
July 2011). This lecture is available at www.abdn.ac. uk/Gifford/documents/Norris-
Hulse_Professor_of_Divinity_._Inaugural_lecture.pdf (accessed 8 Sept 2012). 
439 Ibid. 
440 Ibid., p.5. 
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‘flat plane’ which atheists take to be a given. That is, the issue is much more 
complex and multi-dimensional than merely arguing over the so-called facts 
of belief. She believes that we have lost the shared ‘flat plane’ of universal 
reason, and looks to Alasdair MacIntyre for support, with his notion of 
tradition-based rationality: ‘there are no tradition-independent standards of 
argument’.441 
She comments,   
“why human motivations to sacrificial behaviours could possibly occur then 
become pressing, and lead to a final speculation on how ritual practice and 
scientific endeavour could be significantly related – and indeed, might have 
to be so related, if our current worldwide ecological crisis is to be 
alleviated.”442 
In other words, Coakley, homing in on the urgent need to find a new, 
committed, responsible human attitude to the ecological plight of the planet, 
suggests that Christian belief linked with the practice of sacrifice, might be 
the only efficacious route left open. She quotes E O Wilson, the Harvard 
biologist: 
“only the power of a sacrificial religious motivation can sufficiently redirect 
human will to undertake the changes we need to save us from ecological 
disaster.”443  
Therefore, the suggestion is that the concept of sacrifice be harnessed to 
achieve an otherwise impossible change in human aspirations and 
behaviour. 
Coakley disputes the definition of sacrifice as violence, suggesting that it is 
much more than that, with the ritual actor moving from “evocations of 
blood” to “cleansed expressions of moral altruism”. She wishes to consider 
the philosophical significance of (now unfashionable) theories about the 
“mobilization of psychic energy in relation to sacrificial rites”.444 All of this is 
                                                 
441 Ibid., pp.14-15. 
442 Ibid., p.6. 
443 Ibid, p.21. 
444 Ibid., p.7. 
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to be achieved under a philosophical understanding of rational religion. She 
disputes the view of Kant: 
“…according to Kant... ‘the superstitious illusion contains the means, 
available to many an individual’, which enables him to ‘transform’ the 
contingent into something reasonable and moral. But according to Kant such 
historically contingent materials such as (sic) sacrifice are necessarily 
inferior to the ‘religion of reason’ and are ultimately destined to be 
supplanted by it. Modern ‘man’, it is presumed, will eventually grow out of 
ritual.”445 
Coakley thinks Kant ‘squeamish’, and takes the contrary view that ritual is an 
indispensible part of a comprehensive, efficacious human method, an 
“organic unity of ritual practice and reason”.446 
Coakley also comments that sacrifice is not merely a primitive characteristic 
of human society which is something to be wished away as part of societal 
development. Rather, it is something which has a function in the natural 
development of humanity: 
 
“I seek to cleanse the notion of sacrifice from that of mandated (Girardian) 
violence, and identify in the new notion of evolutionary sacrifice a principle 
of divine reason.”447 
 
Therefore, she is changing the meaning of the term again, from the diffuse 
and hazily defined Christian idea, which is itself a change from the Old 
Testament notion. This is the third generation of the term. 
She quotes Darwin: 
“There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from 
possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience 
courage and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another , and to 
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447 Coakley, 2009, p.19. 
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sacrifice themselves for the common good would be victorious over most 
other tribes, and this would be natural selection.”448 
 
 
Conclusion 
Let us now refer back to the synthesis of the view from Schwager and 
Gottwald, with some input from Gorringe, at the end of Chapter 8:  
3. God is known through a certain type of experience, in which priorities 
are adjusted away from those of human society as it defines itself in 
God’s absence, and towards another standard in which God’s 
commandments are the only authority.  Within God’s scheme, 
sacrifice is not wanted. 
And on the other,  
4. Human nature asserts itself in God’s absence, and under these 
circumstances violence becomes salient. Sacrifice and scapegoating 
are part of this situation, and may be generated by it automatically 
and inescapably.  
If a reconciliation of these points with Coakley’s opinion, and Darwin’s, 
above is to be attempted, then God must be seen as an apparently perverse, 
but actually developmental, force within evolution, and sacrifice, in all its 
forms, a developing mechanism which is self-configuring to the needs of a 
particular society at the time.  Not asserting self, not setting out to promote 
one’s own interests, but following divine reason, is effective in protecting the 
longer-term interests of the community. God is the smoothing force which 
planes off errors and digressions in behaviour and enables society to 
maintain a true direction. Other voices echo this in their own terms: Chilton 
sees sacrifice as building community449; Taylor sees Eve’s rivalry with God 
                                                 
448 Darwin, Descent of Man (1871), 2004 edn, p.157-8. 
449 Chilton, 1992, p.32. 
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(that is, with true direction) as the actual fall. 450 Divine providence may 
seem to attend on those who hear the voice of God; God attends to those who 
follow his commandments, and ignores the others; only the pure in heart get 
God’s attention. Under Coakley-Darwin, this would amount to God’s 
evolutionary voice falling out of ear-shot as one departs from the profitable 
path. 
These combined observations fit with all and so are hardly contentious;  but 
the agreement is only on the effect of God. The means by which the system 
works is a wholly different matter.  
                                                 
450 Taylor, 1998, Ch. 2, p.22. 
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The Common Ground 
In the previous chapter, we saw how  
1. According to Brueggemann, sacrifice is part of a priestly phenomenon 
in which ritual is effective in itself.  God participates in the process 
and is found to be giving of himself in the act of sacrifice. 
2. This is consistent with Barker’s affirmation of the traditional 
understanding452 that an important part of the High Priestly function 
was to make atonement for sin. This seems to have something in 
common with sacral kingship as Girard, Frazer, Hocart and others 
describe it. 
3. Barker also points out that restoration of the ‘the bonds of the 
covenant’ is a troublesome description of the function of sacrifice, 
since no covenant is to be found in the Old Testament referring to the 
remission of sins; therefore, she speculates that this is in fact an 
allusion to ‘the older faith’, which she explains in terms of an Elohist 
reference453. Barker speculates that correct translation of the Hebrew 
in this text refers to the invocation of God: ‘thus I am to be invoked 
throughout all generations”. The older faith accomplished this 
through priestly action, and this tradition was revived and re-
expressed by Jesus. 
 
Let us now generalise that concept of ‘priestly action’, so as not to get side-
tracked too much into a discussion on priesthood, and consider the practical 
function and outcome. Brueggemann is concerned with healing and how this 
is to be achieved. He speaks of the condition of people and societies as 
‘numbness and ache’ and ‘the strangeness of healing’454, and states 
“We cannot alone work our own healing. It requires a priest, someone who 
is authorized in the community, who is recognized as having the capacity to 
bear and holiness among us, holiness that outruns our technical control and 
                                                 
452 For instance, in Leviticus and in Hebrews. 
453 Exodus 3:15. Barker, 2004, p.38. 
454 Brueggemann, 1989, p.13. 
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understanding...Healing is an act of atonement...so that the poison of the 
affront is forever contained and removed as a threat...The act of putting the 
poison away is an act not done by ourselves but on our behalf by the priest 
who bears holiness. This act done for us leads to forgiveness, reconciliation, 
and the capacity to start again with a new life and a restored relation. ”455 
So, it is the treatment of the condition arising from sin that leads to 
forgiveness of the sin. The doctor-priest who heals you is also the agent of 
God who delivers forgiveness for sinful behaviour. This description accords 
with Catholic understandings, but hardly with Protestant ones, so, coming 
from Brueggemann in particular, this is a surprising stance. However, 
Brueggemann’s other themes: rebalancing, readjustment to God from a 
position of alienation and the removal of pain are of course also the aims of 
the sacral kingship system. Therefore, in Brueggemann’s summarized 
position we see a traditional Judaeo-Christian understanding of the workings 
of the process of sacrifice, and a basis for understanding its roots in sacral 
kingship. 
Although common ground is found in the function of sacral kingship, beyond 
that, we have a gulf between Brueggemann-Barker and Darwin-Girard-
Coakley. However, in chapter 2a, we saw that there is a link between 
Brueggemann’s sphere of influence and that of Girard through the work of 
Gottwald and Schwager, and to some extent of that of Gorringe.  In Gorringe’s 
memorable words, it is the model of God “only known in the journey from 
bondage to freedom”456. The meaning of this phrase of course depends 
entirely upon how ‘bondage’ and ‘freedom’ are construed, but comparison of 
the way these terms might be discerned in the work of the various authors 
shows a degree of commonality: 
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 Gorringe Brueggemann Gottwald Schwager Girard Coakley 
Bondage The idea of 
human 
freedom to 
choose, 
independent 
of God’s will: 
‘well-fed 
slavery’, 
which may 
seem like 
freedom, but 
in fact it 
disqualifies 
us from 
knowing 
God, and is a 
spiritual 
wilderness 
and spiritual 
death.457 
The glory of 
the world, 
seen in 
Egypt. This 
‘story of 
death has 
implications 
in the 
present day, 
for ecology. 
The richest 
are the most 
covetous and 
are in 
bondage to 
their own 
ambitions458  
Yahweh, 
deemed to 
be so named 
by Moses, 
brings about 
the escape 
from 
bondage in 
Egypt and 
self-rule in 
Canaan. The 
Elohist 
tradition is 
corrective of 
the Yahwist, 
and presents 
criteria for 
Israel which 
transcend 
kingly 
models.459  
Sacrificial 
ideas do not 
originate 
from 
Yahweh’s 
wishes, but 
are a human 
invention. 
Commitment 
to sacrifice 
therefore 
means 
enslavement 
to a human, 
not a divine 
system460 
The mimetic system 
and the 
victimage/scapegoat 
practices (inc. 
sacrifice) arising 
from it enslaved 
human societies 
because of their 
satanic aspects and 
hidden nature, until 
they were 
exposed.461 
Selfishness 
pays off 
initially, but 
traps the 
whole 
species in 
trouble. 
Commitment 
to old ways 
and 
individual 
agendas not 
profitable in 
evolutionary 
terms. 
Sacrifice is 
not 
necessarily 
tied to 
violence. 462 
Freedom Finding God 
in narrowed 
choices; the 
Torah is the 
bread of life; 
manna, 
though 
monotonous, 
is God’s 
prescribed 
food. Jesus is 
the bread of 
life because 
he embodies 
God’s word. 
The glory of 
Yahweh, 
seen in the 
desert. Jesus 
reveals that 
scarcity is a 
myth and 
that there is 
a freedom of 
plenty: “the 
world is 
filled with 
abundance 
and freighted 
with grati-
tude, and 
that his is a 
Commitment 
to ‘God 
because of 
Egypt’, that 
is, the 
converse of 
the 
benchmarks 
of worldly 
power and 
the co-
identification 
of religion 
with state 
objectives. 
Israel 
developed in 
Keep the 
law; turn to 
the Lord, 
and 
everything 
will be made 
new. In this, 
the self-
revelation of 
God is 
identical 
with the 
overcoming 
of violence. 
Freedom is 
freedom 
from human 
Exposure takes 
away the power of 
the mimetic system, 
and divinely-
inspired priorities, 
or good religion, is 
enabled to displace 
bad religion. This is 
the achievement of 
Jesus. Girard sees 
Ezekiel’s valley of 
dry bones revived 
when the Spirit is 
revived within 
society and it ceases 
to think sef-
destructively.464 
Self-
sacrificial 
religious 
motivation 
may be  in 
line with and 
disclosive of 
the divine 
reason of 
evolution.  It 
is likely to 
lead to 
better 
decisions for 
the planet, 
and forestall 
ecological 
                                                 
457 Gorringe quoted J K Galbraith’s ‘culture of contentment’. Well-fed slavery destroys 
people because it condemns them to “unsustainable lifestyles and the ecological destruction 
which flows from that”. Gorringe, 2005, p.13. 
458 Brueggemann, 2000, p.71ff. 
459 Gottwald, 2009, p.82. 
460 Schwager, 1987, p.43ff. 
461 Girard, 1987. 
462 Coakley, 2009. 
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sacramental, 
subversive 
re-ordering 
of public 
reality. 
Canaan as an 
ethical 
confederacy, 
not an ethnic 
group.463 
violence & 
injustice. 
disaster. In 
short, it may 
lead to 
freedom and 
life. 
 
Indeed, the common themes are striking: spiritual death occurs in an 
indulgent life, which is seen analytically as a life of bondage to personal 
aspiration and well-being, and spiritual life in acceptance of narrowed 
choices and an understanding of where the long-term good lies. Bondage is 
associated with violence and human systems, and God is found in the escape 
from violence and bondage. Human systems often include violence, and may 
decay towards violence, as preoccupation with self has the effect that 
relationship with God is left further and further behind.  
Of course, the agreement is by no means complete, and successive writers 
tend to define their own thinking over against that of others (for instance, 
Coakley’s understanding of the possibility of decoupling sacrifice and 
violence is an explicit reaction to Girard). It would, though, be possible to 
develop and  synthesize Girard’s later thinking and Coakley’s, in much the 
same way as Lascaris took Girard’s early thinking on mimesis and sacrifice, 
and Davis’s objections to it, and proposed a third way. 
Having established that there is common ground, let us examine a religiously 
motivated approach, orientated in opposition to mimetic violence and 
scapegoating, and indeed, human violence generally, and configured to work 
on principles of self-sacrifice. In order to fulfil God’s purposes, might this 
work to develop the community sustainably and to safeguard the planet? We 
shall see what sort of shape this attempt might have, if (a) Girardian theory is 
to be involved and (b) there is a ‘sacramental re-ordering of public reality’ as 
Brueggemann defines the process he envisions.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
464 Girard, 1987, p.447 
463 Gottwald, 1979, p.32ff. 
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Girard and Spiritual Death  
In the final chapter of Things Hidden (1987), Girard lays out the current 
position of humanity, in which he sees the revelation of the mimetic system 
and victimage process made by Jesus as a necessarily divine intervention465 
which has allowed people to detect the scapegoat mechanism. But 
nevertheless he states,  
“the notion that the victimage process is a universal one remains hidden 
from view...The victims are always there... The paradox is strange but quite 
logical. Sacrifice is the stake in the struggle between doubles, with everyone 
accusing everyone else of giving in to it, everyone trying to settle his own 
account with sacrifice by a final sacrifice that would expel all evil for 
good.”466 
This is why everyone enters the kingdom of heaven violently, says Girard, 
quoting Luke 16:16. This verse, frequently seen as enigmatic, is otherwise 
translated as “everyone forces his way in”467, but Girard’s interpretation 
stands up to this rewording. 
Mankind, says Girard, has no wish to give up the sacrificial wish wholesale, 
but has ‘devoured’ the sacrificial forms in existence, and many other forms of 
universality, and left itself with a death of cultures worldwide, through loss 
of ‘the signified’: 
“ Present-day thought is the worst form of castration, since it is the 
castration of the signified... We struggled against the Puritanism of our 
parents only to fall into a form of Puritanism far worse than theirs - a 
Puritanism of meaning that kills all it touches. This Puritanism desiccates 
every text.”468 
The sacredness of violence has been deconstructed, and the casualty on a 
wider scale is meaning generally. Therefore, meaninglessness becomes an 
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466 Ibid., p.440. 
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overwhelming problem and constant, undirected attempts to escape from it 
are the symptom in contemporary society. 
In a rather later book, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning469, Satan is seen to exist 
first of all as a figure created by structures of mimetic violence. Logically, 
once those structures are exposed and lose their efficacy as a consequence, 
Satan has lost his power and maybe his very existence. But, says Girard, 
“Satan is always someone”470, and quoting Jesus, “Satan expels Satan”471, 
from which one might distil that disorder is expunged by a new situation 
which includes the basis of future disorder. The target which the Christian, 
anti-mimetic approach must address is therefore a moving one, and Girard’s 
observations are essentially historical ones, and therefore lacking much of a 
foreground; he looks at what has happened, and discerns what might happen 
in the coming phase only indistinctly, but with the certainty that there is a 
new Satan, or a revised version of the old one, which having lost a good part 
of his old system, has simply moved to a new area of operation. The model of 
Satan he is working with is the personalised version of the abstract concept 
of ‘scandal’, used in the synoptic gospels to refer to mimetic rivalry.472 St. 
John’s gospel, though, uses the name ‘Satan’ to refer to this same 
phenomenon. 
If, as Girard says, the world is now in a situation where ‘the signified’ is at 
risk, then Brueggemann’s scheme of priestly action may no longer be an 
option, and those who doubt the relevance of religion in the present day will 
be quick to agree with this; but if, a Girard also says, people are in flight from 
meaninglessness, then they must by definition be trying, however blindly, to 
flee towards some form of meaning. Previously, sacrifice was found to be an 
effective mechanism for approaching and reconciling oneself to God, the 
source of all meaning. Now, that direction for many is no longer valid. 
There are various ways on understanding what is happening; the loss of 
Satan as previously understood has removed some of the means of defining 
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and recognizing God; Satan has in a sense taken God with him in the course 
of his own destruction; put in personal terms, Satan is engaged in new work, 
and part of the new project is obscuring God. 
If it took Jesus to explain the old Satan to us, then we may well wonder when 
and how the new Satan will be explained. What, to use Kirwan’s term, is a 
truly relevant  ‘framework for soteriology’473 in a situation where Satan has 
moved on, and the explanations of Jesus, and the general truths he 
announced, are no longer quite as topical as they were, because the problem 
has shifted. The speculations lead one to imagine that Girardian insights, 
valuable as they are, might be only one set of a series in which an unfolding 
scenario is depicted.  
Coakley, as we saw in a previous chapter, sees salvation as dependent on 
religious commitment of sorts. She takes the salvation of the planet, rather 
than personal salvation as her focus, and therefore raises the discussion to 
the level of a universal. Her message is, though put in analytical terms, 
compatible with Christian commitment and Christian ethics, but it leaves a 
large area as the work of ‘faith’, and does not address what ‘faith’ might 
amount to in an age when meaning itself is under attack.  
If Coakley’s argument is to be accepted here (and it certainly seems strong, 
even if it lacks much detail), then sacrifice will not have come to an end, 
because Christian sacrifice will have found a telos at the level of the human 
universal. Further, it will be possible to trace sacrifice as an evolving concept 
which may be expected not only to continue in existence but to continue to 
evolve with society and the conditions which come to prevail; and if indeed 
Jesus’s intervention has had the effect of redirecting the sacrificial tendency, 
then his work might be seen in sociological terms as to be seeking to bring 
about a conscious shift in human behaviour. Coakley and Darwin seem to 
look at such a phenomenon and say that it has as an evolutionary effect.  
The current project, then, is to understand the reconnection with meaning 
that might occur through a new form of commitment to sacrifice. As an 
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ethical project and no more, this is easy enough to define; but, Coakley says, 
ethics are not enough: only a religious commitment will be sufficient, and it 
is not clear what shape the religious component will take, particularly if it 
were to depend on, or be facilitated by, effective practice. Brueggemann 
describes such effective practice, but he speaks with historical focus (though 
he may also delineate lasting truths), and Girard believes that Christian 
sacrifice, as defined by Jesus, is a lasting concept not susceptible to further 
change.  
However, a new, or modified, focus may be in order now, and the idea is 
worth exploring. To commence this project we will propose that the end of 
meaning and ‘the signified’, which Girard refers to at the end of Things 
Hidden, is a mistaken perception, and that what is actually occurring is a shift 
in these things. Girard is concerned that the end of the mimetic system might 
mean the escalation of violence out of control, and this could be the case; but 
sacrifice itself might be moved on by new patterns in behaviour which 
themselves help to deflect such consequences.  
Brueggemann detects a failure or significant decline in communion, that is, 
close relationship with God474. It is speech that is the central ‘act of 
communion’, and speech has failed us: 
“Reduced communion and reduced communication take two identifiable 
forms in our society. As Robert Bellah and his colleagues have shown so 
well, one form of reductionism is the practice of subjective consciousness.475 
That is, we no longer imagine a real live, responding other, with a centre of 
his own. We imagine that reality is only us, our yearnings and our cravings. 
In such a collapsed world, there is no real speech, because there is no one 
but us, no one to address, no one to answer, no one to whom to speak 
seriously, no one who addresses us with authority....The world is defined by 
one’s subjective shaping of reality, a shaping that can never satisfy, nor lead 
to communion, because the partner is permitted no real existence of his or 
her own” 
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This view seems to have a distinct overlap with Girard’s ‘loss of the signified’. 
If all that counts for each of us in his or her own life is ourselves and our own 
aspirations, the world otherwise becomes stripped of its links to God. Little 
is signified, because under this perspective there is little to signify. Girard 
seems to come close to despair over this, and hopes that the Holy Spirit will 
reactivate people, whose spirits are desiccated so that they resemble the dry 
bones in Ezekiel’s valley of the dead: 
“All of us are in this valley, but it is up to us to resuscitate meaning by 
relating all the texts to one another without exception...meaning which is 
being lost or threatened on all sides but simply awaits the breath of the 
Spirit to be reborn.”476  
Therefore, meaning is dependent on a view of life and God, which is relational. 
Brueggemann senses a deep sense of loss, a ‘yearning and wishfulness’ and 
‘resilient hope’ in people who exist in discommunion or reduced communion, 
and do not have the wherewithal to expand their understanding of reality 
and embrace God. He quotes Alistair MacIntyre’s explanation of this reduced 
state as it manifests itself in public and private arenas; in the public, the 
subjectivity “is visible as a ‘managerial’ consciousness in which all reality is 
reduced to problem-solving.”477 And a problem-solving approach, 
Brueggemann and Girard would agree, is not equipped to deal with this big 
problem: in some ways it looks straight through it as though it were 
transparent. 
Brueggemann goes on to speak of a second form of reductionism which is “an 
uncritical form of objectivism about God that assigns everything to God...(it) 
is powerful in the North American scene that lusts after a settled, uncritical 
religious assurance.” He is very critical of this syndrome and the worship 
associated with it, which is “mistaken, dishonest and destructive”.  
Let us therefore dismiss the second form from our enquiry and concentrate 
on the first. Brueggemann sees the missing key from both public and private 
areas of people’s lives as the absence “from any such speech (of) any practice 
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of commitment that may raise any critical question.” This leads, in the 
private area, through an “excessive ‘therapeutic’ preoccupation to yearning 
for relations in which there is no “sacrifice, durability or responsibility”478 (my 
emphasis).  
The linking of these three terms is telling in the context of loss of meaning, 
which we have detected in both Brueggemann’s and Girard’s understanding 
to be the fundamental to the contemporary malaise. According to both, it is 
suggested here, the finding of meaning can only be supported by a view of 
life, and God, which is relational , and, to use Brueggemann’s rather 
Wittgenstinian term, the ‘speech’ is not there to enable this mental direction 
to be taken. Girard uses a different turn of phrase: the breath of the spirit is 
required to restore the faculty. 
This measure of agreement still leaves us with the underlying problem, 
which is that we are all operating in a sort of spiritual deoxygenation 
brought about by the harmful effects of individualism. To borrow Girard’s 
term, this is the new Satan, but unlike the old one (mimesis and victimage), 
he does not work in secret. Instead, he has a complete public facade which is 
explicit and well argued, and may even seem to be complete and adequate; it 
is the human emotion of desolation that tells of the underlying problem. 
Although Girard’s response to perceived future prospects is very limited and 
includes apocalyptic scenarios479, (inevitably so, since he regards the 
mimetic system as a single, colossal, irreplaceable feature of human history) 
Brueggemann’s, by contrast, is extensive and set within a vision of cycles of 
relationship with God. He sees the present problem as one to be addressed 
by preaching, and says that the preacher must speak through “this taxonomy 
of guilt and suffering”, as indeed the prophets of the exile did in their own 
way, according to the problems of that time. Brueggemann therefore seems 
to think he has a solution, or at least an approach, to the besetting problem; 
Girard simply leaves us with the problem, and fears it may be terminal. 
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Review 
Research question Part 2: The fading concept of sacrifice (“Investigate the 
Christian concept of sacrifice and place it in its context; examine its 
effectiveness.”), has produced the following outcomes: 
The Christian concept of sacrifice is half-developed from its 
traditional form in the religion of Israel to the model suggested by 
Jesus. That is not to say that elements of the old religion remain, but 
that the function they had has not been fully transferred. ‘Mending the 
relationship with God’ is the key example of this. Confession and 
penance within Catholicism do address this to an extent, but within 
Protestantism there is no equivalent, and nowhere is there a 
developed system for the community to mend the relationship except 
in joint prayers of confession. According to Brueggemann, a good deal 
more is needed by way of mediation by a priest whose function 
corresponds to that of the Temple (this at least is his claim in relation 
to Protestantism), and as we have found in our analysis, the 
understood absence of God from self-indulgent life is itself a call away 
from the DVR.  
The thinking here builds upon Girard’s analysis of the fundamental 
nature of sacrifice in human societies  – but Girard offers little by way 
of observation on creative developments in the concept and activity of 
sacrifice, except for a general fear of how the future might unfold.  
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“..since we are primarily heirs to the Latin language, we are 
equally heirs to the fact that ‘it is in Latin that the division 
between the sacred and profane expresses itself most clearly’480... 
This is as much in the political sphere... as in the cultural... As an 
absolute noun, ‘the sacred’ is a modern creation... ”481 
 
The Sacred as Something Felt 
In this chapter, we will look at the sacred as a concept in long-term decline in 
the Western mind. It is often thought to have begun to lose its power at the 
time of the Reformation; a time when the word of God assumed an 
overwhelming importance, at least in Protestant culture. But is this just a 
shift in emphasis, or is there an incompatibility between these two types of 
revelation (the word of God, and the sense an occasion, a place or a person 
possessing a value which far exceeds the normal) which makes it hard for 
them to exist in parallel? Is, in fact, the decline in the sacred something which 
has only set in since the Reformation, or is the trend of much longer 
standing, but obscured by the ascendency of the Catholic tradition up to the 
time of the Reformation? And, given the effect of Post-Modernism in 
rejecting meta-narratives, has the playing field been levelled again, and an 
opportunity been created anew for religion which is felt as much as 
explained? 
The idea of the sacred is certainly something more easily felt than defined. 
The words scholars have used to describe it, such as ‘shaking’, or 
‘fascinating’482 are subjective rather than objectively analytical, and this is 
illustrative of the problem.  Loss of the sacred seems to amount to a loss of 
the feeling that something is sacred. 
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Beyond the Sacred Cosmos 
Ultimately, if expressed as an assertion (“this is sacred”), that feeling 
depends on a sense of special value and perhaps of God’s presence or 
ownership as an active reality within the world; on the other hand, if used in 
commentary (“sacred to the Incas”), it tends to refer to irrational behaviour 
within a culture: the group referred to held something dear to their deity, but 
the commentator does not see why to support this, or has no feeling for it. 
‘Sacred’, therefore, as an active concept, involves not only the living sense of 
God, but also the feeling or conviction that certain things (places, objects) 
and certain behaviour (thoughts, memories and imaginings) in a sense 
belong to God and are transformed, or made holy, by that association.  These 
understandings are “folded up in myths” according to Ricoeur483. When that 
value is lost, the view becomes a phenomenological one, and ideas of the 
sacred (and its near synonym, the holy) are often demoted in status to 
superstition; that is, their content of meaning, no longer felt, becomes 
invisible or is discounted. 
As an illustration, take the ending of the middle ages and the world-view 
which accompanied.  In the climate of scientific thought which came with the 
Enlightenment, (and that itself followed the Protestant revolution which 
shrank the potential for the sacred484), there was a great simplification, and 
some would say, impoverishment of understanding of the world: 
“If compared with the ‘fullness’ of the Catholic universe, Protestantism 
appears as a radical truncation, a reduction to ‘essentials’ at the cost of a 
vast wealth of religious contents.”485 
By contrast with the well-lit but plainly-furnished world of post-Reformation 
Protestantism, the middle ages have come to represent a time of unreason, to 
the extent that ‘mediaeval’ and ‘superstition’ have become associated 
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terms486. That association, differentiating the mediaeval mind-set from our 
own, points to a loss of the idea of holiness as a descriptor of the way the 
world is: during the time that the mediaeval mind-set represented the 
dominant version of reality (to use Brueggemann’s phrase), there was a 
vision of God in almost everything: 
“To the world when it was half a thousand years younger, the outlines of all 
things seemed more clearly marked than to us…Every event, every action 
was still embodied in expressive and solemn forms which raised them to the 
dignity of a ritual. For it was not merely the great facts of birth, marriage 
and death which, by the sacredness of the sacrament, were raised to the 
rank of mysteries; incidents of less importance, like a journey, a task, a visit, 
were equally attended by a thousand formalities: benedictions, ceremonies, 
formulas.”487 
“Towards the end of the Middle Ages two factors dominate religious life: the 
extreme saturation of the religious atmosphere, and a marked tendency for 
thought to embody itself in images…All thinking tends to religious 
interpretation of individual things; there is an enormous unfolding of 
religion in daily life…Religion penetrating all relations in life means a 
constant blending of religious and profane thought.”488 
At an extreme, the contemporary view is a complete inversion of this: 
“Our modernity is constituted as modern precisely by having moved beyond 
the sacred cosmos… Human beings no longer receive the meaning of their 
existence from their belonging to a cosmos itself saturated with 
meaning…Their existence is decentred, eccentric, a-centred. They lack 
festivals, their time is homogeneous like their space. That is why we speak 
of the sacred world today as something archaic. The sacred is the 
archaic.”489 
Of course, the move ‘beyond the sacred cosmos’, though substantial, is not 
complete. The human instinct for religion, though given a reduced scope by 
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the long dominance of Enlightenment thinking, has not perished entirely, 
and finds outlets not only in the remnants of Christianity but also in natural 
pantheism and ecology:  an appreciation of divinity demonstrated in the 
world490. This preaching, even in a largely irreligious age, still grounds the 
community.491  Also, it is of course the case that within Catholic thought the 
desacralization of the cosmos has been resisted: 
“…Catholicism succeeded in re-establishing a new version of cosmic order in 
a gigantic synthesis of biblical religion with extra-biblical cosmological 
conceptions” 
Berger goes so far as to suggest that this process has had the effect of 
reversing some of the development of religious thought which took place in 
Old Testament times492. That is to say, the Catholic Christian world-picture 
departs from the Hebrew one and in some sense reverses the progress of the 
theological thinking demonstrated in the Hebrew Bible. The 
“disenchantment” of the world is a feature of the religion of Israel from its 
earliest days, he contends. For instance, writing of the similarities between 
the religions of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, despite their strong cultural 
differences, he notes: 
“…the human world (that is, everything that we today would call culture and 
society) is understood as being embedded in a cosmic order that embraces 
the entire universe... it is an order that posits continuity between the 
empirical and supra-empirical, between the world of men and the world of 
the gods. This continuity, which assumes an ongoing linkage of human 
events with the sacred forces permeating the universe, is realised (not just 
reaffirmed but literally re-established) again and again in religious ritual… 
The Old Testament posits a God who stands outside the cosmos, which is his 
creation, but which he confronts and does not permeate. By the eighth 
century, at the very latest, we find that conception fully developed and 
radically divergent from the general religious conceptions of the ancient 
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Near East.  This God is radically transcendent, not to be identified with any 
natural or human phenomena…He appears without mates or offspring, 
unaccompanied by a pantheon of any sort.”493 
However, it is already apparent that there are cycles in operation here, in 
disenchantment and re-enchantment, amongst different peoples at different 
times, and not the single movement to an apocalyptic conclusion which 
Girard detects in his understanding of the loss of meaning which ‘castrates 
the signified’.494 
Berger’s observation about the departure of Catholic thought in particular 
from the pattern of the Old Testament (Protestant thought representing a 
partial reversion), is significant because we are dealing with a Protestant in 
Brueggemann, and a Catholic in Girard. We might therefore expect to see the 
influence of their respective backgrounds in their underlying attitudes to the 
cosmos as sacred or as rationalized; we might also look for a more strictly 
monotheistic stance in Brueggemann’s interpretation of Old Testament 
prophecy, relatively free of what Berger describes as  ‘re-enchantment’ and 
‘re-mythologization’, and a more natural sympathy with “the radicality of the 
Israelite conception”495 and “the anti-magical animus of Yahwism496”.  This 
tendency, carried to a logical conclusion, results not only in desacralized 
religion, but even in the death of religion itself. Ricoeur has commented on 
this seminally: 
“...the argument would seem to require carrying this process through to free 
the kerygmatic kernel from the sacred husk... In this regard, the programme 
of demythologizing the Christian message in the twentieth century may be 
understood as an attempt to radicalize a tendency already at work in 
primitive Christianity. Rudolf Bultmann, for instance, has argued that if 
demythologization is externally motivated by the destruction of the mythic 
universe under the blows of science, it is internally based on a 
demythologization that is part of the kerygma itself and that can be 
documented by the exegesis of the New Testament. Christianity’s response 
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to desacralization therefore is not to submit to it as an unavoidable task but 
to carry it out as a task of faith. Or to put it another way, faith and religion 
need to be separated and we need to go so far as to conceive of an a-
religious Christianity such as that spoken of by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his 
later writings.”497 
However, the outcome of the comparison is not what might be expected. As 
we have seen, it is Brueggemann who offers a detailed account of the 
function of priesthood in the process of atonement and healing within the 
biblical accounts; he is arguing for sacralisation and noting its effective part 
in the scheme of things. Girard pays close attention to the to the meaning of 
the sacred in areas he considers to be formative to human society as a whole, 
notably primitive, sacral kingship and mythological elements, in other 
words, at an early developmental stage. He has little to say, though, about the 
disenchantment of the universe and the influence of Protestant thinking.  
 
Manifestation & Proclamation 
Paul Ricoeur, in Figuring the Sacred, quoting Mircea Eliade, suggests that the 
idea of ‘hierophany’ is central: anything by which the sacred shows itself is a 
hierophany.498 The logic here is that although the sacred element may be 
beyond description, the experience of its manifestation is something that can 
be recounted. Ricoeur contrasts manifestation and proclamation, and argues 
that the sacred belongs to manifestation, which  
“...is not verbal by origin. But I think there is something specific in the 
Hebrew and Christian traditions that gives a kind of privilege to the 
word...The notion of sacred text may have been alien to the Hebraic and pre-
Christian tradition.  We apply a category that belongs to this sacrality that is 
cosmic and then that is condensed, as it were, in a book, and that thus 
changes its function as it becomes fundamental without being sacred.”499 
                                                 
497 Ricoeur, 1995, p.62. 
498 Ricoeur, 1995, p.49. 
499 Ricoeur, 1995, p.71. 
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Ricoeur’s speculative point is noted without necessarily being accepted. 
From the point of view of this study, the sacred may be indicated within a 
text, and may be accessible through accounts of behaviour.  Sacrifice and 
prophecy are, of course, areas or aspects of human behaviour, and therefore 
a key question here is what elements of behaviour are seen in the 
contemporary world as sacred or potentially so. Thomas Berger comments: 
“All phenomena are profane that do not ‘stick out’ as sacred. The routines of 
everyday life are profane unless, so to speak, proven otherwise, in which 
latter case they are conceived of as infused in one way or another with 
sacred power (as in sacred work, for example).”500  
This starting point effectively notes the foundation of Girard’s thinking on 
the sacred. He indeed sees the human world (not the natural one) as ‘infused 
with sacred power’, in one particular way: the way in which sacrifice and the 
sacred are inseparable and both tied to violence: 
“..the full range of the term sacred, or rather of the Latin sacer, which is 
sometimes translated “sacred” , sometimes “accursed” for it encompasses 
the maleficent as well as the beneficent.”501 
For Girard, the sacred is a concept essentially identified with violence, and 
hardly defined otherwise. He refers to primitive societies that have no legal 
system, and observes that they have attitudes to violence which are 
incomprehensible to us. They recognize that violence is contagious, and 
recognize it only in “an almost entirely dehumanized form, that is, under the 
deceptive guise of the sacred.”502 
“Although the sacred is “bad” when it is inside the community, it is “good” 
when it returns to the exterior. The language of pure sacredness retains 
whatever is most fundamental to myth and religion; it detaches violence 
from man to make it a separate, impersonal entity, a sort of fluid substance 
that flows everywhere and impregnates on contact.”503 
                                                 
500 Berger, 1969, p.26. 
501 Girard, 1977, p.257. 
502 Girard, 1977, p.30. 
503 Girard, 1977, p.258. 
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For that reason, the sacred is invoked in driving out violence, and the 
mechanism for this is scapegoating. 
Berger, again thinking of the sacred cosmos (though his thoughts are 
transferable to the human world) observes as follows: 
“To be in a ‘right’ relationship with the sacred cosmos is to be protected 
from the nightmare threats of chaos. To fall out of such a ‘right’ relationship 
is to be abandoned on the edge of the abyss of meaninglessness...But behind 
this danger is the other, much more horrible one, namely that one may lose 
all connection with the sacred and be swallowed up by chaos.... In the sacred 
cosmos, however, these constructions achieve their ultimate culmination – 
literally, their apotheosis”504 
Therefore, both for Girard and for Berger, the sacred is a protection against 
chaos. Girard’s scapegoat theory describes a system built into human 
behaviour, which automatically steers communities away from chaos by 
causing them to focus blame (whether deserved or not) on one individual, 
who is evicted, or killed, and may later be declared divine. This is the pattern 
of sacral kingship, as defined by Frazer, Hocart and others.505 The king is the 
surrogate victim who is killed to bring order and prosperity to his people. 
However, the automatic process is one which makes the participants blind to 
what they are actually doing; they do not think of the victim as a surrogate, 
and this characteristic distinguishes the processes and the language of the 
sacred: 
“Though generally less mythic than the language of divinity, the language of 
pure sacredness is more mythic in that it eliminates the final traces of the 
real victims, thereby concealing the fact that the sacred cannot function 
without surrogate victims.”506 
                                                 
504 Berger, 1969, p.26-27. 
505 Quigley (ed), 2005. 
506 Girard, 1977, p.258. 
12   The Sacred, the Holy and the Signified 
 
199 
 
According to Grande507, Berger’s view is that the eviction of chaos is achieved 
by a cultural construct. This he recognizes as widespread, but not as 
automatic: 
“Religion for Berger is on the whole the establishment, through human 
activity, of an encompassing holy order or holy cosmos which is capable of 
maintaining order despite the continual threat of chaos” 
Therefore, although Girard is not unique in identifying the sacred as a social 
phenomenon, he stands out from others who have investigated it (Frazer, 
Hocart, Berger, et al.) because of his theory that it is feature of humanity and 
a product of the process of hominization508, and thus in a sense inevitable; it 
is built into the way that human groups operate, and not just a feature of the 
way that certain cultures have evolved. Further, it is invisible to those who 
are involved in it, so its process tends to evade analysis. However, Girard 
sees human development reaching its final phase, and as part of this, the 
sacred is becoming exposed for what it is: 
“The sacrificial system is virtually worn out, and that is why its inner 
workings are exposed to view.”509 
In other words, Girard does not claim particular insight for himself, but 
instead observes that the unveiling of the interlinking of violence and the 
sacred was something bound to happen as the sacrificial system decays and 
loses its natural camouflage. 
The idea of the sacred therefore both lies at that heart of Girard’s thinking, 
and is declared by him to be in inevitable decline as humanity progresses 
towards a final denouement: once the sacrificial system has gone, there is 
nothing to prevent violence escalating and destroying the world, particularly 
as the technology now exists to do just that. The decline of the sacred points 
to the apocalypse. 
                                                 
507 Per Bjornar Grande, Mimesis and World Building, at 
http://www.girardstudies.com/www.girardstudies.com/Memesis_%26_world.html. 
Accessed 22.9.2010. 
508 Though this theory is now questioned. See Chapter 8. 
509 Girard, 1977, p.295. 
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Brueggemann, the sacred and divine engagement 
In Brueggemann’s writing, the term ‘sacred’ is hardly used, perhaps for 
reasons that Ricoeur has explained, though this similarity does not 
necessarily imply any immediate influence by Ricoeur. He would be more 
inclined perhaps to use the term ‘holy’, though actually that near-synonym is 
not much used by him either. 
It does not seem worth dissecting the terms and finding differing shades of 
meaning between them, or forensically laying out their usage within 
Brueggemann’s work, as the evidence to be gathered is minimal in extent 
and mainly notable for that fact alone. Broadly speaking the two terms are 
either interchangeable (holy place or sacred place), or, when they are not 
(God’s holy word but not his sacred word), the difference seems to be one of 
habitual usage. Therefore, we shall consider them as a combined term, and 
from here on, one will imply the other. 
It is therefore necessary to look at Brueggemann’s work analytically to see 
how the combined term fits into it. The idea of something held dear to God 
leads into his idea of prophecy and preaching, which in both cases reveals 
what is held dear to God, and therefore possibly what is sacred.  However, 
there is a counterpart to this; God holds dear humanity when humanity 
keeps his commandments, and otherwise turns his back.  When he does, evil 
and chaos become ascendant. The alternative to God holds superficial 
attraction; prophecy and preaching are a call back to the ways which invite 
God’s favourable attention. The prophets rail against the ways that lead away 
from God and his holy ways, and towards injustice, and against those who 
promote those ways, profit from them, and seduce people to them. Jeremiah 
has God say: 
“Your iniquities have turned these away, and your sins have kept good from 
you; for wicked men are found among my people; they lurk like fowlers 
lying in wait. They set a trap; they catch men; like a basket full of birds, their 
houses are full of treachery; therefore they have become great and rich, they 
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have grown fat and sleek. They know no bounds in deeds of wickedness; 
they judge not with justice the cause of the fatherless, to make it prosper, 
and they do not defend the rights of the needy.”510 
In Brueggemann’s scheme, then, sacred might be identified with the 
presence of God, and God’s attention and direction, achieved through 
obedience to God’s word.  Prophecy is the barometer which detects the 
climate of sacred presence and its counterpart, the ascendency of evil, 
injustice and chaos in its absence. 
Brueggemann has another pair of counterparts: the poetry of prophecy and 
its converse. Prophetic vision is differentiated from the ordinary world, or 
(in Brueggemann’s phrase, “the prose world”511), and the mode of expression 
used is crucial to any attempt to get out of the bind of thinking in the terms of 
this world, or “to move beyond settled reality”512: 
“The Bible is our firm guarantee that in a world of technological naiveté and 
ideological reductionism, prophetic construals of another world are still 
possible, still worth doing, still longingly received by those who live at the 
edge of despair, resignation and conformity. Our preferred language is to 
call such speech prophetic, but it we might also term it poetic513. Those 
whom the ancient Israelites termed prophets, the equally ancient Greeks 
called poets. The poet/prophet is a voice that shatters settled reality and 
evokes new possibility in the listening assembly..”514 
The coupling of ‘settled reality’ and ‘prose’, and also of ‘prophecy’, ‘poetry’ 
and ‘new possibility’ can of course be taken at the level of matter-of-fact 
description of modes of communication;  but in the context of religious 
discussion, the implication must be of effective practice in opening a link to 
the divine and transcendent. It is, therefore, necessary to move from prose to 
                                                 
510 Jeremiah 5:25-28, as quoted at Brueggemann, 1989, p.18. 
511 Brueggemann, 1989, p.3. it might be observed that the mediaeval world was essentially 
not a prose world, but a sacred one, without being a prophetic one particularly. This is not a 
conjunction which Brueggemann foresees. 
512 Brueggemann, 1989, p.5. 
513 Brueggemann’s footnote: “George Anastapto, The Artist as Thinker (Chicago: Swallow 
Press, 1983), 11.Amos Wilder, Theopoetic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), has explicated 
the poetic dimension of the religious imagination”. 
514 Brueggemann, 1989, p.4. 
12   The Sacred, the Holy and the Signified 
 
202 
 
poetry to speak of holiness, and therefore to speak of hierophany or 
revelation: 
“God needs prophets in order to make himself known, and all prophets are 
necessarily artistic. What a prophet has to say can never be said in prose.”515 
‘Poetry’ and ‘prose’ need some definition here.  This is the sense in which 
Brueggemann uses these two terms: 
“By prose I refer to a world that is organised in settled formulae, so that 
even pastoral prayers and love letters sound like memos. By poetry, I do not 
mean rhyme, rhythm or metre, but language that moves like Bob Gibson’s 
fast ball, that jumps at the right moment,  that breaks open old worlds with 
surprise, abrasion and pace. Poetic speech is the only proclamation worth 
doing in a situation of reductionism, the only proclamation, I submit, that is 
worthy of the name preaching. Such preaching is...the ready, steady, 
surprising proposal that the real world in which God invites us to live is not 
the one made available by the rulers of this age.  The preacher has an 
awesome opportunity to offer an evangelical world: an existence shaped by 
the news of the gospel. ”516 
The interesting point then arises, to what extent does this type of 
communication, poetically mediated, necessarily involve the concept of the 
sacred or holy? Indeed, does the fact that Brueggemann can and does speak 
at length about God’s self-communication through the prophets mean that he 
must be speaking of the sacred, even though he is not minded to use that 
word?  If it does, then talk of God and talk with God– the responses to God’s 
self-revelation – by definition are in prophecy-poetry. If finding ‘meaning’ as 
Brueggemann and Girard use that term, is dependent on communication 
with God, then it would be the case that in an age or in a society not inclined 
to speak poetically, communication with God, and the finding of meaning 
would both be considerably handicapped. Loss of the sacred would be co-
incident with a decline in the ability to speak prophetically. Therefore, 
prophecy and the sacred stand together as something felt. Prophecy is not a 
                                                 
515 von Balthasar, 1982, p.43. 
516 Brueggemann, 1989, pp.3-5. 
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left-brain activity that one can class with the emerging rationalism of the 
post-reformation age, or wholly apportion to the category of ‘explanation’. 
It may help to clarify this issue if one reflects on the urgent need for an 
ecological commitment to the future of the planet. Coakley stated that in 
order for the magnitude of the task to be taken on and dealt with, a religious 
commitment was required517.  Would such a religious commitment be 
centred on nature because it is sacred, or on the Word which calls the 
believer to act in a particular way? One has the impression that Coakley 
herself (and possibly her intended audience) fall into the second camp, but 
that many enthusiasts for ecology by contrast belong to the first, and are 
motivated by the perceived sanctity of nature. 
 
The Sacred and the Word 
So, it seems from Brueggemann’s account, if the idea of the sacred is to be 
admitted at all, it is in prophetic words. The religious status of such words is 
therefore extremely high. What, one might ask, is the relationship between 
truly prophetic words and ‘the Word’ itself? 518Might one jump to ‘the sacred 
is the Word’, and even go further:  could it be that in the Word and the 
person of God is all that is sacred, and that there may be nothing sacred at all 
apart from these.  
 That is the conclusion pointed to by Ricoeur, when he says that the Israelites 
refused a sacred universe.519 And it is beyond dispute that prominent New 
Testament texts support the view that the Word is divine in itself and 
unsurpassed in importance: 
                                                 
517 Coakley, 2009. 
518 ‘Word’ and ‘words’ are not interchangeable terms, but there is at least an oblique link here 
to Fishbane’s point about “the meaning of words is ‘Torah’”, and “the Torah bears Israel’s 
sins”518. 
519 Ricoeur, 1995, p.57. 
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“when all things began, the Word already was. The word dwelt with God, 
and what God was, the Word was. The Word, then, was with God at the 
beginning.”520 
“And Jesus answered him, saying, It is written, that man shall not live by 
bread alone, but by every word of God”. 521 
The Word, then is fundamental to existence itself, as a sort of DNA or policy. 
The fragments of it we encounter or identify in life are to be our guide.  It is 
closed by nature and not apparent to people much of the time; revelation 
achieved through preaching, according to Ricoeur’s definition, permanently 
alters perception of the Word and opens up its hidden state.522  
However, Ricoeur goes on,  
“The hope to see faith in the word outwith the religion of the sacred is really 
vain and that the end of the word as well as of the hearing of the word is 
bound to some new birth of the sacred and its symbolism, beyond its 
death…?”523  
He articulates a point here which he further develops into a rapprochement 
with the religion of manifestation rather than proclamation. Brueggemann is 
less clear on the subject, but it might not be unfair to make the same point on 
his behalf, given the explicit importance of priestly action in his scheme. So, 
although Brueggemann tends not to use the word ‘sacred’, it could be argued 
that he engages with the content of that word in a serious way.  
Girard, on the other hand, does use the word ‘sacred’ a lot – even in a book 
title – but it may be questioned whether he is actually all that much 
concerned with it. Violence and the Sacred, despite its title, is actually about 
sacrifice, and the idea of the sacred as discussed by him tends to lead 
immediately into a discussion on violence. For instance, he states 
                                                 
520 St John’s Gospel, 1:1 NEB. 
521 Luke 4.4. Matthew 4.4 contains a similar text. Both are based on and probably 
deliberately refer to Deuteronomy 8:2-3. 
522 Ricoeur, 1995, p.72. 
523 Ricoeur, 1995, p.68. 
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“The sacred consists of all those forces whose dominance over man 
increases or seems to increase in proportion to man’s effort to master them. 
Tempests, forest fires, and plagues, among other phenomena, may be 
classified as sacred. Far outranking these, however, though in a far less 
obvious manner, stands human violence – violence seen as something 
exterior to man and hence as part of all the other outside forces that 
threaten mankind. Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred.”524 
From this point, he goes on to discuss violence, contagion and ritual 
impurity. The impression is that violence, the struggle between order and 
chaos, is the main thing to be discussed when ‘sacred’ is used, and most of 
the other content of that word can be left aside. At a later stage he states, 
“As we have seen, the sacred embraces all those forces that threaten to harm 
man or trouble his peace,”525 
and again the discussion reverts to violence. He goes on to explain the book 
title, Violence and the Sacred: 
“This impersonal designation is fundamental to our discussion. In Africa, as 
in many other parts of the world, there is only a single term to denote the 
two faces of the sacred – the interplay of order and disorder, of difference 
lost and retrieved, as enacted in the immutable drama of the sacrifice of the 
incestuous king.”526 
Girard links his discussion to Greek mythology, but returns to the idea of the 
sacred in primitive societies: 
“We are wont to say that primitive peoples are imbued with the sacred. The 
truth is that these peoples assume, just as we ourselves do, that they have 
freed themselves, up to a point, from subjection to the sacred. They alone 
adhere to the rules, promulgated by the sacred itself, that allow them to 
maintain a precarious independence from divine intervention.”527 
                                                 
524 Girard, 1977, p.31. 
525 Ibid, p.58. 
526 Ibid, p.257. 
527 Ibid., p.267. 
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This seems to be a reference back to the ‘sacred cosmos’ with which we 
began this chapter. Indeed, it appears that Girard’s thinking on ‘the sacred’ is 
rooted in this understanding and anthropological descriptions of primitive 
societies. He extends all of this into the biblical period, and with only a fairly 
short look at the Old Testament, focuses sharply on the New Testament, and 
the resolution of the age-old problems of victimage and sacrifice as defined 
in the anthropological work. 
Therefore, as we have seen, Girard and Brueggemann are both starting from, 
and restricting themselves to, different areas of meaning in the term ‘sacred’.  
Put together, they seem at first to be hardly compatible, as Brueggemann 
starts with an understanding of Israel after it has rejected the sacred cosmos, 
and never looks back. Therefore, the issues with which Girard is so much 
concerned have little history, though they do have something of a lingering 
presence, in biblical Israel, and Brueggemann’s scheme reflects this: it is 
hard to point to anything ‘sacred’ in the sense in which Girard uses the term 
and identify it in Brueggemann’s understandings, except of course the role of 
priests. But the sheer absence in Brueggemann of the word ‘sacred’ tells its 
own story of his disenchanted universe and near-absolute reliance on the 
Word and on words. It is only through focussing on Brueggemann’s account 
of prophetic method, that it becomes apparent that prophecy is not just an 
account of the world as it truly is, or a route to solving problems, but a 
method of speech that is efficacious in itself, because it is holy. This is the 
adjustment to the old concept of the sacred. However, it would take an 
additional component, not at present to be found in the work of either 
writer. This would involve modification of Girard’s thinking on ‘loss of the 
signified’, as demonstrated in the final chapter of Things Hidden, to the extent 
that it was Israel (not any form of recent Puritanism) which began the 
process of desacralization, and did so very long ago, early in Israel’s history. 
The final stages of loss of meaning which Girard comments on are a long-
term consequence of a process that has been running ever since . If we make 
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the terms the ‘sacred’ and ‘holy’ subsidiary to Girard’s term ‘the signified’528, 
then the problems noted by both writers of the shunning of the sacred and 
the dismissal of the enchanted universe can find common ground, though not 
a common timescale. If one were bold, one could say that hominization, 
(which Girard is inclined to speak of as a sort of generative event, in fact,  the 
ultimate generative event as the culmination of a number of others),is in fact 
a cyclical process 529. This produced certain kinds of behaviour (notably all 
that is observed as developed human mimetics) and which then disposed of 
the means of mimetics (the sacred) once they had served their purpose. This 
is what Christianity has done.  By doing so, it has brought humanity into a 
perilous state in which the protection of the scapegoat process, which is part 
of the sacral approach,  has been exposed and therefore no longer is 
operative. That is the situation humanity is now in, and Girard thinks that it 
might herald the apocalypse. It heralds the end of the cycle; this ties in with 
Girard’s apocalyptic thinking well enough, but with Brueggemann’s work, 
there is theory about apocalypse without any sense of immediate problem: 
“Apocalyptic turns the future as a problem productive of deep anxiety into an 
arena for praise and obedience of God who will surely prevail.”530 
What is left after that major adjustment? The mutual recognition of meaning 
has had to be constructed for the two authors, and the reconstruction lives in 
the uneasy circumstances of a complete difference in tone.  For Girard, the 
contemporary world has ceased to find meaning because it looks for it in the 
wrong place, and overlooks the gospel, which is where meaning is to be 
found. 
For Brueggemann, meaning is present in the Word and in words; this much 
might be expected of him as a Protestant theologian. But, Brueggemann 
suggests, it is also present in ritual, and he embraces the post-modern world 
and its attendant fragmentation of the grand entities of thought; he claims 
                                                 
528 For a much fuller discussion of this term, see McKenna, Andrew: Violence and Difference, 
which is an extended comparison of Girard and Derrida, involving the ideas of 
deconstruction.  
529 Girard, 95-96, 100. 
530 Brueggemann, 2002, p.8. 
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that preaching (prophecy) continues in loci which are contextual, local and 
pluralistic. 
 
 
 
13  The Holy and the Here & Now 
 
209 
 
“The Prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel dined with me, and I asked them how 
they dared so roundly to assert that God spoke to them; and whether 
they did not think at the time, that they would be misunderstood, & so 
be the cause of imposition. 
Isaiah answered, I saw no God, nor heard any in fine organical 
perception; but my senses discover’d the infinite in everything, and  as I 
was the perswaded & remain confirm’d; that the voice of honest 
indignation is the voice of God, I cared not for consequences but wrote. 
Then I asked: does a firm perswasion that a thing is so, make it so? 
He replied. All poets believe that it does, & in ages of imagination this 
form perswasion removed mountains; but many are not capable of a 
firm perswasion of anything. 
…I heard this with some wonder, & must confess my own conviction.”531 
 
This truly remarkable passage is quoted by the editors of a collection of 
essays published as a tribute to Brueggemann532.  Their observation on it, 
noting a resonance with Brueggemann’s work,  is that “the poet has the risk-
ridden power to make available through the written word that which was 
not previously available.”  That is to say, the poet (Blake) or the prophet 
(Blake, or Blake’s Isaiah) can make something so by writing it; the revelation 
is in the act of writing, and does not precede it. The writing is no mere report 
of something which originated earlier or in another place. Spontaneity and 
creation are involved, and in that simple, low-key phrase, not previously 
available, lies the shocking new world of prophecy:  somehow rooted in 
everyday experience, but moved out of its familiar form by the shaping force 
of imagination which invents, or brings into the world, knowledge of God on 
the basis of a personal conviction.  
 
Both Girard and Brueggemann have ‘the shocking new world of prophecy’ 
right at the centre of their thinking. In Girard’s case, it is something which 
                                                 
531Blake, William  from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell  plates 12-13, in Blake, 1966, p.153 
532 Linafelt & Beal (eds), 1998, p.1. 
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simultaneously rejects the most vicious and universal tendencies in the 
human character (which he holds are mimetic in character) and also the 
normal human mechanisms for dealing with those tendencies533. And, 
according to Girard, although the mimetic process is both contagious and 
invisible to people who are almost inevitably swept up by it534; but the 
questioning response to the mimetic system is not automatic, involuntary or 
instinctive in the same way. Instead, it requires a conscious rejection of the 
normal pattern of behaviour, of normal relationships, and possibly of the 
status quo in a general sense.  
 
Brueggemann notes the effect of the shocking new world, which often 
includes a hostile reaction to what looks like, and indeed turns out to be, 
subversion of the dominant version of the world535: the prophets are 
resented, sometimes killed536, and according to the texts this is an offence to 
God.  God is not on the side of those who value the settled stability which 
comes of worldly-wisdom and human power-structures. Brueggemann 
works outward from this observation and from the idea of prophecy as 
alternative reality537 to examine what prophecy is and does in relation to 
society. He also explores what conditions are favourable to prophecy, in 
other words, when it is likely to occur and have an effect, and finds that God 
speaks powerfully when human power and human systems have failed, or 
are in abeyance.  
 
It is therefore more or less inevitable, under both views, that prophecy538 
will be seen as a dangerous challenge to the stability of human relations. 
                                                 
533 Girard  1972 & 1986. 
534 Girard, 2001, p.19ff. This subject will be explored in much greater detail later on. For the 
present, the main point is that mimetic behaviour is not voluntary; it is the default mode of 
humanity. 
535 Brueggemann, 2000, p.6. The ‘dominant version of the world’ is the normal world view in 
any society and any one time. It is almost universally a ‘narrative of violence’ according to 
Brueggemann, both literally speaking and also metaphorically in what he terms the 
‘economic violence’ of the free market economy. 
536 There are a number of statements in the New Testament to the effect that the prophets 
have been killed, for instance, Acts 7:52.  
537 Brueggemann, 1978, p.11ff. 
538 However, it should be borne in mind that the two writers are not really looking at the 
same areas of prophecy. Girard’s main focus is on the prophecy of Jesus and later writers, 
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As a background to the insights of these two authors, let us explore first in a 
general way what the relationship of prophetic talk is to everyday life – the 
here & now – and to perceptions of what is divine. The exploration begins 
with an examination of how we accommodate God in our description of the 
world.  
 
 
The Basis of Talk of God, and of Talk with God   
 
Much talk of God in the Bible is drawn from the language of everyday 
experience. For example, God “was walking in the garden in the cool of the 
day”539. This description refers to the most accessible kind of shared 
experience, drawn from the here-and-now of whenever and wherever the 
reader lives, in good times or bad, whether good or evil seems to rule the 
world.  The reader is asked to imagine God doing what she routinely does. 
Therefore, the experience of God is bracketed with ordinary human 
experience. No abstract conceptualisation is called for, simply the recall of 
the personal experience of the reader. So, it may be that the here-and-now is 
the inevitable starting point for any dialogue, because it is the arena of our 
common experience, the least private aspect of our minds, and seems to need 
no verification beyond its simple presence.540  So to refer to God using such 
terms, however metaphorical the mode of speech may be, is to couch the 
reference in such a way that nothing beyond a simple report seems to be 
required. God was encountered, at that point in space and time, as we are in 
our daily lives, in the garden, in the evening. However, what may be implied 
is the emotion that goes with the situation: hearing a person of authority 
approaching, bearing in mind our experience of such persons in our lives to 
date. Genesis uses the situation to show a newly frightened Adam, suddenly 
                                                                                                                                     
and on sacral kingship in primitive societies and myth in classical literature, whereas 
Brueggemann is concerned with the Hebrew Bible. 
539 Genesis 3:8. 
540 Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. The Social Construction of Reality London: Penguin, 1967, p.37. 
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afraid because he realised that he was naked, having equally suddenly lost 
the trust of God with which he was born. The dominant version and the 
narrative of violence begin here, in the expectation of God’s retribution.  
  
But the corollary of the situation in which there is, to use Brueggemann’s 
phrase, a dominant version of reality, is that the attitudes of ordinary human 
life come along with the general expression; the dominant version in the 
reader’s experience is automatically imported into this and any description, 
and would tend to persist in any extension of the simple anecdote. It 
therefore becomes impossible to separate interpretation from the original 
intended meaning; such is the power of the dominant version of reality at 
either end of the equation541. 
 
This brings us to a point which on the face of it seems beguilingly simple, in 
that there appears to be a division between two fundamental categories of 
human thought: the monitoring of experience (the here-and-now), and the 
use of imagination and memory, but close examination reveals that they are 
inseparably conjoined. The dominant understanding of the world is implied 
in any reading of ordinary experience under ordinary circumstances (unless 
the reader is exceptional). Such a normal reading seems to involve no 
exercise of the imagination, but only reporting of facts, but in fact the process 
involves the application of a ‘reality template’ which is constructed through a 
process dependent on imagination. Nevertheless, to the user, as it were, the 
reality template, or dominant version of reality, almost always seems to be 
merely factual. 
 
Where a different understanding of the world, or (to use Brueggemann’s 
term) a counter-imagination of the world542 is concerned, the two categories 
interact in a different way. This can involve shock, and bring about the 
charge that God being redefined, imagined rather than perceived – a charge 
                                                 
541 Nicholas Lash, in Theology on the Way to Emmaus, explores the contribution to meaning 
made by the person who witnesses drama.  Lash, 1986, p.37ff. 
542 Of course, the counter-imagination is not rooted in violence, in contrast to the dominant 
view, in Brueggemann’s opinion.  
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which Blake would admit, but Brueggemann neutralises by using the 
vocabulary of imagination throughout543.   
 
A prophet, therefore, according to Brueggemann, is someone who detaches 
description from its normal associations, and supplies new connotations 
instead. She does this in order to subvert: “flying low under the dominant 
version with a subversive offer of another version to be embraced by 
subversives.”544 (Original emphases). 
 
Girard’s view has its similarities to this, though he approaches from another 
direction.  He insists that truth lies only in the unmasking of the mimetic 
delusion which causes human understanding of reality, and of God, to be 
reshaped. In other words, human history carries with it throughout a pattern 
of imaginations of the world, and that near-universal imaginative 
construction tends to be the dominant world view545.  
 
These corporate acts of delusion or imagination can be undercut by the 
analytical truth of the view which identifies the mimetic system for what it is. 
This analytical view is equivalent to Brueggemann’s re-imagination of the 
world, but with the important difference that Girard does not use the 
language of imagination but instead makes up-front realist claims for what is 
being recognized in such a situation. Indeed, his argument is that the 
absolute reality of the world is being revealed in the laying bare of the 
mimetic process and its mechanisms of violence and sacrifice. He concludes 
Violence and the Sacred with these words:  
                                                 
543 A point which may seem to hint at an anti-realist orientation characterising 
Brueggemann’s thinking; but in fact, it may be that Brueggemann does this because of a 
belief about human processes, not because of any doubts about universality of truth. This 
point will be further examined later.  
544 Brueggemann, 2000, p.6. However, the theme is recurrent in Brueggemann’s work. For 
instance, in The Prophetic Imagination (1978), there is a prolonged discussion of alternative 
approaches, including a testing of the hypothesis that ‘the task of prophetic ministry is to 
nurture, nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness 
and perception of the dominant culture around us.’ (p.13). In Texts under Negotiation (1993), 
there is a chapter headed Inside the Counterdrama which sets out the possibilities for 
subversives in the contemporary Church.  
545 This point underlies much of Girard’s thinking and is made time and again in his work. 
One book, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (1978), has it as its principal theme. 
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“We have managed to extricate ourselves from the sacred somewhat more 
successfully than other societies have done, to the point of losing all 
memory of the generative violence; but we are now about to rediscover it. 
The essential violence returns to us in a spectacular manner- not only in the 
form of violent history but also in the form of subversive knowledge.” 546 
 
It will be apparent immediately firstly that both Girard and Brueggemann 
are using the word ‘subversive’, and also that the prophets, or those who can 
see for what it is the mimetic process and its narrative of violence (this is a 
combination of Brueggemann’s and Girard’s terminology), will speak 
differently from others; and that the here and now will have a different 
meaning for them.  
 
So, under identical physical conditions, one person may find circumstances 
(the here and now) reveal God in a certain way, and another not. The 
quotation from Blake at the head of this chapter refers to this issue. Then, it 
would be fair to say that talk of God has imposed demands on expression 
that cannot be supplied fully from that arena of the everyday without 
encountering issues of veracity.  The result, which is frequently encountered, 
is that those who do claim to encounter God begin to use language in a 
different way, and develop a finite (private) province of meaning547, which is 
capable of being shared by those who undergo the same experience, but not 
otherwise.   When religious groups do this, they are in a sense withdrawing 
from the territory of the dominant version of reality, and pitching camp on 
their own defined space.  
 
Let us take as an example of what happens under this human adjustment of 
reality: a visit to the theatre. When the curtain is down, the everyday world is 
the dominant reality. When it goes up, the audience visits a world of other 
                                                 
546 Girard, 1972, p.318. 
547 This is a term coined by me to describe a key part of what is involved in creating the 
‘dominant version of reality’, to which Brueggemann refers. 
13  The Holy and the Here & Now 
 
215 
 
meanings and a different order.548  That world is temporarily available 
through the special circumstances of the theatre, and it is not available in the 
audience’s daily life, in the world from which the theatre is set apart. For this 
reason, Peter Brook has described the experience as ‘holy’549. However, for 
those who have visited a particular theatrical performance, the meaning 
found in the performance witnessed is transferred and becomes a part of the 
filter through which the everyday world is perceived550.  
 
This kind of adjustment is one small part of the elaborate process by which a 
particular world view is built up and maintained. In uncountable minute 
ways, the world perceived is changed and built up, and within a culture, that 
emergent world is held largely in common551.  
 
 
Connecting within and without the Finite Province 
 
It will be apparent that the process for constructing finite provinces of 
meaning, from which a dominant version of reality will emerge, is one in 
which the imagination plays an important part. Imagination, therefore, is the 
mechanism through which communities build up their dominant versions of 
reality, and is the generating agent for perceptions of reality even when they 
seem to boil down to reports of perceptions, lacking any element of 
invention.  The idea of truth may seem to be at risk here, if imagination is 
used in arriving at its definition. Brueggemann, who is inclined to use the 
language of imagination quite generally, has examined ‘contested truth in a 
post-Christian World’552,  in which he puts forward that the definition and 
redefinition of truth is a continuous process, in which the episodes of the 
Bible have a re-entrant function, becoming newly appropriate to situations 
                                                 
548 Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p.39. 
549 This is a major theme of his book The Empty Space (Brook, 1968). 
550 Some playwrights, notably Berthold Brecht, call time on this phenomenon by frequently 
reminding listeners that they  are experiencing theatre, not real life. 
551 Green (1978) explains this in terms of paradigms, that is, templates of interpretation. 
552 This phrase is the strap-line to the book title Deep Memory, Exuberant Hope Brueggemann, 
2000. 
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as they arise. God, as rendered in the Bible, is ‘an unsettled character’553 who 
poses a problem for theology as it has been done conventionally in the 
Christian West, where it has been the business of a dominant cultural power 
(the Church) with a long historical perspective tending to reinforce a linear 
view.554 
 
The idea of non-linearity, both in human affairs (cycles of growth and 
collapse of dominant versions of reality) and in the prophecy which calls 
such schemes to account, is contrary to the normal assumption of history, 
which traditionally looks for a particular cause of any disruption to affairs 
which otherwise are  in a normal, steady state. Contemporary thought, with 
the emergence of chaos theory555,  has questioned the assumption that there 
is such a thing as a default steady state, or that instability results from some 
action disturbing a status quo which would otherwise be fit to endure, and 
instead sees growth and collapse as both effects of an underlying instability.  
 
For the purposes of this argument, let us follow the suggestion that 
assumptions of stability have been exaggerated in the post-Enlightenment 
dominant world view, and admit the possibility of non-linearity in human 
development. The model which might be applied instead of the linear one is 
that of episodes which may be viewed collectively as a sort of web, separated 
but interdependent, and possibly mutually interpretive.  
 
This realisation tends to promote the view that the Bible is to be read like a 
drama, which unfolds through a number of interactions, which are both 
isolated for the reasons given above, but also interrelated. This is a subject 
which Raymund Schwager, drawing upon Girard556, has made his own557.  
                                                 
553 Ibid., p.77 
554 Ibid., page 130, ch.7 footnote 1. 
555 This is an enormous subject which can only be touched upon here. An example of this is 
the appearance in the journal Foreign Affairs of an article by the Harvard academic Niall 
Fergusson on Complexity and Collapse, in which the fundamental instability of human cultures 
and organisational constructions is reviewed. Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2010. 
556 The developed panoply of Dramatic Theology is unquestionably Schwager’s work, and it 
is to his credit that it has spawned the ‘Dramatic Theology’ movement. But the thinking that 
lies within it shows many connections made between biblical texts and Girard’s ideas, an 
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Interestingly for this study, Brueggemann has also investigated the idea of 
drama and particularly counterdrama558 as a playing out of the subversive 
message of the gospels.559 
 
Brueggemann also has much to say in relation to non-dramatic, but static 
and resolved schemes of theological interpretation. In Texts Under 
Negotiation,560 he argues that the Church responded to the advance of 
science in the eighteenth century by hardening its theology into a set of 
concepts and ideas to provide “a settled unchanging frame of reference”.  
This came out of a vision which saw religion and science as companions 
within a divine scheme of a deist nature, in which God had invented the 
system by which the world was constructed and is maintained. Science 
discerns this system and religion interprets it, and states its interpretation in 
terms of propositions which are not negotiable.   
 
Brueggemann argues that a descendent of the eighteenth century’s project is 
fundamentalism561, in which the Bible is the servant of a coded system. That 
is to say, the Bible may be defined as a system of propositions which are 
factual truths, each of which can be approached in the same way.  It is the 
coded system, understood as the normal, reasonable view in the present age, 
which makes this claim. In another age, and another culture, a different claim 
could have been made. For instance, one might take descriptions by 
Brueggemann and others of how the Hebrew language and its associated 
                                                                                                                                     
example being the Epistle to the Hebrews and Girard’s scapegoat. Girard-Schwager 1975-91, 
p.55. 
557 Schwager, 1999: Jesus in the Drama of Salvation.  
558 Because Brueggemann is so concerned with opposing the dominant version of reality; this 
is what he calls ‘the counterdrama’ is configured to do. Brueggemann, 1993, pp57ff. 
559 Brueggemann, 1993, p.57ff. On p. 65, Brueggemann states, “I propose that we “take” 
reality as a drama, and that we see the text as a script for that drama”. 
560 Ibid., p.65-66.  Brueggemann references Rogers, J B & McKim D K, 1979. 
561 Ibid, p.66: [The practice of ordering faith into hard and non-negotiable sets of ideas and 
concepts].. “evolved in both Catholic and Reformed circles and eventuated, in the United 
States, in fundamentalism”. 
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culture works in relation to the interpretation of the Torah562 and say that in 
that case, the coded system was one in which mystery figured large, and the 
truth was revealed as one peeled away layers of meaning and probed 
through uncertainties and ambiguities to what was hidden within563.  
Someone who belongs in one culture and naturally operates within its coded 
system may have difficulty accepting the realism of the meaning found 
through another.  The barriers are very hard to surmount and an inclusive 
approach may not work. Getting to grips with the new is likely to depend on 
abandoning the old mind-set as ‘error’. 
 
Brueggemann’s point about the power of the coded system applied to 
Christianity since the Enlightenment is a fundamental one for our 
consideration of the whole matter of prophecy and the mechanisms 
involved, and it is of strong relevance to the present moment.   Consider any 
form of religious literalism which might be perceived in the world today, 
such as a group which typically tends to believe that they act in simple 
response to their texts; they unswervingly follow these and the statements 
made in them as simple factual statements. This mode of interpretation is 
explained by Brueggemann as a coded system, but the conservatives in 
question take it as their justification and their claim to authority.  
 
In other words, those who follow a coded system will not at any price agree 
that it is the case that the text is the servant of the system, but the reverse. 
The coded system is typically blind to its existence as a system, and to the 
selectivity involved in being a system; the proponents of such a system 
                                                 
562 There are said within Judaism to be 4 layers of Torah interpretation: simple, hint, search, 
hidden. These are known by the acronym  PaRDeS. This Hebrew word refers to a garden of 
delight or a park closed with a wall (here there are echoes of Eden); it is also translated as 
‘orchard’ The word ‘paradise’ in English is related, and shares the same Persian root 
http://ucija.org/Jamaica/pardes-full.pdf accessed 13.9.11. 
563 This, in its strong and irreconcilable contrast to propositional  realism, has similarities 
(though limited similarities) to the approach of the Apophatic tradition, which has popped up 
from time to time during eras of rationalism, and generally been viewed as no more than a 
backwater of faith.  
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would tend to believe that they are just getting right down to the truth, the 
content of the texts, and, further, that the truth they have found is universal 
in its application and in its availability. 
 
 Girard resoundingly agrees that there is such a thing as a coded system, 
though he does not use that term to define it.  Instead, when he uses a name 
at all, he talks of principally mimetic theory or the mimetic process and then 
of related topics like scapegoating or ‘the scapegoat mechanism’.564  What is 
particularly interesting is that both involve a form of blindness or blinding, 
which affects some (possibly a great majority), but not all. It is suggested 
here that there is a broad similarity of function between Brueggemann’s 
coded system and Girard’s mimetic system, not least in that each of them is 
invisible to those operating within their system.  
As both Brueggemann and Girard invoke religion as the antidote to this 
problem, it will be useful to start by illustrating the problem from the New 
Testament:  
“…we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to 
Gentiles”565 
What Paul is saying here is that the message does not fit into the modes of 
thought of either of these groups. To the Gentiles (Greeks in some 
translations) it simply lacks logic and therefore common sense; to the Jews it 
is a ‘stumbling block’. This translation of the Greek skandalon is sometimes 
rendered ‘scandal’, sometimes ‘obstacle’ or ‘offence’566.  The word can also 
mean ‘snare’ and derives from a root meaning ‘to limp’. However, the 
metaphor of stumbling is a graphic one, and ties up with other texts in which 
divinity is said to be ‘a stone of stumbling’567 What I want to suggest here is 
                                                 
564 In his most recent book, the form he uses is, “my hypothesis is mimetic” (Girard, 2010, 
p.ix). This is perhaps more helpful than Brueggemann’s term ‘coded system’ in that it refers 
to the tendency in human behaviour rather than its product. 
565 1 Cor. 1:23  NIV. 
566 Darby Bible Translation. 
567 Isaiah 8:14: “Because of my awesome holiness I [the Lord Almighty] am like a stone that 
people stumble over.” (GNB). 
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that a skandalon is an affront to the coded system and an instance of the 
mimetic principle in action - and on occasions in the process of being 
recognized for what it is.  
 
Girard homes in on the term ‘scandal’ and deals with it in some detail568, as 
he considers it very significant.  He starts from the notion of scandal, which 
he says is common to a group of texts which he says ‘centre’ on that word. 
His explanation is difficult, because the term itself is confusing to the modern 
mind. Girard tries to explain its usage: in the Gospels, the skandalon is always 
someone, and never a material object; it can even be the speaker herself, if 
alienated from others. It involves, he says, “an obsessional obstacle, raised by 
mimetic desire”569.  Girard quotes 1 John 2, 10-11: 
“He who loves his brother walks in the light, and in it there is no cause for 
stumbling [skandalon].” 
And again, from Matthew’s gospel:  
“Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me; but whoever 
causes one of these little ones who believe in me to [be scandalized], it 
would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened round his neck 
and to be drowned in the depth of the sea.”570 
Girard goes on571 to refer to the passage in which Jesus turns on Peter when 
he rebuked him for speaking of his coming death572. Girard justifies the 
translation “Get behind me, Satan! You are a scandal to me”, explaining that 
Peter is in a state of scandal; this in turn makes him a threat of scandalization 
to Jesus.  
 
                                                 
568 Girard,1978, p.416ff. 
569 Refer to explanation of mimetic desire in Introduction. 
570 Matthew 18:6. Girard does not quote the version of the Bible from which he is quoting. It 
seems to be a modified version of the New American Standard Bible. 
571 Ibid, p.418. 
572 Matthew 16:22-23. 
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The idea of the skandalon is very frequently accompanied by references to 
blindness, as in the quotation from John above. One stumbles over something 
one does not see. This idea of blindness to God is something that Girard takes 
up, with particular reference to imposing the mimetic habit that carries it on 
others, in the worst case on impressionable young children573. Brueggemann 
also touches upon it, though using other vocabulary574 in his discussion of 
the coded system.  All of them, knowingly or unknowingly, follow in the 
footsteps of John Calvin, who said that humans’ ability to make sense of a 
confused knowledge of God  can be greatly enhanced by the ‘spectacles’ of 
Scripture.575 Green interprets Calvin’s metaphor: revelation does not 
introduce new content into the world, but “corrects the astigmatism of the 
sinful imagination, thereby freeing us to see clearly what has been there all 
along.”576  In other words, it highlights the stumbling-block. 
 
Ricoeur, investigating tragedy in Greek myth, observes that sometimes 
blindness is sent by the gods in their satanic mode (kakos daimon) when they 
try to crush a tragic hero577; conversely, the gods can enable clear sight. 
Girard holds that the blindness is the product of mimetic rivalry, and the 
skandalon is mimetic rivalry itself578. To be in the grip of mimetic rivalry, 
which is the persisting problem of people generally, puts them into darkness. 
They are therefore in the grips of a situation which blanks out the part of 
reality which lies in Jesus’s message.  
 
Brueggemann’s term ‘dominant version of reality’ is useful here. It embraces 
the idea of the coded system, but it can also be explained in mimetic terms.  
                                                 
573 Girard, 1978, p.417. 
574 Brueggemann discusses the issues in terms of philosophical-historical categories: 
eighteenth century propositionalism and nineteenth century developmentalism. 
Brueggemann, 1993, p.66. 
575 Calvin, John, 1960, 1.6.1, p.70. 
576 Green, 1989, p.107. 
577 Ricoeur, 1967, p.218. 
578 There seems to be an inconsistency between this claim and the idea that he also puts 
forward (previous page, para 2) that the skandalon is always a person. The explanation may 
be that it is normally identified with a person. 
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Challenging the Coded System & the Effect of Language 
The outcome of this discussion is that a challenge to the existing coded 
system, if it succeeds, results in a revolution, or code change. Let us 
summarize the main points and linkages we have touched upon so far in this 
chapter, which lead up to and support this point: 
 
1. Basic talk of God and of experience of God may be drawn from 
everyday experience, the arena of the ‘here-and-now’, but 
conceptualisation of God inevitably depends on the imagination. 
2. Talk of God, even when drawn from the here-and-now, carries with it 
a world view. In most people’s case, this is what Brueggemann calls 
the ‘dominant version of reality’ of the place and time, as most people 
conform to it. Brueggemann has suggested that cultural patterns 
involve a ‘coded system’ which intervenes between reader and text 
and becomes the set of conditions for interpretation. Different coded 
systems may have similar aims, but a different method, and the 
method of one culture may not carry meaning for another. 
3. The message of prophecy, in the view of both Girard and 
Brueggemann, is subversive of the dominant version of reality. 
Prophets are therefore involved in undermining the coded system, 
not in articulating an existing orthodoxy. 
4. The work of prophecy is therefore, when viewed together, a web or 
an unfolding drama, as Schwager has described it.  
5. When cultures become worn out and cease to have adequate utility, 
the syntax of thought through which meaning was developed and 
communicated is disrupted and may become inaccessible. For that 
reason, the history of societies and of ideas is non-linear. 
6. Brueggemann also suggests that in the eighteenth century, as part of 
the Enlightenment, the church in response to the advance of science, 
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hardened its doctrine into a set of propositions which can be 
approached ‘on the level’. 
7. This has led to doctrinal fundamentalism, as seen, for instance, 
amongst some contemporary evangelicals. 
8. It is also at odds with the Hebrew mode of understanding, and that of 
mystics such as the Apophatics, which probe unknowing as the 
medium for approaching God. 
9. The coded approach of the Enlightenment scheme gives dominance to 
the ‘here-and-now’, and undercuts the religious imagination which 
may find religious meaning in all things. 
 
In the next section, we will look at what opportunities exist uniquely before 
this has happened, at the points in time when culture had not set fast into a 
mould, and consider the possibility that expression is at its peak at this time 
of remoulding, and loses its efficacy as it becomes progressively more firmly 
set. The agenda of the enquiry is threefold:  
a. To consider whether it is in the nature of formative periods in 
culture to define the relationship with God in new terms, and 
enable insights in a way that is not available outside such 
periods.  
 
b. To set against this idea the suggestion by Brueggemann that 
preaching is by definition the sub-version of reality, which 
exists in opposition to the dominant concept of the here-and-
now; preaching is therefore a reaction to the status quo. We 
will also consider the suggestion by Girard that Jesus breaks 
through an illusion or blindness affecting the whole of 
humanity as to the reality of human behaviour. 
 
c. To investigate Girard’s claims that the world is undergoing a 
change which may be terminal: the new Puritanism ‘castrates 
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the signified’ and by doing so may lead to a severe and even 
terminal crisis within the foreseeable future. We shall also 
consider Brueggemann’s more optimistic comments on the 
general function of trouble, as producing the conditions to 
allow and even to generate a new view of the way ahead.
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The Beginning and End of a Formative Period of Culture 
We saw earlier that  it is Brueggemann’s claim that the new social reality of 
Israel was radically discontinuous with that of the region and with the state 
religion of Egypt, and that the faith of Israel had mutated away from the 
common form in the Near East in that era. The differences which emerged 
had much to do with power, and God was described in a way that drew 
attention to misuses of human power. The effectiveness of the new view was 
found to be proved by the helplessness of the gods of Egypt and the regime 
(the two have to be considered together) to prevent the plague of Aaron and 
the exodus.   
The new mode of religion lasted from the 13th century BCE to the year 1000 
BCE as a ‘viable social reality’. It was followed by the kingship of David, and 
then there began a period of change from the time of Solomon (acceded 962) 
in which the Mosaic scheme was abandoned. The radicalism of the religion of 
the exodus was lost in this process.579 
 
The Mature Culture and Adapted Religion that Accompanied it 
Brueggemann notes the royal consciousness at work in the kingdom of 
Solomon, “a self-serving achievement with its sole purpose the self-securing 
of king and dynasty.”580  He quotes Mendenhall, who described it as ‘the 
paganization of Israel”581: it involved “a steady abandonment of the 
radicalism of the Mosaic vision.”, as well as an eradication of tribal structures 
and perspectives. It was therefore syncretist in the adjustment of religious, 
social and ethical standards to mesh with a political scheme. It was also 
                                                 
579 In making these claims Brueggemann refers to George Mendenhall, who described  
the achievement of Solomon as ‘the paganization of Israel’ (Mendenhall, 1963, chs. 7-8). 
580 Brueggemann, 1978, p.30 
581 As footnote 579 above, p..160. 
14  The Royal Consciousness 
 
226 
 
revisionist, because it inverted the idea of the Promised Land which had 
been defined over against royal Egypt, and qualitatively different from it: a 
rich, stable Israel had a certain amount in common with Egypt. This revision 
had dire effects for prophecy: the vital combination of criticism and 
energizing, which Brueggemann sees as its characteristic effects, were 
hamstrung because the transcendent agent necessary to criticism was gone, 
and “no more futures could be envisioned because everything was already 
present a hundred-fold”.582 However, this is not so much a point about 
monarchy as about successful monarchy which generates prosperity. It is 
also not a point about whether prophecy was produced, but whether it was 
heeded. 
In the economics of affluence, the people of Israel are “so well off that pain is 
not noticed and we can eat our way round it”583. Satiety is the character of 
life, and makes it difficult to keep a revolution of freedom and justice under 
way584, because these have ceased to be the underlying criteria for society; 
instead the order of the state has replaced them, using oppression and 
delivering a “royal programme of achievable satiety.”585 Theology is 
‘flattened’ and delivers a ‘coded certitude’.586 This dominant version of 
reality involves the politics of oppression, and even of rapacity, as 
Brueggemann comments with reference to Amos587. The function of the 
people becomes to underpin and guarantee the dynasty and the court. 
 
 
                                                 
582 Brueggemann, 1978, p.32.  
583 Brueggemann does not explain his use of the word ‘coded’, but there is an element of 
interiority implied; that is, the certainty is the case, because those who hold the certainty to 
be the case make the claim unilaterally, and interpret the texts accordingly. In the instance 
referred to, theology confirms and affirms the royal programme. [Brueggemann, 1978, p.41]. 
584 Brueggemann, 1978, p.32. 
585 Ibid, p.42. 
586 Brueggemann, 1992, p.65. 
587 “Therefore you trample upon the poor, and take from him exactions of wheat, you have 
built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you have planted pleasant 
vineyards, but you shall not drink their wine.” Amos 5:11, quoted at Brueggemann, 1992, 
p.55. 
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God Made Immanent, and God Made Abrasive 
God is made domestic and safe through being immanent. Because he has 
been built a huge house to be accommodated in (the Temple), he is deemed 
to be present in it and his real absence might go unnoticed.588 This stands in 
contrast to the Mosaic tradition’s assertion that “Yahweh stands apart from 
and over against Israel, thereby asserting that Israel’s access to Yahweh is 
characteristically precarious.”589 But under Solomon, because his possible 
absence is not on the agenda, God is ‘over-present’, and his “abrasiveness, his 
absence, his banishment are not noticed, and the problem is reduced to 
psychology.”590 Brueggemann draws a comparison with contemporary 
America: Americans are accustomed to imagine “a comfortable congruity 
between the gospel and dominant American values.”591 Where this is 
challenged by church leaders, he gives great credit: 
“I regard the two letters of the American Roman Catholic bishops on nuclear 
arms and economics as among the most important religious events of recent 
times in America. I submit that their importance is that the bishops have 
publicly asserted the profound tension that exists between the claims of the 
gospel and the dominant values and policies of the American system… The 
bishops have shown in powerful ways how the theological claims and social 
reality go together, and it is clear that the bishops do their theology in the 
presence of God’s peculiar friends, the marginal.”592 
 
The Difficulties of Discussing the Religion of Immanence 
The idea of God’s assumed presence is something Brueggemann dwells upon. 
He seems to take at face value the simple view inherent in the religion of the 
                                                 
588 “You. Lord, have placed the sun in the sky, yet you have chosen to live in clouds and 
darkness. Now I have built a majestic temple for you, a place for you to live in for ever.”  1 
Kings 8:12-13. 
589 Brueggemann, 1992, p.150. 
590 Brueggemann, 1978, p.41. 
591 Brueggemann, 1992, p.148. 
592 Ibid. 
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monarchy in Israel:  God’s presence is a singular event; God is here because 
he is not elsewhere. Brueggemann does not raise philosophical questions on 
whether God, as a Spirit, might have multiple presences or a universal 
presence, as indeed he must have if he answers prayers sourced from a 
number of different locations at the same time. With Temple worship, in 
which there is only one official residence for God, this question perhaps 
seemed not to apply, and the self-deception involved in assuming God to be 
ever-present is therefore thickened: he cannot be anywhere else, if he is 
always here.  
Brueggemann may therefore be as it were, quoting the situation, rather than 
describing the concept of God’s presence. Of course, it involves a theological 
diminution of the concept of God, in which God’s freedom is not considered, 
and the personhood of God is assumed to be limited in space as humans are, 
but the assumed right of access to God is also affected: 
“The tension between God’s freedom and God’s accessibility is a tricky issue 
that every religious person and especially ministers would do well to reflect 
upon. Indeed, the whole point of having religious functionaries is to assure 
access. That is the sociological expectation: “Will you say a prayer, 
pastor?”593 
Brueggemann is here referring to expectations under Solomon and referring 
both back to the time in the desert, in which the Elohist texts clearly depict 
God as elusive, and forward to the present age.  
However, it would be useful also to look forward in time to Jesus’s 
commendations on prayer, which involve prayer alone in one’s room, and 
prayer conducted by small groups of believers. This sort of prayer either was 
a replacement for, or was supplementary to, worship at the Temple594.  The 
key to obtaining God’s ear is apparently in the mode of approach, not in the 
place. (This is perhaps a point Brueggemann would agree with, though he 
does not make it himself overtly).  
                                                 
593 Brueggemann, 1978, p.35. 
594 Matthew 6:6 & 18:20. 
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These point add to Brueggemann’s critical review of what was happening 
under Solomon. He constructs a triangle595 of three interdependent 
characteristics to illustrate this: 
 
An Economics of Affluence                                                                     Politics of Oppression 
[1 Kings 4:20-23]596            [1 Kings 5:13-18, 9:15-22]597 
  
    Religion of Immanence       
    [1 Kings 8:12-13]598 
However, there seems to be a serious problem with this analysis, in the way 
it appropriates ‘immanence’ (a word for which he offers no special 
definition). The intention is apparently to set the transcendence of God as 
experienced by Moses against the presence of God assumed by Solomon, 
amounting to an appropriation of God to the regime. By implication, 
Brueggemann is applying the same criticism to regimes which share cultural 
characteristics with his, particularly contemporary America.   
In support of Brueggemann, it might be said that there are parallel cases 
where immanence seems to have displaced other aspects of religious vision, 
with serious, long-term consequences. Alister McGrath suggests that in the 
nineteenth century Britain a major failure occurred599. Some writers, led by 
the Romantic Poets, moved from God and the transcendental as subjects, to 
the natural world. In some cases, this seemed to involve deifying the natural 
                                                 
595 Brueggemann, 1978, p.36. 
596 1 Kings 4:20-23 is a passage about the prosperity and contentment of Solomon’s subjects, 
and the huge resources needed to support his regime. 
597 1 Kings 5:13-18 & 9:15-22 described the resources Solomon used to build his temple: 
30,000 men as forced labour, project managed as three rotating groups, with one group in 
Lebanon at any one time; and the distinction Solomon made in his choice of labour: non-
Israelites were forced to labour, but Israelites were not, and occupied superior positions in his 
organisation. 
598 1 Kings 8:12-13 The superior conditions for God created by Solomon are described: 
instead of living in clouds and darkness, he has a majestic temple. 
599 McGrath, A. 2004, Ch. 5, pp. 112-143. 
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world600, which of course is a feature of some contemporary ecological 
approaches. However, the main point of the Romantics was to find God at 
work, and manifested, in the world around us. This has led to a more general 
modern trend to concentrate on God’s immanence in the world, and sweep 
away old notions of ‘elsewhere’ and the occult. As Don Cupitt says, this 
cultural trend refuses “any kind of jump to a higher level…The External 
descends into the contingent world and is diffused through it.”601  
But there is more to be extracted from a ‘religion of immanence’ than this, 
which seems gratuitously to impose a particular perspective on the ministry 
of Jesus, and to raise questions over the important role of the Holy Spirit in 
Christian doctrine.  If the Holy Spirit is defined as the immanent aspect of 
God, because she pervades the world602, and the life of Jesus also represents 
God’s immanence within humanity603 (Emanuel = God with us), then 
Brueggemann’s triangular model is clearly either too simple, or else 
historically discrete in a way which discounts other forms of immanence 
illustrated in the Old Testament, let alone the New.  
Brueggemann might be exonerated of a significant omission, on the basis of 
his focus on the pre-Christian era, were it not for the fact that he began The 
Prophetic Imagination with a statement about the relevance of the Old 
Testament experience to Church and society in America today604. His aim 
therefore depends on modes of God’s immanence but his argument in the 
section tends to bracket immanence generally with the state religion of 
Solomon. Indeed one might go further with Gottwald and see immanence as 
the basic mechanism of God’s interaction with the world: “Since the primary 
manifestation of Yahweh is Israel itself, any misconstruction of Israel entails 
a misconstruction of Yahweh”.605 Brueggemann is clearly saying that 
                                                 
600 The archetypal example of this, much quoted, is Joseph Addison’s The Spacious Firmament 
[CH4 148], though in fact Addison lived a hundred years earlier. Church of Scotland, CH4, 
2005. 
601 Cupitt, Don, 1987, p.8. 
602 Luke 3:22. To emphasise the point, the Holy Spirit descended in corporeal form, like a 
dove. 
603 Philippians 2:6-8. 
604 Brueggemann, 1978, p.11. 
605 Gottwald, 1979, p.658. 
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Solomon is responsible for a misconstruction of Israel, and by doing so 
‘misconstructs’ Yahweh. 
A solution to this uncharacteristically opaque section of The Prophetic 
Imagination, which involves no loss of differentiation between Solomon and 
Moses, or for that matter Solomon and Jesus, would be to address the 
character and limits of the perceived immanence in various cases, and see 
how the variation might amount in either case to ‘a misconstruction of 
Yahweh’.  The immanence exhibited in the episode of the burning bush or of 
Pentecost is, after all, qualitatively very different from that of Solomon’s 
temple. Significant variations of mode are apparent, and Brueggemann’s 
point about the domestication of God gains additional force once these are 
expressed. The key point is that Solomon’s religion is one in which God is 
subjugated and expressed as a feature of the state system, a ‘coded certitude’, 
to use a term which is resonant within Brueggemann’s scheme:606 As we 
have seen, Brueggemann is sensitive to the development  within cultures of 
‘coded systems’, which are foundational to meaning.  
To say that a coded system is at work is not so much to speak of a ‘religion of 
immanence’ as of God deemed to be immanent within the body politic, or 
“present in the regime”607, which could (and in Brueggemann’s view does) 
amount to self-idolatry.  
A final point is that the regimes of Pharaoh and Solomon aspire to be 
unchanging, and in that sense are opposed to the theology of revolutionary 
justice. Imperial politics block out the cries of those who are denied, and 
anaesthetise the people with satiety so that they do not notice, whereas 
passion, defined over against satiety, is the state in which “the capacity and 
readiness to suffer, to die, and to feel is the enemy of imperial reality.”608 
                                                 
606 In Texts Under Negotiation (Brueggemann, 1993,) he refers to a ‘coded system’:” in 
response to the advance of science, faith was ordered into a hard and non-negotiable set of 
ideas and concepts…the upshot for biblical interpretation is that the Bible had to become a 
servant of the coded system.” (pp65-66). 
607 Brueggemann, 1978, p.36. 
608 Brueggemann, 1978, p.41. 
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Brueggemann makes one of few forward links from his Old Testament 
studies to Christ and Christian thought, when he speaks of Jesus’s care for 
those suffering on the margins in the midst of “social power unfairly 
managed and ideologically legitimated”.609 There seems to be a point here, 
implied rather than explicit, and only partly developed, about the 
interdependence of power and immanence. As Brueggemann says, “Israel’s 
discernment [is] that Yahweh’s presence is always powerfully related to 
social experience and social reality.”610 We may trace this relationship 
through, and beyond, Brueggemann’s work as follows: 
1. God’s immanence in the world takes on differing forms depending on 
the mode of power which is salient at a particular juncture. Cultures 
produce socio-political definitions for the nature of God and detect or 
imagine his immanence, as part of the dominant version of reality. 
The dominant version which finds God, for instance, within its own 
regime is usually blind to God in the aspects which the regime turns 
its back on: possibly such areas as freedom, justice, the plight of the 
poor, etc.  
2. God’s immanence in prophecy is defined over against the definition of 
God as claimed by the regime for itself. It is a corrective restatement. 
3. God as related in prophecy (including that of Jesus) is always 
progressively accommodated within the dominant version in a 
reduced form. That is, the dominant version adopts and adapts 
prophecy to itself. 
4. The reason is that dominant versions throughout history and very 
often between cultures have features in common and share a 
dynamic. 
 
Points (1) & (2) belong to Brueggemann; point (3) is something he is likely 
not to have difficulty with; point (4) really comes out of Girard but fits with 
Brueggemann.  
                                                 
609 Brueggemann, 1992, p.71. 
610 Brueggemann, 1992,  p.143. 
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Brueggemann’s Extension of Gottwald’s Thinking 
Brueggemann, following Gottwald to some extent, considers that  
“the Old Testament both partakes of the common theology and struggles to 
be free from it.  The Old Testament both enters the fray of ambiguity and 
seeks distance from the fray to find something certain and sure. The God of 
Israel is thus presented vicariously as the God above the fray who appears 
like other Near Eastern gods and as a God who is exposed in the fray, who 
appears unlike the gods of common theology, a God particularly available in 
Israel’s historical circumstances.” 
Within the common theology, the dominant version of reality held that “The 
world may be delineated as a ruthless savage contest for control that works 
violence beneath the surface of democratic mantras and religious 
legitimation”.611 In this context, God’s position either above or within the 
fray may alternatively place God either in a position of control or of risk; in 
the latter case, God abandons not only control but also certainty in entering 
the fray. But Israel’s theology is also contractual and sets limits for 
humanness:  “such a conclusion affirms that the Old Testament belongs to its 
cultural world in basic theological ways, and it warns against any inclination 
to see Israel’s faith too readily as a religion of grace.”612 Brueggemann 
therefore balances the context of Israel’s faith within the common tradition 
with its essentially unique points, but keeps a time-focus in this comparison. 
Elsewhere, Brueggemann refers to Israel’s God as “nonimperial”. He seems to 
suggest two things: 
1. The idea that God is ‘in the fray’ and is impinged upon by ‘the cry of 
pain’ of his people. The hurt is taken as “the new stuff of faithfulness”.  
God is no longer trouble-free, presiding over untroubled legitimated 
structures.613 Instead, trouble is the context of the relationship. 
                                                 
611 Brueggemann, 2009, p.3. 
612 Brueggemann, 1992, p.15. 
613 Brueggemann, 1992, p.29. 
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2. Gottwald’s idea, which Brueggemann summarises as “Israel is 
founded precisely by those who reject and are rejected by the 
nonslippage of the world of Egyptian (and Canaanite) totalitarianism. 
Israel, in contrast to those political forms, is a social movement of the 
failures and rejects who delegitimate both the rationality of empire 
and the coherence of the gods who legitimate those structures.”614 
The point in (1) is something that Brueggemann has pursued at some length. 
In The Costly Loss of Lament615, a study based on the Psalms of Lament, and 
drawing upon the work of Westermann616 he comments on the effects of 
lament:  the situation or attitude of the speaker is transformed. The response 
to the cry of pain, as Brueggemann explains it in another context, is that “the 
startling affirmation of biblical faith is that God accepts the groan, takes it 
into God’s own person, and speaks it back to hurting Israel as promised from 
on high.”617 
He puts forward the theory that the relationship between Israel and its God 
is one in which God is held responsible for things not being as they should; 
hurt and hope are voiced; this in itself guarantees a two-way relationship. 
Lament helps to resist a theological monopoly, through giving the second 
party to the covenant (the petitioners) a voice additional to that of praise 
and doxology. That additional voice insists that things are not right as they 
are, that things may be changed, that continuation of the present situation is 
not acceptable, and that it is God’s role and obligation to change things. The 
underlying principle is that justice is required in God’s dealings with his 
people, and that God is accountable under the covenant, just as people are. In 
any crisis, God is at risk because God is engaged in the crisis. Brueggemann 
specifically describes this phenomenon as a ‘social reconstruction of 
reality’618, and this indicates an emphasis on what is happening as a socio-
political event, a redistribution of power.  
                                                 
614 Brueggemann, 1992, p.20. 
615 Brueggemann, 1986. 
616 Westermann, 1981. 
617 Brueggemann, 1992, p.52. 
618 Brueggemann, 1986, p.59. 
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He sets against this what happens when lament does not form a part of 
Israel’s worship: the political-economic monopoly of the status quo is 
consolidated and re-enforced. Covenant interaction is diminished and loses 
value because one party to the covenant loses its voice, at least partially: the 
only voice that remains is that of thanksgiving and celebration, which turns 
the corpus of the faithful into ‘yes men and women’: 
“where there is lament, the believer is able to take initiative with God and so 
develop over against God the ego strength that is necessary for responsible 
faith. But where the capacity to initiate lament is absent, one is left only with 
praise and doxology.”619  
Under this view, God is not omnipotent, but is like a mother who dreams 
with her infant “that the infant may one day grow into a responsible, mature 
covenant partner who can enter into serious communion and conversation.” 
The first act of the infant society, as its history begins620 is to cry out for 
justice: God is mobilized into public life. But when lament is lost, justice 
questions “cannot be asked and eventually become invisible and 
illegitimate.”621 And once justice questions can no longer be asked of God, 
they also fade from every aspect of public life, including the courts. In a 
situation where the lament is absent (through the form having fallen out of 
use), justice questions cannot be asked of God and may become “invisible 
and illegitimate. Instead we learn to settle for questions on ‘meaning’ and 
reduce the issues to resolutions of love”.622 
Brueggemann extends his argument to suggesting that silencing aspects of 
justice in the dialogue with God deteriorates the relationship with him, and 
runs the risk of reducing him to a “dead cipher who cannot be addressed and 
is only the silent guarantor of the status quo.” He contrasts this with the 
alternative: God as the transformer of what has not yet appeared, who is 
vulnerable and whose omnipotence is reshaped by pathos. 
                                                 
619 Brueggemann, 1986, p.61. 
620 Exodus 2:23-25. 
621 Brueggemann, 1986, p.63-4. 
622 Ibid., p.64. 
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Convergence between Brueggemann and Girard 
Having established the common context and the relationship between the 
Israel’s God as revealed in prophecy, and ‘the silent guarantor of the status 
quo’, let us return to the point we noted as one of potentially common 
ground between Brueggemann and Girard: 
Dominant Versions of Reality throughout history and in many 
cultures have features in common and share a dynamic. 
 
We will begin with Girard’s position, and see how that relates to 
Brueggemann’s thinking. 
 
1. Girard declares that the victimage mechanism is the common basis of 
religion623, but the Bible is condemnatory of ethics which involve 
persecution. Therefore, the Bible is in opposition to the general 
nature of religions and the common religion of its historical context. 
2. The mimetic system is almost universal in human societies and 
involves a tendency to escalate to extremes.624 The Gospels call 
people away from this tendency to a high duty not to respond to evil 
with evil.625  This command deals not only with the general tendency 
to default to mimetic behaviour but also with the inbuilt perception of 
those caught up in the mimetic process that they are not aggressing 
so much as responding to a wrong received, and are defending what is 
right. However, it is possible to renounce the mimetic tendency, or, as 
Rebecca Adams put it in discussion with Girard, by “imitation of a 
positive model”626, the ultimate positive model of course being God. 
(however, to this writer the tendency to imitate comes first and forms 
a basis for either positive or negative mimesis). 
                                                 
623 Girard, 1978, p.3ff. 
624 Girard, 2010, Ch. 1. 
625 Matthew 5:38-42. 
626 Girard and Adams, 1993, pp 22-26. 
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From these factors, we might draw the inferences from Girard but within 
Brueggemann’s terms that  
 
(a) The Dominant Version of Reality and the basis of religion will 
most frequently be closely intertwined (as in the common 
religion), except where religion becomes a counter-definition of 
reality (as in Gottwald’s analysis of the origins of Israel and in 
Brueggemann’s account of prophecy). 
 
(b) In nearly all societies, the dominant version of reality and the 
Bible naturally provide differing frames of reference.627 Of course, 
the frames of reference arising from either may be adjusted to 
approach the other.  
 
 
Having established the correlation and noted the possibility to work within 
the terms of either author in the areas where their thinking runs close, let us 
look in more detail at the thought of Girard in these particular areas, and 
how susceptible it may be to interpretation into Brueggemann’s terms and 
vice-versa.  
Girard’s thinking often stems from an anthropological approach. He is more 
inclined to think of human origins than the formation of Israel, as 
Brueggemann does. Specifically, he looks to myth as the evidence of early 
human understandings of what it means to be human and divine. In doing 
this, he draws extensively on the work of others who have studied that field: 
Fraser, Hocart, Levi-Strauss, Durkheim and Ricoeur, for instance.  
Girard is convinced that myth describes violent human origins. Myths by 
definition have a code (this point is a parallel one to Brueggemann’s 
observations on ‘coded systems’), and the code has no key; it may therefore 
be difficult to crack, except that myths, according to Girard,  are all rooted in 
                                                 
627 Brueggemann, 2009, p.5. 
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the violence of human origins, and speak truthfully of those origins. Almost 
all myths involve what Girard calls a ‘founding murder’, and this event is 
both enshrined in the mythical story and concealed by it. Thus the murder 
which is the first recorded event of a nation or group is ‘invisible’.628  He 
therefore places violence as the foundation of the human story and as the 
root of all ideas of the sacred, which tend to involve the mimetic process in 
which scapegoating forms a part.   
The gospels, on the other hand are distanced from other sacred texts, 
because they recognize for what it is the mimetic processes and scapegoating 
involved in them. They expose this, and by exposing it, cancel its power, and 
call in question the transcendence which is attributed to it.  Let us now look 
in some detail at how Girard builds up his case. 
In Things Hidden629, Girard refers to a group of texts in Matthew and Luke’s 
gospels, which were once referred to as ‘the curses against the Pharisees’. 
That term has now dropped out of currency, though it is clearly apparent 
that Jesus is directing accusations against them repeatedly. Girard suggests 
that Jesus is using the Pharisees as intermediaries for something much 
larger, and that “something of absolutely universal significance is at stake.” 
In passages in both gospels630, Jesus accuses the Pharisees of murder and 
names Abel (the first person in the Bible to be killed), and Zechariah son of 
Barachiah, who is killed right at the end of 2 Chronicles, that is, at the end of 
the Bible as Jesus knew it. The blame is to rest on ‘the people of this time’631, 
and the position is therefore grievous of those (the teachers of the law) who 
have withheld the truth from the people by keeping from them the key to the 
door of the house of knowledge; “you yourselves will not go in, and you stop 
those who are trying to go in!”632 
Girard opines that Jesus by citing the first and last murders of scripture, by 
implication included all the others in between, and explicitly mentions ‘all 
                                                 
628 Girard, 1978, p.105ff. 
629 Girard, 1978, p.158ff. 
630 Matthew 23:34-36, and Luke 11:50-51. 
631 Luke 11:51. 
632 Luke 11:52. 
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the righteous blood shed on earth’, or in Luke, ‘the blood of all the prophets 
shed from the foundation of the world’. Girard attaches special significance to 
the words ‘from the foundation of the world’, noting that in the original 
Greek the word used implies a crisis, or a violent event out of which comes a 
resolution.633 
The foundation of the world, here, coincides with the event which Girard 
calls ‘the founding murder’, which sets in place the mind-set which allows 
further persecutions but does not recognize them as such. For that reason, 
‘darkness’ is a characteristic of the situation.634 Blindness and self-
justification are built into the behaviour: when the Pharisees say, “If we had 
lived in the days of our fathers, we should not have taken part with them in 
the shedding of the blood of the prophets”, they are paradoxically behaving 
in the same way as their fathers did, because their imitation and repetition of 
their actions is unconscious to the extent that they can disown what their 
fathers did, whilst carrying on in the same way. Girard finds confirmation of 
this in John’s gospel: 
“You are of your father the devil…(who) when he lies, speaks according to 
his own nature, for he is liar and the father of lies.”635 
Society is host to dynasties of lies about the way the world essentially is and 
might be, because people, generation after generation, are trapped within a 
system of thinking which is satanic. 
This immensely powerful, self-perpetuating social tradition which conceals 
itself from those involved in it loses its power when it is exposed for what it 
is. That is the work of Jesus, and his singular achievement is the expansive 
visionary analysis of the methods of God and Satan636, and the incipient, 
catastrophic failure of the Satanic method. 
                                                 
633 The word in Greek is kataboles, which in medicine refers to the onslaught of a disease.  
634 As in “This is your hour, and the power of darkness” Luke 22:53. 
635 John 8:43-44. 
636 Or, the Devil, diabolos, which is the Greek equivalent to the Hebrew term Satan used in the 
Gospels.  
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It is a not difficult to approach Brueggemann’s scheme from this point.  If 
dominant versions of reality share a dynamic, as Brueggemann has 
suggested they do, in the exemplar cases of royal Egypt, Israel under 
Solomon and contemporary America; and if the factor uniting these 
dominant versions of reality is the ‘royal consciousness’, a state of mind in 
which it is assumed that God and the state are at one, then what is happening 
is that the contemporary mores of the establishment eclipse the God of 
prophecy. If Girard’s point is accepted that the general mores of most 
societies, at most times, are governed by the mimetic system which is 
founded upon violence, and works by controlling violence with violence, and 
that its opponents are suppressed by violence or suborned by the threat of 
violence, then the voices raised against both the mimetic system and the 
Dominant Version will be well illustrated by those of Moses and the prophets 
in the Exodus and the Exile.  
Further, if God is not always present, and if his assumed immanence in 
national life is a misconstruction of God, then the cause, according to Girard 
is that it is not God who is being followed at all, but the mimetic process, 
which Girard identifies with Satan.  
Now, whilst it is possible to say at this juncture that a partial fit between the 
thinking of Brueggemann and Girard is emerging, it has to be stressed again 
that this does not mean that they themselves would each accept the thinking 
of the other. 
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  “Then the chief priests and Pharisees called a meeting. “Here is this man 
working all these signs”, they said, “and what action are we taking? If we let 
him go on in this way, everybody will believe in him, and the Romans will 
come and destroy the Holy Place and our nation. One of them, Caiaphas, the 
high priest that year, said, “you don’t seem to have grasped the situation at 
all; you fail to see that it is better that one man should die for the people, 
than for the whole nation to be destroyed.” ...From that day, they were 
determined to kill him.”637  
 
One of the difficulties inherent in this mutually critical correlation is that 
Girard homes in on characters, real persons, the fictional characters of great 
literature, and the main players in religious and texts. Brueggemann does 
none of this, and correlating the ideas put forward by Girard in this way with 
the much more abstract observations of Brueggemann is therefore complex. 
 
Satan 
Let us look first at the identity of Satan as Girard describes him. The 
definition flows from the main Old Testament role of legal prosecutor638, in 
which he acts as agent provocateur to entrap and condemn. However, his 
power and hugely extensive activity does not, for Girard, involve any 
individual existence: “to clothe himself in the semblance of being, he must act 
as a parasite on God’s creatures.”639 He is “totally mimetic” and his 
quintessential being is “the violent contagion that has no substance in it”. 
Girard has therefore made the old personal concept of Satan into an abstract 
one. His social science or anthropological approach has observed a coherent 
link between the various characteristics ascribed to Satan and this leads to 
the definition.  
                                                 
637 John 11:47-53. Girard quotes this: Girard, 1986, p.112. 
638 As illustrated in the book of Job. 
639 Girard, 2001, p.42. 
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Drawing particularly on the Gospel of John, because more than the Synoptics, 
John “defines anew, abruptly indeed but also without hostility, the 
consequences for rivalistic imitation”640, Girard sets out and relates to the 
Gospel account an analysis of Satan as a complex character, who works with 
extraordinary power in different, even contradictory ways, and is 
simultaneously a principle of order and disorder.641  The complexity is 
illustrated in Satan’s use of desire; he is able to manipulate people not only 
through imitative desire but also the rivalry that springs from it.  
Girard grounds this analysis in the Tenth Commandment, normally 
translated as  
“You shall not covet thy neighbour’s house. You shall not covet the wife of 
your neighbour, nor his male nor female slave, nor his ox or ass, nor 
anything that belongs to him.”642  
Girard asserts that the word ‘covet’ used here is misleading because it 
suggests an uncommon desire, but the original Hebrew in contrast uses the 
straightforward word for desire; the prohibition is therefore against the 
inclination to want what your neighbour has. Girard identifies this state, 
wanting what the other person has, as the default position of people 
generally: they will easily quarrel over what the other has, or desires, and it 
is this involuntary mimetic rivalistic process, rather than anything truly 
autonomous that tends to drive their desires. Desire is therefore often not 
                                                 
640 Girard, 2001, p.39. Girard quotes John 8:42-44 to set the scene for his analysis of what 
Satan is and does: 
 “If  God were your father, you would love me, 
 For I proceeded and came forth from God;...  
 
 You are of your father the devil 
And it is the desires of your father  
That you wish to do. 
From the beginning he was a murderer 
And had nothing to do with the truth 
Because the truth is not in him. 
When he speaks lies, 
He draws them from his own nature, 
Because he is a liar and the father of lies.” 
641 Girard, 2001, p.32ff. 
642 Exodus 20:17. 
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just a matter between the desirer and the desired, but involves a third party. 
Jesus understands this, and acts accordingly to break the pattern: 
“If Jesus never speaks in terms of prohibitions and always in terms of 
models and imitation, it is because he draws out the full consequences of the 
lesson offered by the tenth commandment. It is not through inflated self-
love that he asks us to imitate him; it is to turn us away from mimetic 
rivalries.”643 
Jesus is therefore offering an alternative model, and invites his followers to 
turn their imitative tendency to embrace his model rather than that of the 
devil. This is the core of his claim that he represents that Father over against 
Satan, and light (a message of understanding) against darkness (a way of 
living based on principles which are concealed even from those who follow 
them).  
Girard traces Satan’s methods. Initially, he invites people to abandon 
irksome discipline. As in the Garden of Eden, he is a seducer; he says, have 
what you want. This starts people, Girard says, on “the superhighway of 
mimetic crisis.”644 Of course, the idea of the broad and winding way to 
destruction  is no more than a conventional illustration about Christian 
doctrine of good and evil, found for instance in dramatic form in The 
Pilgrim’s Progress.645 What Girard is building onto this foundation is the 
jagged646 track of mimesis, which entices us then frustrates us: 
“ But then suddenly there appears an unexpected obstacle between us and 
the object of our desire, and to our consternation, just when we thought we 
had left Satan far behind us, it is he, or one of his surrogates, who shows up 
to block the route. This is the first of many transformations of Satan.”647 
The second move of Satan is therefore the conversion of the mimetic model 
into a rival. That is to say, simple desire develops a reflexive aspect to it; 
desire leads to envious imitation of what one’s neighbour has, and the 
                                                 
643 Girard, 2001, p.13. 
644 Girard, 2001, p.33. 
645 Bunyan, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/bunyan/pilgrim.pdf Accessed 8 September 2012. 
646 winding, In Bunyan’s terms. 
647 Girard, 2001, p.33. 
15   Satan & Dionysus 
 
244 
 
neighbour responds by being the more intent on keeping what he has. A 
spiral development of desire is set up, which leads to hostility: 
“As a general rule, quiet and untroubled possession weakens desire. In 
giving my model a rival, I return to him, in a way, the gift of the desire he 
just gave to me. I give a model to my own model. The spectacle of my desire 
reinforces his at the precise moment when, in confronting me, he reinforces 
mine. That man whose wife I desire, for example, had perhaps ceased to 
desire her over time. His desire was dead, but on contact with mine, which is 
living, it regains life.”648 
It is this that brings about ‘scandals’, a term from the Gospels into which 
Girard delves deeply, as we have seen. It denotes the consequences of 
mimetic rivalries; to be scandalized is to be compromised in progress, 
diverted (from God), tripped, blocked, or hobbled. He gives the example of 
Peter, who rebuked Jesus over his foretelling of his rejection by the religious 
establishment and his future suffering. In doing this, he was (unconsciously, 
no doubt) inviting Jesus to change the pattern of his desiring and follow 
Peter, not God. Jesus turned on him and said,  
“Get away from me, Satan! You are an obstacle in my way, because these 
thoughts do not come from God, but from man.”649 
‘Obstacle’ here might also be translated ‘scandal’, or ‘stumbling block’. In 
other words, Peter’s proposal would trip and incapacitate Jesus: lead him off 
the way he should be following, and into the trap of mimesis. 
Satan works in ways that seem contradictory, but nevertheless it is by 
tacking this way and that with changes of direction that he makes progress. 
This progress even includes his own temporary self-expulsion, in a move 
which brings order back into human communities, but encourages those 
communities to operate on the kind of basis which is underpinned by 
mimetic, and therefore, satanic, systems. Disorder expels disorder to create 
order on the basis of victimage and the politics of oppression. Satan can 
always put enough order back into the world to prevent the total destruction 
                                                 
648 Girard, 2001, p.10. 
649 Matthew 16:23. 
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of what he possesses.650 His strength is that he uses processes which are 
invisible, and therefore works under cover of darkness. 
Jesus, however, disarms Satan by exposing his processes, and he therefore 
works in the light. As part of this aspect of the subject, in Things Hidden, 
Girard examines Jesus’s self-defence against the Scribes, when he refutes the 
suggestion that he is using the power of Satan to cast out devils:  
“How can Satan cast out Satan? If a kingdom is divided against itself, it 
cannot stand. And if a house is divided against itself, it cannot be 
maintained. And if Satan has risen up against himself and is divided, he 
cannot endure and is finished.”651 
Girard claims that the general sense of this is usually misunderstood, 
because what Jesus is trying to do here is to get his listeners, the Pharisees, 
to reflect on how it can be that Satan is divided against himself (which Girard 
holds, he is). The relationship of Girard’s point to the text is not very clear in 
this case, where he is relying on Mark’s version. However, in The Scapegoat 
he quotes Matthew 12:23-28, in which Jesus clearly claims that his 
opponents cast out Satan by Satan, but he casts out Satan by the power of the 
spirit of God.652 He makes two points: the logical conclusion to be drawn 
from Jesus’s action is that “the kingdom of God is already among you”, and if 
the Pharisees are casting out Satan by the power of Satan, then their 
kingdom cannot stand. This is the passage in full as Girard quotes it: 
“All the people were astounded and said, ‘Can this be the Son of David?’ But 
when the Pharisees heard this they said, ‘The man casts out devils only 
through Beelzebub, the prince of devils.’ Knowing what was in their minds, 
he said to them, ‘Every kingdom divided against itself cannot stand, Now if 
Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; so how can his kingdom 
stand? And if it is through Beelzebub that I cast out devils, through whom do 
your own experts cast them out? Let them be your judges, then. But if it is 
                                                 
650 Girard, 2001, p.37. 
651 Mark 3:23-26. 
652 Girard, 1986, p.185. 
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through the spirit of God that I cast devils out, then know that the kingdom 
of God has overtaken you.”653 
What Jesus is able to confer is an understanding of how Satan works, and of 
how Satan’s self-division is made into a fatal flaw, rather than a tactical 
regrouping, when Satan’s methods are seen for what they are. Without this 
insight, Satan reinstates himself in the process of his own persecutors. Satan, 
therefore, in the longer view, cannot be cast out by Satan, but only by the 
spirit of God. 
.  
Principalities and Powers 
Girard considers where in the world the constituency lies for the foundations 
of the Satanic scheme – the founding murder and single victim mechanism. 
He notes that  
“Christians heartily distrusted the sovereign states in which Christianity 
emerged and spread, on account of the violent origin of these states. In 
naming them Christianity did not resort to their usual names, such as the 
Roman Empire or the Herodian Tetrarchy. Instead, The New Testament 
usually calls upon a specific vocabulary, that of ‘principalities and 
powers’.”654 
The ‘violent origins’ which Girard refers to are of course his way of linking in 
this statement to the ‘founding murder’ of his own theory; in other words, he 
is tying the Christian recognition of mimetic violence to his own explanation 
of it. The distrust is illustrated when Peter quotes Psalm 2: 
“The kings of the earth took their stand 
And the rulers were gathered together 
                                                 
653 There is a further reference to this in the Girard-Schwager correspondence. Schwager 
states, “Being a man and the claim to be God is the essence of Satan (sic). So the Jews accuse 
Jesus of being a totally satanic being... In accusing Jesus of being Satan the Jews react 
themselves according to the satanic spirit, because they kill him falsely.” Girard-Schwager, 
1975-91, p.84. 
654 Girard, 2001, p.95. 
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Against the Lord and his anointed.”655 
 
Girard goes on to explain that ‘principalities and powers’ are the social 
phenomena which the founding murder created. But the term used in the 
New Testament variously of the powers of this world, and of ‘celestial’ 
powers656, a term which refers to the spiritual component corresponding to 
the material power; both stem from the collective founding murder.  
At this point, there is clearly scope for relating ‘principalities and powers’ to 
Brueggemann’s dominant version of reality, or at least its governing aspect. 
However, there are also difficulties in this correlation.  
To begin with, there is the metaphysical aspect to Girard’s definition of Satan 
which is quite unlike Brueggemann’s conceptualisation of what is happening 
in the dominant version of reality. There, God is acknowledged as a force 
with human agents (the prophets), but no equivalent scheme is offered for 
the opposition: it is simply a misconceptualisation of God and a 
misunderstanding of his will that is involved657.  
However, a dominant version of reality considered in a general sense, or 
anthropologically, involves constructs of reality. This might feature the 
personification of ideas, including, for instance, a god-king, or Satan. 
Although Brueggemann himself tends not to stress that anti-realism is 
involved, the point is there tacitly. Therefore, there is, logically, no 
disagreement between Brueggemann’s idea that there are multiple versions 
of reality in use simultaneously in the life of Israel and use of the term 
‘Satan’. It’s just that Brueggemann avoids it in his analysis, and there is 
therefore no clear distinction between Brueggemann’s assertions which are 
realist (the existence of God, to take a simple example), and those which are 
interpretative but not realist. This situation is, perhaps, a consequence of 
                                                 
655 Acts 4:26. 
656 Girard, 2001, p.96-97. 
657 Though Brueggemann does consider the scheme in the Book of Job, in which Satan as 
prosecutor and God collude together, and Job remains unaware of the collusion. An 
Introduction to the Old Testament: The Canon and Christian Imagination, pp. 300-301. 
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following the socio-literary method, which tends not to distinguish in these 
terms.  
However, if Brueggemann’s approach is anti-realist to some extent, Girard’s 
is not. For instance, his approach to Satan is a realist one even though he 
asserts that Satan does not have a personal existence; the force in the world 
to which the name ‘Satan’ is given is real, and actualised in human behaviour. 
This is a realist religious assertion in the same way that ‘God is a spirit’ is.  
We are therefore left with the possibility of only a partial correlation  – but a 
helpful one nonetheless.  
 
In the following section, we explore some ideas found only in Girard, which 
have no echo in Brueggemann. 
 
Dionysus 
Dionysus, like Satan, is a personification of something recognizable in the 
world. Dionysus is therefore a characteristic of the way things are. Girard 
explores this phenomenon in Violence and the Sacred. 
Dionysus is actualised in festivals. Anthropologically, festivals are found 
frequently to prescribe or allow the violation of normal practice, the law, and 
sexual mores: 
“Such violations must be viewed in their broadest context: that of overall 
elimination of differences. Family and social hierarchies are temporarily 
suppressed or inverted; children no longer respect their parents, servants 
their masters, vassals their lords. This motif is reflected in the aesthetics of 
the holiday – the display of clashing colours, the parading of transvestite 
figures, the slapstick antics of piebald ‘fools’. For the duration of the festival 
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unnatural acts and outrageous behaviour are permitted, even 
encouraged.”658 
Girard believes that such festivals commemorate a sacrificial crisis659, and, 
referring to Durkheim’s perception, he states: 
“the festival revitalizes the cultural order by re-enacting its conception, 
reproducing an experience that is viewed as the source of health and 
abundance; re-enacting, in fact, the moment when the fear of falling into 
interminable violence is most intense and the community is therefore most 
closely drawn together660. 
Sacrifice and the original crisis recorded in it are considered in another 
chapter, and therefore at this point let us concentrate on how Girard’s 
thinking on Dionysus relates to that point of confluence in Girard’s and 
Brueggemann’s thinking, the dominant version of reality.  
 
Bad and Good Violence 
Girard claims that societies distinguish between ‘bad’ violence and ‘good’ 
violence, and this is reflected in its rituals, which  
“select a certain form of violence as ‘good’, as necessary to the unity of the 
community, and sets up in opposition to it another sort of violence that is 
deemed ‘bad’, because it is related to violent reciprocity.”661 
Now, although it is not a rite or ritual, the event recorded in the quotation at 
the head of this chapter (Caiaphas’s justification for the execution of Jesus) 
shows such a distinction being made in practice. The good violence is part of 
the method used to maintain and safeguard the dominant version of reality. 
When people are involved in the dominant version they seem to have little 
difficulty in regarding its ‘good violence’ as benign. That is how we are able 
to think of our troops fondly as ‘our boys’, and simultaneously demonise 
                                                 
658 Girard, 1977, p.119. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Girard, 1977, p.120. 
661 Girard, 1977, p.115. 
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enemy troops as vile murderers, even when the methods of the two sides are 
similar.  
When prophetic voices question this domestication of violence, as Ghandi 
did, those voices tend at first to seem oddly discordant and disloyal. It is only 
when a perspective is gained, perhaps by the passing of time,  that the 
discordance is modulated.  
 
 
 
‘Good’ Violence in Festivals 
Think of November 5th and Guy Fawkes. He was a terrorist (or freedom 
fighter), in modern terminology, whose plot to blow up King and Parliament 
in 1605 was discovered before the explosion could be set off. His guilt was 
hardly in question, as he had been caught red-handed, but he could not have 
acted alone. He was tortured to reveal the names of his co-conspirators and 
put to death elaborately and horribly. He was the last of the conspirators to 
be executed, and his name stood for all, and has been remembered in that 
way; for the last four hundred years the death has been celebrated at parties, 
during which his effigy is burned on a bonfire. The ghoulish foundation of 
this happy family occasion is hardly ever questioned, and to those involved, 
violence hardly seems to be a part of it. All of that is because Good Violence is 
involved. It was better that one man (Guy, plus of course his unremembered 
handful of accomplices) should be killed than that the leadership of the 
nation should be blown up, with the possible consequence of a coup d’état 
and other perceived catastrophes including foreign domination.  
This anecdote illustrates the link between festival and violence associated 
with Dionysus. Some abnormal behaviour is present in it too, though not the 
wholesale inversion described in Greek myth and in anthropological studies 
of kingship rites in primitive societies.  
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Turning to Caiaphas’s speech, with its obvious similarities to the case of Guy 
Fawkes, it is important that the Christian response to it is to invert the power 
game in it. Christians are the ones to celebrate the event, not their 
adversaries. It was the defeat which led to the victory, and it was able to do 
so because the rules had changed to subvert the system of power: the 
victimage system which has its foundations in mimesis.  
 
Any consideration of Dionysus would be incomplete without taking 
Nietzsche’s writing into consideration.  Nietzsche saw Dionysus as a 
principle of life subject to no extraneous principle: “raw, tragic, joyful, but 
real.”662 In The Antichrist (1888) and The Genealogy of Morals (1887) 
Nietzsche argued that raw life is characterized by ‘will-to-power’, the 
tendency of any organism to maximise power; Christianity, on the other 
hand, is anti-life, suffocating natural emotions and killing this life through the 
superimposition of another world. Under this view (which has a simpler 
structure than Girard’s), disorder and frenzy (Dionysus) are confronted by 
stifling order (Christianity) which will use any means to impose its code. 
Nietzsche’s is a vision of ‘either-or’, but in the last days before he was 
overtaken by madness, it modulated into ‘both-and’, according to Girard: 
“...the manic-depressive embodies the two opposing faces of the sacred, 
which are interiorized and lived through interminably in an alternating 
pattern. I believe this is what Nietzsche is alluding to, on the threshold of 
madness, when his long-standing opposition between Dionysus and Christ 
completely disappears. Instead of writing Dionysus against the Crucified, he 
writes Dionysus and the Crucified. What Nietzsche never detected in his 
researches... the identity of God and the scapegoat – he was able to realise in 
his madness. Wishing to be God, he became the victim, his own, primarily: 
he experienced the destiny of the scapegoat.”663 
                                                 
662 Williams, S.N. , 1997, p.219. 
663 Girard, 1978, p.310. 
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In other words, the mimetic victimage mechanism leading to scapegoating, 
which is rampant within the concept of Dionysus, turned on its own prophet, 
Nietzsche, and the realisation came at the time he lost his sanity.  
In the conclusion to Things Hidden, Girard claims that “our own ability to 
detect the scapegoat mechanism is wholly determined by the detection that 
has already taken place within the gospel text.”664 The gospel has therefore 
set in motion a process of increased understanding, and this understanding, 
which comes of an authentic reading of the gospels,  increases as sacrificial 
Christianity declines or ‘disintegrates’.  
The increased understanding coincides with the modern threat of violence 
which “knows no limits”, and is understood as being human rather than 
divine in origin. We, in the present age, are part of an historical succession, 
and treat our predecessors in that succession with a polemical spirit and lack 
of fairness: 
“Like them, we are motivated to by the worldly ambition to refute and 
replace the dominant modes of thought. The only advantage that we have is 
that we happen to be at a more advanced stage in the same historical 
process, which is accelerating and leading towards and increased revelation 
of the truth.” 
Note that whereas Brueggemann sees the dominant version of reality as 
something which tends to develop in settled societies and stands in need of 
periodic challenge by prophets who paint an alternative picture, Girard sees 
its traits as the motor which drives most human interaction under any 
circumstances. It is the way the world is, and departing from it is a traumatic 
business: 
“The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the 
kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently.”665 
However, it would not be incompatible with Brueggemann’s main argument 
to suggest that departing from the DVR is a business in which things can get 
                                                 
664 Girard, 1978, p.436. 
665 Luke 16:16. 
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nasty; but he does not suggest that such a departure inevitably leads to 
violence, or that there is a necessary link between the business of prophecy 
and violent outcomes. 
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 “Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the prose and 
the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. 
Live in fragments no longer.” 666 
 
 
It may be stating the obvious to say that the projects of both Brueggemann 
and Girard are deeply concerned to reveal what lies at the heart of religious 
texts. But that is a complex matter, and from the point of view of this study, 
the correlation of two distinct agendas and methods increases the 
obliqueness of the connections to be made. Sacrifice, for instance, may be 
explained by prophecy, but the explanation may be far from explicit; it may 
lie in the domain of what is sacred; and prophecy may disown the category of 
what is sacred667, or aspects of it. 
Is there prophecy in the very explanation of prophecy? Is the writer who 
articulates and even gives meaning to sacrifice enacting a priestly function? 
The answer to these questions may be a partial affirmative, but it is not a 
simple one. The academic writer does not address the world at large, so 
much as a specialist readership of academics and people who have an 
interest in theology. That is true of both Brueggemann and Girard. Nor do 
they address their public in terms which are designed to win them over 
emotionally, nor make use of devices like parables or poetry, as the biblical 
prophets did, though (in Brueggemann’s case) the essential nature of such an 
approach is discussed and affirmed668. They are not apparently seeking to 
express themselves resonantly and pick up on their readers’ inner feelings, 
or ‘cement the words to their hearts’669. They are not, either of them, in their 
academic work at least, overtly engaged in the proclamation or the 
manifestation of God, though they talk about such things. 
                                                 
666 Forster, E.M. Howard’s End Ch. 22.   
667 Quote from Amos. 
668 Brueggemann, 1989. 
669 Dale London, at the Psalms Hymns and Spiritual Songs Easter School in Aberdeen, 5 April 
2006. 
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Nevertheless, the work that they both do in illuminating biblical texts may 
further the work of prophecy. If this is the case, part of the cause will be that 
prophecy begins to seem more relevant in the present time. Therefore, they 
may justifiably be claimed to belong to the field of prophecy in a way, as we 
shall see. 
 
Making the texts talk,  that is, making them illuminate our minds with 
meaning, means actively understanding their language. This does not only 
mean comprehending the Hebrew  or the Greek, and the mind-set that went 
with the speaking of those languages two thousand or more years ago 
(though Brueggemann is certainly a notable expert in this, and Girard is not), 
but also understanding the normative concepts which assembled themselves 
into a world-view, or dominant version of reality. The approach involved is 
not so much a historical one as a literary one, in that it studies the mode of 
communication more than the facts surrounding the circumstances of that 
communication.  
 
In writing about such things, both Brueggemann and Girard are 
communicating the non DVR message to an audience which for the most part 
probably speaks DVR, as it were. This is, of course, the universal problem 
which prophecy faces: bridging a conceptual gap; successful mastery of that 
problem defines the speaker as a prophet, who is found to reveal meaning, 
rather than a crank, who does not.  
 
 
Brueggemann considers that the problem to be overcome, and the context 
for ministry in the present time, is “the failure of the imagination of 
modernity”670. In this, he includes both moral-theological and economic-
political aspects.  Writing in the early 90s, he declared that  
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“We are at a moment when the imagination of modernity is being displaced 
by postmodern imagination, which is less sure and less ambitious, and 
which more modestly makes a local claim. The postmodern act of 
imagination must work its way in the presence of other, rival and competing 
acts of imagination, none of which can claim any formal advantage or 
privilege. Thus, at its deepest levels, our culture is one in which the old 
imagined world is lost, but still powerfully cherished, and in which there is 
bewilderment and fear, because there is no clear way on how to order our 
shared imagination differently or better.”671 
 
These conditions are analogous to those of Israel’s exile, when faith had to 
survive in an environment in which there was indeed bewilderment and fear, 
because the old certainties had been lost and the present time involved 
multiple, competing claims to truth.  
 
In this situation, Brueggemann does not think that his job is to redefine the 
religious imagination, but to ‘fund’ it: 
 
“Rather, the task is to fund – to provide the pieces, materials and resources 
out of which a new world can be imagined. Our responsibility is not the 
voicing of a grand scheme or a coherent system, but the voicing of a lot of 
little pieces out of which people can put life together in fresh 
configurations”672 
 
‘Our’ here refers to ministry, or possibly to a grouping he refers to at the 
beginning of the book as “many of us in the academy and in the church”673, 
who have noticed that a new interpretative situation faces them, and regard 
it as an emergency.  These are the people who have the job of generating the 
fragments from which individuals will, through their own imaginations, 
assemble their own vision.  
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The situation which has been found to have expired is the ‘modern’ one 
(meaning post-Enlightenment), and its method is factual analysis and 
scientific positivism; that is, it regards the scriptures as history, describing 
events that are held to have taken place as described. The new approach 
requires a distinctively different “practice of knowledge and a new, 
derivative option in political power.”674 
 
Referring particularly to the work of Stephen Toulmin675, Thomas Kuhn676 
and Michael Polyani677, Brueggemann notes that the Post-Modern mind-set 
marks a return to Pre-Enlightenment standards, marked by a concern for 
information, or an information culture, which is oral, particular, local and 
timely,678 and thus relevant to the context of the specific person or people 
involved.  
 
 
 Pre- 
Enlightenment 
Modern Post-Modern Brueggemann’s comment 
Reliable 
Information 
Oral Written Oral  
Nature of truth Particular Universal Particular Knowing is contextual 
Local/General Local General Local Contexts are local 
Reality Timely Timeless Timely Knowledge is pluralistic 
 
From this analysis, Brueggemann concludes: 
 
“Thus I shall want to argue that the practice of Christian interpretation in 
preaching and liturgy is contextual, local and pluralistic. We voice a claim 
that rings true in our context,  that applies authoritatively to our lived life. 
                                                 
674 Brueggemann, 1993, p.2. 
675 Particularly Cosmopolis: Toulmin, 1992. 
676 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Kuhn, 1962.  
677 Personal Knowledge: Polyani, 1974. 
678 Brueggemann, 1993, p.6. 
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But it is a claim that is made in a pluralism where it has no formal 
privilege.”679 
 
Admitting that this will look to some like a relativist position, Brueggemann 
stresses that he is not advocating an end to objectivity, but finds that it is 
‘with us’; he goes on to claim that relativism is less of a threat than 
objectivism, because objectivism involves such a deception.  With Kuhn and 
Polyani (as he reads them), he commends a kind of perspectivism: 
 
“…a perspective has the power to make sense out of the rawness of 
experienced life, even though it cannot be ‘proven’ or absolutely 
established.”680 
 
What, it may be asked, is the difference between a current perspective which 
is not merely an individual one, and a dominant version of reality? Only, it 
seems, whether or not it is the view of those who hold the power to dictate 
the dominant culture. A perspective may be embodied within the DVR, or 
exist, as it were, underneath it. This idea of a non-consensus or majority view 
(that is, a situation in which pluralism is the rule) is very much a concept 
rooted in the post-modern context, in which great absolutes have no part, 
but individual reconstructions of meaning in a landscape of “general failure, 
demise and disease”681.  
 
At this point, it is apparent that the alternative to the incoming DVR (that is, 
a Post-Modern view of the world), is not anything like a reinstatement of the 
old certainties. Brueggemann’s persistent refrain, a counter-imagination of 
the world, indicates a set of individual counter-imaginations, which may 
nevertheless have a collective force.   
 
That leaves us with the idea of counter-imaginations which may or may not 
be pluralistic in nature, but at the time when old understandings are going 
                                                 
679 Ibid., p.9. 
680 Ibid, p.10. 
681 Ibid, p.20. 
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through a prolonged period of decline leading to “evident cultural 
collapse”682,  they are seen as mutually in opposition to the decaying 
established culture. The shape of the new thinking that will in time be seen 
to have displaced the old is not yet clear. That is why Brueggemann is 
committed to finding an alternative understanding which works in 
conjunction with the Post-Modern mind-set. 
 
So Brueggemann has no expectation of rehabilitating old certainties or any 
single vision of truth.  He dreams of voices singing in harmony, not in unison, 
and in a place we do not fully recognize as home. 
 
 
Analogies of Exile 
The analogy of exile, and its resonance for the Post-Modern mind, is a point 
discussed by Brueggemann in Cadences of Home (1997), a book which begins 
with a discussion of the metaphor of exile.  Published four years after Texts 
Under Negotiation, the thinking in it builds upon that of the earlier book, and 
develops in the direction of the metaphorical exile of contemporary 
Christians: 
 
“I suggest an evangelical dimension to exile in our social context. That is, 
serious reflective Christians find themselves increasingly at odds with the 
dominant values of consumer capitalism and its supportive military 
patriotism; there is no easy or obvious way to hold together core faith 
claims and the social realities around us. Reflective Christians are 
increasingly ‘resident aliens’.”683 
 
                                                 
682 Brueggemann, 1997, p.3. 
683 Brueggemann, 1997, p.2. 
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At this point, we have people of faith (a) distanced from the old, 
unambiguous certainties of faith by an unavoidable new relativist mind-set, 
and (b) alienated from the socio-ethics of society around them.  The 
combined trauma must be considerable, and in one way, worse than that of 
exile. The way in which it is worse is that there is no clear event for them to 
take as the turning point in their fortunes; they cannot say, “when they led us 
away captive”, or look forward to when the Lord will turn again the captivity. 
There are no historical markers. Instead, there is just the aching awareness 
that the world has changed, that the tide has gone out and left them, if not 
high and dry, then perhaps cut off in their own little rock-pool. 
Brueggemann sees the metaphor of exile as “a rich source for self-
discernment”684, and distinguishes between ‘Christian exile’  in a secular 
culture and ‘cultural exile’ with the loss of conventional hegemony; he 
characterises these two as ‘evangelical’ and ‘American’ respectively, 
referring to the loss of the alignment between Christianity and 
establishment.  He suggests that exile has a cultural dimension which is more 
‘American’ than Christian: 
“The ‘homeland’ in which all of us have grown up has been defined and 
dominated by white, male, Western assumptions which were, at the same 
time, imposed and also willingly embraced. Exile comes as those values and 
modes of authority are being effectively and progressively diminished. That 
diminishment is a source of deep displacement for many, even though, for 
others who are not male and white, it is a moment of emancipation...For all 
these quite visible resistances to the new, however, we are required to live 
in a situation that for many feels like less than ‘home’. In such a context, folk 
need pastoral help in relinquishing a ‘home’ that is gone, and in entering a 
new, dangerous place that we sense as deeply alien.”685 
 
Brueggemann follows Martin Buber in declaring an “epoch of homelessness”, 
arising from the loss of old certainties, as a consequence of the intellectual 
                                                 
684 Ibid, p.2. 
685 Brueggemann, 1997, p.2. 
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revolution caused by Locke, Hobbes and Descartes. He is therefore tracing a 
descent into metaphorical exile which began three hundred years ago, the 
final stages of which are exhibited in the Post-Modern revolution in concepts. 
The realisation that this descent is the case is the painful aspect which has 
traumas evident in the fields both of faith and of culture.  
 
Brueggemann is proposing that Christians declare themselves as in exile, and 
thus realise the metaphor, and cut through the cords which bind 
expectations to situations now in the past.  The realisation of the metaphor, 
and mutual confession mutual admission within the community of faith that 
the adverse circumstances are indeed the case, would bring reconciliation to 
the condition of Christians in the present time. This move would involve  
“..refocusing our attention, energy, and self-perception. In times when the 
church could assume its own ‘establishment’, it may have been proper to 
use prophetic texts to address ‘kings’. But a new circumstance suggests a 
very different posture for preaching and pastoral authority, now as an exile 
addressing exiles, in which displacement, failed hopes, anger, wistful 
sadness and helplessness permeate our sense of self, sense of community 
and sense of future.”686   
 
Having got this under its belt by this act of initiative, Brueggemann suggests, 
a new form of thriving will begin, despite the apparently unpropitious 
circumstances. He notes that Israel’s exile was marked by such a turn-round: 
“The most remarkable observation one can make about this interface of 
exilic circumstances and scriptural resources is this: Exile did not lead Jews in 
the Old Testament to abandon fate or settle for abdicating despair, nor to 
retreat to privatistic religion. On the contrary, exile evoked the most 
brilliant literature and the most daring theological articulation in the Old 
Testament.”687 
                                                 
686 Ibid, p.3. 
687 Ibid, p.3. 
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This is, then, a time of opportunity, in which “preachers are ‘liberated’ to 
assert that hard-core, pre-rational buoyancy in a church too much in the grip 
of the defeatist sensibility of our evident cultural collapse.”688 He sees a 
buoyant response to trouble as both deeply Jewish and evangelical, that is, 
“grounded in a sense and sureness of news about God that circumstance 
cannot undermine or negate.”689 
 
Brueggemann goes on to discuss how one might preach to exiles, and about 
the lament involved in speaking of one’s own condition as an exile. We will 
return to this later, but for the moment, let us leave Brueggemann here, and 
investigate how Girard views the situation of dislocation in contemporary 
life, and what response to it there may be. 
 
 
Girard, Post-Modernism and the Apocalyptic 
Girard is not interested in adapting to Modernism and Post-Modernism. He 
claims to be a ‘mimetic realist’690, and sees himself as an apocalyptic thinker: 
 
“…I am a theorist of mythology…However, there is a sort of outline of a 
theory of modernity at the end of I See Satan691 that is purely 
apocalyptic…The apocalyptic feeling is the consciousness that the scapegoat 
business has run its course…Any great Christian experience is apocalyptic 
                                                 
688 Ibid, p.3. 
689 Ibid, p.3. 
690 Girard, 2007, p.26. (on Dostoevsky’s The Eternal Husband and Cervantes’s El Curioso 
Impertinente) “That was the real insight. The fact that the plot was the same...in the two texts 
turned me into the mimetic realist I have been ever since”, and page 28:“I have always been 
a realist…No new discipline has ever produced any durable results unless it was founded on 
common-sense realism…I think the old German idealistic legacy has simply been misleading 
for the whole European culture.” 
691 Girard, 2001, pp182-187. 
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because what one realises is that after the decomposition of the sacrificial 
order there is nothing standing between ourselves and possible 
destruction.” 692 
 
Therefore, there is a distance between Girard and Brueggemann in how they 
view the present age and the possibilities for any future. For decades now 
Girard has expressed the view that the former controls on violence have 
become dysfunctional, and the world is in danger of being overwhelmed by 
violence of unprecedented magnitude. Systems in society which contain and 
limit violence through scapegoating have failed because  
“after the Christian revolution this is no longer possible. The system cannot 
be pulled back by any pharmacological resolution, and the virus of mimetic 
violence can spread freely. This is why Jesus says ‘Do not suppose I have 
come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword 
(Matthew 10:34)”693 
 
The ability to contain mimetic rivalry being gone,  Girard looks to the future  
and sees the consequence as destruction.  
 
In The Scapegoat (1986) p.187, he states “the gospels state explicitly that 
Satan is the principle of every kingdom.” It is only a short step from talking of 
‘every kingdom’ to talking of ‘the dominant version of reality in most 
societies.’ In other words, despite their differences on the future, both Girard 
and Brueggemann seem to have a similar foundation to their theories, in this 
view that societies tend to be distanced from God, and even in the grips of 
forces polarly opposed to God, or in exile from God. Achieving a 
rapprochement, according to each in his own way, involves a call away from 
the dominant version of reality. 
                                                 
692 Girard at al., 2007, pp. 234-237. 
693 Girard, 2007, p.237.  
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The Idea of Exile 
 
However, the idea of ‘exile’, literal or metaphorical, has more to it than 
distance from God, and must include distance from home, loss of freedom, 
being compelled to live in a strange place, in strange ways, subject to strange 
and perhaps repulsive laws and customs. Girard would have no difficulty 
with the idea of compulsion, or of people being compelled or dragged away 
by a malevolent force, and made to live in an environment both sinister and 
evil, as we shall see; all of that is part of mimetic theory.  
 
But if people are dragged off from a kind of metaphorical ‘home’, or natural 
uncorrupted state, what can be said of it?  Girard describes societies as 
defined by a ‘founding murder’, and analyses mythology to show how this 
memory is enshrined in the earliest records of many societies. If that 
founding murder is the first event, then what can be said of the state that 
preceded it? Unless one resorts to metaphysics, how can one speak of an age 
of innocence if all the records refer only to the corruption that came after it; 
does the whole idea rely on a Platonist excursion into some realm of pre-
experience in which truths reside about the uncorrupted essence of 
humanity?  As Girard identifies mimetic behaviour in children from their 
first interactions with others, he cannot be referring to uncorrupted 
childhood versus deviance in adult years694. A fall from grace, to use a term 
rooted in the book of Genesis, seems to be involved, but it overtakes the 
infant early, as she enters a “world of fallenness”.695 
 
                                                 
694 Oughourlian is a practicing psychiatrist, and also professor of clinical psychopathology at 
the University of Paris. Writing with reference to his clinical experience as a psychiatrist, is 
definite about the display of mimetic behaviour from the earliest moment: “It appears that we 
are constantly in mimetic reaction with one another from the very moment of birth”  
Oughourlian, 2010, p.13. 
695 Ibid, p.14. 
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Girard-Schwager and the Uses of Exile 
Schwager is hardly concerned with the Old Testament, and, like Girard, sees 
the unfolding of the biblical texts as progress towards Jesus and the Kingdom 
of God696. Therefore ‘exile’ is not a concept he mentions much except to refer 
to the gathering of God’s people at the end of exile, as a stage in that 
progress: 
 
“Whenever God rescues oppressed men and women from their enemies he 
gathers them anew at the same time...God rescued the dispersed of his 
people from the hands of their enemies and gathered them from all the 
lands...the liberation and the new gathering are in fact one and the same 
event. 
The message of the new gathering was first proclaimed by the prophets of 
the exilic period”697 
And again,  
“The prayer which Jesus taught his disciples includes in it the incipient 
existence of a renewed Israel -- for "our Father" is not the Father of an 
individual but of a people -- and at the same time it aims toward the further 
coming of God's kingdom. The petitions involving the sanctification of the 
name and the coming of the kingdom belong closely together, as is clear 
from Ezekiel, for God promised by this prophet that he would act anew not 
because of the sinful people, but for his name's sake, and that he would 
show himself as holy when he gathered Israel together again from its 
scattered state of exile (Ezek. 20:41, 44; 28:25; 36:22, 24)... The request of 
the Our Father for sanctification of the name consequently pleads for that 
double event in which God is sanctified as Lord by his gathering together of 
                                                 
696 See The Unity of the Old and New Testaments, in Schwager, 1999, pp.6-8. 
697 Schwager, 1987, p.117-8. 
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the people and turning them toward himself. So we concur with what 
Jeremias says: "the only, meaning of the total reality of Jesus is the gathering 
of eschatological people of God." ”698 
 
So, it appears that whilst Schwager is very interested in the outcome of exile, 
and how this leads towards salvation and the realisation of the Kingdom of 
God, Brueggemann lingers looking at the effects of exile as it happens, rather 
than at its consequences. This means that the correlation between 
Brueggemann and Girard-Schwager in this key point can only be that they 
complement one another by discussing different parts of a sequence; but 
even this limited outcome does not have much content, because Girard-
Schwager look towards a future (the coming of the Kingdom, or apocalypse), 
whereas Brueggemann is concerned with states of being, which partly repeat 
themselves in time, but under differing cultural circumstances. Apocalypse is 
hardly in his vocabulary, though he certainly looks to the drawing near of the 
Kingdom on earth.699 
 
Dramatic Theology 
However, despite this fundamental difference and others, the idea of exile, 
used metaphorically, provides an arena in which their thinking can interact, 
and synergies reside in this, as will become clear.  
 
In order to view the interaction under a perspective which shows the 
synergies in action, let us move to the idea of Dramatic Theology. 
 
                                                 
698 Schwager, 1999, p.39-40. ‘Jeremias’ is a reference to Neutestamantlich Theologie, Pt. 1, by J. 
Jeremias.  Pub. Guterslohe, 1971, or New Testament Theology, New York: Scribner’s, 1977 
699 In Reverberations of Faith, (2002) Brueggemann does have a section on ‘Apocalyptic 
Thought’ (p.5ff), but this is mainly a survey of the subject and has little that is original to 
Brueggemann in it. 
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The idea of Dramatic Theology has been developed by Girard’s associate 
Raymund Schwager at Innsbruck University.  Schwager, working from a  
Roman Catholic cultural standpoint, dismissed the kind of approach which  
considers revelation as a set of propositional statements  amounting to a 
theory and instead proposed a reading of the Bible as a web of actions, by a 
variety of persons (divine and human), at various points in time and place, 
which cannot be described in any linear fashion, but can be distilled into 
dramatic episodes. The theory is only arrived at retrospectively and through 
taking into account the many acts that contribute to it.  
Schwager makes use of the word ‘act’ in its dramatic sense, presenting in 
Jesus in the Drama of Salvation700 a structure like this: 
 
First Act The Dawning of the Kingdom of God 
Second Act The Rejection of the Kingdom of God 
Third Act The Bringer of Salvation Brought to Judgement 
Fourth Act Resurrection of the Son as Judgement of the Heavenly Father 
Fifth Act The Holy Spirit and the New Gathering 
 
From that, essentially Catholic, analysis, he moves on to a section of 
observations including one entitled The Drama of Christian Life701. In this, the 
person of faith is presented as an actor playing a part in which she imitates 
God and Jesus as closely as possible. The message is a direct, votive one: the 
good actor is the one who is truly dedicated, and subjects her (or his) own 
will and personality to true service: 
“Even if a good actor puts everything into his part, his own life remains 
more important. It was different with the faith of Jesus. His human life had 
                                                 
700 Schwager, 1999. 
701 Ibid., p.218ff. Schwager acknowledges his debt to von Bathasar, from whose work his own 
ideas have been developed. 
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no aim of its own beside his mission. It was a matter of being the living flesh 
and dramatic instrumentality for that threefold life which had gripped him. 
A similar task stands before those who are ready to follow him. Christian 
faith…includes a fundamental conversion.”702 
One aspect of this situation which is developed in the Girard-Schwager 
correspondence in two ways is (a) the idea of the priest and therefore of 
priestly action being defined by prayer703 and (b) a convergence with 
Protestant thought, particularly that of Luther704, which he found allied well 
with the scapegoat thesis. This writer adds to those observations that the 
core protestant idea of the ‘priesthood of all believers’705 involves each 
Christian, through prayer, in the dramatic theology process as a participant, 
not as a spectator. This has profound implications for Brueggemann’s idea of 
the necessity of priestly intervention in the process of sacrifice, which we 
unfolded in Part 2, and which we will synthesize with Schwager’s insight in 
Chapter 20. 
 
Brueggemann has also launched a theory of dramatic interpretation. It is  not 
by any means identical to Schwager’s, but has a significant overlap and 
predates it by several years, in terms of published major works on the 
subject.  
 
Although Brueggemann’s focus tends to be on a dramatic episode , whilst 
Schwager is interested mainly in an assembly of such episodes into 
something from which  a viable theological scheme of some sort can be 
derived, each embraces the other’s range, and both settle on the key phrase 
                                                 
702 Ibid, p.219. 
703 Girard-Schwager 1975-91, p.72. 
704 Ibid, p.122. 
705 Luther does not use these precise words, but says, “In fact, we are all consecrated priests 
through Baptism, as St. Peter in 1 Peter 2[:9] says, "You are a royal priesthood and a priestly 
kingdom," and Revelation [5:10], "Through your blood you have made us into priests and 
kings." Luther, 2009. 
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‘drama of salvation’ to describe the overall effect.706 For Schwager, this 
means that his starting point is to investigate the doctrine of redemption707.  
Brueggemann’s project is rather different: to liberate the texts for the church 
in a new situation.708  
 
Brueggemann in particular sees the dramatic approach as a tool for 
understanding one’s own life in relation to God709, and as a useful counter to 
the state of theology in the USA and elsewhere, which followed science into 
“a hard and non-negotiable set of ideas and concepts” and this reinforced a 
closed or ‘coded’ system. Acknowledging that he is greatly simplifying the 
issues, he claims that the current ‘Battle of the Bible’ is rooted, for 
conservatives, in eighteenth-century propositionalism and for liberals in 
nineteenth-century developmentalism710, and the way out of these 
whirlpools is to see “biblical faith as drama for our time”. 711 
 
What this actually means in theological terms and how God can be involved 
in drama despite being “scripted by habit”712 is explored on two essays on 
the Shape of Old Testament Theology: 1:Structure Legitimation  and 
2:Embrace of Pain.713 
 
                                                 
706 Brueggemann, 1993, p.69, and the title of Schwager’s 1999 book. 
707 Schwager, 1999, p. ix. 
708 Brueggemann, 1993, p.vii. 
709 “To see my life as a drama (or series of overlapping dramas) is to insist that my life is not a 
settled certitude, as though I were painted by number. Nor is my life an empty procession of 
one damn thing after another. My life is rather an ongoing transaction in which issues of 
constancy and development (freedom), elements of playfulness, credibility and danger are all 
underway. While this drama is one of enormous seriousness, I can indeed trust myself to the 
drama, for I do not need single-handedly to ‘make it work’. In part I play against, in the 
presence of, and supported by the other members of the cast.” Brueggemann says that the 
dramatic view of one’s life enables one to see oneself as “ a genuine and significant other to 
God” Ibid., pp 67-68.  
710 Involving for conservatives the question about God’s reality offstage (a point rooted in 
dogma), and for liberals the question about whether ‘this could really happen’ (a 
preoccupation with historical veracity). Ibid, p.69. 
711 Ibid, p.66. 
712 Ibid, p.67. 
713 Brueggemann, 1992, p.1 & p.22. 
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Brueggemann starts with a more distant perspective than Schwager, not 
with any call to action, but with the abstraction of reality as drama: 
 
“What is now required and permitted is a mode of scripture interpretation 
quite unlike most of what we have practised before. In seeking to find a 
mode of interpretation congenial to our actual life in the world, I propose 
that we ‘take’ reality as a drama, and that we see the text as a script for that 
drama.”714 
 
The metaphor of drama, Brueggemann says, “with its playful open-
endedness”, is found to be  
 
“ an appropriate counterpart to the to the epistemology of post-modernity, 
because drama in life and death, as drama in the theatre, need not be so 
imperialistic and dare not be so absolute. Drama need not claim to voice or 
enact the whole of truth, but can play with, probe and explore one moment 
of truth with patience and courage. It intends, moreover, that this fully 
exposed moment of enactment should be an opening and a sacrament of 
everything larger, though it does not claim to grasp all that is larger.”715 
 
Schwager has a response to this. He begins by reciting his core message of 
faith and action: 
 
“Existence in faith does not mean playing a role which is strange, but being 
addressed by a role received (mission) in the indeterminacy at the centre of 
                                                 
714 Brueggemann, 1993, p.64-65. 
715 Ibid.  
16   Making the Texts Talk 
 
271 
 
one’s person and challenged to a new self-termination and freedom made 
possible by the Holy Spirit.” 
 
He then goes on, 
 
“It may appear at first glance that such an understanding of life is in radical 
opposition to modern thinking, which since the Enlightenment circles round 
that autonomous subject which is responsible to itself and gives laws for 
itself. Where Christian thought has almost exclusively based itself on the 
autonomous moral subject, the doctrine of redemption has also in fact run 
into a fundamental crisis...it is acquainted with the dialectic of the 
Enlightenment and has dissolved into different tendencies, so that today 
there no longer exists a unified modern thought.”716  
 
Schwager goes on to discuss the implications for praxis and orthopraxis 
under these chaotic circumstances. He concludes that lex orandi - lex 
credendi, ‘the law of prayer is the law of belief’. He directs his investigation 
from this point into whether “the hidden divine life finds clear expression 
pre-eminently in the liturgy of the church and whether this liturgy can be 
understood as the dramatic performance of the dramatic event of salvation 
in Jesus Christ.”717 
 
This is of course in clear contrast to Brueggemann, who is not concerned 
with liturgy, and looks mainly to the texts. A clear point of divergence has 
become apparent, beyond which any further comparison would become 
perverse. But even as this point is reached , it is also clear that there is a 
mutual acceptance of the location of the individual in a stew of dislocated 
schools of thought, in which the individual and her understanding of reality 
                                                 
716 Schwager, 1999, pp. 220-221. 
717 Ibid, p.223. 
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legitimately understood as that which impinges on her and accordingly 
seems to be the case, looms large. They are, both, then, concerned with the 
flight from absolutes in thought, and with the general predicament of 
modern life as “postmodern, postsystem, postcertitude”.718 
 
The interpretation in dramatic terms of what the person of faith does when 
the proposed world offered either by the text or by dogma “runs dead 
against my presumed world”.719  Any form of alienation, either from 
contemporary understandings of what truth is, or from the so-called facts of 
faith, or from contemporary mores, or from the religious call to action which 
Schwager describes, involves liminality, and possibly exile. The metaphor of 
exile is therefore one of great utility. 
 
Brueggemann sees the drama of exile as one that prepares one for the drama 
of salvation. To Schwager, the gathering of God’s people is the outcome of 
exile that moves the world on  - on, as both he and Girard would claim, 
towards the Kingdom and the Apocalypse.  
 
The unfinished business of both Brueggemann’s and Girard-Schwager’s 
thinking (even though it is not within their personal remit) is the project to 
determine how the church is to make use of drama coupled with the 
experience of exile in all its forms to describe its location and its future 
journey. A rich source for self-discernment, as Brueggemann said, and an 
opportunity to look forward to liberation and new gathering, in Schwager’s 
words. Both would agree, an opportunity to make the texts talk powerfully, 
within a new order. Schwager’s emphasis on roles, and following the role 
one inherits within the situations one finds oneself in, could be matched by 
an additional condition: the playing of that role in relationship to other 
                                                 
718 Brueggemann, 1993. p.23. 
719 Ibid. 
16   Making the Texts Talk 
 
273 
 
‘characters’. The role has a meaning only in the context of relationships. And, 
Girard might add, the relationship can only truly prosper when Satan is not 
an invisible third party to it. 
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Like fireworks in the night 
The Holy Spirit came; 
Disciples’ fears took flight 
When touched by fronds of flame 
And suddenly the world was young 
As hope embraced a Saviour’s claim.720 
 
 
The business of this chapter is breakthroughs: breakthroughs from one habit 
of thought to another, the shattering of the usual way of looking at the world, 
to admit a new form of understanding.  In science, this is often referred to as 
‘paradigm shift’: a revolution in thinking which affects how reality is 
perceived. Within religion, it is what prophecy achieves.  
 
When Brueggemann speaks of prophecy as the sub-version of reality721, he is 
employing a deliberate double-entendre,  referring to the paradigm-shift722 
involved in committing to an alternative future scenario. He is of course also 
referring to its subversive effect. In considering this, the first thing to be 
done is to examine the relationship of the sub-version of reality (the catalyst 
of the incipient paradigm shift) to the everyday world and established 
attitudes, and see how and when it successfully changes perceptions of 
reality. So, we will look first at what the paradigm-shifters actually do: they 
criticise the established view as being unsound, and they present a vision of 
future possibilities which are differently founded. They function as critic-
visionaries, and whilst the critical aspect may be straightforward in itself 
(though probably disputed and almost certainly unpalatable initially), the 
visionary aspect with which it is associated is likely to call into question 
perceptions of what exists and what is possible. The combination of the two 
may therefore be intensely difficult, threatening and unwelcome. 
                                                 
720 Ian Masson Fraser, in Church of Scotland Church Hymnary 4, No. 584. 
721 Brueggemann, 2000, p.1ff. 
722 See page 115, footnote 246.  
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This takes us back to the quotation from Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
which we referred to earlier. Blake’s point was that poets assert truth which 
they feel, but do not necessarily derive from any external source that they 
can positively identify. They do this through an intuitive sympathy with ‘the 
infinite in every thing’, and through ‘honest indignation’.  The first of these 
may be the identity of God, but the second is the voice of God. The sense of 
the infinite is the spring from which the indignation flows. Blake also refers 
on many occasions to the imagination not only as the fundamental capability 
of the poet (visionary), but also as the foundation of knowledge.723 
 
Brueggemann refers to the energizing language of amazement used by the 
prophets of Israel in describing God’s new plan.724  Acknowledging his debt 
to Paul Ricoeur in the development of his thought on this subject, he says,  
 
“I have come to see that imagination is the capacity to entertain, host, trust 
and respond to images of reality (God and the world) that are beyond 
conventional dominant reason. It has slowly dawned on me that biblical 
exposition …is an artistic preoccupation that is designed to generate 
alternative futures.”725 
 
The ‘depiction of alternative futures’ is identical with ‘paradigm shifts’, and 
paradigm shifts are in a relationship with formative periods in culture 
                                                 
723 For instance: 
“Imagination is the Real and Eternal World of which the Vegetable World is but a 
faint shadow.” 
“What is now proved was once only imagined.” 
“To see a World in a Grain of Sand,  
And Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour.” 
Blake, 1966 p.431 Auguries of Innocence. 
724 Brueggemann, 1978, p.69. 
725 Brueggemann, 2009, p. xx. 
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(though cause and effect are hard to distinguish). Therefore, let us consider 
the circumstances under which paradigm shifts tend to occur, or, to use 
Brueggemann’s term, the point at which the sub-version surfaces. That is not 
so much a point about when the prophet speaks, as about when and in what 
conditions his message registers. 
 
Prophets have the capacity to insert into the culture they serve a new 
conceptual framework relating to God and mankind. Intuitively, they 
comprehend the scheme of that relationship, understanding what its 
essentials are. They know how to communicate it, because they understand 
their public726, or, to use Brueggemann’s own term, they comprehend the 
dominant version of reality of the moment. Without that comprehension and 
an ability to confront it, they would remain voices crying incomprehensibly 
in the wilderness. But with these twin capabilities, they can articulate the 
possibility of a new reality.  Their capabilities come from, and are dependent 
upon their liminality, their position of being on a threshold between two 
existential states727, and being able to mediate the future one to the present.   
 
Prophets effectively try to set new rules, and that means that they must 
either modify or dispose of the existing ones. To fail would be to invite a 
backlash, and there is anecdotal evidence in the Bible that this often 
happened728. Prophets being scapegoated: persecuted, driven out or 
exterminated is something on which Girard has much to say.  
 
The cycle of prophecy successfully attacks the status quo, establishing new 
rules which in time harden into orthodoxy, and in the long term are sooner 
or later overthrown. There are minor revolutions and phases of modification 
                                                 
726 The depth, vigour and cost of the communicative power is well illustrated in Hosea 1-3, in 
which the prophet’s own marriage to an unfaithful wife is a vehicle for bringing alive the 
reality of Israel’s unfaithfulness to God. 
727 The term is used formatively by Victor Turner in Turner (1969). 
728 For instance, II Chronicles 36:16, Jesus at Matthew 23:37, Stephen at Acts 7:52. 
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too, in which prophetic groups emerge who define themselves over against 
the dominant version within their society: mystics, radicals, charismatics, 
apophatics, Methodists. These dissenters, who may be prophets in the sense 
in which we have proved that term, often punch above their weight, 
particularly in their popular appeal.  
 
 
Religious Radicalism and Social Crisis 
 
If prophets tend to stand at turning points in the religious tradition, the 
turning points themselves tend to coincide not only with cultural crisis but 
also times of social stress. The prime examples are the Exodus from slavery 
in Egypt and the wanderings in the wilderness which were led by Moses, and 
the exile in Babylon which was the context for Isaiah. Brueggemann has 
concentrated on the second of these, and Norman Gottwald has produced 
seminal studies of the first, most notably, The Tribes of Yahweh729.  
 
Gottwald’s work on the Exodus paints it as the tradition which recounts the 
forming of a nation. The account is “narrative-like literature of a history-like 
quality that stops short of being actual historiography”, but nevertheless “it 
is possible to extract a plot line that exhibits unity of action and causal 
connections.” 730  The account serves to link Israel-in-embryo in the 
wilderness and Israel in florescence in the land, by means of the following 
factors: 
 
1. A people oppressed by kings unites to escape from bondage to the 
oppressor. 
                                                 
729 Gottwald, 1979. 
730 Gottwald, 2009, p.109.  
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2. A freed people unites and experiments to create a 
tribal/intertribal community of mutually supported equals. 
3. A people struggles to create necessary leadership in the absence 
of coercive state power. 
4. A people in a very precarious economic situation labours to 
provision itself both as it migrates and as it cultivates its own land. 
5. A people threatened by disease and plague, and perhaps under-
population, struggles to reproduce and preserve itself by adequate 
hygienic measures.731 
 
The function of the prophet, Moses, was to envision the new possibilities and 
lead his people through a long and perilous journey to their realisation.  The 
range of issues involved is nothing like the situation which confronted Israel 
in exile in Babylon.  Brueggemann describes that predicament as follows: 
 
“Exile, that is social, cultural displacement, is not primarily geographical but 
liturgical and symbolic.” 732  
 
The statement is not entirely clear, as liturgy is not a subject which 
Brueggemann writes about, though of course, writing elsewhere, he 
composes it. He quotes Alan Mintz: 
 
“ the catastrophic element in events [of exile] is defined as the power to 
shatter the existing paradigms of meaning, especially as regards the bonds 
between God and Israel”733 
 
                                                 
731 Ibid., p.127 . 
732 Brueggemann, 1997, p.15. 
733 Mintz, 1984, p.x 
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So, the Exodus covers the formation of the nation and its bonds with God, 
and the Exile the situation in which those bonds seemed in danger of being 
shattered, and the paradigms of meaning, according to Brueggemann, were 
indeed shattered734.  
 
Brueggemann goes on to comment that when this happens, there is a difficult 
move to be made through the shattering to “newly voiced meaning”. This 
move depends on “careful and sustained attention to speech.” 735  He then 
goes on to adopt Paul Ricoeur’s terminology of ‘limit experiences’ articulated 
through ‘limit expressions’736. This is a point about extreme situations calling 
forth radical expressions. 
 
“Newly voiced meaning” can amount to radicalism, and there is a tradition of 
this across the centuries against which one can compare Brueggemann’s 
views. The results of this comparison are illuminating. For instance, Norman 
Cohn, in The Pursuit of the Millennium737, describes a great range of such 
occurrences in the Middle Ages, and relates them to uncertainties: the sense 
that the age was about to end and the terrible economic precariousness of 
the expanding class of urban poor in particular. This insurgence of radicals 
included many claimants to being the new Messiah, or Jesus himself, or the 
reincarnation of other charismatic but secular leaders such as Baldwin, 
Count of Flanders and Emperor of Constantinople738 or Frederick I 
Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor. Although not restricted to Germany and 
the Low Countries, the insurgence was much more widespread there than in 
France, Britain, Spain or Scandinavia. 
 
                                                 
734 Brueggemann, 1997, p.2. He refers to the “loss of a structured, reliable world, …(and new 
circumstances in which) treasured symbols of meaning are mocked and dismissed.” 
735 Brueggemann, 1997, p.15. 
736 Ricoeur, 1975, pp.107-45. 
737 Cohn, 1957. 
738 Baldwin was made Emperor by the Crusaders when he captured that city in 1204. With a 
year, he had been captured by the Bulgarians and put to death. Ibid, p.90. 
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It is notable that this distribution follows a pattern of government. The areas 
where radicals were more likely to appear (Germany and the Low Countries) 
were governed as smaller units often led by dukes, margraves and electors 
who were at odds with each other, so that warfare constantly recurred.739 
The settled state which kingship brings, and particularly national kingship 
with consistent, systematic government, tends to be inimical to prophecy. On 
the other hand, rapid social change was often the catalyst for “revolutionary 
movements of the poor, headed by messiahs or living saints”.740 
 
Compare this with parts of the history of Israel.  The administration of the 
people during the period following the invasion of Canaan was by ‘judges’ 
(whose character is of national heroes) responsible under God as the 
deputies who implement his policies. This spasmodic mode of government 
was brought to an end by the people’s request for a king741; what they 
wanted was an end to unreliability and the current (rather sleazy) rule of 
Samuel’s sons as ‘Judges’, so that Israel could be more like other nations, and 
be managed, organised in peace and have their battles fought in times of war. 
In other words, they wanted a settled, comprehensive, systematic 
government, even at a high price in taxes. Their request was granted, but 
with the proviso that they would not have God’s ear in the way that they had 
had in the past. God would not be responsible to them in hearing their 
complaints. 
Prophecy is, then, often the child of turbulent conditions, and the words 
attributed to God in 1 Samuel indicate that these are the conditions in which 
God is active within the life of Israel; actively in touch. On that basis, it would 
be logical to infer generally that God’s word is not readily heard, or so 
accessible, in settled times when people have put in place their own scheme 
which dominates all others. Indeed, Samuel is saying (on God’s behalf) that 
                                                 
739 Ibid, pp. 53-60. 
740 Cohn, 1957, p.53. 
741 1 Samuel 8. 
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in such circumstances, God is not at hand.  The dominant version, not just of 
government but even of conceptualised reality, is that of the human rulers. 
 
The Catastrophe of Exile & Limit Expressions  
In Cadences of Home, Brueggemann goes a stage further. Writing about exile, 
both the biblical exile in Babylon, and the metaphor it represents for the 
contemporary church in the USA, he suggests that as the Christian message is 
a message of the dispossessed.  Christians exist under a foreign culture, with 
an alien version of reality emphatically dominant in the world they inhabit. 
Therefore, to be Christian is to stand apart from the dominant culture and 
naturally to have a bias for the changing or overthrow of that culture, or for 
departing from it and leaving it behind.  (This last point is my inference, 
rather than Brueggemann’s explicit statement.) The longing for a God-related 
form of structure and meaning in their lives can be interpreted for the 
present day as ‘Christian exile’ in a secular culture742. 
 
Christian ‘exile’ is defined by assaults on Christian paradigms of meaning, 
and Brueggemann and Mintz claim that the position of the dispossessed 
makes it essential to recount the event or state of exile, then re-voice their 
message in new terms; as Mintz puts it,  
 
“first to represent the catastrophe, and then to reconstruct, replace, or 
redraw the  threatened paradigm of meaning, and thereby make creative 
survival possible.”743 
 
                                                 
742 Brueggemann, 1997, p.2. 
743 Mintz, ibid., p.2. 
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This is the kind of thing that Paul Ricoeur refers to as  ‘limit experiences’, 
which bring about ‘limit expressions’, which are necessary to articulate the 
shattering of paradigms of meaning: 
 
“Limit expressions bring about the rupturing of ordinary modes of 
speech….The expression ‘Kingdom of God’ may be understood as the index 
that points limit-expressions in the direction of limit experiences that are 
the ultimate referent of our modes of speaking.”744 
 
Ricoeur holds that language uses limit expressions only to open up our 
experience, to make it explode in the direction of experiences that are 
themselves limit-experiences. The suggestion made here, drawing upon both 
Ricoeur and Brueggemann, is that the expressions which have the capacity to 
articulate prophetic insights are ‘limit expressions’, coined in the white heat 
of ‘limit experiences’. Only in such special conditions can they be brought 
into existence.  
 
However, Ricoeur redefines what ‘limit experiences’ might be, drawing back 
from ‘the language game of the eschatological’745 and apocalyptic 
associations, and refers to moments of inner transformation, quoting “the 
kingdom of God is within you.”746 This is an aspect which lies outside 
Brueggemann’s field of argument in his discussion of the Exile and 
contemporary situations on which that experience throws light.  
 
Brueggemann747, drawing upon Victor Turner748, refers to transitional states, 
the in-between time and place in social transformation when “the old 
                                                 
744 Ricoeur, 1995, p.61. 
745 Ricoeur, 1995, p.58-59. 
746 Luke 17:20-21. 
747 Brueggemann, 1997, p.29. 
748 Turner, 1969. 
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configurations of social reality are increasingly seen to be in jeopardy”.  He 
stated that a safe place is required within such situations to host ambiguity 
and resolve it without pressure. In this, he is seeking to avoid the culture of 
violence against which Christianity is defined.749 However, as we have seen, 
the emergence of prophecy has frequently not coincided with any safe place, 
but only with the most turbulent and unsettled of times.  
 
Our focus, following Brueggemann’s theory, is therefore upon prophecy as a 
temporary phenomenon, surfacing from time to time, usually at a time of 
social turbulence, in the form of a subsidiary, contrary vision of reality. It is 
temporary because its expression is articulated powerfully only for a limited 
time, before the mainstream of the discussion hardens into orthodoxy. Such 
an orthodoxy goes with more settled, stable times, and is found to have come 
to terms with human institutions, and therefore tends to affirm them. In 
other words, orthodoxies by definition tend to be tied to the dominant 
version of reality within their form of life.  
 
However, there is an alternative scenario, such as that exhibited by 
particular orthodoxies such as Orthodox Judaism, in which existing beliefs 
(including prophecy), existing customs and rituals and membership of the 
group are protected and made unchanging to preserve them in a foreign or 
hostile environment, or indeed during a long period of instability.  
 
The general tendency towards orthodoxy is exhibited in most faiths, which 
have a defined canon of texts which is closed. The reason given is usually the 
avoidance of error or heresy750, but it may be that an underlying human 
                                                 
749 However, there is an immediate collision with the prophecy of the Hebrew Bible, much of 
which is coercive in the Monarchical period (though not the Elohist), and also with the very 
confrontational nature of some of Jesus’s preaching.  
750 As in the Synod of Jerusalem (1672), at which the Greek Orthodox Church defined its 
canon of divinely inspired writings. Similar definitions were made at the Council of Trent. 
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tendency is at work:  the quest for certainty.  Therefore, it is very hard for 
orthodoxies to be prophetic, without ceasing to seem to be orthodox751. This 
means that prophecy tends to be defined as an activity of the past within 
orthodoxies752 and if it emerged in the present moment would certainly run 
the risk of being branded and even dismissed by those who control the 
orthodoxy as unorthodox and therefore reprehensible.  An example of this, 
some would agree, might be the lack of approbation for the Liberation 
Theology movement of South America in certain parts of the Catholic 
establishment; and approval of the late Archbishop Oscar Romero in others. 
  
As a broad generalization, it would probably be fair to say that in defending a 
status quo, orthodoxies historically have often knowingly or unknowingly 
gone along with the ways of the world, or the normal standards of the society 
of their time. Their motivation may just have been to survive and continue in 
some remaining aspect of their work. An extreme example of this would be 
the churches in Germany in the 1930s, all except one of which affirmed the 
Nazi regime753.  If Brueggemann and Girard are to be followed, then that 
acceptance of the status quo, through embracing the dominant version of 
reality, is tantamount to an acceptance of the narrative of violence. The 
implications of this are of course very serious within the thinking of these 
two writers. 
 
There are moments (relatively short periods in history) when the sub-
version breaks through orthodoxy as an isolated event, the orthodoxy 
continuing afterwards, even if somewhat influenced by the outburst. When 
                                                                                                                                     
(1546) by the Roman Catholic Church, the 39 Articles of 1563 by the Church of England, 
and the Westminster Confession of Faith of 1647 by British Calvinists. Within Judaism, the 
canon is defined by the Masoretic Text. 
751 Though such radicalism may seek to get back to an original orthodoxy, as in the case of 
the current Radical Orthodoxy movement. 
752 If evidence of this is required, the sheer absence of recognized prophets since biblical times 
in the Christian tradition would provide the strongest possible evidence. 
753 The exception was the Confessing Church, led by Martin Niemoller and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, amongst others. 
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this happens it can be an occasion of remarkable vibrancy and energy, and 
this quality is characteristically preserved in its literature. That is not to say 
that such periods are set apart from the narrative of violence – far from it – 
but the turbulence of the period is not only one in which God-talk is more 
necessary754; it also throws up opportunities for revised imaginings and new 
expressions, which at other times are much harder to come by. An example 
would be the Apophatics, a tradition which includes writers widely 
separated in place and time, from fifth-century Syria to seventeenth-century 
England: Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Meister Eckhart, the writer of 
The Cloud of Unknowing, Thomas Traherne.  
 
The suggestion here is that what we observe in these mystics is a form of 
prophecy which is particularly apparent not so much at the end of a cultural 
cycle, or a point of crisis in a settled state; on the contrary, these effects are 
more apparent at the beginning of cultural cycles when concepts, and 
therefore language, are naturally in a state of flux. The volcanic eruptions 
throw up new forms of expression in the period before the lava hardens and 
loses its fluid capability and its heat. This is not the same point as 
Brueggemann’s: he suggests that prophecy accompanies the end of a cycle. It 
could be argued that the distinction is not a particularly helpful one, as both 
end and beginning are part of a process of transition. However, in this 
discussion, causation is important, and that is where the difference of 
emphasis lies. The association of prophecy with emerging new ways of 
thinking may be consistent with aspects of Girard’s theories, as we shall see 
later.  
 
The Contemporary Attack on Meaning 
Girard takes a dark, sometimes apocalyptic view of the present day. Far from 
believing that the period of flux through which we are living is likely to prove 
                                                 
754 Brueggemann, 2000, p.95. 
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any sort of golden age or time of Renewal for religion, he suggests that the 
current changes may prove to be terminal.  As we have seen, he detects a 
new Puritanism which ‘castrates the signified’ and by doing so may lead to a 
severe crisis within the foreseeable future.  
In the last chapter of Things Hidden, Girard describes an observable trend in 
society: 
 
“We are getting away from one kind of Puritanism only to fall into another. 
It is now not a matter of depriving mankind of sexuality, but of something 
we need even more – meaning” 755 
 
A follower of Brueggemann might point out straight away that this is what 
happens in the crisis-ridden environment that marks the end of an era and 
the opening up of times favourable to prophecy. Similarly, one might observe 
that the desiccation of old modes of finding and expressing meaning is a 
necessary precursor to the dawning of the new.  What happens, it could be 
said, is that old modes of conveying meaning decline, become stiff and 
lacking in utility, and from this situation in which meaning is the casualty, a 
vigorous new mode emerges. 
 
But Girard does not seem to be saying that the existing modes of thought and 
expression have become incapable of conveying meaning, but that a form of 
Puritanism has got a grip on contemporary culture, just when old puritan 
attitudes to sex have been relaxed. In what seemed to be a liberal time, a new 
form of restrictive thinking emerges. This new Puritanism clamps down on 
any signs of belief, and its effect is to exorcize meaning, ‘desiccating’ texts 
and annihilating any prospect of knowledge with a nihilism put with an 
assurance and dogmatism of the strongest kind. This is “a Puritanism of 
                                                 
755 Girard, 1978 p.442. 
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meaning that kills all that it touches.”756  It is suggested here that the 
‘Puritanism’ referred to, even though it may be Puritan in character in this 
case,  might be defined more generally as an inelasticity of thought, and that 
then parallels become apparent in other situations where a phase of culture 
is in decline.  
 
Girard is articulating a desperate realisation that thought has nowhere to go 
under such circumstances. The old certainties have been cast aside, but 
nothing is available to replace them. The 19th century philosophers and 
theoreticians (Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud) – thinkers with whom 
Girard engages widely757- are not possible sources of a new kind of thought. 
Christianity is in a double bind because it has done away with the old 
sacrificial version, but the new progressive version has done away with 
apocalyptic intervention: it “has sacrificed a large part of the text to an ideal, 
without noticing – irony of ironies! – that this text is the only way of attaining 
it.”758  
 
In other words, Girard is saying that we have reached a point in 
contemporary society where we are expert in defining lack of meaning and 
concentrated on that end, but have lost the ability to find or recognize 
meaning. In that sense, we ‘castrate the signified’. Girard is historically-
minded, and often quick to quote examples from the past in support of his 
claims, but in this case, he quotes none.  This is because he believes that the 
present situation is uniquely barren.  However, Girard, despite himself, 
concludes Things Hidden with Ezekiel’s parable of the dry bones returning to 
life when all seemed extinct, commenting that he “had always cherished the 
hope that meaning and life were one”, and that the breath of the spirit is all 
                                                 
756 Ibid, p.441-442. 
757 For instance, his most recent book Battling to the End  (Girard, 2010) has a section on 
Clausewitz and Hegel; Violence and the Sacred (Girard, 1972) considers Freud and the 
Oedipus Complex, etc. 
758 Ibid. 
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that is needed to bring about renewal.759 Although Girard does not state this 
at this point, it is evident that within his thinking, hope now rests on the 
renunciation of revenge, and this is the ‘meaning’ lost sight of in the 
barrenness of the present situation.  
 
If this is the case, we see the point at which Girard’s vision runs out, and 
apocalypse looms. Girard clearly sees terror in his own theory. But 
Brueggemann’s vision does not run out. Girard witnesses a triumph of the 
here-and-now over vision, and an eclipse of the holy; beyond that he can only 
hope and pray. But Brueggemann would ascribe to the situation the 
favourable conditions for a new beginning, a destruction which is necessary 
and ultimately creative. 
 
If this new opportunity is not to be understood in terms of ideas which can 
be assembled into a grand narrative, what vehicle is possible?  The answer 
may be, the understanding of the place of oneself and also one’s group in a 
confused, alien world of chaotically clashing accounts as being one of a role 
played in relationship to others. 
 
Old men ought to be explorers 
Here or there does not matter 
We must be still and still moving 
Into another intensity 
For a further union, a deeper communion 
Through the dark cold and the empty desolation, 
The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters 
Of the petrel and the porpoise. In my end is my beginning760. 
 
                                                 
759 Ibid, p.447. 
760 From East Coker, in Eliot, 1963, p.196. 
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Review 
Research question, part3: Prophecy: outdated and never outdated 
Examine the meaning of prophecy, ancient and modern, its relationship 
to the dominant version of reality, and the meaning that might be found 
in it.   
The response to prophecy, in all ages we know of, seems to have been  
often simply to reject them, to stone the prophets literally or 
metaphorically, because they are subversive and threaten to 
undermine the DVR. Therefore, prophecy may be frequently invisible 
as such, and classed in other ways, until time or some radical change 
in circumstances brings about a change of perspective which gives the 
prophets recognition.   
Brueggemann explains the circumstances and workings of the whole 
area of prophecy; Girard is involved in laying out a new version of 
reality in the face of the DVR. 
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“The Word…breaks away from the numinous… to the extent that the Word 
takes over for itself the functions of the numinous.”761 
 
 
A covenant is a solemn contract, not merely a set of promises, though that is 
how it is often interpreted in church circles; it involves rights and 
responsibilities on both sides, and breach of the terms may endanger the 
whole relationship. It is therefore relational in essence762; its chief concerns 
are how the parties are to interact, and how people are to behave towards 
one another and meet predetermined standards in so doing. In so far as 
covenant defines religion, religion is about behaviour. Ethics forms a large 
part of this, but ‘behaviour’ covers more than just ethics; it involves the 
maintenance of relationships: the relationship between God and his people, 
the relationships between people. 763 
The obvious parallel is the idea of a social contract, mooted by John Locke, 
Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Some writers on the subject go 
further than the idea of a parallel, and suggest that “the Covenant of Moses 
and the New Covenant of Jesus are actually “early examples of a Social 
Contract” 764, on the basis that a social contract is a record of reciprocal 
promises between the parties: 
“The details of what is being promised vary from one Social Contract 
to another, but the promises are voluntary, mutually reciprocal, and 
rely on trust and honour rather than policing through sanctions or 
punishments. In a social contract community, breaches of promise or 
breaches of expectation are typically resolved through a civil 
                                                 
761 Ricoeur, 1995, p.65. 
762 Not all writers on the subject share this emphasis on relationship. Brueggemann, for 
instance, describes it as “a theological idea, a liturgic practice, and a durable public 
institution in Israel”. He does, however, acknowledge that it is founded on God’s resolve to 
be in the relationship. Brueggemann, 2002, p.37. 
763 This paragraph is the present writer’s analysis, though it draws in ideas from 
Brueggemann. 
764Collaborative commentary on Lawrence Kohlberg’s Six Stages of Moral Reasoning  at  
http://knol.google.com/k/foundations-of-ethics  accessed 3.10.11. 
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resolution process that does not contemplate a sanctions or 
punishment enforcement regime.”765 
Biblical covenants are like secular bargains and treaties but at this point, the 
parallel breaks down, because of the form of some biblical covenants. In the 
Bible, not all covenants place duties on both parties, and some, such as those 
at Gen. 9:16 and Gen. 15:18 look like simple promises by God. However, 
duties may still be implied (particularly of faithfulness), and this writer’s 
view is that this duty is implied and that consequences follow its breach. So, 
we see that a breach of the agreement puts the relationship itself into 
suspension. God understands the failure as a rejection, and Israel comes to 
understand that this is indeed what has happened. And for God to ‘turn away 
his face’ can have dire consequences and be a punishment of the most severe 
kind, leading to a loss of protection and security. Indeed, the relationship 
with Israel is a particular one, because Israel understands the idea of a 
covenant, whereas its neighbour peoples do not: 
“The term ‘Canaan’ or ‘Canaanite’, it is agreed, is not an ethnic term. It 
is an ideological term, and is used by Israel to characterize all those 
who refuse Israel’s vision of a covenantal reality.”766 
“The promise of the covenantal drama is the evocation of a 
community of joy that finds true communion and freedom in glad 
obedience. The entry point into such a community of joyful freedom 
in obedience is the practice of assertion and abandonment. It is this 
practice that our culture so fears and resists, that our community of 
faith has long understood to be the arena for obedience that glorifies 
God and makes the world a neighbourhood. In such a practice, both 
our fearful conformity and troubled autonomy are overcome. Through 
                                                 
765 Ibid. 
766 Brueggemann, 1999, p.27. Brueggemann refers to Nils Peter Lmche (sic), The Canaanites 
and their Land: The Tradition of the Canaanites (JSOTSup 110; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 191). 
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such daring and constancy we become members of the Beloved 
Community.”767 
So, in the Bible, the idea of a covenant depends upon the recognition of the 
deal and the attention of the parties; their absence from the arrangement or 
lack of attention to it renders the whole thing defunct, or a sham. God must 
be actively present, and the people must truly focus on him. So, in this 
particular context, it is hard to dispose of the idea of the numinous, or talk of 
religion fined down to ethics, as Bonhoeffer did in an exploratory way. 
Covenants may be largely ethical in content, and be interpreted as an aspect 
of ‘the Word’; indeed, they are thought by some to be capable of displacing 
the numinous, or the functions of the numinous.  But to allow that this has 
happened or could happen, is to deny the relational aspect and be left only 
with an ethical understanding, and therefore a lesser arrangement than once 
existed. However, within such an understanding could lurk an aspect of the 
numinous not recognized as such, in waiting, as it were, for revelation. 
In this chapter, we shall examine in what way covenants, and particularly the 
one or ones to which Jesus referred, are foundational: foundational to belief, 
but also perhaps foundational to an understanding of the predicament of 
humanity.  
 
The Everlasting Covenant and the New Covenant 
Let us put the various covenants in perspective. There are a number of them 
referred to in the Old Testament: those of Noah [Gen. 9:16], Abraham 
[Gen.15:18-21], at Sinai [Ex.24:8], with the royal house [2 Sam. 7:12], and the 
new Covenant anticipated by Jeremiah [Jer. 31:34]. Gottwald, in his seminal 
study on the sociology of the religion of liberated Israel, has analysed 
Theophanic and Covenant Texts, as sources for Covenant in pre-monarchic 
Israel. The analysis is intended to show the kind of relations that existed 
                                                 
767 Brueggemann, 1999, p.34. 
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between Yahweh and Israel in early times. Note that the occasion of 
Covenant may be marked by animal sacrifice768. 
Margaret Barker, in her work on the relationship of Jesus’s message to the 
theology of the First Temple769, has given close attention to these various 
covenants. She notes that ‘new covenant for the remission of sins’, so often 
assumed to be key within Christianity, is a term probably patched together; 
the words ‘new covenant’ are only ‘securely’ found at 1 Corinthians 11:25770, 
and not so found in the early-dated manuscripts of the gospels. The words at 
Matthew 26:28, “this is my blood of the covenant, poured out for many for 
the forgiveness of sins” may be a redaction, as they appear first in the third 
                                                 
768 Gottwald, 1979, p.57: 
 
Exodus 19:3-8 Israel, through Moses’ mediation, agrees to a covenant 
with Yahweh in which it accepts his sovereignty and 
agrees to do what he commands. 
Exodus 24: 1-2, 9-11 Moses, the Levitical leaders, and seventy elders of Israel 
‘behold’ God on the mountain and eat and drink in his 
presence (a covenant meal?). 
Exodus 24:3-8 Moses and young men of Israel officiate at a sacrifice in 
which people covenant to obey the commands of Yahweh 
as written in ‘the book of the covenant’ (the Covenant 
Code of Exodus 20:24-23:19) and announce in his “words” 
(the Decalogue of Exodus 20:1-17). 
Exodus 34:2-3, 5-10, 27-28 Yahweh declaims his sovereignty over Israel to Moses and 
announces his covenant “in accordance with these words” 
(the Decalogue of Exodus 34:11-26). 
Deuteronomy 26:16-19 A two-sided covenant formula is given in which Israel 
declares Yahweh is its God and Yahweh declares that 
Israel is his people.  
Joshua 24  At Shechem, Joshua receives converts to Yahwism in a 
covenant act in which the alternative choices of Yahweh, 
or the old gods of Canaan are offered to the assembled 
peoples. 
 
769 Barker, 2004, Chapter 2. 
770 Though these words are also used at Hebrews 9:15. It seems clear that this recounts the 
announcement of a new covenant. In Hebrews 9, the words ‘remission of sins’ are not used 
in relationship to covenant, but it does say that Christ died to ‘abolish sin’ (9:26), so the self-
gift and sacrifice are perhaps tied together with  the ‘new covenant’ mentioned in 1 Cor. 
11:25. 
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century.771 She believes that the Covenant Jesus refers to, ‘for the remission 
of sins’ is not a new covenant, but a long-existing one. She also believes that 
the reference is not so much to the covenants with Noah and Abraham, or 
that at Sinai772, or that with the royal house, but that mentioned at Jeremiah 
31:31-34, which is the only one which refers to the remission of sins.  
Jeremiah’s covenant is described as ‘everlasting or ‘eternal’773, a word which 
can also carry the meaning ‘hidden’.  Yet, on the face of it, the situation 
Jeremiah looks forward to is not hidden at all, because universal knowledge 
of God is involved, and the law will be “written on the hearts” of Israel774. 
Perhaps what is intended is that it is God’s law that will occupy the hidden 
places of their hearts rather than the unworthy instincts which people 
generally secrete there, and because this is the case, God will have no need to 
hold their wrongdoing against them or remember their sin.775 The covenant 
is of course set in the future, so what God is saying is that when people have 
begun to live in this way, then this new covenant will apply. It is hidden for 
the time being, until that new state emerges. 
But Barker goes on to assert that “in the world of the Temple, the hidden, 
secret place was the eternal state outside time”776.  This seems speculative. 
The evidence presented is only in the form of understandings of the 
conceptual understructure of Hebrew and biblical quotations which seem to 
this author to have been selected somewhat opportunistically. Nevertheless, 
the idea is an interesting one.  
                                                 
771 Barker refers to ‘earlier texts’ without being specific as to which ones exactly she has in 
mind.  
772 Gottwald states that “Israelite tradition identifies Moses as the one who first brought Israel 
into covenant with Yahweh, as opposed to the anticipatory covenants made with individual 
ancestors Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. ‘Covenant’ is an awkward and somewhat misleading 
term for the Hebrew berith, which refers to a formal, solemn, and binding agreement between 
parties in which there are obligations to do certain acts, or to refrain from doing them, and 
there are promises or threats of consequences that follow fulfilment or breach of the 
obligations” Gottwald, 2009, p.115.  It is not clear why the covenant with Israel should be 
accorded a status eclipsing that of the earlier covenants with Israel’s ancestors. Though the 
importance of the covenant on Sinai is very great for the nascent nation, there is nothing 
about this covenant to indicate that earlier covenants were revoked or superseded. The 
material in them might continue to be important and additional to that of the Sinai covenant. 
773 Berit ‘olam in Hebrew. 
774 Jeremiah 31:33 
775 Jeremiah 31:34. 
776 Barker, 2004, p.34. 
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Numbers 25:11-13 (in an episode about Moses) refers to a covenant ‘for all 
time’777, or ‘everlasting’ according to various translations of the Bible.  
Barker says ‘eternal’778, but the dimension of timelessness inherent in this 
choice of word does not seem to be warranted in this case. The word used in 
Hebrew [‘olam] often translated ‘everlasting’ or, more literally, ‘age-long’ 
does not seem in most of its applications to have the sense of timelessness, 
but more of being good for the whole of the remainder of human history; 
perhaps for human history after a particular threshold has been passed. We 
are hampered in our understanding here by the absence of a developed 
future tense in Hebrew. However, God is also referred to as ‘olam, and this 
usage is sometimes translated as ‘eternal’. The Hebrew word used, therefore, 
is not a conclusive guide. All we can say for certain is that within its original 
context, the usage refers to something outside current awarenesses of time, 
but not necessarily outside human history.  
We must also consider the term ‘eternal’ and its ramifications for the past. As 
a covenant is a contract between willing parties, it is really more or less 
impossible to conceive of it as predating a rational form of life. Therefore, for 
us,  the usage ‘for eternity’ seems wrong for this reason too. The covenant 
must be a part of human history, and must therefore have a start date, within 
time. What then, might a covenant be that is hidden, bearing in mind that the 
etymology of ‘hidden’ in Hebrew apparently has some sort of overlap with 
‘eternal’?779  Is there something about being trapped in time (which humans 
are), that means that things which already exist in the world outside time, or 
perhaps before humanity came to exist, are simply not apparent? Is religious 
Gnosticism involved in any presumed answer to this conundrum, because if 
it is, then a charge of Gnosticism may be unavoidable for Enoch, or indeed for 
Barker. However, within this uncertain morass, the idea of a time to come, 
                                                 
777 New English Bible. 
778 Though she does enlarge on the ambiguity world of the term, and refers to its additional 
meaning of ‘hidden’.  
779 Barker writes about ‘hidden’ and ‘eternal’ at length. I do not think it would be unfair to 
say that she just ‘has a hunch’ about a connection between the two, but it is impossible to 
describe in precise terms Barker, 2002, Ch.2. 
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rather than a speculation on the remote past, seems a more tempting 
solution and more likely to have attracted Jeremiah’s mind.  
This idea of the hidden nature of God’s rationality is something 
Brueggemann also refers to, in connection with the wisdom literature. God’s 
reasoning, which gives rise to the terms of covenant is not obvious or easily 
guessed by humans. The world, says Brueggemann, refuses to be decoded, 
and for that reason ethical decisions are “endlessly provisional and open to 
reformulation”.780  The word ‘endlessly” might be questioned, bearing in 
mind what Jeremiah forecasts. For that reason, one could argue that ethics 
cannot for the present take the place of the calls of religion and particularly of 
prophecy, because ethics on their own lack any link to what is decisive but 
also hidden; hidden, one might add, until new conditions are written on 
people’s hearts. If that time were to come, ethical behaviour would become 
automatic and outside reference would become largely or completely 
unnecessary. 
 
Girard and the Context of Covenant:  Original Sin and Original 
Blessing 
This may aid a consideration of the relationship of thinking about the 
Covenant to Girard’s scheme. Let us begin with the remote past. He identifies 
the satanic tendency to mimetic behaviour781  and the victimage process as 
something that occurred during ‘hominization’. In other words, it is as old as 
the species. Some recent thinkers782 have said that essential traits of it can be 
traced in animals, which means that it may be older than the species, at least 
                                                 
780 Brueggemann, 2002, p.234-5. 
781 See p. 91, also p.327ff and Ch. 20 of this thesis. 
782 Including several speakers including David Barash and David S. Wilson at the Girard 
Darwin Conference, Surviving Our Origins, Cambridge, May 2011. The papers of this 
conference are not yet available but known to be under preparation for publication shortly by 
Prof. Paul Gifford of St Andrew’s University. 
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in part. Therefore, there can have been no ‘unfallen’ human state before the 
mimetic tendency exerted itself, as Coakley has observed783.  
If the fall and hominization are contemporaneous, then innocence was the 
state of pre-humans or anthropoids. The problem here is that we are 
imposing theological categories onto what, for Girard, is an anthropological 
argument. The crucial point here is the idea of an event: a sharp separation 
from the divine state, whether that is spoken of as a matter of the 
development of species (‘hominization’), or as a feature of entering time. In 
either case, one might use the vocabulary of the fall and ‘original sin’.  At this 
point, one might observe that there is a broad compatibility with Barker’s 
interpretation: that is, the everlasting covenant is predicated on an 
inaccessible previous way of understanding the world.  
James Alison argues that “original sin is known in its ecclesial 
overcoming”784, that is, he finds the reality of original sin delineated through 
‘ecclesial hypostasis’ – what we are becoming through ecclesial life. This 
sophisticated argument from cure to the original problematic state is 
essentially Girardian, because of its dependence on the hidden nature of 
mimetic traits. According to Alison, it is the achievement of Christian 
thinking to reveal what was previously hidden.  
Steinmair-Posel, drawing on the work of Peter Sloterdijk, Raymund 
Schwager and James Alison, also takes up the idea of original sin, and 
comments as follows: 
 
“Recently the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk called the concept of 
conflictual mimesis the “scientific version of the doctrine of original sin.” 
Symbolically the scene of origin is described by the story of the Fall of Adam 
and Eve in paradise. This story tells us about the serpent, which is 
traditionally identified as a satanic figure and which Schwager interprets as 
a symbol for conflictive mimesis. 
This serpent fallaciously distorts God’s words and thus presents God as a 
                                                 
783 Coakley, 2009. 
784 Alison, 1998, Chapter 6, p.162ff. 
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rival to the human beings. The serpent insinuates that God withholds 
something from humankind so that they may not be like God.”785 
 
“On the basis of the insights of mimetic theory, Raymund Schwager and 
James Alison have tried to show how the original perversion and distortion 
of the experience of the divine could have happened historically. Both 
theologians have drawn up a scenario for this original perversion. Schwager 
imagines that the anthropoids, who had just attained the capacity for self-
transcendence, culpably remained behind their newly bestowed 
possibilities, that is, that they failed to use them adequately”.786 
 
Schwager is of course interpreting the Fall and the story of Adam and Eve in 
Girardian terms. However, this seems to run into difficulties when he begins 
to imagine this in a realist way, as an event involving anthropoids. The 
explanation then seems uncharacteristically speculative, and frankly, a 
rather lame account of the evolutionary failure of pre-human anthropoids.  It 
may well be that they failed to imagine the mind of God, but the idea that 
they should have done this, as Schwager suggests,  is rather odd, as is the 
notion that they are (in God’s judgement presumably) to blame for the 
failing. This seems like a blind alley for any sort of discussion, as there is no 
source or evidence of any kind to latch on to, and Schwager does not venture 
into social science or archaeology-anthropology to support his suggestion. 
Barker, though, is careful to build upon the source material available. She 
finds further evidence for her scheme in the book of Enoch, which, as she 
observes, traces the fall of man to interaction with fallen angels. They taught 
people the ways of evil, and inculcated them into those ways. This resulted in 
                                                 
785Steinmair-Posel, Petra:  Original Sin, Grace and Positive Mimesis, published as part of Project 
Muse at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contagion/v014/14.1steinmair.pdf p.7 (accessed 
3.10.11). The following reference is given for the quotations from Schwager: Raymund 
Schwager, “Rückblick auf das Symposium,” in Dramatische Erlösungslehre: Ein Symposium, 
Innsbrucker Theologische Studien 38, ed. J. Niewiadomski and W. Palaver 
(Innsbruck, Austria: Tyrolia, 1992), 357; also Palaver, René Girards mimetische Theorie, 
284. Steinmair-Posel is drawing upon Schwager (2006). 
786 Ibid., p.8. 
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the eternal covenant being broken. Isaiah refers to something apparently 
similar: angels who rebelled: 
“Sons I have reared and brought up 
But they have rebelled against me 
Ah, sinful nation, 
A people laden with iniquity 
Offspring of evildoers, 
Sons who deal corruptly! 
They have forsaken the LORD, 
They have despised the Holy One of Israel, 
They are utterly estranged.”787 
 
We have already noted that Barker, in discussing the significance of 
covenant, comments that within this subject, theologically what is hidden, is 
eternal788. This is based on the definition in a Hebrew dictionary. Her 
argument here is that elements of the physical world, with the exception of 
humans and sea-creatures, are never of wholly divine origin, though ‘hidden 
things’ may be. She cites the Hebrew word bara’, and its usage in support of 
her analysis. 789.   
Barker delves into Hebrew to find a link between bara’, which refers only to 
divine activity and means create or separate, and berith, meaning covenant, 
with root meaning ‘bind’. The importance of this link is that creation and 
covenant both involve promoting order by imposing limitations (binding). 
This terminology has possibly leaked through into some early Christian 
expression: “I bind unto myself this day the strong name of the Trinity”.790 In 
the Hebrew, this motif of binding extended through many understandings of 
order, including that of kings and rulers: “The LORD and his Messiah must 
have maintained both the natural and the social order by bonds and 
weavings and this was the eternal covenant”.  (My emphasis).  
                                                 
787 Isaiah 1:2, 4 as quoted by Barker 
788 Barker, 2004, p.33ff. 
789 Barker, 2004, p.42-43. 
790 Opening lines of hymn by St Patrick, of Roman British origin but active in Ireland, 372-
466, church of Scotland, Church Hymnary 4, No. 639. 
18   Covenant, Lament & Thanksgiving 
 
301 
 
Though Girard does not particularly pick upon the term ‘binding’, it is not at 
all difficult to interpolate it into his discourse: humans are bound to a nature 
which involves desire, imitation and rivalry; humans are also bound to God 
through Jesus in a commitment to recognise and disempower this bond. 
Similarly, unbinding can be involved: unbinding of the inclination to rivalry 
and violence, and unbinding of the relationship to God and the injunction 
involved in it.  
When God was unbound from Israel, God’s protection of Israel was 
withdrawn, and chaos loomed. When it was realised that this is what had 
occurred, there was an urgent need to mend the relationship.  
 
The Remedy: Sacrifice 
This idea of disruption of relationship and breach of covenant is pursued by 
Barker in relationship to the ‘priestly covenant’.  The priests were the ones 
who had the ability to make amends to God. Barker gives an extreme 
example of this, from Numbers 25, in which the high priest Phineas killed a 
couple (a man of Israel and a woman of Midian), whose mixed marriage 
outraged the Covenant and brought a plague on Israel as a consequence. The 
execution carried out by Phineas was enough to protect and restore the 
Covenant. Barker translates Num. 25;12-13: 
(the LORD gave to Phineas and his descendants) “ my covenant of 
shalom...the covenant of the priesthood of eternity (or the covenant of 
eternal priesthood) because he...made atonement for the people of Israel”. 
However, once again the use of ‘eternity’ is questionable, and other 
translations stress permanence or ‘for all time’791, and not an appointment 
that is timeless. However, this is perhaps a minor point here. More important 
is Barker’s opinion that a dimension has been lost because of the redactions 
of the Deuteronomists, which have so greatly shaped the Old Testament to 
the form in which we have inherited it, and have “no creation theology, no 
                                                 
791 There is a degree of consensus on this form of words in various translations: for instance, 
GNB and NEB. 
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place for atonement, no place for the anointed kings of the house of David, no 
place for prophets except insofar as they agreed with Moses, and no place for 
the wisdom tradition.”792 
Barker’s point is that priestly theology united past, present and future, in 
other words what is hidden and what is apparent in the world, and, using the 
word in what seems to be Barker’s particular sense of it (which we have 
criticised), ‘eternal’.  As has been stated previously, Barker’s argument is 
selective and often lacks conclusive evidence, and one either accepts it with 
its limitations as a helpful insight, or not.  
Here, it seems helpful. Priestly theology has the key to what the 
Deuteronomists locked away (the ‘bonds and weavings’ which tie together 
the Word and the worldly order), and it is the obfuscation of this involved in 
the Second Temple tradition which Jesus referred to at Matthew 23:29-36: 
the Pharisees and lawyers had locked up and suppressed something vital to 
true understanding of the world and of God. Again, an understanding of 
Jeremiah’s vision of the covenant at Jeremiah 31:31-34 as a future event 
helps to put this activity of the Pharisees as perpetuating an undesirable but 
essentially temporary state. 
The means of making good the relationship is sacrifice. Phineas sacrificed the 
couple who had broken the terms of the covenant; W. Robertson Smith 
considered that the Hebrew term herem (normal meaning devote or 
destroy793) included the execution of criminals in sacrificial form.794 So, 
sacrifice in these early examples included an element of setting the house in 
order, and offering the cause of the outrage of the covenant to God as a way 
of dissociating the community from them.  
Up to this point, the arguments described are largely those of Margaret 
Barker, interfaced from time to time with those of Girard. Of course, Barker 
is thought by many to go too far in the assembly of arguments which we have 
                                                 
792 Barker, 2004, p.35. 
793 Including ‘devotion to destruction’ in Joshua 7:12. 
794 Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, 3rd edn., 1977, pp370-371, note 4, quotes in Gottwald, 
1979, p.775, note 475. 
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heard of into a comprehensive scheme.  At best, the evidence to support her 
claims is incomplete, and there is much induction and some speculation 
involved in them. She is also somewhat inclined to translate the Hebrew in a 
way which other scholars would judge idiosyncratic. However, her thinking 
has several aspects which help illuminate the issues that concern us here.  
 
 
Atonement and Covenant 
However, in instances like the ones mentioned, the community is not truly 
atoning for the crime, merely identifying, or perhaps even scapegoating, the 
perpetrators and making them pay the price (that is, unless they see the light 
and reject this form of mimesis in favour of imitating God). Girard would say 
this is a classic operation of the victimage mechanism.  
Later forms of sacrifice include another element, not necessarily present in 
the early form: a self-impoverishment, in which the repentant person (or 
community) gives of their wealth to God. The reasons lying behind this are 
much disputed, but the suggestion made here is that this is a gesture of 
negative assertion of self. The person(s) making the sacrifice are not looking 
to promote their own material interests at this point, or at least not trying to 
do so by any direct means, but are depleting themselves as a sign of their 
submission to God and of their acceptance of his understanding of what is 
good and right and desirable, rather than their own. This is a pivotal point in 
which lies a criticism of both Girard and Brueggemann; of Girard, in that he 
gives insufficient weight to this process in his study of desire and its hold on 
humanity; and of Brueggemann, in that he does not see Israel’s assertion of 
its covenantal rights against God in the Psalms of Lament as basically alien to 
the underlying, sacrificial, spirit of the Covenant. 
 
18   Covenant, Lament & Thanksgiving 
 
304 
 
  
The Covenant as ‘Othering’ 
In a study which relates the developing relationship of infant and mother, in 
which the child is progressively equipped to carry its own identity, 
Brueggemann suggests that covenant is analogical to this situation, and 
derived from it: 
“I suggest that ‘othering’ with God and with neighbour is derivative from 
and informed by this primal othering with mother.”795 
“One can see the riskiness of this two-fold act of asserting and yielding when 
a child in the same instant is both angry with mother, so angry that he wants 
to assault her, and yet desperately wants to be embraced by her. He wants 
omnipotence over her, and yet wills to cede his life over to her in order to be 
safe and affirmed. This tricky relation is, as any of us can attest, one that 
admits of no final closure or settlement, but is the endless work of 
humanness.”796 
Brueggemann supports this with references to Psalms 22 & 27, and goes on 
to suggest that a good relationship with God may depend on having learned 
‘to other well with mother’. People who have not got this background, affect 
the church by othering “excessive conformity or excessive preoccupation – 
either way, operating as false selves.”797 He goes on, “if it turns out that 
mother or father abandon, in demand or in indulgence, we wait yet to be 
taken up by this God who can complete the unfinished work of valorizing us 
as genuine selves.” He understands the Psalter as a dialectic of self-assertion 
as complaint and self-abandonment in praise.”798 
 
 
 
                                                 
795 Brueggemann, 1999, p.5. 
796 Ibid. 
797 Ibid, p.6. 
798 Ibid, p.7. 
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Lament and Its Relationship to Covenant 
We have already observed that Covenant is a contract, with rights and 
responsibilities apportioned to the parties. That is the factual state of affairs, 
but, as we have also seen, it is subject to the spirit and purpose of the 
Covenant, and there may be a tension between the two. Nevertheless, let us 
now look at the remedies open to a people aggrieved by apparent breaches 
of their rights under the covenant. 
This is almost entirely an Old Testament area, and relates to security and 
well-being. The idea of people having legitimate expectations of God, and a 
right of complaint when disappointed in such expectations, has tended to be 
minimised in Christianity. Instead, thanksgiving is the normal mode of 
address to God, even in times of adversity. It is therefore the case that any 
idea of ‘covenant as contract’ is weakened by this being the predominant 
approach.  
Walter Brueggemann, in a study of the psalms of lament799, has commented 
on them as displaying an element missing from contemporary worship now 
that those psalms have fallen out of use. His angle of approach here is not 
that these psalms are obsolete, but that they still have potential utility, but 
tend to be ignored. 
In the social construction of reality (an anti-realist understanding), 
Brueggemann considers, the Psalms of Lament put God at risk.800 They resist 
a theological monopoly, through giving the second party to the covenant (the 
petitioners) a voice additional to that of praise and doxology. That additional 
voice insists that things are not right as they are, that things may be changed, 
that continuation of the present situation is not acceptable, and that it is 
God’s role and obligation to change things. The underlying principle is that 
                                                 
799 Brueggemann, 1986. However, note the reservations of Palaver (following Canetti) in his 
essay on lament. Palaver considers religions of lament to be dangerous. This might be said to 
be a Girardian insight which is corrective of Brueggemann’s enthusiastic approach. Palaver 
(unpub.). 
800 Brueggemann, 1986, p.59. 
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justice is required in God’s dealings with his people, and that God is 
accountable under the covenant, just as people are.  
In a situation where the lament is absent (through the form having fallen out 
of use), justice questions cannot be asked of God and may become “invisible 
and illegitimate. Instead we learn to settle for questions on ‘meaning’ and 
reduce the issues to resolutions of love”.801 
Brueggemann extends his argument to suggesting that silencing aspects of 
justice in the dialogue with God deteriorates the relationship and runs the 
risk of reducing him to a “dead cipher who cannot be addressed and is only 
the silent guarantor of the status quo.” He contrasts this with the alternative: 
God as the transformer of what has not yet appeared, who is vulnerable and 
whose omnipotence is reshaped by pathos. 
Drawing upon the work of Westermann802, he comments on how the 
situation or attitude of the speaker is transformed, lament is resolved by and 
corresponds to thanksgiving, and thanksgiving is ultimately transformed to 
praise. (The point of this is that thanksgiving is fettered and corresponds to 
benefits received, whereas praise is free of such ties). 
 
Lament, Thanksgiving and Sacrifice 
However, when we offer up this template of lament to Old Testament, as well 
as to New Testament understandings of sacrifice, discrepancies emerge. 
1. The first is that lament involves self-assertion, and the idea that the 
deal involved in the Covenant is deliverable in terms of wealth, or 
conditions of well-being received. That in turn depends upon the 
assumption that the criteria for good outcomes are something which 
people, and not just God, can ascertain. There is therefore, a certain 
vanity in the idea of complaint, of which God might be imagined to be 
critical, as he was in relation to the complaints of Job.  
                                                 
801 Ibid., p.64 
802 Westermann, 1981. 
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2. Self-assertion is also alien to the spirit of sacrifice, which involves 
engagement through self-depletion, in other words, giving up 
resources. Lament is a claim on resources and benefits not received. 
3. Within Christianity, the self-depletion involved in sacrifice is 
extended to seeking benefits for others rather than for the self. The 
gift of self for others who are hostile, not merely others who are 
friends or kin, involves a similar inversion of the idea of lament, 
which becomes not a complaint about benefits not received by the 
subject, but an intercession on the part of others who are perceived as 
being unfortunate or standing in need. 
Therefore, one might say that the converse of lament is sacrifice, not 
thanksgiving as is often supposed. Indeed, as Brueggemann comments, 
thanksgiving is the counterpart to lament, marking the point at which lament 
is called off because the reasons for complaint have been cancelled.  He 
credits Westermann with this thinking: 
“the lament is resolved by and corresponds to the song of thanksgiving. 
Indeed, the song of thanksgiving is in fact the lament restated after the crisis 
has been dealt with.”803  
Therefore, thanksgiving is a calculated response, proportionate to benefits 
received804 or promises made good. However, its near-synonym in worship, 
praise, is an unfettered response, not conditional on such things, and even 
delivered in circumstances which might, if a different view were taken, give 
cause for lament. Therefore, Christian thanksgiving is perhaps normally 
more accurately described as praise. It is a prayer expressing hope, no 
matter what the facts of the present situation. This reflects the belief that the 
kingdom of God is already here, amongst us.805 
                                                 
803 Brueggemann, 1986, p.57. 
804 Such as that seen in Joshua 24: the people make their covenant with God because he has 
delivered them from Egypt safely.   
805 Luke 11:20  “...if it is by the finger of God that I drive out the devils, then be sure that the 
kingdom of God has already come upon you.” 
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Thus, ‘the kingdom of heaven’ is promoted not only as an element of the 
future, but also as a condition already available806 ;  the knowledge of God is 
put forward as something capable of  experience during human life, similar 
to the way a father is known by his children807.  The reality and immediacy of 
God and his kingdom are a constant theme, and with the availability of the 
kingdom comes the invitation to enter it and live according to its 
standards808, and participate in its intense, mustard seed-like, growth.  The 
element of present tense in this teaching is powerful, though there is a 
cultural ambiguity here:  Aramaic has an undeveloped tense structure809, and 
it is hard to envisage how the contemporaries of Jesus might have been 
conceptually equipped by language810 to think of the Kingdom as a detached 
future event, in the way that modern westerners might.  
 
One of the oldest Christian documents known to exist is the Didache,811 a 
manual for liturgical practice. The two Didache thanksgivings each mention 
thanks for the ‘knowledge’ made known to us through Jesus. The choice of 
words is interesting, as the thanks are put forward for knowledge received: 
the broken bread of the thanksgiving meal was “scattered over the 
mountains, and was gathered together to become one”.812 This looks very 
                                                 
806 Lk 11:20. 
807 As in the Lord’s Prayer: Lk 11:2. 
808 Green et al., 1992, p.599. 
809 Blomberg, 1990, p. 75: “Inasmuch as Jesus normally taught in Aramaic, a distinction 
between past and present tenses…would seem to be somewhat irrelevant. The Semitic perfect 
tense, which regularly characterises Hebrew narrative, can at times refer to past, present, or 
even future action.” 
810 My point here follows the thinking of Wittgenstein that concepts generally depend on 
language, rather than the other way round. 
811 A recent account by Draper, drawing on the work of a number of scholars from von 
Harnack in the late 19th century to van de Sandt, Milavec and Garrow in the last ten years. 
Garrow (Garrow, 2004) suggests that the Gospel of Matthew depends on the Didache, not 
the other way round. Draper suggests a date in the “mid-first century”. Draper, 2006. 
812 A thanksgiving from the Didache: 
THE THANKSGIVING SACRAMENT   
1) Now concerning the Thanksgiving meal, give thanks in this manner.  
2) First, concerning the cup: We thank You, our Father, For the Holy Vine of David 
Your servant, Whom You made known to us through Your Servant Jesus; May the 
glory be Yours forever.  
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much like a metaphor for knowledge, which Jesus has reassembled from 
fragments. In other words, Jesus has reassembled key pieces of knowledge 
into a new entity. 
The communion was, therefore, in the view of these earliest Christians, a 
spiritual meal centred around wisdom regained from fragments813, the 
“broken bread scattered over the mountains...gathered together to become 
one”. This is not a point Barker makes, but it is suggested here that it is 
consistent with her insights, and, as we shall see, is also aligned with what 
Girard would recognize as the positive mimetic elements of the Christian 
revelation. 
 
Covenant, Logos  and Trinity 
It is of course a central Christian tenet that the Word is identical with the 
second person of the Trinity (“the Word became flesh and dwelt among 
us”814).  
Brueggemann, too, picks up on this point. Writing about Wisdom literature, 
he states: 
“Much in wisdom instruction is prudential, but alongside the pragmatic is a 
directly theological strand that is especially visible in Proverbs 8:22-31. In 
this poem ‘wisdom’ speaks as a person (a woman!) and is said to be God’s 
primal companion in the process of creation. This remarkable teaching has 
long been important in theological reflection. In Christian tradition the 
                                                                                                                                     
3) Concerning the broken bread: We thank You, our Father, For the life and 
knowledge Which You made known to us through Your Servant Jesus; May the glory 
be Yours forever. As this broken bread was scattered over the mountains, and was 
gathered together to become one, So let Your Church be gathered together From the 
ends of the earth into Your kingdom; for the glory and power are Yours through 
Jesus Christ forever. 
5) But let no one eat or drink of your Thanksgiving, unless they have been baptized 
in the Name of the Lord; for concerning this the Lord said, "Do not give what is holy 
to dogs."  
 
813 The central focus of the early Christians on the knowledge of Jesus is considered at length 
in Milavec (2003). 
814 John 1:14. 
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theme of Proverbs 8 appears to be taken up in John 1:1-18 as the ‘logos of 
creation’, that is, the hidden but decisive rationality of God’s creation that in 
Christian confession is embodied in Jesus of Nazareth.”815 
Brueggemann is here focussing on the second person of the Trinity as the 
identity of the ‘logos of creation’. Here, he does not go on to say that the third 
person is the means by which this is freely available in the world, but in 
another place he speaks of spirit as ‘force’: 
“the irresistible force of God’s presence and will in the world”.816 
Covenant stands in relation to these two entities. We have already 
commented that Covenant is an aspect of the Word. In fact you could say that 
the Word defines the Covenant, and the Covenant gives access to important 
aspects of the Word. The Covenant is an event which occurs in the process of 
finding meaning (that is, logos), and it is broken when the link is lost, or 
perverted – for instance, when knowledge is abused. This may be caused by 
pursuing a false Logos, reflecting the knowledge of those “skilled in doing 
evil”817. However, this false Logos is not named, but perhaps subsumed in the 
general category of ‘the devil and all his works’. 
 
The Logos of Heraclitus and the Logos of John 
In Things Hidden, Girard pursues the idea of the Logos, or Word, and finds 
that it has more than one identity, and finds a name for the alternative to the 
Logos of God: the Logos of Heraclitus, which he draws from the thinking of 
Heidegger. 
 “Because in the Greek translation of the Old Testament (Septuagint) logos 
signifies the word, and what is more, the ‘word’ is the definite meaning of 
command and commandment; hoi deca logoi are the ten commandments of 
                                                 
815 Brueggemann, 2002, p.234. 
816 Brueggemann, 2002, p.200. 
817 Jeremiah 4:22. 
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God (decalogue). Thus logos signifies keryx, the angelos, the herald, the 
messenger who hands down commands and commandments.”818 
“Heidegger...defines the Heraclitean Logos – as the violence of the sacred, 
which keeps doubles in relative harmony and prevents them from 
destroying one another. By contrast he is blind to the reality of the 
Johannine Logos. What stops him from analysing this side successfully is his 
concern to introduce violence not only into the Greek Logos – where it really 
has a place – but also into the Johannine Logos, which is thus represented as 
being the expression of a needlessly cruel and tyrannical deity.” 
Heidegger obviously means there to be a difference between the violence of 
the Greek Logos and the violence he attributes to the Johannine Logos. He 
sees the former as a violence committed by free men, while the second is a 
violence visited upon slaves. The Jewish Decalogue is simply an interiorized 
form of tyranny... 
The illusion that there is difference within the heart of violence is the key to 
the sacrificial way of thinking. Heidegger fails to see that any form of violent 
mastery ends up in slavery because the model-obstacle comes into play, 
dominating thought in the same way that it dominates concrete 
relationships between people.”819 
At this point, it is possible to see a close engagement between Girard’s theory 
and the problems of the Covenant relationship in the national life of Israel, as 
described in the Old Testament, as illuminated by Barker. The Covenant is a 
call to behave according to the divine pattern, to behave as God behaves; to 
depart from that pattern is also to depart from a mode of behaviour which is 
mimetic, but mimetic in a particular way – a way which is positive. The 
departure involves being taken up in another form of mimesis, which is 
negative and based in violence.  
“If the Father is as the Son describes him, the Word of the Son (as we have 
just quoted it) is indeed the Word of the Father. It is not a gratuitous 
representation; it describes the very being of the Father. It invites us to 
become like the Father, by behaving as he behaves. The Word of the father, 
                                                 
818 Heidegger, Martin, Introduction to Metaphysics, p.134, quoted at Girard, 1987, p.265 
819 Girard, 1987, pp 265-266. 
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which is identical with the Father, consists in telling mankind what the 
Father is, so that people may be able to imitate him.”820 
The two forms of mimesis are characterised as light and darkness. Light 
enables understanding, but darkness blinds and makes ignorant: 
 
“In him [the Logos] was life; 
And the life was the light of men. 
And the light shineth in the darkness, 
And the darkness comprehended it not.821 
 
Girard comments, “...this text - like the Prologue to the Gospel of John – 
establishes the relationship between God and humanity in terms of 
expulsion. The only difference is that in the story of Adam and Eve, God 
manipulates and expels mankind to secure the foundations of culture, whilst 
in the Prologue to John it is mankind who expels God.”822 (Original emphasis). 
However, there is an alternative reading. We have already noted that it is 
apparent from the general history of covenant in action that the effect of a 
covenant breach has always been to lose touch with God. This may be 
expressed as God’s departure from the scene, or God’s expulsion. In support 
of Girard, it has to be said that there is nothing in the early accounts to hint 
that when God ‘turns away his face’ that is anything but his intentional 
response, and that, of course, has been the usual interpretation of those 
texts. Indeed, Brueggemann comments that the covenant is grounded only 
on God’s resolve to be part of the relationship823, and this places the 
initiative firmly on God’s side. But if, as Girard comments, in John’s Prologue 
it is mankind which expels God, then it is possible to infer that this is what 
has been actually happening from the first. In other words, God has not so 
much changed (by absenting himself), as he has been newly interpreted as 
                                                 
820 Girard, 1987, p.269. 
821 John 1:4-5, Authorized Version. Girard’s italicisation. 
822 Girard, 1987, p.275. 
823 Brueggemann, 2002, p.37. 
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absent. Brueggemann, on the other hand, sees this situation as a role reversal 
by God: 
“The full drama is...inordinately demanding. It is demanding because in this 
two-fold drama, we (and this surprising Thou) are always changing position 
and reversing roles.”824 
Lament, viewed under this perspective, is behaviour of the primary mimetic 
kind – the kind based in violence, which begets violence. It starts from the 
desire of what is not available, and escalates this into a set of demands which 
it claims are justified by terms of contract. Its processes are basically those of 
mimetic desire, though there may be no immediate referent, but only 
reference to a personal past state of felicity. Thanksgiving (which is fettered 
to the complaint which precedes it, unlike praise which is unconditional) is 
the truce declared when the hostilities of lament are satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
824 Brueggemann, 1999, p.18. 
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What life have you, if you have not life together? 
There is no life that is not in community, 
And no community not lived in praise of GOD. 
And now you live dispersed on ribbon roads, 
And no man knows or cares who is his neighbour 
Unless his neighbour makes too much disturbance 
T.S. Eliot  choruses from The Rock 
 
This chapter is about God seen as a solitary being, and as an entity 
interpreted in terms of community and inter-relationship.  The perceived 
identity and nature of God both stem from, and feed into, the models current 
in society for secular rule, depending on which way you are inclined to look 
at the situation. In Chapter 8, we considered sacral kingship, in which the 
king bears all and suffers all, and noted, with Girard, how this role in 
primitive societies is constructed around the need to transfer blame out of 
the community. In tribal societies where forms of sacral kingship have been 
investigated825, the king is held accountable for unwelcome events such as 
bad weather, crop failure, defeat in battle and epidemics, and may be killed; 
the king may be, Girard has argued, both pre-eminent and a scapegoat, or, as 
Scubla has it, a prisoner of his people and destined to undergo a violent 
death. In later society, where traces of sacral kingship remain, God may hold 
the king accountable826.  
 
Kingship in more developed societies, on the face of it, is a very different 
affair, since except in times of revolution, the person of the king is closely 
                                                 
825 From Sir James Frazer in The Golden Bough (1890) up to contemporary writers like Lucien 
Scubla, René Girard and Luc de Heusch. 
826 For instance, consider the condemnation issued by Elijah against King Ahab at 1 Kings 
21;21-22:  “The Lord says to you, ‘I will bring disaster on you. I will do away with you and 
get rid of every male in your family, young and old alike. Your family will become like the 
family of King Jeroboam son of Nabat, and like the family of King Baasha son of Ahijah, 
because you have stirred up my anger by leading Israel into sin”.  
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protected and he is unlikely to be sacrificed. On the contrary, at least in its 
archetypal, historical form,   monarchy has full rein of all forms of violence, 
and the mimetic system may be seen in operation in its most extreme form, 
unidirectionally, from the king down.  
 
However, a distinctive feature of the history of Israel is that it includes 
notable departures from the system of monarchy, and periods in which 
prophets called the king’s stewardship of the nation into question. Likewise, 
within Christian religion, the two principal forms in which the identity and 
mode of God is expressed, monarch and trinity, very much affect and are 
affected by the projects of prophecy and sacrifice. Cause and effect may be 
interlocked, but one clear outcome is a modification to the concept of God 
 
The suggestion to be investigated is that this interplay of cause and effect 
between model of God and model of secular government is useful and the 
prophetic process involved makes for a closer approach to the kingdom of 
God. To put this in another way, the mimetic systems within society may be 
transmuted from the harmful type in which desire and violence are fuelled 
by each other, into another type which has more or less the reverse effect827. 
Within this movable scenario, there are more or less favourable conditions 
for prophecy. 
 
 
Cuius regio, eius religio 
A leader, said Napoleon, is a dealer in hope. Leaders motivate their followers 
by painting them a picture of a brighter future, and showing them that it is 
possible to attain it.    
                                                 
827 Adams & Girard, 1993. 
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God is of course the archetypal and ultimate leader. For that reason, “God is 
our hope and strength”828. In traditional understandings of his nature, he has 
the ability to show the future to us, and the power to bring it to pass. God is 
the leader par excellence, who is just to his subjects, whose wisdom is 
perfect, and whose power and majesty are unsurpassed. God is a model for 
all leaders, or at least, for all leaders who have absolute power.  
It is hard for anyone who has only ever known a liberal democracy to 
imagine the extent to which an absolute monarch can define reality, and cut 
across all boundaries to exert his will and shape the future. At an extreme, a 
monarch could impose his subjectivity on his realm: he can, at a whim, scoop 
you up or cut you down, and there may have been be no appeal against it.  
Absolute kings were the prime movers, the completely free agents who 
dominated agency, or at least, agency under God. When something went 
radically wrong, and there was a defeat, or a famine, or some other calamity, 
the inference was that God had withdrawn his support from the nation 
because of their actions, which of course meant to a large extent, from the 
decisions of the king and the way he had ruled.   
 
Ideas of God’s identity, style, and his action in the world for obvious reasons 
tend to be patterned according to the experience of particular ages.  
Monarchy, absolute or otherwise, was a common human experience from the 
earliest days to which the written books of the Bible can be traced, until the 
revolutions came in the  modern era. There are of course notable exceptions 
to this, such as the Roman Republic which preceded the Empire, where the 
democratic (though not egalitarian) institutions lapsed back into monarchy; 
but nevertheless, in the broad historical sweep, the point remains. It is, 
therefore, the dominant human experience of power in history. The 
counterpart to this is a religious world-view in which, like a king, God 
                                                 
828 Psalm 46. 
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dominates agency, but absolutely829 and continuously. God reigns above830, 
he is the king of creation831.  
The experience of the modern age is of course the significant exception to 
this. Nevertheless, even now, ideas of monarchy as all-powerful have proved 
surprisingly durable and have long outlived the supersession of unlimited 
monarchy by other forms of government. Therefore, it seems likely that the 
idea of the king is rooted not only in experience or memory of that form of 
government, but from a sort of mental predisposition. The human tendency 
to adopt ego-states ranging from controlling parent (king) to child has been 
studied at great length within such psychotherapeutic disciplines as 
Transactional Analysis.832 
  
It may be imagined that such ideas cannot survive unaffected forever once 
their source has ceased to be active. Nevertheless, despite this, the concept 
continues to represent the idea of supremacy. It may, in Platonist terms, 
represent the concept of the ideal with which we are born, which is hard-
wired into human thinking-patterns. If Plato is to be followed here, then the 
idea of a superb supreme commander may be inescapable833. 
 
This situation applied in the earlier days of Israel as a settled community in 
their own land. Brueggemann comments: 
 
“Israel appropriated from its cultural context both the idea of divine 
kingship and the institution of human kingship. YHWH, the God of Israel, is 
affirmed as ‘maker of heaven and earth’ (as in Gen. 14:19), as ‘God of gods 
and Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and awesome’ (Deut.10:17), who 
                                                 
829 Cupitt, 1987, p.93. 
830 Hymn Sing praise to God who reigns above by Joachim Schutz 1640-90 United Reformed 
Church, 1991, No. 75. 
831 Hymn Praise to the Lord by Joachim Neander, dated 1680 Church of Scotland, 2005 
No.124. 
832 Stewart & Joines, 1987, Part 2. 
833 Plato’s scheme extends down to real examples. For instance, Socrates in Plato’s Apology 
is identified as the perfect example of a supreme commander. 
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presides over all earthly affairs, and in a polytheistic world, over all divine 
affairs as well. The divine kingship of YHWH, moreover, is regularly 
celebrated in the hymnic liturgies of the Jerusalem temple.”834 
 
More mundanely, kingship may also be an analogy of parental power and the 
traditional patriarchal position of the father within the family. The child’s 
perspective is that of a junior member of an organisation in which others 
hold overwhelming power, and the natural response to overwhelming power 
is awe. In its time, monarchy encouraged such responses, which reinforced 
its own position. Some would say that the Church and established religion 
rest their whole scheme on a similar model.  
 
Awe is the emotion likely to be triggered by any such pre-programmed 
reaction. And monarchy (or empire) is the setting for the definitive form of 
all the books of the Bible. As identifiable documents, it is generally agreed by 
scholars that the books of the Bible all date from the period following the 
institution of monarchy in Israel835.  The work of those Deuteronomic editors 
has left an impression or idea of a religiously unified Israel836, unswervingly 
monotheistic, as a sort of national epic.  Yahweh, according to their 
description, is in lots of ways as we are, but much more powerful. He is 
kingly in character, and the language of monarchy is used to describe him. 
However, this is not the whole story. 
 
Polytheism and the Queen of Heaven 
It has already been recounted how Yahweh was seen in the earlier Old 
Testament period as not the only god, but a god amongst gods, of whom he 
emerged as the chief and the most authentic, before eventually being 
                                                 
834 Brueggemann,2002, p.116. 
835 But some conservatives, including orthodox Jews tend to hold that the Torah was written 
by Moses. 
836 Gottwald, 1979, p.77. 
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recognized as the most effective and therefore supreme god, and then as the 
only god.837 
Amongst the other gods in the regional pantheon, and within Israel itself, 
was Asherah, otherwise known as Ashtart or (in Greek), Astarte. Her 
presence is recorded only marginally in Old Testament texts838, but 
archaeology has revealed many figurines of her in Israelite settlements839. 
Brueggemann comments that her cult was linked with Yahweh as his female 
counterpart: “Yahweh and his Asherah” according to graffiti found in the 
excavation of a ninth-century southern caravanserai840: 
 
“...the actual religious practice of ancient Israel was intensely varied and 
contested. The Old Testament as we have it is unmistakeably a highly 
partisan, one-sided presentation of ancient practice; the framers of this 
canon in their Yahwistic advocacy841 took care to exclude from the textual 
tradition what they regarded as untrue or harmful.... 
...insofar as Asherah is a goddess, attention to her (even by condemnation) 
likely indicates the incorporation of the character and functions of feminine 
divinity into the faith of Israel and perhaps into the character of YHWH. The 
classical tradition of monotheism has no doubt excluded, as much as 
possible, hints of the feminine in the character of God. The presence of 
Asherah in the Old Testament (or repressed hints of that presence) may 
indicate an awareness that a feminine dimension of the divine is absorbed 
into the character of YHWH.”842 
Polytheistic schemes tend to involve much rivalry between gods, as is amply 
demonstrated in Greek, Roman and Norse mythology. Mythology like this is, 
according to Girard843, a dramatization and demonstration of the mimetic 
process, involving stereotypes of persecution and ‘the crimes of the gods’. 
                                                 
837 Barker, 1991. 
838 Brueggemann, 2002, p.10. The subject is covered more fully in Becking, Dijkstra, Korpel 
& Vriezen, 2001, pp.17ff. 
839 Barker, 2004, p.79. 
840 Brueggemann, 2002, p.10. 
841 A reference to the Deuteronomists. 
842 Brueggemann, 2002, p.11. 
843 Girard, 1986. This point is the theme of the book.  
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The monotheism of the Gospels disposes of this, and of any question that the 
kingdom of God is divided against itself; that situation is ascribed to the 
devil, and to the works of the devil.844 In other words, it is the method of the 
devil to divide, and the process of rivalry involved is the visible 
demonstration of this. But God ‘ties up the strong man’, the mimetic process, 
by ‘being a stranger to the violence of persecution’845 and by doing so, 
renders it powerless. 
 
The nature and practice of God, then, is anti-mimetic, or, more accurately, 
reverse mimetic, but the monotheism involved is a difficult and surprisingly 
complex issue.  
 
 
Monotheism 
Monotheism, as it is now thought of in the West, is largely a philosophical 
concept coming out of Greek, not Hebrew thought. Brueggemann comments 
on this, saying that intellectual claims for the singularity of God (he seems to 
have in mind the thinking of Aquinas and his followers) are of “little interest 
for the Bible”:  
 
“The reason that such a claim, from the perspective of the Bible, is 
uninteresting and mischievous is that the Bible articulates YHWH as a fully 
functioning person marked by immense complexity and interiority that are 
characteristically excluded in conventional rational understandings of ‘the 
one true God’. The biblical question is not the number of Gods [one!], but the 
practice and character of God in an assumed world of contested 
polytheism...The Old Testament, in its final form, certainly ends up with an 
affirmation that ‘YHWH alone is God’.  This affirmation is clearest in exilic 
                                                 
844 Matthew 12:25. 
845 Girard, 1986, p.187. 
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Isaiah (43:11, 48:12). That confession made in doxological form is not an 
intellectual or rational conclusion.”846 
 
In a polytheistic world, Yahweh’s was a prophetic voice heard above a 
clamour of other voices. Initially, according to Brueggemann, he was one 
amongst others in a pantheon headed by the High God El, in the common 
religion of the region. Gradually, Yahweh emerged not only as the particular 
god of Israel, but as a unique model, quite different from others in the 
pantheon: 
 
“Israel, in its interpretive traditions, continued over time to reformulate its 
testimony about YHWH; the subordinate god of Israel began to be assigned 
greater and greater domains of governance, until YHWH was assigned, in 
Israel’s testimony, the preeminent place, occupying the role in theological 
imagination that El long held as presiding officer of the divine council.”847 
 
 Yahweh is then apparent as different, more powerful and more worthy: the 
only true god.  From that point there is an evolution to his recognition as the 
only god: 
 
“The rich metaphors of monotheism offered in the text mean that Israel 
attests to one God, but this god will not be slotted in or domesticated by 
conventional theological formulations. This monotheism is the articulation 
and enactment of a God who comes and goes, who wounds and heals, who 
judges and heals in ways that that defy all preconceived patterns. Such a 
restless God, evident in the texts of doxological monotheism, is often too 
rich and wild for institutional faith, which thrives on control and certitude. 
Institutional forms of theology thus endlessly yearn to limit, narrow and 
                                                 
846 Brueggemann, 2002, p.137. 
847 Brueggemann, 2002, p.138 See 1 Kings 22:19-23 for the idea of a divine council. 
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flatten the rich metaphorical field that this God inhabits and where this God 
is known in Israel.”848 
 
The extraordinary nature of Yahweh, therefore, lay mainly in what 
Brueggemann calls his “rich and wild” nature and his “covenantal 
exclusiveness in relation to Israel”849. The ramifications of this point are very 
interesting for us in this study. If Yahweh requires Israel to behave in one 
way (that is, be bound by a covenant), that presumably occurs in the face of 
other gods setting a different example and expressing other requirements. 
Yahweh, considered alongside other gods, is not of earlier origin, so with the 
emergence of Yahweh and an understanding of his particular requirements 
for behaviour is the memory of a previous state, in which the injunctions of 
other gods had inspired different forms of behaviour.  
 
The force of this argument is not only as historical reconstruction, but as a 
metaphor of how the memory of Israel recorded the dawn of its history.  
Ordinary human life, based on mimetic structures, was confronted by the 
emergence of a model of God which questioned those structures; yet the 
model of God was itself, apparently, one based to some extent on human 
patterns of government in which mimetic traits play a strong part. 
 
However, the other model of God, Elohim, to which we referred earlier, 
which survives in a number of key passages in the earlier books of the Old 
Testament is of interest here. The shadowy source of all ethics (Elohim) and 
the King of the Universe identified as a person (Yahweh), have, of course, 
been merged in one in Judaeo-Christian belief for thousands of years850. The 
expression of their merged state has naturally tended to be dominated by the 
                                                 
848 Brueggemann, 2002, p.139. 
849 Ibid, p.138. 
850 It is arguable that the Christian concept of the Trinity revives and resolves in part the 
Yahweh-Elohim dilemma, in that something of Elohim may be found in the Holy Spirit. 
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later form, Yahweh, because mentions of him are overwhelmingly dominant 
in the Bible.  Again, some851 would say that this is because of the 
circumstances under which the text which has come down to us has been 
edited. Indeed, the specific circumstances of the wandering life in the desert, 
which seem to have given rise to the Elohist model, are far from applicable to 
any age of settled existence.  In the eighth century BCE, the prophet Hosea 
provides an interesting insight and memory of how life was different when 
the temptations of a settled life economic self-promotion did not exist852: “I 
will make you live in tents again”. In other words, relationship with God 
cannot truly be sustained in circumstances where human institutions have 
become dominant, and tend to direct society on a route inconsistent with 
God’s preferences. 
 
The Flight from Monarchy 
Gottwald, in his study of the early development of Israel, refuses to restrict 
himself to the period in which the surviving documents originate:  
 “.. it is necessary to rebut the...contention that the history of Israel begins 
with the monarchy...the main outlines of a pre-monarchic, and in critical 
aspects and anti-monarchic, form of Israelite life conflict so fundamentally 
with the presuppositions and impulses of the monarchic traditionists that 
we cannot possibly understand them as a late fabrication. Such a body of 
traditions about old Israel make sense only as the direct product of a 
premonarchic form of and thought which carries on in the monarchy in part 
as an archaic cultural survival, in part as a religio-national norm, and in part 
as a continuing social struggle within Israel.”853 
 
If Gottwald is to be followed here, there was for centuries an alternative 
model in the minds of Israelites, as a rival to that of monarchy. This means 
                                                 
851 Including Brueggemann and Barker, who lay this charge at the door of the 
Deuteronomists. 
852 See p.140 for the quotation from Hosea 12:7-9. 
853 Gottwald, 1979, p.41-42. 
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that there must have been a tension, at least for some, between single god 
and a somewhat diffuse model of state rule, in contrast to the norm in the 
region, which was the converse.  Gottwald goes on,  
 
“Israel chose a course of decentralizing, nonstratifying, essentially 
antipolitical development in deliberate contrast and opposition to its 
immediate neighbours and in doing so was propelled to a level of eventful 
struggle and inordinate self-consciousness that have all the hallmarks of a 
striking historical consciousness.” 
 
That is, Israel defined itself and continued to do so in the historical long term 
by reference to its one-time social and governmental form, enshrined in the 
collective memory. 
The tension between the actualities of monarchy and settled life, and the 
memory of life ‘in tents’ seems to provide a fertile ground for prophecy of a 
certain kind; which is, as Brueggemann frequently asserts, subversive. 
 
Trinity 
Putting a date on the concept of the Holy Trinity is not easy, as it comes into 
the existing records as a theory in about 170854, but there are phrases in the 
gospels which imply it855, and it is widely accepted within Christianity as a 
fundamental truth:  the understanding of Jesus as to his position in relation 
to God, and of the nature of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Jesus is not only a wisdom teacher, but “he is the embodiment of the wisdom 
of God that provides the coherence and visibility of God’s creation. Thus, Paul 
                                                 
854 By Theophilus of Antioch. 
855 As in the baptismal formula in Matthew 28:19. 
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can write of Jesus as ‘the wisdom of God’ in a way that echoes the teaching of 
Proverbs 8: 22-31” 856. In other words, the theological status of Jesus is found 
by reference to existing scripture, and more or less reiterated in Christian 
texts. In subsequent philosophical reflection in the church, moreover this 
wisdom-logos theme of God’s pervasive presence in the world is articulated 
as the Second Person of the Trinity, a theological claim larger and deeper 
than simply the historical Jesus.”857 
Moreover, to borrow Hosea’s words, Jesus is a tent-dweller858. He, unlike the 
nation in general, has not lost touch with the relationship established with 
God in the desert wanderings, but remains rooted in them.  
 
The Second Person of the Trinity: Logos 
In the previous chapter, we considered the logos, the essence of God, and the 
identity of the Word with the second person of the Trinity, as a central 
Christian tenet. Wisdom, therefore, is the second person, and is 
communicated by the third person, the Holy Spirit.  
 
Brueggemann comments on wisdom literature in the Bible, as prudential, not 
merely pragmatic.859  He states, “the discernment and articulation of 
recurring patterns of behaviour and outcome permit the wisdom teachers to 
insist that God’s world is reliable, though the claim is related in experience 
not revelation.”860 He traces the configuration of the wisdom tradition 
through the simple closed statements of Proverbs and the exposure in Job of 
the weaknesses of any such attempt to codify wisdom in the face of new 
experiences; and in Ecclesiastes the tone of protest gives way to resignation. 
Jesus’ teaching, Brueggemann asserts, is a continuation of this tradition. He 
                                                 
856 Paul does this in 1 Cor. 1-2. 
857 Brueggemann, 2002, p.234. 
858 Hosea 12:9. 
859 Brueggemann, 2002, pp232-235. 
860 Ibid., p.233. 
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picks up particularly on proverbs 8:22-31, in which ‘wisdom’ speaks as a 
woman, God’s partner in creation.  
The contemporary German protestant theologian Moltmann states that  
“Creation is a Trinitarian process: God the Father creates through the Son in 
the power of the Holy Spirit...For a long time the tradition of the Western 
church stressed only the first aspect, so as to distinguish God the Creator 
from the world as his creation, and in order to emphasise his transcendence. 
By doing so, it robbed nature of its divine mystery and delivered it up to 
desacralization through secularization...What helps most here is the 
Christological act of creation through God’s Word, and the pneumatological 
understanding of creation out of God’s Spirit.”861 
He goes on to say that according to Proverbs 8:22-31, creation came about 
through something so closely related to God that it is of his person, his 
‘daughter’862 Wisdom, which might otherwise be termed God’s Spirit. 
Language struggles with this concept; Barker observes in the early history of 
Israel a different attempt to relate Wisdom to God, as his partner, wife or 
consort.863 
Creation, then, under Moltmann’s Trinitarian understanding is a co-
operative venture, in which the parties do not rival one another, but build 
upon one another’s role. The same thinking is apparent in Paul’s description 
of the individuals making up the Church in a complementary way, similar to 
the way the parts of a body complement each other to form an entire 
functioning person.864 
 
 Returning to our previous point about divine rivalry, it will immediately be 
apparent that the idea of complementarity is incompatible with the idea of 
rivalry. The whole perceived structure of divinity under Trinitarian 
                                                 
861 Moltmann, 1997, p.115. 
862 ‘Daughter’ is perhaps controversial, though Proverbs 8:22 states that God created her. 
863 Barker, 1992, p.48ff. She also investigates Wisdom as a recurring type of female goddess.  
864 1 Corinthians 12:27. 
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understanding is a counsel against rivalry, which Girard would say, comes 
out of the human mimetic tendency. 
 
 
 
The Third Person of the Trinity 
Brueggemann is quoted865 as saying that “inasmuch as God creates by word, 
by wisdom (Jer. 10:12) and by spirit (Gen. 1;12), there is a faint insinuation 
of Trinitarian dimension in the process of creation.” Moltmann comments,  
 
“If the experiences of the Holy Spirit are grasped as being a ‘rebirth’ or a 
‘being born anew’, this suggests an image for the holy spirit which was quite 
familiar in the early years of Christianity, especially in Syria, but got lost in 
the patriarchal empire of Rome: the image of the mother. If believers are 
‘born’ of the Holy Spirit, then we have to think of the Spirit as the ‘mother’ of 
believers, and in this sense as a feminine Spirit. If the Holy Spirit is the 
Comforter, as the Gospel of John understands the Paraclete to be, then she 
comforts ‘as a mother comforts’ (cf. John 14:26 with Isaiah 66:13). In this 
case the Spirit is the motherly comforter of her children. Linguistically this 
brings out the feminine form of Yahweh’s ruach in Hebrew. Spirit is 
feminine in Hebrew, neuter in Greek, and masculine in Latin and 
German.”866 
The power of language being what it is, one wonders if Greek-speaking 
believers in the earliest church were disinclined conceptually to think of the 
                                                 
865 The Trinity Guide to the Trinity, William J. La Due (ed) 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=0WvgLlSKW7oC&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&dq=bruegg
emann+trinity&source=bl&ots=q3RFS2KzZP&sig=3iCMoHvHtfKjlA_IPfuIW65tUoA&hl
=en&ei=e6mKTtP5H6i_0QXexK3ABQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved
=0CE0Q6AEwBjgK#v=onepage&q=brueggemann%20trinity&f=false Accessed 26 October 
2011. 
866 Moltmann, 1997, p.35. 
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Spirit as ‘mother’, because of the gender of the word in that language (which 
is?). 
The spirit as a force making for collective unity, defined positively in relation 
to the internal characteristics of the group, not defined over against some 
external alternative (that is a negative definition made on the basis of what 
we are not). 
“in the Spirit, God is present in us like a husband, wife or partner. He 
accompanies us and shares our suffering. The Holy Spirit does not deal with 
us in a domineering way, but tenderly and considerately – in fact, in the 
spirit of fellowship. This fellowship or community with God in the Holy 
Spirit is not merely related to persons; it is also objectively related,  for the 
presence of God in the Spirit here and now is the hopeful anticipation, and 
the beginning in history, of God’s presence in the kingdom of his glory.”867 
“Spirit is an attempt to speak about Israel’s conviction that the world is 
YHWH’s area of governance beyond human explanation or control. Old 
Testament formulation about the spirit is dynamic and has nothing of the 
Spirit as ‘The Third Person of the Trinity, a Christian formulation arrived at 
when the faith of the Bible was transposed, in the early church, into the 
substantial categories of Hellenistic philosophy.  In general, Trinitarian 
Christian theology has not resulted in a well-developed sense of the Spirit, 
perhaps precisely because the force does not lend itself to such cerebral 
articulations...In any case, the spirit is said in the Old Testament to operate 
in ways that put the decisive governance of human life well beyond human 
control or explanation.”868 
 
Put into Girardian terms, spirit as the discernible force which flows in the 
opposite direction to primary (negative) mimesis, and sets up a pattern of its 
own, which Girard and Rebecca Adams have termed ‘good mimesis’, or (in 
Adams’s case) ‘creative mimesis’. 
 
                                                 
867 Moltmann, 1997, p.90. 
868 Brueggemann, 2002, p.200. 
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The Spirit, then having come out of the Father and the Son in accepted 
Christian doctrine, does not depend on the name of the Father and Son, but 
has a life of its own in the world. In this connection, Girard quotes Matthew 
25:31-46, and comments that Jesus’s expectation that reaction to the 
anonymous poor is tantamount to a reaction to him (that is, anyone hungry 
or thirsty, a stranger or naked, sick or in prison) – depends on the Holy Spirit 
to be active in all people, because if it were not there to provoke a reaction, 
blame could not be involved.  
“Henceforth, it is not the explicit reference to Jesus that counts. Only our 
actual attitude when confronted with victims determines our relationship 
with the exigencies brought about by the revelation which can become 
effective without any mention of Christ himself.”869 
 
Proponents of this point may ascribe the world wide abandonment of 
sacrifice at the same time to the anonymous action of the Holy Spirit. Girard 
quotes John 16:12-15, referring to the jumbled collection of texts on the 
Paraclete to which it belongs as apparently “the incoherent fruit of mystical 
schizophrenia”870: 
“I still have many things to say to you, but they would be too much for you 
now. But when the Spirit of truth comes, he will lead you to the complete 
truth, since he will not be speaking as from himself, but will say only what 
he has learned; and he will tell you of the things to come. He will glorify me, 
since all he tells you will be taken from what is mine.” 
Actually, says Girard, it is our own schizophrenia which obscures its clear 
meaning. The mimetic principles and methods which we use prevent us from 
seeing the Paraclete.  
 
 
                                                 
869 Girard, 1986, p.203. 
870 Girard, 1986, p.210. 
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Trinity as a Mechanism for Prophecy 
 
Therefore, a situation arises in which the Trinity is a mechanism for resisting 
the progress of the mimetic system, and which structurally incorporates the 
contrary principle of good mimesis in itself; but at the same time, the agent 
of the virtuous process, can and does remain invisible to a proportion of 
people. 
Nevertheless, the Spirit is at work in history, and progress has been made. 
Kirwan neatly summarises Girard’s understanding of the effectiveness of the 
Paraclete, or Holy Spirit, in history: 
“The history of the West’s move away from scapegoating (such as it is), and 
of our desacralized world, which effortlessly sees through scapegoating 
processes and makes us instinctive partisans for the victim – this history is 
the product not of an Enlightenment rationality, banishing the darkness of 
religious superstition, but of the evangelical impulse itself. It is the 
Paraclete, the advocate for the defence, at work in history, informing and 
transforming culture and institutions, who has effected and continues to 
effect this stupendous change.”871 
 
 
The Lamb of God before whom the Nations will Bow 
 
Something which has a resonance of ‘good mimesis’ and of the religion of the 
period of ‘living in tents’ may be found in contemporary scholarship in 
Burton Cooper’s idea of the ‘disabled God’872.  
                                                 
871 Kirwan, 2009, p.135. 
872 Cooper, Burton 1992.  
19   Mimesis, Monarchy & Trinity 
 
331 
 
Cooper begins by questioning traditional perceptions of God’s nature which 
are built upon human experiences of earthly power, and ideas of God’s 
perfection which are derived from human notions of completeness. Cooper 
observes that in the Book of Leviticus onwards, these ideas have taken hold 
within Judaeo-Christian religion. To be eligible for priesthood, you have to be 
unblemished873; Matthew exhorts us to be perfect, “even as your Father in 
heaven is perfect”.874 The natural reaction is to look for conformity to a 
standard, to paint God in human terms and then stress that he is complete 
and without fault. The same applies even more to Jesus, who is 
characteristically depicted in much Western art as a beautiful, elongated 
figure with a face unaccented by expression, suffering or age.  
But the lesson of Christ’s suffering, and God’s gift of Christ to suffer for 
mankind, is that God, despite his divine nature and any arguments one may 
choose to accept of his necessary ‘completeness’, has made himself subject to 
mankind to some extent.  God suffers with and for mankind, and thus is 
changed. This very different understanding, which 
“ holds that we find the meaning of divine perfection through the life and 
teaching of Jesus and that we move to perfection in our own lives through 
Christ and by relating to others as he did. Perfection, here, is not first of all, 
or ever, a matter of independence or completeness.” 
“Most human suffering arises out of human selfishness or ignorance or 
indifference or the fragile finitude of the human body and psyche. But in the 
life of Christ, we can see that God's love finds its perfect expression in 
suffering love. Again, I am not saying that all suffering is suffering-love, but 
that a life formed by love for others inevitably leads to one's own suffering, 
and this is true in Jesus' life and in the history of God.”875 
Cooper quotes Moltmann, who makes use of the image of the "crucified God" 
to express the suffering-love of God, extends this to make his own point:  
                                                 
873 Leviticus 21:16-23. 
874 Matthew 5:48. 
875 Cooper, Burton, 1992, p.176. 
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“Jesus on the cross is God disabled, made weak and vulnerable to worldly 
powers because of the perfection of divine love”.876     
This Christological understanding of God’s power is captured by Bonhoeffer:  
We turn to God when we are sorely pressed; 
And pray for help, and ask for peace and bread; 
We seek release from illness, guilt and death: 
All people do, in faith or unbelief. 
 
We turn to God when he is sorely pressed, 
And find him poor, scorned, without roof and bread, 
Bowed under weight of weakness, sin and death: 
Faith stands by God in his dark hour of grief. 
 
God turns to us when we are sorely pressed, 
And feeds our souls and bodies with his bread; 
For one and all Christ gives himself in death: 
Through his forgiveness sin will find relief.877 
 
Cooper draws the conclusion that, from a Christological perspective, “God's 
perfection, God's goodness, God's identity are so far from transcending the 
suffering of the world that they participate deeply and unavoidably in that 
very suffering.”878 
This is a radical change to the concepts of God’s power which depict him as 
king of the universe (Yahweh), and much closer to the Elohist model of the 
source of all ethics, who wrestles with man, but does not win outright879.  But 
there are also differences. It is not rooted in the memory of the founding of a 
nation, nor in a journey from bondage to freedom, though it may be 
anchored in a journey out of bondage in another sense. Certainly, it involves 
                                                 
876 Moltmann, 1974, Foreword In Explanation of the Theme, pp xvii ff. 
877 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich from Letters and Papers from Prison translated by the Compilers of 
Church Hymnary 4, Church of Scotland. 
878 Op.cit. p.177. 
879 The episode at Jabbock: Genesis 32:22-28. 
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a decoupling of God from the power structures of this world, which are built 
upon rivalry (Girard), and on a predisposition to think oneself into the 
mentality of the ‘tent-dwellers’ whose social world was distanced in nature 
from that of the settled world, and whose mentality was therefore naturally 
inclined to hear prophecy (Brueggemann). 
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We began this thesis with a statement of purpose: 
“This project has a pastoral purpose: to identify the forces for a positive 
energizing of community, freed from the destructive forces which mire the 
world in its old ways.” 
Put another way,  that means an attempt at discovering potential for 
changing the world in the work of these two authors. The ‘reclamation’ of 
which the title speaks is a creation or rediscovery of forces which can be 
applied in this way, to provide positive energising of community. It is 
important that this is not a survey of effects; we did not set out to assess the 
impact of Girard and Brueggemann, so the effectiveness of any reclamation 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis. The terms ‘prophecy’ and ‘sacrifice’ may 
have fallen into neglect and disrepute, but there is no way that this thesis can 
certify that that situation has been reversed. The most that is said is that the 
work of the two authors provides a basis for thinking about these concepts 
and acting in relation to them which is enlivened or enlivening and relevant 
to the conditions of the present day. 
Our introduction continued,  
“Such forces are not contemporary in origin; they are present in voices from 
biblical times which have often been misheard, unheard, or ignored within 
Christian ministry. The understanding of this process of re-energization is 
the project of both Brueggemann and Girard...” 
In other words, Girard and Brueggemann write with long-existing negative 
societal forces in mind, and ways of resolving those forces a part of the 
scheme they set out. This has certainly been borne out by our research. In 
the case of Girard, the “destructive forces which mire the world” are ascribed 
causally to the process which has formed mankind as it is, which have 
become established and developed invisibly, according to Girard, in every 
society and nation.  
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Sacrifice 
Sacrifice has been held to be the effective process for dealing with mimesis in 
its ‘negative’, characteristically human, dominating form; but according to 
prophetic voices, and under the regime of Jesus, sacrifice does not work 
unless accompanied by a change of heart. The action in itself is not enough. 
However, according to Schwager, sacrifice is defined by prayer880; and 
according to Brueggemann, sacrifice may amount to action pre-loaded with 
meaning, and therefore inclined to be effective. Sacrifice also needs to be 
considered together with its converse, lament, which challenges God.  
The definitions put together make an interesting composite. In Coakley’s and 
E O Wilson’s ecologically-related commentaries, sacrifice is essential for the 
survival of the world;  a situation in which intention and effect are inter-
dependent, and reflect (in Coakley’s case) an abandonment of rivalry with 
God. Taking all of these together, sacrifice is essential for the healthy future 
of the world, is defined by prayer and uses prayer to align itself with the will 
of God; and it is configured as action pre-loaded with meaning. It is therefore 
explicit in a number of ways, and is thus able to express itself in the world 
beyond the sacrificial community. 
An extra element brought to the discussion through the correspondence 
between Girard and Schwager is an openness to Lutheran thinking. Whilst it 
is true to say that Schwager’s main interest in this was focussed on the 
transfer of the burden of sin on to Jesus and his voluntary role in this881; and 
the contrary tendency in humans to transfer their sin onto victims, it is also 
true that the excursion into Lutheranism can barely avoid consideration of 
‘the priesthood of all believers’, and what this might amount to when the 
concept of sacrifice has changed and the priestly role of mediation  in the 
sacrificial role has changed with it. There is a general re-ordering of roles 
here, not only for the subject who becomes the sacrificed as well as the 
                                                 
880 Schwager, R, in Girard-Schwager correspondence 1975-1991, p.72. 
881 Girard-Schwager 1975-1991 p.122. 
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sacrificer, but also in relation to any intermediaries in the situation. We have 
already observed Brueggemann’s surprising insistence (surprising for a 
protestant, that is), that the priestly role is a necessary one in mending the 
relationship with God, which is the main purpose of sacrifice in his 
estimation. He says the individual cannot accomplish the process on her 
own, and needs the help of someone (or some people) in the role of priest. 
This brings us to a crucial point in this ‘mutually critical correlation’. How 
does it help to assemble the Girardian view that sacrifice is an effective 
process for dealing with mimesis,  with that of Brueggemann which holds 
that sacrifice is a way of mending the relationship with God?  The answer, in 
the eyes of this writer, is that negative mimesis (tied to violence and self-
interest) can only be transformed into positive mimesis (imitation of God) 
through an act of personal sacrifice. This is a point made by Coakley in 
relation to ecology and the common good. Brueggemann would add that the 
reform can only be made with assistance, a priestly role in the traditional 
sense, but modified in this writer’s eyes by a post-Reformation view on 
where the identity of the priest lies. It may often be assumed that the 
‘priesthood of all believers’ transfers that status to each believer, and that in 
that situation are contained the destructive elements of individualism and 
self-righteousness, that have so often been laid at Protestantism’s door. But 
another reading is suggested here: not that we are each of us priests, but that 
we are collectively a priest. It is not the priesthood of each believer but the 
priesthood of the people of God. Further, that some of the key failings of 
Christians over the centuries are that they were content to limit their efforts 
to live sacrificially to the individual level, but applied other criteria when 
acting in a group or expressing their expectations of a group to which they 
subscribe. The effect of that was to cancel some of the effects of positive 
(self-sacrificial) mimesis already existent at a personal level by being content 
to allow negative mimesis to apply at a group level. So, to take the example of 
what happens in wars, individuals may give all and sacrifice themselves ‘for 
their friends’, whilst nations take the gift and spend it on the destruction of 
others to whose possible identity as ‘friends’ they are blind. In such a 
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scenario, there is no priest to be found.  This effect will be found to apply in 
many walks of life with great regularity; government, commerce, even in the 
competition between charities which exist for essentially similar 
beneficiaries. 
Acting self-sacrificially as a community, says Coakley, we can save the planet 
from destruction; acting self-sacrificially as a community, it is asserted here, 
we may mend the relationship with God. However, what a revolution it 
would take in conventional appreciations of ‘success’ for this to be brought 
about. It is daunting, but perhaps no more daunting than the challenge set at 
a personal level for those who first set out to follow the ‘way’ of Jesus 2000 
years ago.  
What is meant by sacrifice here the renunciation of revenge and the practice 
of the teachings of the kingdom of God that are advocated by Girard.  
Prophecy 
The idea of prophecy as an authentic call from the ways of this world to the 
ways of truth is played out in expositions of Hebrew Bible texts, which then 
inform observations on contemporary life. This is how Brueggemann paints 
it, particularly with reference to contemporary America.  
An active sense of ‘ways of truth’ as a reality or set of realities in the world, is 
something which our two writers could agree on.  In Brueggemann’s scheme, 
the realities are multiple because everything is relative to the community, in 
which there is always the opportunity for a ‘new song’. The context of the 
community is therefore generative of reality.  In Girard’s scheme, the ‘ways 
of truth’ are multiple, because one set relates to causal influences which 
control violence through systems of myth and religion. Another set exposes 
the first set to challenge individuals and groups not to participate in a self-
deceiving process that direct violence upon victims. Girard’s work may be 
essentially prophetic in itself in drawing attention to this. The effect of the 
prophecy is consistent with the conclusions on sacrifice above: effective 
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solutions lie only with the group which is committed to the wisdom of the 
prophecy; effective sacrifice is a proper response to prophecy. 
The potential for what we might at this stage call priestly action is therefore 
distinct from, and to a degree exists in opposition to, the general, established 
world-view prevalent in the West today, the DVR.  
To Brueggemann, this observation would present not the slightest difficulty, 
because his understanding of prophecy is that it exists as an external 
perspective: the stance is outside society, but utterance is made from within 
society. Girard, too, claiming that his scheme is consistent with that of Jesus, 
sees it as a call to society to reform; further, he sees the unmasking of the 
scapegoat process and the mimetic mechanism that lies behind it as certain 
to disarm the process and the mechanism882; and as it is a feature of that 
process that it holds violence under control, the world tends to become a 
more dangerous place in the Christian era. The corrective for that situation, 
it is argued here, is for the groups, of any size up to and including the United 
Nations, to understand themselves according to positive mimesis. The 
‘priestly action’ involved becomes actualised in a prayerful commitment to 
the common good. 
Of course, attempts have been made already, some of them very notable 
ones. Methodism in the nineteenth century was very influential on public 
policy. There is no equivalent to this in the present day, though advocacy is 
widespread, from the public statements Archbishops of Canterbury to the 
collective action of the church as expressed in Christian Aid, CAFOD or 
Tearfund. Another major example is the United Nations, and the world-wide 
acceptance of its existence as a moderating influence on the mimetic violence 
of states inclined to conflict. But the existence of the UN and in fact of all 
forms of mediation is a form of medicine in human affairs. It originates 
externally to the problem area, and thus like prophecy, offers and external 
perspective. We also see, perhaps for the first time since World War 2, 
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government asking people to act self-sacrificially by not taking their legal 
entitlement to benefits.   
What is missing at present is a unifying call which ties these two phenomena 
together. The synthesized approach we sketched out earlier is a commitment 
to internal re-orientation away from the negative mimetic model. This brings 
us to the pastoral motive of this study. The two authors are each legitimately 
described as a resource for influencing contemporary attitudes, and 
therefore, available to deploy as a force for the positive energising of society. 
This is a point about sense of identity in relation to the priestly role referred 
to earlier. 
With Brueggemann, there is little difficulty in the claim, as he is applying a 
concept, and re-enlivening it, without essentially changing what it is. By his 
own admission, he is preparing the ground, fertilizing the soil with material 
favourable to new prophetic growth. Girard, on the other hand, is not really 
reclaiming anything, though he may be explaining both past and current 
usages. He is in fact making new claims, which are for universal truths borne 
out in the life and message of Jesus, which he finds illustrated in literary 
works from earlier society’s mythologies through classical to modern 
literature. There is something essentially external about his call to human 
societies, but the call to the reform of societies is not developed.  
We have also noted that Tim Gorringe883  provided an insight of profound 
importance for this study, in the application of a short phrase, “God [who] is 
only known in the journey from bondage to freedom”. This insight applies, 
we have found, to both authors in a broadly similar way; they equip their 
readers for a journey from old understandings to new. The old 
understandings, according to the arguments of both writers, amount to a 
kind of bondage, and the loosening of the bonds is the process in which 
understandings of God dawn on the consciousness. In the steady state of the 
old attitudes, God is hidden. This is explicit in Girard, when he writes of 
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Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World884, and in Brueggemann 
when he speaks of talk of God (the Bible) “redescribing reality”885.  
 
 
Outcomes of this research 
 Let us look again at the section summaries and bring their interim 
conclusions together. 
 
Part 1: Concepts and versions of reality 
Investigate ‘biblical concepts’, the ‘dominant version of reality’, and 
relate to prophecy and sacrifice.  
What is at stake here is recognizing the DVR for what it is, and 
overcoming it.  
Part 2: The fading concept of sacrifice 
Investigate the Christian concept of sacrifice and place it in its 
context; examine its effectiveness. 
For reasons to do with the DVR and the mimetic tendency which is its 
mechanism, Christian sacrifice remains confused, apparently unable to 
construct a coherent model from the components of traditional sacrifice 
of a third party and self-sacrifice.  The  historic models of the OT are 
partly problem here, partly solution, because within them lies an 
understanding of the priestly function which Brueggemann insists is the 
key to moving forward from what is otherwise an impasse.  Girard 
apparently does not notice this issue. 
Part3: Prophecy: outdated and never outdated 
Examine the meaning of prophecy, ancient and modern, its 
relationship to the dominant version of reality, and the meaning that 
might be found in it.   
                                                 
884 Girard, 1987. 
885 Brueggemann, 2008. The title of the book is “Redescribing Reality – what we do when we read 
the Bible”. 
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The prophetic element is present in contemporary society, but lacks a 
current conceptual model which supports it as having a reality and 
credibility. The link between a corrective call and the mind of God is 
hardly there. That may be because another link - that between prophecy 
and sacrifice has decayed, and needs to be regenerated. 
 
 
Outcomes: the longer term 
The process does not stop here.  Although the potential for transformation 
has been established, much remains to be done if the projects of the two 
authors are to be realised as a change in the shape of Christian witness. What 
is now needed is an extension into a new vision for prophecy-sacrifice as an 
active part of Christian life, witness and influence. These two writers have 
prepared some, but not all, of the required raw material, but what is needed 
by communities and practitioners in ministry is not only a clearly articulated, 
digestible version, but a sort of practical handbook. That is not something 
that either Brueggemann or Girard has attempted. This is not envisaged as 
yet another enthusiastically-worded manual on how to fill the church, but an 
aid to reflection on what sort of influence the people of the church can bring 
to bear on the public and commercial life they are involved in – both jointly 
and individually. The influence in question is understood in the intertwined 
terms of prophecy-sacrifice. 
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